The Great French Revolution

By PETER KROPOTKIN

Volume II

A clear picture of the role of the people in the dramatic events with which our modern world began.

The Vanguard Press

announces

A New Series

of Studies

in

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

Edited by
Harry Elmer Barnes

at

$1.00 each

THE AMERICANS IN SANTO DOMINGO. Melvin M. Knight.

THE BANKERS IN BOLIVIA. H. A. Marsh.

OUR CUBAN COLONY. L. H. Jenks.

(Continuation from Back of Jacket)

Fiction and Biography

111—**LOVE'S PILGRIMAGE.** Upton Sinclair. Two volumes. ($1.50)

112—**THE MAIN STEM.** William Edge.

113—**DAUGHTER OF THE REVOLUTION, AND OTHER STORIES.** John Reed. Introduction by Floyd Dell.

114—**AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE.** Life of Grace Scribner.

115—**LOOKING BACKWARD.** Edward Bellamy.

116—**NEWS FROM NOWHERE.** William Morris.

117—**THE JUNGLE.** Upton Sinclair.

118—**VERNEY'S JUSTICE.** Ivan Cankar. Translated by Adamic.

119—**DAN MINTURN.** M. H. Hedges.

120—**OUT OF THE PAST.** R. W. Postgate.

1927 AMERICAN LABOR YEAR BOOK. $1.50.

THE AMERICAN LABOR WHO'S WHO. $1.50.

See Back of Jacket for Other Vanguard Titles

V. P
V. P
V. P

THE GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION

1789–1793

BY

P. A. KROPOTKIN

AUTHOR OF "MUTUAL AID" ETC.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY

N. F. DRYHURST

VOLUME II

NEW YORK
VANGUARD PRESS

Copyright, London, 1909, by William Heinemann

Authorized American Edition

VANGUARD PRINTINGS

First—May, 1927

Second—May, 1929

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

CHAP.		PAGE
XXXV.	The September Days	297
XXXVI.	The Convention — The Commune — The Jacobins	309
XXXVII.	The Government—Conflicts with the Convention —The War	318
XXXVIII.	The Trial of the King	330
XXXIX.	The "Mountain" and the Gironde	340
XL.	Attempts of the Girondins to Stop the Revolution	348
XLI.	The "Anarchists"	353
XLII.	Causes of the Rising on May 31	361
XLIII.	Social Demands—State of Feeling in Paris—Lyons	370
XLIV.	The War—The Rising in La Vendée—Treachery of Dumouriez	379
XLV.	A New Rising Rendered Inevitable	391
XLVI.	The Insurrection of May 31 and June 2	399
XLVII.	The Popular Revolution—Arbitrary Taxation	407
XLVIII.	The Legislative Assembly and the Communal Lands	413
XLIX.	The Lands Restored to the Communes	421
L.	Final Abolition of the Feudal Rights	427
LI.	The National Estates	432
LII.	The Struggle Against Famine—The Maximum—Paper-Money	437
LIII.	Counter-Revolution in Brittany—Assassination of Marat	445

CHAP.		PAGE
LIV.	The Vendee — Lyons — The Risings in Southern France	453
LV.	The War—The Invasion Beaten Back	462
LVI.	The Constitution—The Revolutionary Movement	470
LVII.	The Exhaustion of the Revolutionary Spirit	478
LVIII.	The Communist Movement	484
LIX.	Schemes for the Socialisation of Land, Industries, Means of Subsistence and Exchange	493
LX.	The End of the Communist Movement	500
LXI.	The Constitution of the Central Government —Reprisals	508
LXII.	Education—The Metric System—The New Calendar—Anti-Religious Movement	518
LXIII.	The Suppression of the Sections	528
LXIV.	Struggle against the Hebertists	533
LXV.	Fall of the Hebertists—Danton Executed	542
LXVI.	Robespierre and his Group	550
LXVII.	The Terror	555
LXVIII.	The 9th Thermidor—Triumph of Reaction	562
	Conclusion	573

CHAPTER XXXV

THE SEPTEMBER DAYS

People roused to fury—Massacres at Abbaye prison—Commune tries to put an end to massacres—Massacres continue—Attitude of Girondins—Explanation of massacres—Address of Assembly to people—End of massacres

THE tocsin sounding all over Paris, the drums beating in the streets, the alarum-gun, the reports of which rang out every quarter of an hour, the songs of the volunteers setting out for the frontier, all contributed that Sunday, September 2, to rouse the anger of the people to fury.

Soon after midday, crowds began to gather around the prisons. Some priests who were being transferred from the Town Hall to the Abbaye prison, to the number of twenty-five,* in closed carriages, were assailed in the streets by the Federates from Marseilles or Avignon. Four priests were killed before they reached the prison. Two were massacred on arriving there, at the gate. The others were admitted; but just as they were being put through some simple form of interrogation, a multitude, armed with pikes, swords and sabres, forced the door of the prison and killed all the priests with the exception of Abbé Picard, head of the Deaf and Dumb Institution, and his assistant.

This was how the massacres began at the Abbaye—a prison which had a specially bad reputation in the quarter where it stood. The crowd, which had formed around this prison,

* Sixteen, says Méhée fils (Felhémési, *La vérité toute entière sur les vrais acteurs de la journée du 2 septembre, et sur plusieurs journées et nuits secrètes des anciens comités de gouvernement*, Paris, 1794). I maintain the exact orthography of the printed title. "Felhémési" is the anagram of Méhée fils.

composed chiefly of small tradespeople living in that part of the town, demanded that all the royalists arrested since August 10 should be put to death. It was known in the quarter that gold was plentiful among them, that they feasted and received their wives and friends quite freely. The prisoners had made illuminations after the defeat of the French army at Mons, and sang songs of victory after the taking of Longwy. They insulted the passers-by from behind the bars and promised the immediate arrival of the Prussians and the slaughter of the revolutionists. The whole of Paris was talking of the plots concocted in the prisons, of arms introduced, and it was widely known that the prisons had become actual manufactories of false paper-money and false drafts on the "Maison de Secours," by which they were trying to ruin the public credit.

All this was said and repeated among the crowds that gathered round the Abbaye, La Force, and the Conciergerie. Soon these crowds forced the doors and began killing the officers of the Swiss regiments, the King's guards, the priests who were to have been deported because of their refusal to take the Oath to the Constitution, and the royalist conspirators, arrested after August 10.

The spontaneity of this attack seems to have struck every one by its unexpectedness. Far from having been arranged by the Commune and Danton, as the royalist historians are pleased to declare,* the massacres were so little foreseen that the Commune had to take measures in the greatest haste to protect the Temple, and to save those who were imprisoned for debt or for arrears of payments, as well as the ladies attending on Marie-Antoinette. These ladies could only be saved under cover of the night by the commissioners of the Com-

* They quote, to prove this, that persons were liberated, between August 30 and September 2, thanks to the intervention of Danton and other revolutionary personages, and say: "You see very well how they saved their friends!" They forget, however, to say that out of the three thousand persons arrested on the 30th, more than two thousand were released. It was sufficient that any patriot of the prisoners' section should claim his release. For the part played by Danton in the September days, *see* the careful study of A. Aulard, in his *Etudes et leçons sur la Révolution française*, 1893–1897, 3rd series.

mune, who carried out their tasks with much difficulty and at the risk of perishing themselves by the hands of the crowds that surrounded the prisons, or were stationed in the neighbouring streets.*

As soon as the massacres began at the Abbaye, and it is known that they began at about half-past two A.M.,† the Commune immediately took measures to prevent them. It immediately notified them to the Assembly, which appointed Commissioners to speak to the people ; ‡ and at the sitting of the General Council of the Commune, which opened in the afternoon, Manuel, the attorney, was already, by six o'clock, giving an account of his fruitless efforts to stop the massacres. "He stated that the efforts of the National Assembly's twelve commissioners, his own, and those of his colleagues from the

* Madame de Tourzel, the Dauphin's governess, and her young daughter Pauline, three of the Queen's waiting-women, Madame de Lamballe and her waiting-woman, had been transferred from the Temple to La Force, and from this prison they were all saved, except Madame de Lamballe, by the Commissioners of the Commune. At half-past two in the night of September 2 and 3, these Commissioners, Truchot, Tallien and Guiraud, came to render an account of their efforts to the Assembly. At the prison of La Force and that of Sainte-Pélagie, they had taken out all the persons detained for debt. After reporting to the Commune, about midnight, Truchot returned to La Force, to take out all the women. "I was able to take out twenty-four," he said. "We have placed especially under our protection Mademoiselle de Tourzel and Madame Sainte-Brice. . . . For our own safety we withdrew, for they were threatening us too. We have conducted those ladies to the section of the 'Rights of Man,' to stay there until they are tried" (Buchez and Roux, xvii. p. 353). These words of Truchot are absolutely trustworthy, because as we know, by the narrative of Pauline de Tourzel, with what difficulty the commissioner of the Commune (she did not know who he was, and spoke of him as a stranger) succeeded in getting her through the streets near the prison, full of people watching to see that none of the prisoners were removed. Madame de Lamballe, too, was about to be saved by Pétion, the mayor, but some forces unknown opposed it. Emissaries of the Duke of Orléans are mentioned, who desired her death, and names even are given. However, one thing only is certain ; there were so many influential persons who, since the Diamond Necklace affair, were interested in the silence of this confidante of the Queen's, that the impossibility of saving her need not surprise us.

† *Mon agonie de trente-huit heures*, by Jourgniac de Saint-Méard.

‡ Bazire, Dussaulx, François de Neufchâteau, the famous Girondin Isnard, and Laquinio were among the number. Bazire invited Chabot, who was beloved in the faubourgs, to join them (Louis Blanc, quarto edition, ii. p. 19).

municipality, had been ineffectual to save the criminals from death." At the evening sitting the Commune received the report of its commissioners sent to La Force; and decided that they should be sent there again to calm the minds of the people.*

During the night of the 2nd and 3rd, the Commune had even ordered Santerre, commandant of the National Guard, to send detachments to stop the massacres. But the National Guard *did not wish to interfere;* otherwise, it is clear that the battalions of the moderate sections would have gone. An opinion was evidently forming in Paris that for the National Guard to march upon the crowds would have been to kindle civil war, at the very moment when the enemy was but a few days distant, and when union was most necessary. "They divide you; they disseminate hatred; they want to kindle civil war," said the Assembly in its proclamation of September 3, in which it called on the people to stand united. Under the circumstances there was no other weapon but persuasion. But to the exhortations of the Commune's envoys, who were trying to stop the massacres, a man of the people aptly replied at the Abbaye by asking Manuel, "If those rascals of Prussians and Austrians entered Paris, would *they* try to distinguish between the innocent and guilty."† And another, or

* *See* the minutes of the Commune, quoted by Buchez and Roux, xvii. p. 368. Tallien, in his report to the Assembly, which was given in later during the night, confirms the words of Manuel: "The procurator of the Commune," said he, "went first to the Abbaye and used every means suggested to him by his zeal and humanity. He could not make any impression, and saw several victims killed at his feet. He himself was in danger of his life, and they were obliged to force him away for fear that he should fall a victim to his zeal." At midnight, when the people went over to La Force, "our commissioners," says Tallien, "followed them there, but could not gain anything. Some deputations came after them, and when we left to come here, another deputation was then going thither."

† "Tell me, Mr. Citizen, if those rascals of Prussians and Austrians came to Paris, would they too seek out the guilty? Would they not strike right and left, as the Swiss did on August 10? As for me, I am no orator, I put no one to sleep, and I tell you I am a father of a family; I have a wife and five children whom I want to leave here in the keeping of the section, so that I can go and fight the enemy, but I don't intend that these scoundrels who are in prison, for whom the other scoundrels are coming to open the doors, shall be able to go and slaughter my wife and children." I quote from Felhémési (Méhée fils), *La vérité toute entière*, &c.

perhaps the same, added: "This is Montmorin's blood and his companions! We are at our post, go back to yours; *if all those whom we set up to do justice had done their duty, we should not be here.*" * This is what the people of Paris and all the revolutionists understood thoroughly that day.

In any case the Watch Committee of the Commune,† as soon as they learned the result of Manuel's mission on the afternoon of September 2, published the following appeal: "In the Name of the People. Comrades,—It is enjoined upon you to try all the prisoners in the Abbaye, without distinction, with the exception of the Abbé Lenfant, whom you shall put in a secure place. At the Hôtel de Ville, September 2. (Signed: Panis, Sergent, Administrators.)"

A provisional tribunal, composed of twelve jurors chosen by the people, was at once set up, and Usher Maillard, so well known in Paris since July 14 and October 5, 1789, was appointed president of it. A similar tribunal was improvised at La Force by two or three members of the Commune, and these two tribunals set themselves to save as many of the prisoners as was possible. Thus Maillard succeeded in saving Cazotte, who was gravely compromised,‡ and Sombreuil, known to be a declared enemy of the Revolution. Taking advantage of the presence of their daughters, Mademoiselle

* Prudhomme, in his journal, gives in these words the reply made by a man of the people, on the first visit to the Abbaye by a deputation from the Legislative Assembly and from the municipality.

† The Watch Committee of the Commune, which had taken the place of the preceding administration, and was composed at first of fifteen members of the municipal police, had been reorganised by a decree of the General Council of the Commune on August 30: it was then formed of four members, Panis, Sergent, Duplain and Sourdeuil, who, with the authorisation of the Council, and "seeing the critical state of circumstances and the divers and important works to which it was necessary to devote themselves," added on September 2 seven other members: Marat, Deforgues, Lenfant, Leclerc, Durfort, Cailly and Guermeur (Buchez and Roux, vol. xvii. pp. 405, 433; vol. xviii. pp. 186, 187). Michelet, who saw the original document, speaks only of six; he does not mention Durfort; Robespierre was sitting on the General Council, Marat took part in it "as journalist"—the Commune having decreed that a gallery should be erected in the Council Chamber for a journalist (Michelet, vol. vii. ch. iv.). Danton tried to reconcile the Commune with the executive of the Assembly; that is to say, with the Ministry of which he was a member.

‡ Michelet, vol. vii. ch. v.

Cazotte and Mademoiselle Sombreuil, who had obtained leave to share their fathers' imprisonment, and also the advanced age of Sombreuil, he succeeded in having them acquitted. Later on, in a document which Granier de Cassagnac * has reproduced in facsimile, Maillard could say with pride that in this way he saved the lives of forty-three persons. Needless to say that "the glass of blood," said to have been drunk by Mademoiselle Sombreuil to save her father, is one of the infamous inventions of the royalist writers.†

At La Force prison there were also many acquittals, and, according to Tallien, there was only one woman who perished, Madame de Lamballe. Every acquittal was hailed with cries of "*Vive la Nation!*" and the acquitted person was escorted to his residence by men of the crowd with every mark of sympathy; but his escort refused absolutely to accept money from either the man set at liberty or his family. Thus they acquitted the royalists against whom there were no established facts, as, for example, the brother of the minister Bertrand de Molleville; and even a bitter enemy of the Revolution, Weber, the Austrian, who was foster-brother to the queen; and they conducted them back in triumph, with transports of joy, to the houses of their relations or friends.

At the Carmelite Convent, priests began to be imprisoned from August 11—among them being the famous Archbishop of Arles, who was accused of having been the cause of the massacre of the patriots in that town. All of them would have been deported but for what happened on September 2. A certain number of men armed with sabres broke into the convent that day and, after a summary trial, killed the archbishop, as well as a great many of the priests who refused to take the civic oath. Several, however, saved themselves by climbing over a wall; others were saved, as is shown in the narrative of the Abbé Berthelet de Barbot, by members of the Luxembourg section, and by some pikemen who were on duty in the prison.

* *Histoire des Girondins et des massacres de Septembre*, 2 vols., 1860.

† *Vide* Louis Blanc, Book viii. ch. ii.; L. Combes, *Episodes et curiosités révolutionnaires*, 1872.

The massacres continued also on the 3rd, and in the evening the Watch Committee of the Commune sent out to the departments, in envelopes of the Ministry of Justice, a circular, drawn up by Marat, in which the Assembly was attacked, the events recounted, and the departments recommended to imitate Paris.

The tumult among the people, however, subsided, Saint-Méard says, and on the 3rd, about eight o'clock, he heard several voices calling out: "Mercy, mercy for those who remain!" Moreover, only a few political prisoners were left in the prisons. But then there happened what must needs happen. With those who had attacked the prison on principle, there began to mingle other elements—the dubious elements. And finally there appeared what Michelet has aptly called "the fury of purification"—the desire to purge Paris, not only of royalist conspirators, but also of coiners, the forgers of bills of exchange, swindlers, and even the prostitutes, who were, they said, all royalists. On the 3rd the thieves in the Grand Châtelet and the convicts at the Bernardins had already been massacred, and on the 4th a band of men went out to kill at the Salpêtrière, and at Bicêtre, even at the "House of Correction" at Bicêtre, which the people ought to have respected as a place of suffering for the poor, like themselves, especially the children. At last the Commune succeeded in putting an end to these massacres, on the 4th, according to Maton de la Varenne.*

More than a thousand persons in all perished, of whom two hundred and two were priests, twenty-six of the Royal Guards, about thirty of the Swiss belonging to the Staff, and more than three hundred prisoners under the common law, some of whom, imprisoned in the Conciergerie, were fabricating during their detention false paper-money. Maton de la Varenne, who has given † an alphabetical list of persons killed during those September days, makes a total of 1086, plus

* M. r. de la Varenne, *Histoire particulière des évènements qui ont eu lieu en France pendant les mois de juin, de juillet, d'août et de septembre, et qui ont opéré la chute du trône royal* (Paris, 1806). There were a few more isolated massacres on the 5th.

† *Histoire particulière*, pp. 419–460.

three unknown persons who perished accidentally. Upon which the royalist historians embroidered their romances, and wrote about 8000 and even 12,852 killed.*

All the historians of the Great Revolution, beginning with Buchez and Roux, have given the opinions of various well-known revolutionists concerning these massacres, and one striking trait stands out in the numerous quotations which they have published. This is, that the Girondins, who later on made use of the September days to attack violently and persistently the "Mountain," in no wise departed during those days from this very attitude of *laisser faire* with which later on they reproached Danton, Robespierre and the Commune. The Commune alone, in its General Council and in its Watch Committee, took measures, more or less efficacious, to stop the massacres, or, at least, to circumscribe and legalise them, when they saw that it was impossible to prevent them. The others acted feebly, or thought that they ought not to interfere, and the majority *approved* after the thing was done. This proves up to what point, in spite of the cry of outraged humanity necessarily raised by these massacres, it was generally understood that they were the inevitable consequence of August 10, and of the political equivocations of the governing classes themselves during the twenty days which followed the taking of the Tuileries.

Roland, in his letter of September 3, so often quoted, spoke of the massacres in terms which recognised their necessity.†

* Peltier, arch-royalist writer and liar, giving every detail, put the figure at 1005, but he added that there had been some killed at the Bicêtre and *in the streets*, which permitted him to bring the total up to 8000! (*Dernier tableau de Paris, ou récit historique de la Révolution du 10 août*, 2 vols., London, 1792–1793). On this Buchez and Roux have justly remarked that "Peltier is the only one to say that people were killed in other places besides the prisons," in contradiction to all his contemporaries.

† "I know that revolutions are not to be judged by ordinary rules; but I know, also, that the power which makes them must soon take it place under the ægis of the law, if total annihilation is not desired. The anger of the people and the beginning of the insurrection are comparable to the action of a torrent that overthrows *the obstacles that no other power could have annihilated*, and the ravage and devastation which the flood will carry far onward if it does not soon return to its channel. . . . Yesterday was a day of events over which perhaps we

The essential thing for him was to develop the theory which was to become the favourite theory of the Girondins—namely, that if disorder was necessary before August 10, all must now return again to order. In general, the Girondins, as Buchez and Roux * have well said, "were chiefly preoccupied with themselves. . . . They saw with regret the power passing out of their hands into those of their adversaries . . . but they found no motive for condemning the movement that had been made . . . they did not deny that it alone could save the national independence, and guard themselves from the vengeance of the army directed by the *émigrés*."

The chief newspapers, such as the *Moniteur* and Prudhomme's *Révolutions de Paris*, approved, whilst the others, such as the *Annales patriotiques* and the *Chronique de Paris*, and even Brissot in the *Patriote français*, limited themselves to a few cold and indifferent words concerning those days. As to the royalist press, it is evident that they seized upon these facts to put in circulation for a whole century the most fantastic tales. We shall not take upon ourselves to contradict them. But there is an error of appreciation deserving of reference, which is to be found among the republican historians.

It is true that the number of those who did the killing in the prisons did not exceed more than three hundred men, wherefore all the republicans have been accused by some writers of cowardice for not having put a stop to it. Nothing

ought to draw a veil; I know that the people, terrible in their vengeance, had in it some kind of justice; they did not take as their victims every one who came in the way of their fury, they directed it upon those whom they believed to have been too long spared by the sword of justice, and who, the peril of circumstances persuaded them, must be immolated without delay. But the safety of Paris demands that all the powers shall return at once to their respective limits."

* P. 397. There is no doubt that the Girondist ministers knew very well what was going on in the prisons. We know that Servan, the Minister of War, on the afternoon of the 2nd, went to the Commune, where he had made an appointment for eight o'clock with Santerre, Pétion, Hébert, Billaud-Varenne and others, to discuss military measures. It is obvious that the massacres must have been mentioned at the Commune, and that Roland was informed about them, but that Servan, as well as the others, thought that they should attend to the most pressing business—the war on the frontiers—and on no account provoke civil war in Paris.

is, however, more erroneous than this reckoning. The number of three or four hundred is correct. But it is enough to read the narratives of Weber, Mademoiselle de Tourzel, Mator de la Varenne and others, to see that if the murders were the work of a limited number of men, there were around each person and in the neighbouring streets crowds of people who approved of the massacres, and who would have taken arms against any one who might have tried to prevent them. Besides, the bulletins of the sections, the attitude of the National Guard, and the attitude even of the best-known revolutionists proved that every one understood that military intervention would have been the signal for a civil war, and, no matter to which side the victory went, this would have led to massacres still more widespread and still more terrible than those in the prisons.

On the other hand, Michelet has said, and his words have been repeated since, that it was *fear*, groundless fear, always ferocious, which had inspired these massacres. A few hundred of royalists more or less in Paris did not mean danger for the Revolution. But to reason so is to underrate, it seems to me, the strength of the reaction. These few hundred royalists had on their side the majority, the immense majority of the well-to-do middle classes, all the aristocracy, the Legislative Assembly, the Directory of the department, the greater number of the justices of peace, and the enormous majority of the officials. It was this compact mass of elements opposed to the Revolution which was merely awaiting the approach of the Germans to receive them with open arms, and to inaugurate with their aid the counter-revolutionary Terror, the Black Massacre. We have only to remember the White Terror under the Bourbons, when they returned in 1814 under the powerful protection of armed foreigners.

Besides, there is one fact which is not sufficiently appreciated by the historians, but which sums up the whole situation, and gives the true reason for the movement of September 2.

It was on the morning of September 4, while the massacres were still going on, that the Assembly decided at last, on the motion of Chabot, to utter the word so long awaited from the

legislators by the people. In an address to the French people, it declared that respect for the decisions of the future Convention prevented its members "from forestalling by their resolution what they must expect from the French nation"; but that they took now, as individuals, the oath which they could not take as representatives of the people: "*to combat with all their might both kings and royalty!—No king; capitulation, never; a foreign king, never!*" shouted the members. And as soon as this address was voted, despite the restriction just mentioned, certain commissioners of the Assembly went immediately with it to the Sections, where these Commissioners were promptly welcomed, and the sections took upon themselves to put an end at once to the massacres.

But this address was not voted in the Assembly before Marat had advised the people to massacre the royalist knaves of the Legislative Assembly; nor before Robespierre had denounced Carra and the Girondins in general as ready to accept a foreign king, and the Commune had ordered the searching of Roland's and Brissot's dwellings. It was on September 4—only on the 4th—that the Girondin Guadet invited the representatives to swear their readiness to combat with all their might both kings and royalties. If a frank declaration of this kind had been voted immediately after August 10, and if Louis XVI. had been brought to trial there and then, the massacres would certainly not have taken place. The people would have realised the powerlessness of the royalist conspiracy from the moment the Assembly and the Government declared their readiness to combat the supporters of the throne.

Furthermore, Robespierre's suspicions were not pure fancy. Condorcet, the old republican, the only representative in the Legislative Assembly who since 1791 had openly pronounced for the Republic while repudiating on his own account—but only on his own account—all idea of desiring the Duke of Brunswick on the throne of France, admitted, however, in the *Chronique de Paris* that the Duke had been mentioned to him sometimes.* The fact is that during those days of interregnum

* Carra, the editor of the *Annales patriotiques*, one of the chief organs of the Girondist party, mentioned Brunswick in these terms, in the

several candidates for the throne of France—the Duke
York, the Duke of Orléans, the Duke of Chartres (who
the candidate of Dumouriez) and the Duke of Brunswi
were undoubtedly discussed, not only by those politicians
like the Feuillants, did not want to have a republic, but
by those who, like the Girondins, did not believe in the cha
of victory for France.

In these hesitations, in this pusillanimity, this wan
honesty among the statesmen in power, lies the true
of the despair which seized upon the people of Paris on
tember 2.

number dated July 19, 1792: "He is the greatest warrior and
cleverest statesman in Europe, this Duke of Brunswick; he is
learned, very enlightened, very amiable; he wants but one t
perhaps—a crown—to be, I do not say the greatest king on earth
to be the true restorer of the liberty of Europe. If he comes to
I wager that his first step will be to come to the Jacobins and p
the *bonnet rouge*."

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE CONVENTION—THE COMMUNE—THE JACOBINS

Convention formed—Its composition—Girondins—"Mountain"—"Plain" or "Marsh"—Activity of sections since their formation—Revolutionary Commune—Jacobin Club and "Mountain"—Jacobins support "Mountain," but oppose Girondins

On September 21, 1792, the Convention, that Assembly which has been so often represented as the true type, the ideal of a revolutionary Assembly, was at last opened. The elections had been made by all the citizens, both active and passive, but still in two degrees, which means that all the citizens had first elected the electoral assemblies, and these had nominated the deputies to the Convention. Such a mode of election was clearly in favour of the wealthy; but as the elections took place in September, in the midst of the general agitation resulting from the triumph of the people on August 10, and many who were opposed to the Revolution, being terrorised by the events on September 2, preferred not to show themselves at all during the elections, things were not so bad as might have been feared. In Paris, Marat's list, containing all the revolutionaries known at the Cordeliers' and Jacobin Clubs, was accepted in its entirety. The five hundred and twenty-five electors of Paris, who met together on September 2, in the Club of the Jacobins, elected Collot d'Herbois and Robespierre as president and vice-president, excluded from the lists all those who had signed the two royalist petitions known as the Petitions of the Eight Thousand and the Twenty Thousand, and voted for Marat's list.

The "moderantist" element dominated, however, all the same in the new Assembly, and Marat wrote, after the first sitting, that, seeing the character of the majority of the delegates, he despaired of the salvation of France. He foresaw that their opposition to the revolutionary spirit was going to plunge the country into endless struggles: "They will end by bringing everything to destruction," he said, "if the small number of the defenders of the people, who will have to contend with them, do not get the upper hand and crush them." We shall see presently how right were his forebodings.

But the events were impelling France towards the Republic, and the inclinations of the people were such that the moderantists of the Convention did not dare to resist the current which was sweeping away royalty. At its very first sitting the Convention declared unanimously that royalty was abolished in France. Marseilles, as we have seen, and several other provincial towns were already before August 10 demanding a Republic; and Paris had done so with all solemnity since the first day of the elections. The Jacobin Club had also decided at last, in its sitting of August 27, to declare itself republican, after the publication of the papers found in the Tuileries. The Convention followed the lead of Paris. It abolished royalty at its first sitting on September 21, 1792. The next day, by a second decree, it ordained that from this day all public acts should be dated from the first year of the Republic.

Three very distinct parties met in the Convention: the Mountain, the Gironde and the Plain, or rather the Marsh. The Girondins, although less than two hundred, dominated. They had already, in the Legislative Assembly, furnished the King with the Roland Ministry, and they liked to pose as "statesmen." Composed of well-educated, refined and keen politicians, the Girondist party represented the interests of the commercial, mercantile, and propertied middle classes, who were coming to the front very rapidly under the new *régime*. With the support of the Moderates of the Marsh, the Girondins were at first the strongest, and it was from among them the first republican Ministry was chosen. Danton alone, of the Ministry that had come into power on August 10,

had represented the popular revolution: but he sent in his resignation on September 21, when the Convention met, and the power rested in the hands of the Girondins.

The "Mountain," composed of Jacobins, such as Robespierre, Saint-Just and Couthon, of Cordeliers, such as Danton and Marat, and supported by popular revolutionists like Chaumette and Hébert, was not yet constituted into a political party: that was done later through the course of events. For the time being, there rallied round them those who wanted to press on ahead and make the Revolution end in some tangible results—that is to say, to destroy royalty and royalism, to crush the power of the aristocracy and the clergy, to abolish feudalism to establish the Republic.

Lastly, the "Plain" or "Marsh" consisted of those who were undecided—men without settled convictions, always remaining "property-owners" and conservatives by instinct—those who form the majority in all representative assemblies. They numbered about five hundred in the Convention. At first they supported the Girondins, but then deserted them in the moment of danger. Fear made them support for a certain time the Red Terror, with Saint-Just and Robespierre, but afterwards they became partisans of the White Terror, when the *coup d'état* of Thermidor had sent Robespierre and his friends to the scaffold.

One might have thought that now the Revolution was going to develop without further hindrances and follow the natural path dictated by the logic of events. The trial and condemnation of the King, a Republican Constitution in place of that of 1791, war to the death against the invaders; and at the same time the abolition of all that constituted the power of the old *régime*—the feudal laws, the authority of the clergy, the royalist organisation of provincial administrations—all these ought to have been considered as the necessary outcome of the situation.

But the middle classes which had come into power and were represented in the Convention by the "Statesmen" of the Gironde, did not hold this opinion.

The people had dethroned Louis XVI. But as to getting

rid of the traitor who had brought the Germans almost to the gates of Paris, as to executing Louis XVI., the Gironde was very strongly in opposition. Rather civil war than this decisive step! Not from fear of the vengeance of the foreigner—since it was the Girondins themselves who had undertaken to wage war against all Europe; but from fear of the Revolution, of the French people, and especially of the Paris revolutionists who saw in the execution of the King the beginning of the real revolution.

However, the people of Paris, in their sections and their Commune, had been able to form, side by side with the National Assembly, a veritable power, which gave body to the revolutionary tendencies of the Parisian population, and in the end even dominated the Convention. Let us, therefore, pause a moment before touching upon the struggles which rent the National Representation, to cast a retrospective glance on the methods by which this authority, the Commune of Paris, had been constituted.

We have seen in chaps. xxiv. and xxv. how the sections of Paris had assumed importance, as organs of the municipal life, by taking upon themselves, in addition to the police functions and the election of the judges which belonged to them by law, various economic functions of the highest importance—such as the distribution of food-stuffs, public aid, the sale of national lands, and so on, and we saw how these very functions enabled them to exercise a serious influence in the discussion of the great political questions of a general character.

Having become important organs of the public life, the sections necessarily tried to establish a federal link between themselves, and several times already, in 1790 and 1791, they appointed special commissioners with the object of coming to an understanding with each other for common action, outside the regular Municipal Council. However, nothing permanent resulted from these attempts.

In April 1792, when war was declared, the labours of the sections were suddenly augmented by a great many new functions. They had to take upon themselves the enrolment and the choice of the volunteers, the collecting of patriotic

donations, the equipment and provisioning of the battalions sent to the frontiers, the administrative and political correspondence with these battalions, the looking after the needs of the volunteers' families, &c., not to mention the perpetual strife which they had to maintain from day to day against the royalist conspirators who tried to hamper their work. With these new functions, the necessity for a *direct* union between the sections made itself felt more than ever.

Nowadays, looking over the correspondence of the sections and their vast accounts, one cannot but admire the spirit of spontaneous organisation shown by the people of Paris, and the devotion of the men who willingly carried out the whole of this task—usually after finishing their daily labour. Here is where we may appreciate the devotion, more than religious, which was created in the French people by the Revolution. For we must not forget that if each section appointed its military committee and its civil committee, it was to the General Assemblies, held in the evening, that all important questions were generally referred.

We can understand, too, how these men, who were looking on the horrors of war not theoretically, but in reality, and were in daily touch with the sufferings imposed upon the people by the invasion, must have hated the instigators of the invasion —the King, the Queen, the Court, the ex-nobles and the rich, all the rich, who made common cause with the Court. The people of Paris thus joined with the peasants of the frontier departments in their hatred of the supporters of the throne who had called the foreigners into France. When, therefore, the idea of a pacific demonstration for June 20 was suggested, it was the sections that took upon themselves the organisation of this demonstration—it was they who afterwards arranged the attack on the Tuileries on August 10, taking the opportunity, meanwhile, to form at last the much desired direct union for revolutionary action among the sections.

When it became evident that the demonstration on June 20 had resulted in nothing—that the Court had not learned anything, and did not wish to learn anything—the sections themselves took the initiative in demanding from the Assembly

the dethronement of Louis XVI. On July 23 the section of Mauconseil passed a resolution to this effect, of which they gave notice to the Assembly; and then they set to work to prepare for a rising on August 5. Other sections hastened to pass a similar resolution, and when the Assembly, in its sitting of August 5, denounced the resolution of the citizens of Mauconseil as illegal, it had already received the approbation of fourteen sections. The same day some members of the Gravilliers section went to the Assembly to declare that they were still leaving to the legislators "the honour of saving the country," but they added: "If you refuse, however, to do it, we shall have to take it upon ourselves." The Quinze-Vingts section, on its part, announced "the morning of August 10 as the extreme limit of the people's patience," and that of Mauconseil declared that "it would wait peaceably and keeping watch until eleven o'clock on the evening of the following Thursday (August 9) in expectation of the decision of the National Assembly; but that, if justice and right was not done to the people by the legislative body, one hour after, at midnight, the fire-drum would be beaten, and every one would rise." *

Finally, on August 7, the same section requested all the others to appoint in each of them "six commissioners, *less orators than good citizens*, who by their meeting together would form a central point at the Hôtel de Ville," which was done on the 9th.† When twenty-eight or thirty out of the forty-six sections had joined the movement, their commissioners met at the Hôtel de Ville, in a hall adjoining the one where the Municipal Council met regularly—it was small in numbers that night—and they took action in a revolutionary manner, as a new Commune. They provisionally suspended the Municipal Council, shut up in a hall the mayor, Pétion, dismissed the staff of the National Guards' battalions, and took

* Mortimer Ternaux, *La Terreur*, vol. ii. pp. 178, 216, 393; Buchez and Roux, vol. xvi. p. 247; Ernest Mellié, *Les Sections de Paris*, p. 144 *et seq.*

† A "corresponding committee" had already been established for communicating with the different sections, and a meeting of the commissioners of several sections had taken place on July 23.

over all the authority of the Commune, as well as of the general direction of the insurrection.*

Thus the new authority, the Revolutionary Commune, was constituted, and installed in the Hôtel de Ville.

The Tuileries Palace was taken, the King dethroned, and immediately the new Commune made it felt that August 10 was not the culmination of the Revolution inaugurated on July 14, 1789, but the beginning of a new popular revolution, marching in the sense of Equality. Henceforth it dated its documents from "the Year IV. of Liberty and the Year I. of Equality." A whole mass of new duties began to devolve upon the new Commune.

During the last twenty days of August, while the Legislative Assembly was hesitating between the various currents, royalist, constitutionalist, and republican, which drew its members hither and thither, and was proving itself absolutely incapable of rising to the height of events, the sections of Paris and the Commune became the true heart of the French nation for the awakening of Republican France, for flinging her against the coalition of kings, and for organising in co-operation with the other Communes the great movement of the volunteers in 1792. And when the hesitations of the Assembly, the hankering of the majority of the members after royalty, and their hatred of the insurrectional Commune had brought the people of Paris to a pitch of mad fury in those September days, it was still the sections and the Commune that tried to appease them. As soon as the Legislative Assembly decided at last to declare, on September 4, against royalty and

* Ernest Mellié has found the minute-book of the Poissonnière section. It met on August 9, at eight o'clock in the evening, in permanent committee in the church of Saint-Lazare; there it dismissed all the officers of the Saint-Lazare battalion, not appointed by the National Guards themselves, and appointed "on the spot other officers under whose orders the section intended to march." It entered into agreement with the other sections as to the order of marching, and at four o'clock in the morning, having appointed its permanent committee "to keep watch over the preparations for arming and to give the orders for security that they should judge to be necessary," the section joined "the brethren of the Saint-Antoine faubourg," and began to march upon the Tuileries. By means of this minute we get a lively impression of the way in which the people of Paris acted on that memorable night.

the various pretenders to the throne of France, and as soon as it signified its decision to the sections, these joined together at once, to put an end to the massacres which threatened to extend from the prisons to the streets, and to guarantee the safety of all the inhabitants.

Likewise, when the Convention met, and though it had decreed the abolition of royalty in France on the morning of September 21, "it did not dare to pronounce the decisive word 'Republic,'" and "seemed to be waiting for some encouragement from without";* this encouragement came from the people of Paris. They acclaimed the decree in the street with cries of "*Vive la République!*" and the citizens of the Quatre-Nations section went to the Convention, to compel it to take a step further, saying that they would be only too happy to pay with their blood for the "Republic" which was not yet proclaimed, and which was only on the next day officially recognised by the Convention.

The Commune of Paris thus became a power which took upon itself to be the inspirer, if not the rival, of the Convention, and the ally of the party called the "Mountain."

The "Mountain" had, besides, another power on its side which had been formed in the current of the Revolution—the Jacobin Club, in Paris, with the numerous societies in the provinces which were affiliated to it. It is true that this club had none of the power and revolutionary initiative with which modern political writers endow it. The very persons composing the mother-society in Paris were chiefly well-to-do middle-class men. How could they guide the Revolution?

At every epoch, Michelet says, they had flattered themselves with being the wiseacres and political lights of the Revolution, who held the balance of it all. They did not lead the Revolution; they followed it. The tone of the club changed with every fresh crisis. But the club made itself immediately the expression of the tendency which had come to the front at a certain moment among the educated, moderately democratic middle classes; it supported this tendency by cultivating

* Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution*, 2nd edition, p. 272 *et seq.*

opinion in Paris in the directions desired, and it furnished the most important officials under each new *régime*. Robespierre, who, to use Michelet's happy phrase, was "the golden mean of the Mountain," wanted the Jacobins "to serve as an intermediary between the Assembly and the Street, to frighten and reassure the Convention alternately." But he understood that the initiative should come from the Street, from the People.

We have already said that the influence of the Jacobins on the events of August 10 was *nil*, and it so remained until September 1792, the club being nearly deserted at that time. But by degrees, in the course of the autumn, the mother-society of Paris was reinforced by many Cordeliers, and then the club revived and became the rallying-point for the whole of the moderate party among the republican democrats. Marat became very popular there, but not so "the extremists"—which in modern parlance would mean "the Communists." These the club opposed and, later on, fought against them.

When, in the spring of 1793, the struggle entered on by the Girondins against the Commune of Paris reached its critical point, the Jacobins supported the Commune and the Mountain, in the Convention, and helped them to gain the victory over the Girondins, and to consolidate it. By their correspondence with the affiliated clubs in the provinces, the Jacobins supported the advanced revolutionists there, and helped them to checkmate the influence not only of the Girondins, but also of the royalists concealed behind them. This left the Jacobins free to turn later on against the popular revolutionists of the Commune, and so make way for middle-class reaction to accomplish the *coup d'état* of the 9th Thermidor.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE GOVERNMENT—CONFLICTS WITH THE CONVENTION—THE WAR

New Ministerial Council—Danton, at first its leader, later forced to resign—Roland succeeds him—Council inactive—Real power in hands of Danton, Commune, Sections and Jacobins—Council attacks Danton, Marat, and Robespierre—Conflict between Convention and Commune—Provinces become hostile to Commune and people of Paris—Girondins attack Paris sections—Revolution and war—Girondins desire war—Peasants of frontier enthusiastic—Western France not eager—Country unprepared—Plan of Dumouriez and Lafayette—Germans advance—Battle of Valmy—Danton negotiates with Duke of Brunswick—Further republican successes—Battle of Jemmapes—England—Consequences of war—The Vendée

THE first care of the Convention was not to decide what should be done with the dethroned King, but to determine which party should profit by the people's victory over the Tuileries—who should rule the Revolution. Whereupon there broke out those conflicts which for eight months hindered the regular development of the Revolution and, until June 1793, held in suspense the great questions, such as that of the land, the feudal dues, and so on, and led to the exhaustion of the people's energy, to indifference, to that lassitude which made the hearts of those who witnessed it to bleed, as Michelet has so well expressed it.

On August 10, after pronouncing the "suspension" of the King, the Legislative Assembly had handed over all the functions of central executive power to a council composed of six ministers—chosen from without the Assembly, the majority being Girondins—Roland, Servan, Clavière, Monge, and Le Brun—with the addition of Danton, whom the Revolution had placed in the position of Minister of Justice. This council

ad no president; each minister presiding for a week in urn.

The Convention confirmed this arrangement; but Danton, who had become the soul of the national defence and diplomacy, and who exercised a preponderating influence on the ouncil, was forced to resign by the attacks of the Girondins. He quitted the Ministry on October 9, 1792, and his place was lled by the insignificant Garat. After this, Roland, the Minister of the Interior, became the most influential man of the Ministerial Council, and kept his post until January 1793, hen he resigned after the execution of the King. In this osition he exercised all his influence, and permitted the Girondins grouped round him and his wife to employ all their nergy to prevent the Revolution from developing along the road lines which had been marked out for it since 1789: the stablishment of a democracy, the definite abolition of the feual system, and some steps towards an equalisation of conditions. Danton, however, was still the inspirer of diplomacy, and when he Committee of Public Safety was instituted, in April 1793, e became the real Minister of Foreign Affairs on this committee.*

Although in power and dominating the Convention, the Gironde did not know actually what to do. As Michelet ruly says, "it perorated," but it did nothing. Not having ourage for revolutionary measures, neither had it enough for pen reaction. Consequently, the real authority, both for nitiative and for action, rested in Danton's hands in the war nd diplomacy, and in the hands of the Commune of Paris, he sections, the popular societies, and partly with the Jacobin Club with regard to revolutionary measures in the interior. Powerless to act itself, the Gironde directed furious attacks pon those who did act, chiefly against "the triumvirate" of Danton, Marat, and Robespierre, whom they violently accused f dictatorial tendencies. There were times when it was asked whether these attacks should come to a head—whether Danton vas to be ostracised and Marat sent to the guillotine.

* Aulard gives in his *Histoire politique*, 2nd edition, pp. 315–317, n excellent *résumé* of these various changes.

However, as the Revolution had not yet exhausted its vitality, all these attacks failed. They only made the people more ardently in favour of Marat, especially in the faubourgs of Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau; they augmented the influence of Robespierre in the eyes of the Jacobins and of the democratic middle class, and they raised Danton still higher in the eyes of all those who loved to see Republican France defying the Kings. To them Danton was the man of action capable of heading off the invasion, of frustrating the royalist plots at home, and of establishing the Republic securely, even at the risk of his life and his political reputation.

Ever since the first sittings of the Convention, its Right, formed by the Girondins, had renewed the shameful conflict with the Commune of Paris, which they had been leading in the Legislative Assembly since August 11. They owed their power to the insurrection, organised by the Commune, and yet they attacked it with a hatred which they had never displayed for the Court conspirators.

It would be wearisome to narrate here in full all these attacks of the Gironde upon the Commune. It will be enough to mention some of them.

The first was over the auditing of the accounts; it was aimed at the Commune and its Watch Committee, as well at Danton. It is evident that during those disturbed months of August and September 1792, under the extraordinary circumstances created by the movement of August 10 and the foreign invasion, money had to be expended by Danton, the only active man in the Ministry, without too much exactitude of accounts, whether for the diplomatic negotiations which led to the retreat of the Prussians, or for getting hold of the threads of the plot of the Marquis de la Rouërie in Brittany, and that of the princes in England and elsewhere. It is also very plain that it was not easy for the Watch Committee of the Commune, which equipped and sent off every day, in haste, several thousand volunteers for the frontier, to keep very exact accounts. But it was just upon this weak point that the Girondins directed their first attack and their insinuations, demanding that a complete account from September 30 should be rendered. The Execu-

ive of the Commune, that is, its Watch Committee, sent in n extremely clear statement of its accounts,* and justified its olitical action.

But in the provinces, doubts as to their honesty remained anging over Danton and the Commune; and the Girondins their letters to their friends and agents made as much as ossible out of these doubts.

At the same time the Girondins tried to give the Convention n anti-revolutionary guard. They wanted the Directory of ach department—the Directories were, as we know, reactionary -to send to Paris four foot-soldiers and two mounted men, aking in all 4470 men, to guard the Convention against the ossible attacks of the people of Paris and the Commune! And powerful agitation was necessary among the sections, which ppointed special commissioners to resist the passing of this ote, and to prevent the formation in Paris of a reactionary guard.

But it was chiefly the September massacres that the Girondins ever ceased exploiting in order to attack Danton, who in ose days acted hand in hand with the Commune and the ctions. After "drawing the veil," and almost justifying ose days by the mouth of Roland † as they had justified eviously the massacres of La Glacière at Lyons by the mouth Barbaroux,‡ they now manœuvred so well in the Convention at on January 20, 1793, they obtained from it an order of osecution against the authors of the September massacres, in e hope that the reputation of Danton, Robespierre, and Marat ould be blackened by this inquiry.

By degrees, taking advantage of the constitutionalist and

* Out of 713,885 livres received it had expended only 85,529 livres, which there was a clear account rendered (Louis Blanc, ii. 62). aut, on the accusation of the Terror, proved later on that in four nths the committee had arrested only 320 persons. If only the rondins had been as modest after Thermidor!

† *Vide* ch. xxxv.

‡ After long struggles between the revolutionary population of ons and the adherents of the priests, and after the murder in a church the patriot Lescuyer, for having wanted to put up the church's perty for sale, in accordance with law, there was an insurrection the revolutionary working population, which ended in the murder sixty royalists, whose corpses were thrown into the depths of the ar de la Glacière. Barbaroux, a Girondist deputy, justified these ssacres.

royalist current, which asserted itself among the middle classe after August 10, the Girondins succeeded in creating in th provinces a feeling of hostility towards Paris and its Commune as well as towards the party of the "Mountain."

Several departments even sent detachments of federates t defend the Convention against "the agitators who wanted t become tribunes and dictators"—Danton, Marat, and Robes pierre—and against the people of Paris. At the appeal o Barbaroux, Marseilles—this time "commercialist" Marseille —sent up to Paris, in October 1792, a battalion of federates composed of rich young men from the merchant city, wh marched through the streets of Paris, demanding the heads o Robespierre and Marat. They were the precursors of th Thermidor reaction; but, fortunately, the people of Pari defeated the plot by winning over these federates to the cause o the Revolution.

Meanwhile the Girondins did not fail to make a direct attac on the federal organisation of the Paris sections. They wante at any cost to destroy the insurrectional Commune of August 1 and they succeeded in getting new elections for the Genera Council of the Paris municipality. Pétion, the Girondi mayor, resigned at the same time. Here again, however, th sections frustrated these manœuvres. Not only had the part of the Mountain the majority in the elections, but a revo lutionary as advanced and as popular as Chaumette was ap pointed procurator of the Commune, and the editor of th *Père Duchesne*, Hébert, became his deputy (December 2, 1792 Pétion, who was no longer in sympathy with the revolutionar sentiments of the people of Paris, was not re-elected, an Chambon, a moderate, took his place; but he remained the only two months, and on February 14, 1793, he was replaced b Pache, formerly Minister of War.

This was how the revolutionary Commune of 1793 wa constituted—the Commune of Pache, Chaumette, and Hébert which was the rival of the Convention and played so powerful part in the movement of May 31–June 2, 1793, which ended i the expulsion of the Girondin leaders from the Convention and pushed forward with ardour the popular revolution of th

ar II. of the Republic which stood up for Equality and, ally, for Communism.

The great question of the moment was the war. On the ccesses of the armies depended the future development of e Revolution.

We have seen that the advanced revolutionaries, like Marat d Robespierre, had not wanted the war. But the Court led in the German invaders to save royal despotism: the ests and nobles furiously wanted the war, hoping to regain rough it their ancient privileges; and the neighbouring vernments saw in a war upon France the means of combating e spirit of revolution which was beginning to show itself in ir own dominions, as well as a good opportunity for wresting m France some provinces and colonies. The Girondins, on other hand, desired the war, because they saw in it the only y to succeed in limiting the authority of the King without ealing to a popular rising. "It is because you do not wish appeal to the people that you wish for war," said Marat, and was right.

As to the people, the peasants of the frontier departments, en they saw the German armies headed by the emigrant les massing themselves on the Rhine and in the Low Countries, y understood that it was a question for them of taking up s to defend their rights over the lands they had retaken from nobles and clergy. Therefore, when the war with Austria declared on April 20, 1792, an astounding enthusiasm was layed by the inhabitants of the departments close to the tern frontier. The levies for the volunteers, for one year, e made with enthusiasm, to the singing of *Ça ira!* and the iotic gifts flowed in from all sides. But this was not the in the regions of western and south-western France: e the people did not want the war at all.

Nothing, moreover, was ready for the war. The forces of nce, not numbering more than 130,000 men, spread out from North Sea to Switzerland, badly equipped and commanded oyalist officers and staffs, were not in a condition to resist nvasion.

Dumouriez and Lafayette at first conceived the bold plan o rapidly invading Belgium, which had already in 1790 tried t detach herself from Austria, but had been vanquished. The Belgian Liberals had appealed to the French, but the attemp failed, and thenceforth the French generals kept on the defen sive, the more so because Prussia had joined with Austria an the German princes to invade France, and moreover, thi coalition was strongly and openly supported by the Court o Turin, and secretly by the Courts of St. Petersburg and London

On July 26, 1792, the Duke of Brunswick, who commanded one of the invading armies, composed of 70,000 Prussians an 68,000 Austrians, Hessians and *émigrés*, began to march upo Coblentz, publishing as he went a manifesto which roused th indignation of all France. He threatened to set fire to th towns that dared to defend themselves, and to exterminat their inhabitants as rebels. If Paris dared to break into th palace of Louis XVI., the city would be subjected to an exem plary dragooning that would never be forgotten.

Three German armies were to enter France and march upo Paris, and on April 19, the Prussian army crossed the frontie and took Longwy and Verdun without a struggle.

We have seen the enthusiasm that the Commune succeede in rousing in Paris when this news arrived, and how it replied b causing the leaden coffins of the rich to be melted down fo balls, and the bells, as well as the other church furniture i bronze, to be turned into cannon, whilst the churches wer used as vast worksheds, where thousands of people worke making the volunteers' outfits, singing, as they sewed, the *C ira* and the *Marseillaise*, the stirring hymn of Rouget de l'Isl

The *émigrés* had made the allied kings believe that they woul find France ready to receive them with open arms. But th openly hostile attitude of the peasants and the Septembe days in Paris made the invaders pause. The inhabitants of th towns and the peasants of the Eastern departments understoo very well that the enemy had come to take away the fruits of a their conquests, and it had been chiefly in the regions to th East that the risings of the town and country parts, in 1789 an 1790, had best succeeded in destroying feudalism.

But enthusiasm was not sufficient to conquer. The Prussian rmy was advancing, and now with the Austrian army, it had ready entered the forest of the Argonne, which extended ver a length of eleven leagues, separating the valley of the Meuse om the barren Champagne. Dumouriez' army tried vainly y forced marches to stop the invasion. It succeeded only in ccupying just in time an advantageous position at Valmy, the exit from the great forest, and here the Prussians, on eptember 20, met with their first check, while trying to gain ossession of the hills occupied by the soldiers of Dumouriez. nder the circumstances, the battle of Valmy was an important ctory—the first victory of the peoples over the kings—and such it was hailed by Goethe who accompanied the army of ie Duke of Brunswick.

The Prussian army was compelled to make a halt under torren- al rains in the forest of the Argonne, and as everything was cking in the arid plains stretching in front, it became a prey dysentery, which made frightful ravages among the men. he roads were liquid mud, the peasants on the watch—every- ing foreboded a disastrous campaign.

It was then that Danton negotiated with the Duke of Bruns- ick for the retreat of the Prussians. What the conditions ere is not known to this day. Did Danton promise him, as it s been later maintained, to save the life of Louis XVI. ? It possible. But if this promise was made, it must have been nditional, and we do not know what engagements were under- ken in return by the invaders, beyond the immediate retreat the Prussians. Was the simultaneous retreat of the Austrians omised ? Was a formal renunciation of the throne by Louis VI. spoken of ? We are only able to make conjectures.

All we really know is that, on October 1, the Duke of Bruns- ck began his retreat by Grand-Pré and Verdun. Towards e end of the month he recrossed the Rhine at Coblentz, companied by the curses of the *émigrés*.

Dumouriez thereupon, after giving Westermann orders to escort the Prussians back politely," without hurrying them too uch, went to Paris, on October 11, evidently to see how the rties were divided and to determine his own line of conduct.

He so arranged it that, although he did not take the oath to the Republic, he was nevertheless very well received by the Jacobins, and from that time he undoubtedly began to press keenly the candidature of the Duke de Chartres for the throne of France.

The insurrection, which had been arranged in Brittany by the Marquis de la Rouêrie to break out at the time when the Germans would be marching on Paris, also came to nothing. Information about it was given to Danton, who was able to grasp the threads of it, in Brittany as well as in London. But London remained the centre of the conspiracies of the princes, and the island of Jersey was made the centre for royalist stores of arms. The intention was to land a small army somewhere on the coast of Brittany, to seize Saint-Malo with the aid of the local royalists, and to hand over this port of great military and commercial importance to the English.

At the same time, the French army of the South, commanded by Montesquiou, entered Savoy the very day the Convention opened. It took Chambéry four days later and introduced into Savoy the peasant revolution against feudal landlords.

At the end of the same month of September, one of the armies of the Republic, commanded by Lauzun and Custine, passed the Rhine and took Spires by assault on the 30th. Worms yielded four days later, and on October 23, Mayence and Frankfort-on-the-Maine were occupied by the armies of the *sans-culottes*.

In the North, there was another series of successes. Towards the end of October, the army under Dumouriez entered Belgium, and on November 6, it gained a great victory over the Austrians at Jemmapes, in the environs of Mons—a victory which Dumouriez had arranged in such a way as to bring glory to the son of the Duke de Chartres—and to sacrifice two battalions of Parisian volunteers.

This victory opened up Belgium to the French. Mons was occupied on the 8th, and on the 14th Dumouriez made his entry into Brussels. The people received the soldiers of the Republic with open arms. They were expecting them to initiate a series of revolutionary measures, chiefly concerning

property. Snch was also the idea of the "Mountain"—at least of Cambon—the man who had organised the immense business of selling the lands of the clergy as a guarantee for the *assignats*, who was at that moment organising the sale of the estates of the emigrant royalists, and who asked nothing better than to introduce the same system into Belgium. But whether it was that the "Mountain" lacked courage, attacked as it was by the Girondins for its want of respect for property, or that the aims of the Revolution had not found the necessary support in Belgium, where only the proletarians were on the side of the Revolution, while all the well-to-do middle classes and the formidable power of the priests were opposed to it. At any rate, it remains a fact that the Revolution—which might have combined the Belgians with the French, was not accomplished.

With all these successes and victories there was enough to intoxicate the lovers of the war, and the Girondins triumphed. On December 15, the Convention issued a decree in which it defied all the monarchies and declared that peace should not be concluded with any of the Powers until their armies had been expelled from the territory of the Republic. In reality, however, the situation within looked rather gloomy, and the very victories of the Republic only set the seal upon the union between all the monarchies.

The invasion of Belgium decided England as to her *rôle*. The dawn of republican and communist ideas among the English, which was manifested by the foundation of republican societies, and found its literary expression in 1793 through the remarkable work on free communism, by Godwin, "On Political Justice," had inspired the French republicans, especially Danton, with the hope of finding support in an English revolutionary movement.*

But industrial and mercantile interests carried the day in the British Isles. And when republican France invaded Belgium

* The tenor of the negotiations of Brissot in England during January 1793, before the King's execution, is still unknown. Concerning those of Danton, *see* Georges Avenel's article, *Danton et les positivistes religieux*, in his *Lundis révolutionnaires*, 1875, pp. 248 *et seq.* and the work of Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française* (Paris).

and fortified herself in the valley of the Scheldt and Rhine, threatening to take possession of Holland, England's policy was decided.

To take away France's colonies, to destroy her power on the sea, to check her industrial development and her colonial expansion—this was the policy to which the greatest number adhered in England. The party of Fox was crushed and Pitt's was in the ascendant. Thenceforth England, strong in her fleet and still stronger in her money with which she subsidised the continental powers—Russia, Prussia, and Austria among them—became and remained, for a quarter of a century, the head of a European coalition. It was a war of complete exhaustion between the two nations. And this war forcibly brought France to a military dictatorship.

Besides, if Paris, threatened by the invasion, was transported by a sublime enthusiasm and its best elements hastened to join the volunteers from the departments of Eastern France, it was also the war which gave the first impulse to the rising in the Vendée. It furnished the priests with a pretext for explciting the reluctance of the population to leave their shady groves and go fighting, they knew not where, upon the frontier: it helped to arouse the fanaticism of the Vendéans and to make them revolt, at the very time when the Germans were entering France. We shall see later how much evil was wrought for the Revolution by this rising.

But if it had been only the Vendée! All through France the war created such a terrible condition of things for the great mass of the poor folk that one cannot but ask, how did the Republic succeed in passing safely through such a formidable crisis?

The harvest of 1792 was a good one for wheat; but on account of the rains it was only fairly good for the oats and barley. The exportation of cereals was forbidden, and yet for all that there was a famine. In the towns, for a long time nothing so terrible had been seen. Long files of men and women besieged the bakers and the butchers, spending the whole night in the snow and rain, without the certainty of getting one scrap of bread in the morning even at an exorbitant

rice. And this, at a time when quite a number of industries ad been stopped almost completely, which meant no ork.

The fact is that one cannot with impunity take away from a ation of twenty-five millions nearly a million men in the flower their manhood, and perhaps half a million of beasts of burden, ithout its being felt in agricultural labour. Neither can the od-stuffs of a nation be subjected to the inevitable wastage war without making still blacker the misery of the poor—at ie same time that a horde of exploiters enrich themselves at ie expense of the public treasury.*

Questions concerning all these vital facts were being launched ke thunderbolts into the very midst of each popular society the provinces and into each section of the great towns, to id their way thence to the Convention. And above every-ing rose the greatest question of all upon which all the others epended: "What was to be done with the King?"

* The robberies committed by a certain number of officers in the ommissariat of the armies of the Republic were scandalous. Some xamples will be found in Jaurès' *Histoire socialiste, La Convention.* he speculations in which they indulged can also be imagined from the ct that the commissariat officers purchased immense quantities of heat precisely in those departments where the harvest had been bad, id the prices were very high. Speculations in the rise of wheat rmerly made by Septeuil for the profit of Louis XVI., "the good ing," who never neglected this means of filling his privy purse, were w being made by the middle classes.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE TRIAL OF THE KING

Fate of King undecided—Reason of delay—Trial determined on—Gamain betrays the King—Obstacles in way of trial—Justification of trial—Marie-Antoinette and Fersen—Girondins try to prevent trial by attacking "Mountain"—King appears before Convention—Death sentence pronounced—Execution of King

The two months which elapsed between the opening of the Convention and the trial of the King remain up till now an enigma for history.

The first question which confronted the Convention after it had met was naturally that of deciding what was to be done with the King and his family, imprisoned in the Temple. To keep them there for an indefinite time, until the invasion should be repelled and a republican constitution voted and accepted by the people, was impossible. How could the Republic be established, so long as it held the King and his legitimate heir in prison, without daring to do anything with them?

Besides, having become simple individuals, who, taken from the palace, were dwelling *en famille* in prison, Louis XVI., Marie-Antoinette and their children became interesting martyrs, to whom the royalists were devoted, and whom the middle classes and even the *sans-culottes* pitied as they mounted guard over them at the Temple.

Such a situation could not continue. And yet, nearly two months passed, during which the Convention was very much interested in all manner of things without ever broaching the first consequence of August 10—the fate of the King. This delay, in our opinion, must have been intentional, and we can

nly explain it by supposing that during this time they were arrying on secret conferences with the European Courts—onferences which have not yet been divulged, and which vere certainly connected with the invasion and the issue of vhich depended on the turn that would be taken by the war.

We know already that Danton and Dumouriez had had arleyings with the chief commander of the Prussian army, vhich in the end decided him to separate from the Austrian nd effect his retreat. And we know, too, that one of the onditions imposed by the Duke of Brunswick—although ery probably it was not accepted—was that Louis XVI. hould not be harmed. But there must have been more than hat. Similar negotiations were very likely being carried on vith England. And how can the silence of the Convention nd the patience of the sections be explained, without suppos-ng that there was an understanding between the "Mountain" nd the Gironde?

To-day, however, it is clear to us that parleyings of this ind could come to nothing, and for two reasons. The fate f Louis XVI. and his family was not of sufficient interest to ie King of Prussia, nor to the King of England, nor to the rother of Marie-Antoinette, the Emperor of Austria, for them o sacrifice national political interests to the personal interests f the prisoners in the Temple. That was plainly seen through ie negotiations, which took place later, concerning the setting liberty of Marie-Antoinette and Madame Elisabeth. And n the other hand, the allied Kings did not find in France nong the educated class, the unity of republican sentiment hich should have made their hope of re-establishing royalty anish. On the contrary, they found the "intellectuals" the middle classes very much inclined to accept either the uke of Orléans (Grand Master of the Brotherhood of Free-asons, to which all the revolutionaries of renown belonged) his son, the Duke de Chartres—the future Louis-Philippe—even the Dauphin.

But the people became impatient. The popular societies roughout France demanded that the trial of the King ould be deferred no longer, and on October 19, the Commune

attended at the bar of the Convention to signify that this was the wish of Paris also. At last, on November 3, the first step was taken. A communication was read demanding that Louis XVI. should be put upon his trial, and the principal heads of accusation were formulated the next day. The discussion on this subject was opened on the 13th. The affair, however, would have still dragged out to a great length if, on November 20, the locksmith Gamain, who had formerly taught Louis lock-making, had not revealed to Roland the existence in the Tuileries of a secret cupboard, which Gamain had helped the King to put in one of the walls, for keeping his papers.

This bit of history is well known. One day, in August 1792, Louis XVI. sent for Gamain from Versailles in order that he might help him to fix in a wall, under a panel, an iron door which he had constructed himself, to serve to shut in a kind of secret cupboard. When the work was finished, Gamain set out again in the night for Versailles, after drinking a glass of wine and eating a biscuit given to him by the Queen. He fell on the road, seized with violent colic, and had been ill ever since. Believing himself to have been poisoned, or worked upon, may be, by the fear of being prosecuted some day by the republicans, he gave information concerning the cupboard to Roland, who, without letting any one know, immediately took possession of the papers in it, carried them off to his house and examined them together with his wife, and having affixed his seal to each of them he brought them to the Convention.

The profound sensation produced by this discovery can be understood, especially when it became known through these papers that the King had bought the services of Mirabeau, that his agents had proposed to him to buy eleven influential members of the Legislative Assembly (it was already known that Barnave and Lameth had been won over to his cause), and that Louis XVI. still had in his pay those disbanded members of his guards who had placed themselves at the service of his brothers at Coblentz, and who were then marching with the Austrians upon France.

It is only now, when we have in our hands so many documents

that confirm the treacheries of Louis XVI., and can see the forces which were, nevertheless, opposed to his condemnation, that we comprehend how very difficult it was for the Revolution to bring a King to judgment and to execute him.

All the prejudice, the open and latent servility in society, the fear for the property of the rich, and the distrust of the people, were joined together to hinder the trial. The Gironde, faithfully reflecting all these fears, did all that was possible to prevent the trial from taking place, and afterwards to prevent its ending in a condemnation, or, failing this, to see that the condemnation should not be to death, and finally, that the sentence should not be carried out.* Paris had to threaten the Convention with an insurrection to force it to pronounce its judgment when the trial opened, and not to defer the execution. And yet up to the present day what maudlin speeches are uttered, what tears are shed by the historians when they mention this trial!

And what about? If any general, no matter which, had been convicted of having done what Louis XVI. had done—that is, of calling in the foreign invaders and of supporting them—who, among the modern historians, all of them defenders of "State reasons," would have hesitated a single moment to demand the death of that general? Why then so much lamentation when high treason was committed by the commander of all the armies of France?

According to all traditions and all fictions to which our historians and jurists resort for establishing the rights of "the head of the State," the Convention *was* the sovereign at that moment. To it, and to it alone belonged the right of judging the sovereign whom the people had dethroned, as to it alone belonged the right of legislation which had fallen from his hands. Tried by the members of the Convention, Louis XVI. was—to use their own language—tried by his peers. And they, having ascertained the moral certitude of his treason—had no choice. They *had* to pronounce the

* During the trial, some Girondist deputies, those of Calvados in particular, wrote to their constituents that the "Mountain" wanted the King to be put to death only to set the Duke of Orléans upon the throne.

sentence of death. Clemency even was outside the question, at a time when blood was flowing on the frontiers. The allied Kings knew this themselves; they comprehended it perfectly.

As to the theory developed by Robespierre and Saint-Just, according to which the Republic had the right to kill Louis XVI. as its enemy, Marat was quite right to protest against it. That might have been done during or immediately after the conflict of August 10, but not three months after the fight. Now, there was nothing left to do but to try Louis with all the publicity possible, so that the peoples and posterity might themselves judge as to his knavery and his deceit.

In the matter of the act of high treason on the part of Louis XVI. and his wife, we, who have in our hands the correspondence of Marie-Antoinette with Fersen and the letters of Fersen to various personages, must admit that the Convention judged rightly, even though it had not the overwhelming proofs that we possess to-day. But so many facts had accumulated in the course of the last three years, so many avowals had been let drop by royalists and by the Queen, so many acts of the King since his flight to Varennes, which, although amnestied by the Constitution of 1791, served none the less to explain his ulterior acts—that every one was *morally* certain of his treason. Neither had the people of Paris any doubts on the subject.

In fact, this treason began by the letter which Louis XVI. wrote to the Emperor of Austria the very day on which he took the oath to the Constitution in September 1791, amid the enthusiastic acclamations of the Parisian middle classes. Then came the correspondence of Marie-Antoinette with Fersen, written with the King's knowledge. Nothing is more odious than this correspondence. Ensconced in the Tuileries, the two traitors, the Queen and the King, asked for the invasion, planned it, pointed out the road for it, sent information concerning the forces and the military plans. The triumphal entry of the German allies into Paris and the wholesale massacre of all the revolutionists were planned out by the fair and skilful hand of Marie-Antoinette. The people had estimated truly

the woman they called the "Médicis," she whom the historians wish to represent to us now as a poor madcap.*

From the legal point of view, there is consequently nothing wherewith to reproach the Convention. As to the often-debated question whether the execution of the King did not do more harm than would have been caused by his presence in the midst of the German or English armies, there is only one remark to make. So long as the royal power was considered by the propertied class as the best means of holding in check those who wish to dispossess the rich and diminish the power of the priests—so long the King, dead or alive, in prison or free, beheaded and canonised, going about as a knight-errant among his fellow Kings, would have always been the hero of a pathetic legend invented by the clergy and all interested persons.

On the contrary, by sending Louis to the scaffold, the Revolution succeeded in killing a principle, which the peasants had begun to kill at Varennes. On January 21, 1793, the revolutionary portion of the French people knew well that the pivot of all the power, which for centuries had oppressed and exploited the masses, was broken at last. The demolition of that powerful organisation which was crushing the people was begun; its centre was broken, and the popular revolution took a fresh start.

* Fersen, the friend of Marie-Antoinette, has entered in his private diary what these conspirators were preparing for the French patriots. The Minister of Prussia, Baron de Beck—Fersen wrote—disapproved loudly of their not exterminating the Jacobins in the towns through which they passed, and of their having shown too much clemency. As to the Count de Mercy, he said to Fersen that great severity was needful, and *that Paris ought to be set on fire at the four corners.*

On September 11, Fersen wrote to the Baron de Breteuil that, as the territory conquered by the German armies yields only to force, "mercy in such case appears to me extremely pernicious. *This is the moment to destroy the Jacobins.*" To exterminate the leaders in every place through which the allies should pass, seems to him to be the best means: "We must not hope to win them over by kindness; they must be exterminated, and this is the moment." And Breteuil replies to him that he has spoken of it to the Duke of Brunswick. But the Duke is too mild. The King of Prussia appears to be better: "Varennes, for example, will be chastised one of these days." Vide *Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France. Extrait de papiers . . . publié par son petit-neveu, le Baron R. M. de Klinckowström* (Paris, 1877), vol. ii. pp. 60 *et seq.*

Since then the right divine of Kings has never been able to re-establish itself in France, even with the support of Europe in coalition, even with the aid of the frightful "White Terror" of the Restoration. And royalties issuing from the barricades or from a *coup d'état*, like Napoleon III., have not succeeded either, as we have seen in 1848 and 1870. The very principle of royalty was slain in France.

Everything was done, however, by the Girondins to prevent the condemnation of Louis XVI. They invoked every judicial argument, they had recourse to every parliamentary wile. There were even moments when the King's trial was nearly changed into a trial of the "Mountain." But nothing availed. The logic of the situation carried the day over the quibbles of parliamentary tactics.

At first, the Girondins put forward the pretext of the King's inviolability, established by the Constitution, to which it was triumphantly replied that this inviolability no longer existed —since the King had betrayed the Constitution and his country.

A special tribunal, formed of representatives of the eighty-three departments, was next demanded; and when it became evident that this proposal would be set aside, the Girondins wanted to have the sentence submitted to the ratification of the thirty-six thousand communes and all the primary assemblies by a roll-call of each citizen. This was to call in question again the results of August 10 and the Republic.

When the impossibility of thus laying the trial upon the shoulders of the primary Assemblies was demonstrated, the Girondins, who had themselves most eagerly clamoured for the war and advocated war to the bitter end and against all Europe, began now to plead the effect which would be produced on Europe by the King's execution. As if England, Prussia, Austria and Sardinia had waited for the death of Louis XVI. to make their coalition. As if the democratic Republic was not sufficiently odious to them, as if the allurement of the great commercial ports of France, and her colonies and provinces in the East, were not enough to bring the Kings in coalition against France, so that they might profit by the moment when

the birth of a new society had weakened his powers of military resistance outside his own territory.

Repulsed again on this point by the "Mountain," the Girondins then made a diversion by attacking the "Mountain" itself, demanding that several members of this party should be brought to trial as "the aiders and abettors of the September massacres," by whom were meant Danton, Marat and Robespierre, the "dictators," the "triumvirate."

In the midst of all these discussions the Convention decided on December 3 that it would itself try Louis XVI.; but scarcely was this declared than everything was again called in question by one of the Girondins, Ducos, and the attention of the Convention was turned in another direction. By demanding the penalty of death for "any person who shall propose to restore Kings or royalty in France, no matter under what denomination," the Girondins flung at the "Mountain" an insinuation that the "Mountain" was trying to bring the Duke of Orléans to the throne. They sought to substitute a trial of the "Mountain" for the trial of the King.

At last, on December 11, Louis XVI. appeared before the Convention. He was subjected to an interrogation, and his replies must have killed any lingering sympathy which may have existed in his favour. Michelet asks how was it possible for a man to lie as Louis lied? And he can only explain his deceit by the fact that every kingly tradition and all the influence of the Jesuits to which Louis XVI. had been subjected, had inspired him with the idea that State reasons permitted a King to do anything.

The impression produced by this interrogation was so disadvantageous to Louis that the Girondins, comprehending that it would be impossible to save the King, made a fresh diversion demanding the expulsion of the Duke of Orléans. The Convention allowed a vote to be taken on it, and decreed the expulsion, but the next day the decision was revoked after it had been disapproved by the Jacobin Club.

The trial, however, followed its due course, Louis XVI. appeared a second time before the Convention on December 26, with his advocates and his counsellors, Malesherbes, Tronchet

and Desèze; his defence was heard, and it was evident that he would be condemned. There was no longer any possibility of interpreting his acts as an error of judgment, or as an act of foolishness. It was treason, deliberate and crafty, as Saint-Just the next day showed it to be.

If, however, the Convention and the people of Paris could thus form a clear opinion concerning Louis XVI.—both as man and king—it is to be understood that such was not the case with the provincial towns and villages. And we can imagine the unloosing of passions which would have resulted, had the pronouncing of the penalty been referred to the Primary Assemblies. The majority of the revolutionists having gone to the frontiers, it would, as Robespierre said, have left the decision "to the rich, the natural friend of monarchy, to the selfish, to the feeble and the cowardly, to all the haughty and aristocratic upper middle class, all of them men born to thrive and to oppress under a King."

We shall never disentangle all the intrigues which were set on foot at that time in Paris between the "statesmen." It is enough to say that on January 1, 1793, Dumouriez hastened to Paris and stayed there until the 20th, occupied in clandestine conference with the various parties, while Danton remained until January 14 with the army of Dumouriez.*

At last, on the 14th, after an extremely stormy discussion, the Convention decided to vote, by name, upon three questions, namely, to know whether Louis XVI. was guilty of "conspiring against the liberty of the nation, and of criminal attempts against the general safety of the State"; whether the sentence should be submitted to the sanction of the people; and what should be the penalty.

The roll-call began the next day, the 15th. Out of 749

* Jaurès has pointed out here an important error in Michelet. It was Daunou who, on January 14, pronounced the speech in favour of the King that Michelet has attributed by mistake to Danton. Returning to Paris on January 15, Danton, on the contrary, made a powerful speech demanding the condemnation of Louis XVI. It would be important to verify the accusation against Brissot, Gensonné, Guadet, and Pétion, formulated by Billaud-Varennes in his speech on January 15, 1793 (Pamphlet of 32 pages, published by order of the Convention. British Museum Collection, vol. F, 1097).

nembers of the Convention, 716 declared Louis XVI. guilty. Twelve members were absent through illness or official business, nd five abstained from voting. No one said "not guilty." The appeal to the people was rejected by 423 votes out of the 09 who voted. Paris, during all this time, was in a state of rofound agitation, especially in the faubourgs.

The voting by name on the third question—the penalty—asted twenty-five consecutive hours. Here again, apparently hrough the influence of the Spanish ambassador, and perhaps vith the help of his piastres, one deputy, Mailhe, tried to stir p confusion by voting for a reprieve, and his example was ollowed by twenty-six members. Sentence of death, without ny proviso, was pronounced by 387 out of 721 voters, there eing five who abstained from voting and twelve absent. The entence was therefore pronounced only by a majority of fty-three voices—by twenty-six only, if we exclude the votes ontaining conditions of reprieve. And this was at a moment vhen all the evidence went to prove that the King had plotted reason ; and that to let him live was to arm one-half of France gainst the other, to deliver up a large part of France to the oreigners, and, finally, to stop the Revolution at the time vhen, after three years of hesitation, during which nothing urable had been effected, an opportunity at last presented self of broaching the great questions which were of such ntense interest to the country.

But the fears of the middle classes went so far that on the ay of the King's execution they expected a general massacre.

On January 21, Louis XVI. died upon the scaffold. One f the chief obstacles to all social regeneration within the epublic existed no longer. There is evidence that up to he last moment Louis hoped to be liberated by a rising, and n attempt to carry him off, when on the way to execution, ad in fact been arranged. The vigilance of the Commune used this to fail.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE "MOUNTAIN" AND THE GIRONDE

Policy of "Mountain"—Royalist tendencies of Girondins—They reject agrarian law, and swear to respect property—Continuous conflict between Gironde and "Mountain"—Socialistic aims of Montagnards—Brissot and Robespierre—Order *versus* Revolution

Since August 10 the Commune of Paris had dated its documents from "the Fourth Year of Liberty and the First of Equality." The Convention dated its acts from "the Fourth Year of Liberty and the First Year of the French Republic." And in this little detail already appeared two ideas confronting one another.

Was there to be a new revolution grafted upon the preceding one? Or would France confine herself to establishing and legalising the political liberties won since 1789? Would she be content with consolidating the middle-class government, slightly democratised, without calling upon the mass of the people to take advantage of the immense readjustment of wealth accomplished by the Revolution?

Two totally different ideas, and these two ideas were represented in the Convention, one by the "Mountain," and the other by the Gironde.

On the one side were those who understood that for the destruction of the ancient feudal system, it was not enough to register a beginning of its abolition in the laws; and that, to bring the reign of absolutism to an end, it was not enough to dethrone a King, set up the emblem of the Republic on the public buildings, and print its name upon the headings of official papers; that this was only a beginning, nothing but the creation of certain conditions which would perhaps permit

he remodelling of the institutions. And those who thus nderstood the Revolution were supported by all who wished he great mass of the people to come forth at last from the ideous poverty, so degrading and brutalising, into which the ld *régime* had plunged them—all who sought, who strove to iscover in the lessons of the Revolution the true means of levating these masses, both physically and morally. With hem were great numbers of the poor, whom the Revolution ad taught to think.

And opposed to them were the Girondins—a party formidble in its numbers: for the Girondins were not only the two undred members grouped around Vergniaud, Brissot and oland. They were an immense portion of the French nation; lmost all the well-to-do middle class; all the constitutionalists hom the force of circumstances had made republicans, but ho feared the Republic because they feared the domination of ie masses. And behind them, ready to support them, while aiting for the moment to crush them too, for re-establishg royalty, were all those who trembled for their wealth, as ell as for their educational privileges—all those whom the evolution had deprived of their old privileges, and who were ghing for the return of the old *régime*.

In fact, we see quite clearly that not only the "Plain," ut also three-fourths of the Girondins were royalists as much the Feuillants. For, if some of their leaders dreamed of kind of antique republic, without a king, but with a people edient to the laws made by the rich and the learned, the reater number would have very willingly accepted a king. hey gave ample proof of this by their good fellowship with the yalists after the *coup d'état* of Thermidor. And, all things nsidered, this attitude of mind of the Girondins is quite mprehensible, because the essential thing for them was *the tablishment of government by the middle classes*, who were en rapidly growing in trade and commerce, on the ruins feudalism, and, as Brissot used to say, "the preservation of operty" was for them the main point.

Hence their hatred of the people and their love of rder."

To prevent a rising of the people, to constitute a strong government, and to protect property, this was what was essential for the Girondins at this moment; and it is because most historians failed to comprehend this fundamental character of Girondism, that they have sought for so many other secondary circumstances to explain the conflict that broke out between the "Mountain" and the Gironde.

When we see the Girondins "repudiating the agrarian law," "refusing to recognise equality as a principle of republican legislation," and "swearing to respect property," we may perhaps think all that a little too abstract in a hundred years' time. Those formulas had, however, in the time of the Revolution, a very exact meaning.

To reject the agrarian law meant at that time to reject the attempts to place the land in the hands of those who cultivated it. It meant rejecting the idea, so popular among the revolutionists sprung from the people, that no landed property—no farm—should be of more than 120 *arpents* (about 180 acres); that every citizen had a right to the land; and that it was necessary to seize the property of the *émigrés* and the clergy, as well as the large estates of the rich, and to divide them between the poor labourers who possessed nothing.

"To take the oath to respect property" was to deny to the rural communities the right of resuming possession of the lands which had been taken from them for two centuries, by virtue of the royal ordinance of 1669; it was to oppose, in favour of the lords and of the recent middle-class buyers of land, the abolition of the feudal rights without redemption.

Finally, it was to combat any attempt at levying upon the rich commercial class and the stock-jobbers a progressive tax; it was to keep the heavy charges of the war and the Revolution upon the poor only.

The abstract formula had thus, as we see, a very tangible meaning.

In fact, over each of these questions the "Mountain" had to carry on a bitter struggle against the Girondins; so much so, that it was forced to appeal to the people, to approve of insurrection, and to expel the Girondins from the Convention, in

order to be able to make even a few steps in the direction just mentioned.

For the time being, this "respect for property" was asserted by the Girondins in the smallest things, even in the inscribing of the words *Liberty, Equality, Property*, on the base of the statues which they carried at a festival; in the embracing of Danton, when he said at the first sitting of the Convention: "Let us declare that all properties, territorial, individual and industrial, shall be for ever respected." At these words the Girondin Kersaint fell upon his neck, saying: "I repent of having called you a sedition-monger this morning," which was as much as to say, "Since you promise to respect middle-class property, let us pass over your responsibility for the September massacres!"

While the Girondins were thus endeavouring to organise the middle-class republic, and to lay the foundations for the enrichment of the middle classes on the model set by England after her revolution of 1646, the members of the "Mountain" —or rather, the advanced group among them, which for a short time took the lead over the moderate section, represented by Robespierre—sketched the broad outlines of what would have been the basis for a socialist society—meaning no offence to those of our contemporaries who wrongfully claim to be the first to have done so. The Montagnards wanted, first, to abolish the last vestiges of feudalism, and then to equalise property, to destroy the great landed estates, and give the land to all, even to the poorest labourers. They intended at the same time to organise the national distribution of the products of prime necessity, estimated at their just value, and, by means of a properly handled taxation, to fight "commercialism"—that is, the whole tribe of rich stock-jobbers, bankers, merchants and captains of industry, who were rapidly multiplying and accumulating large fortunes.

At the same time, they had proclaimed, since 1793, "the universal right of well-being—well-being for all," which the socialists later on turned into "the right to work." This right had been already mentioned in 1789 (on August 27), and again in the Constitution of 1791. But even the most

advanced of the Girondins were too fettered by their middle-class education to comprehend this right of universal well-being, which implied the right of all to the land and a complete reorganisation, freed from speculation in the distribution of the products necessary for existence.

The Girondins were generally described by their contemporaries as "a party of refined, subtle, intriguing and, above all, ambitious people," fickle, talkative, combative, but in the manner of barristers. "They want the Republic," said Couthon, "but they want also the aristocracy." "They displayed much tenderness," said Robespierre, "but a tenderness which sighed almost exclusively for the enemies of liberty."

They felt a kind of aversion towards the masses; they were afraid of them.*

At the time when the Convention assembled, the gulf that separated the Girondins from the Montagnards was not yet understood. Many saw only a personal rivalry between Brissot and Robespierre. Madame Jullien, for instance, a true friend of the "Mountain" and a true democrat in sentiment, in her letters, called upon the two rivals to cease their fratricidal struggle. But it had already become a struggle between two opposite principles: the party of order and the party of the Revolution.

The people, in a period of strife, and, later on, the historians, always like to personify every conflict in two rivals. It is briefer, more convenient for conversation, and it is also more "romantic," more "dramatic." This is why the struggle between these two parties was so often represented as the clashing of two ambitions, Brissot's and Robespierre's. As is always the case, the two heroes in whom the people personified the

* It is necessary to read the *Mémoires* of Buzot to understand the hatred and contempt of the Girondins for the people. We constantly meet phrases of this kind: "Paris is made up of September murderers"; "here one wallows in the filth of this corrupt city"; "one must have the vice of the people of Paris to please them," &c. *Vide* Buzot, *Mémoires sur la Révolution française, précédés d'un précis de sa vie*, by M. Gaudet (Paris, 1828), pp. 32, 45, 141, &c. *See also* Pétion's letter to Buzot of February 6, 1792, published in the *Révolutions de Paris*, vol. xi. p. 263, from which Aulard has given extracts.

conflict were well chosen. They were typical. But, in reality, Robespierre did not accept the principle of equality to the extent it was accepted by the Montagnards after the fall of the Girondins. He belonged to the group of moderates. In March and May 1793, he understood that, if he wanted the Revolution to triumph, he must not separate himself from those who demanded expropriatory measures, and he acted accordingly—leaving himself free to guillotine later the Left wing, the Hébertists, and to crush the "extremists." Brissot, on the other hand, was not always a supporter of order; he admitted "disorder" up to the moment when his party had come to power. But, all things considered, the two men represented the two parties very well.

A struggle to the bitter end was, therefore, inevitable between the middle-class party of order and that of the popular revolution.

The Girondist party, having come into power, wanted that everything should now be restored to order; that the Revolution with its revolutionary proceedings should cease, as soon as they took the helm. No more disturbance in the street; everything was henceforth to be under the orders of the ministers, appointed by a docile parliament.

As to the party of the "Mountain," they wanted the Revolution to accomplish such changes as would really modify the whole of the conditions prevailing in France: especially for the peasants, who represented more than two-thirds of the population, and the poverty-stricken folk in the towns; changes which would make it impossible ever to go back to the royal and feudal past.

Some day, a year or two later, the Revolution would calm itself; the people, being exhausted, would have gone back into their cabins and hovels; the *émigrés* would return; the priests and the nobles would again get the upper hand. Therefore it was all the more urgent that they should find everything changed in France; the land in other hands, already watered with the sweat of its new owners; and these owners regarding themselves not as intruders, but as having the right to plough

this land and to reap it. They must find the whole of France transformed in its manners, its habits, its language—a land where every man would consider himself the equal of his fellow men from the moment he handled the plough, the spade, or the tool. But for this it was of absolute necessity that the Revolution should continue even though it had to sacrifice a number of those whom the people had appointed to be their representatives, by sending them to the Convention.

Of course such a struggle would be a struggle to the death. For it must not be forgotten that these men of order and government, the Girondins, nevertheless considered the revolutionary tribunal and the guillotine as the most efficacious wheels of government. But it could not be avoided.

Already on October 24, 1792, when Brissot published his first pamphlet, in which he demanded a *coup d'état* against the disorganisers, the "anarchists" and the "Tarpeian Rock" for Robespierre;* already from October 29, when Louvet made in the Convention his speech of accusation in which he demanded the head of Robespierre, the Girondins were holding the knife of the guillotine suspended over the heads of the "levellers, the abettors of disorder, the anarchists," who had had the audacity to take sides with the people of Paris and their revolutionary Commune.†

Ever since that day the Girondins had not ceased in their efforts to despatch the "Mountain" party to the guillotine. Thus, on March 21, 1793, when the defeat of Dumouriez at Neerwinden became known at Paris, and Marat rose to accuse

* "Three Revolutions," he wrote, "were necessary to save France: the first to overthrow despotism; the second to destroy royalty; the third to beat down anarchy! And to this last Revolution I have consecrated my pen and all my efforts *since August* 11" (J. P. Brissot, député à la Convention Nationale, *A tous les républicains de France, sur la Société des Jacobins de Paris*. Pamphlet dated October 24, 1792). Both Brissot's pamphlets were reprinted in London.

† Louvet made no concealment of the true meaning of his "Robespierride." When he saw that the shot directed by him and his friends had missed fire, and that the Convention had not put Robespierre on his trial, on going home he said to his wife, Lodoïska: "We must be prepared for the scaffold or exile." He tells this in his *Mémoires*, p. 74. He felt that the weapon he had aimed at the "Mountain" was turning against himself.

him of treason, the Girondins nearly killed him in the Convention; he was saved merely by his cool audacity; and three weeks later, on April 12, returning to the charge, they ended by getting the Convention to send Marat before the revolutionary tribunal. Six weeks later, on May 24, it was the turn of Hébert, the vice-procureur of the Commune; of Varlet, the working-man preacher of socialism, and other "anarchists" whom they caused to be arrested in the hope of sending them to the scaffold. In short, it was a regular campaign for turning the members of the "Mountain" out of the Convention, for throwing them down the "Tarpeian Rock."

At the same time the Girondins were organising counter-revolutionary committees everywhere; and they kept up an uninterrupted stream of petitions, directed against the Montagnards coming to the Convention from persons who styled themselves "friends of law and liberty"—we know to-day what that means—while those of them who were in the Convention wrote letters, full of calumnies, to their friends in the provinces, exciting them against the "Mountain," and especially against the revolutionary population of Paris. And while the commissioners of the Convention made superhuman efforts to repel the invasion, and tried to stimulate the ardour of the people by applying measures of equality, the Girondins opposed them at every point, in all directions, by means of the despatches they sent to their electors. They endeavoured even to prevent the collection of necessary information concerning the estates of the *émigrés* which had to be confiscated and put up for sale.

In his *Patriote française*, Brissot conducted a bitter campaign against the revolutionists, and altogether the Girondins demanded—nay, they insisted on—the dissolution of the revolutionary Commune of Paris; and they went even so far as to demand the dissolution of the Convention and the election of a new Assembly in which none of the present members of the Convention could be re-elected. And finally, "Commission of the Twelve," which lay in wait for the moment when a *coup d'état* should enable them to send the chief members of the "Mountain" to the scaffold

CHAPTER XL

ATTEMPTS OF THE GIRONDINS TO STOP THE REVOLUTION

Girondins represent middle classes—They support *Liberty*, but oppose *Equality*—Views of Brissot—Girondins and "anarchists"

So long as it was a question of overthrowing the old *régime* of absolute monarchy, the Girondins were in the front rank. High-spirited, fearless poets imbued with admiration for the republics of antiquity, and desirous of power at the same time—how could they adapt themselves to the old *régime?*

Therefore, while the peasants were burning the châteaux of the landlords and their tax-registers, while the people were demolishing the relics of feudal servitude, the Girondins were busy chiefly with establishing the new political forms of government. They saw themselves already in power, masters of the destiny of France, sending forth armies to carry Liberty into the four quarters of the earth.

As to bread for the people, did they ever think about that? Certain it is that they never realised the force of resistance possessed by the old *régime*, and that they never thought that to conquer this force they would have to appeal to the people. The people must pay the taxes, vote at elections, furnish soldiers to the State; but as to making or unmaking political forms of government, that must be the work of the thinkers, of the governing class, of the statesmen.

Therefore, when the King had summoned the Germans to his aid, and they were on their way to Paris, the Girondins, who had wished for the war to rid them of the Court, refused to appeal to the people in revolt to repel the invasion and

rive out the traitors from the Tuileries. Even after August
o, the idea of repelling the foreigner by the Revolution
eemed so hateful to them, that Roland convoked the leading
ien, including Danton and his friends, to speak to them about
is plan. This was to flee, to transport the Assembly and the
risoner King to Blois first, and thence to the South, thus
elivering up the North of France to the invaders, and con-
ituting a little republic somewhere in the Gironde.

The people, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people
hich saved France, did not exist for them. They were
erely bureaucrats.

Altogether the Girondins were the faithful representatives
the middle classes. According as the people grew bolder,
d claimed that the rich should be taxed, and equal chances
wealth be given to all; as soon as they demanded *equality*
the necessary condition of *liberty*—the middle classes began
say it was time to draw the line between themselves and the
ople and to reduce the popular masses to "order."

The Girondins followed this current. When they came
to power, these middle-class revolutionaries, who until then
d given themselves heart and soul to the Revolution, sepa-
ted themselves from the people. The efforts of the people,
striving to set up its own political organisation within the
tions of the large cities, and the popular societies through-
t France, their desire to march forward on the road of
uality were in their eyes a danger for the whole of the
opertied classes, and constituted a crime.

And henceforth the Girondins resolved to stop the Revolu-
n: to establish a strong government and to reduce the
ople to submission—by means of the guillotine if need be.
order to comprehend the great drama of the Revolution
ich ended in the insurrection of Paris on May 31, and the
urification" of the Convention, one must read what the
rondins said themselves; and in this respect the two
mphlets of Brissot are especially instructive.*

"I thought, on entering the Convention," says Brissot

* *Brissot à ses commettants* (May 23, 1793), and *A tous les républi-
s de France* (October 24, 1792).

"that since royalty was annihilated, and since nearly all power was concentrated in the hands of the people or of their representatives, the patriots must change their way of proceeding since their position had changed."

"I thought that the insurrectionary movement must cease, because, when there was no longer a tyranny to be struck down, there ought to be no longer any force in insurrection."*

"I thought," Brissot says further on, "that order alone could produce tranquillity; that order consisted of a religious respect for the laws, the magistrates and the safety of the individual. . . . I thought, consequently, that order, also, was a *truly revolutionary measure*. . . . I thought therefore that the real enemies of the people and of the Republic were the *anarchists, the preachers of agrarian law*, the exciters of sedition."†

"Twenty anarchists," Brissot goes on to say, "have usurped an influence in the Convention which should belong to reason alone." Follow the debates and you shall see on one side men constantly occupied with the care of causing the laws, the constituted authorities and property to be respected; and on the other hand are men constantly occupied in keeping the people agitated, in discrediting by calumny the constituted authorities, in protecting the impunity of crime, and in loosening all the bonds of society."‡

It is true that those whom Brissot called "anarchists" comprised very diverse elements. But they all had this one trait in common: they did not believe the Revolution had ended, and they acted accordingly.

They knew that the Convention would do nothing without being forced by the people. And for that reason they organised the popular rising. In Paris they proclaimed the sovereign power of the Commune, and they tried to establish national unity, not by means of a central government, but by direct relations established between the municipality and the sections of Paris, and the thirty-six thousand communes of France.

Now this is precisely what the Girondins would not allow.

* *J. P. Brissot à ses commettants*, p. 7.
† *Supra*, pp. 8, 9. ‡ *Supra*, p. 13.

"I have declared," says Brissot, "since the beginning of e Convention that there was in France a party of dis-ganisers, which was tending towards the dissolution of the public, even while it was in its cradle. . . . I can prove day: first, that this party of anarchists has dominated and l dominates nearly all the deliberations of the Convention d the workings of the Executive Council; secondly, that s party has been and still is the sole cause of all the evils, ernal as well as the external, which afflict France; and rdly, that the Republic can only be saved by taking rigorous asures to wrest the representatives of the nation from the potism of this faction."

For any one who knows the character of the epoch, this guage is quite plain. Brissot was simply demanding the llotine for those whom he called anarchists and who, by nting to go on with the Revolution and to finish the abolition the feudal system, were preventing the middle classes, and Girondins in particular, from manipulating the Convention their own advantage.

'It is necessary, therefore, to define this anarchy," says representative Girondin, and here is his definition:

'Laws that are not carried into effect, authorities without ce and despised, crime unpunished, *property attacked*, the ety of the individual violated, the morality of the people rupted, no constitution, no government, no justice, these the features of anarchy!"

But, is not this precisely the way by which all revolutions made? As if Brissot himself did not know it, and had not ctised it before attaining power! For three years, from May 9 to August 10, 1792, it had been necessary to despise authority of the King—and to have an "authority without ce," in order to be able to overthrow it on August 10.

Only what Brissot wanted was, that once that point had been ched, and the authority of the King was overthrown, the olution might cease the same day.

ince royalty was overthrown and the Convention had ome the supreme power, "all insurrectionary movement," ells us, "ought to have stopped."

What was most distasteful to the Girondins was the tendency of the Revolution towards Equality—the most dominant tendency in the Revolution at this moment, as M. Faguet has clearly demonstrated.* Thus, Brissot could not forgive the Jacobin Club for having taken the name—not "Friends of the Republic," but "Friends of Liberty and Equality"—especially of Equality! And he could not pardon the "anarchists" for having inspired the petitions "of those workers in the camp at Paris who styled themselves *the nation*, and who wished to fix their salary by that of the deputies!"†

"The disorganisers," he says elsewhere, "are those who want to level everything—property, comforts, the price of commodities, *the various services rendered to the State*, &c., who want the workmen in the camp to receive the salary of the legislator; who want to level even talents, knowledge, the virtues, because they have none of these things."‡

* *L'œuvre sociale de la Révolution française*, edited, with introduction, by Emile Faguet. Paris, undated, ? 1900.

† Brissot, *supra*, p. 29.

‡ Brissot, Pamphlet dated October 24, 1792.

CHAPTER XLI

THE "ANARCHISTS"

Anarchists not a party—Their aims and policy—Brissot quoted—He attacks anarchists—Gironde and anarchists—Girondist programme

' who were those anarchists of whom Brissot spoke so ch, and whose extermination he demanded with so much :our ?

irst of all, the anarchists did not form *a party*. In the vention there were the parties of the "Mountain," the onde, the "Plain," or rather the "Marsh" (sometimes called *entre*), but there were no "anarchists." Danton, Marat, even Robespierre, or some other Jacobin of the same ip, could work at times with the anarchists; but they ys remained outside the Convention. They were, one nt almost say, above it: they dominated it.

he "anarchists" were the revolutionists scattered all France. They had given themselves to the Revolution r and soul; they understood the necessity for it; they d it, and they worked for it.

Many of them gathered round the Paris Commune, because as still revolutionary; a certain number of them were bers of the Cordeliers' Club; some of them belonged to Jacobin Club. But their true domain was *the Section*, still more so, the Street. In the Convention, they were e seen in the galleries, where they guided the debates by approbation or disapproval. Their effective means of n was the opinion of *the people*, not "the public opinion" e middle classes. Their real weapon was the insurrection,

and with this weapon they influenced the deputies and the executive power.

When it became necessary to make a fresh attempt to inflame the people and to march *with them* against the Tuileries, it was they who prepared the attack and fought in the ranks. And when the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people had cooled—they returned to the obscurity from whence they had sprung, leaving us only the rancorous pamphlets of their adversaries by which we are enabled to discover the immense revolutionary work they have accomplished.

As to their ideas, they were clear and decided. The Republic—of course! They believed in it. Equality before the law was another of their canons. But that was not all: far from it.

To use political liberty as the means for gaining economic liberty, as had been recommended to them by the middle classes! They knew that this could not be done. Therefore they wanted *the thing itself*. The Land for All—which was what they called "the agrarian law"—and Economic Equality or to use the language of that period, "the levelling of wealth."

But let us hear what Brissot has to say about them: "These are the men," he says, "who have divided society into two classes, those who have and those who have not—*the unbreeches ones* (*sans-culottes*), and *the property-owners*—and who have stirred up the one against the other.

"They are the men," Brissot goes on to say, "who, under the name of sections, have never ceased from wearying the Convention with petitions, demanding a maximum for corn.

They are the men who have incited "the petition of those ten thousand men, who declared themselves in a state of insurrection if the price of wheat was not fixed," and who are stirring up revolts all over France.

These, then, were the crimes of those who were described by Brissot as the "anarchists": to have divided the nation into two classes; the Haves and the Have-Nots; to have stirred up the one against the other; to have demanded bread—and above all, bread for those who worked.

They were unquestionably great criminals. But who of the

earned socialists of the nineteenth century has been able to nvent anything better than this demand of our ancestors n 1793: "Bread for all"? Many more words there are o-day, but less action!

As for their methods of putting their ideas into execution, ere they are: "The multiplicity of crimes," Brissot tells us, is produced by impunity; impunity by the paralysis of the aw courts; and the anarchists stand up for this impunity, and elp to paralyse the courts, either by terrorism or by denouncing nd accusing the aristocracy."

"Of repeated outrages on property and individual safety he anarchists of Paris give examples every day; and their rivate emissaries, as well as those whom they distinguish by he title of commissioners of the Convention, are preaching his violation of the rights of man everywhere."

Brissot then mentions "the anarchists' eternal denunciations f property-owners and merchants, whom they designate by he name of 'monopolists'"; he speaks of "property-owners vho are unceasingly branded as robbers," of the hatred the narchists feel towards every State official. "From the mo- nent," he says, "when a man takes office, he becomes odious o the anarchists, he becomes guilty." And with cause, say ve.

But Brissot is superb when he is enumerating the benefits of order." It is a passage that must be read if one wishes to omprehend what the Girondist middle class would have given he French people, if the "anarchists" had not given a further mpulse to the Revolution. "Consider," he says, "the de- artments where the fury of these men has been restrained; ake for example, the department of the Gironde. Order has onstantly reigned there; the people there submit to the law, lthough they are paying ten *sols* a pound for bread. . . . The eason is that from this department the citizens have expelled ne preachers of the agrarian law, that they have nailed up the oors of that club * where they teach . . ." &c.

And this was written two months after August 10, when the lindest person could not fail to understand that if the people

* The Jacobin Club.

all over France had "submitted to the law, although they were paying ten *sols* a pound for bread" there would have been no Revolution at all, and royalty, which Brissot feigned to be fighting, as well as feudalism, might perhaps have reigned for still another century, as in Russia.*

We must read Brissot to understand what the middle classes were then preparing for France, and what the "Brissotins" of the twentieth century are still preparing wherever a revolution is going to break out.

"The troubles in the Eure; the Orne and elsewhere," says Brissot, "have been caused by preachings against the rich, against the monopolists, by seditious sermons on the necessity of fixing by force a maximum price for grains and all foodstuffs."

And of Orléans, he says: "This town enjoyed since the beginning of the Revolution a tranquillity that has not even been touched by the disturbances arising elsewhere through the scarcity of grain, although grain was one of the staple commodities of the town. . . . However, this harmony between the poor and the rich was not according to the principles of anarchy; and so one of these men to whom order brings despair, for whom disturbance is the only aim, rushed in to break this happy harmony by exciting the *sans-culottes* against the property-owners."

"Again it is this anarchy," exclaims Brissot, "which has created a revolutionary influence in the army": "Who now can doubt the terrible evil which has been caused in our armies by this anarchist doctrine that would establish under cover of equality in law equality both universal *and in fact*—the scourge of society, just as the other is its support? Anarchic doctrine

* Louis Blanc has defined Brissot extremely well in saying that he was one of those men who are "republicans in advance of the time to-day, and revolutionaries behind the time to-morrow"; people who have not the strength to follow the century, after having had the audacity to outstrip it. After having written in his youth that "property was theft," his respect for property became so great that on the morrow of August 4, he blamed the Assembly for the precipitation with which it had published its decrees against feudalism; and that at a moment when citizens were embracing each other in the street in congratulation of these decrees.

which would bring down to one level learning and ignorance, virtue and vice, offices, salaries, services."

This is what the Brissotins will never pardon in the anarchists: equality in law may be forgiven, but it must never become equality in fact. Had not Brissot, moreover, been sufficiently angered already by the navvies engaged in the camp at Paris, who one day asked that their wages might be made equal to the salary of the deputies? The idea of such a thing! Brissot and a navvy put upon the same level—not in law, but "in fact"! Miserable wretches!

But how did it happen that the anarchists exercised such a great power even to the dominating of the terrible Convention and the dictating of its decisions?

Brissot tells us how in his pamphlets. "It is," he says, "the galleries of the Convention, the *people* of Paris, and the *Commune* who dominate the position and force the hand of the Convention every time some revolutionary measure is taken."

At the outset, Brissot tells us, the Convention was very wise. "You would see," said he, "the majority of the Convention, sincere, sane, the friends of principles, with their eyes always fixed upon the law." They welcomed "almost unanimously" every proposal which tended to humble and crush "the abettors of disorder."

One can guess the revolutionary results which were to be expected from these representatives who always kept their eyes fixed on the law—the royal and feudal law; fortunately, the "anarchists" had something to say in the matter. But these "anarchists" knew that their place was not in the Convention, among the representatives—their place was *in the street;* they understood that if they ever set foot inside the Convention, it must not be to debate with the "members of the Right," or the "Frogs of the Marsh"; it must be to exact something, either from the top of the galleries where the public sat, or through an invasion of the Convention, with the people at their back.

"In this fashion, little by little the brigands" (Brissot is speaking of the "anarchists") "have audaciously lifted up their heads. From being the accused, they have transformed

themselves into the accusers ; instead of being silent spectators at our debates, they have become the arbiters."—" We are in the midst of a revolution," was their reply.

In fact, those whom Brissot called " anarchists " saw further and were giving proofs of a political wisdom far exceeding that shown by those who were pretending to govern France. If the Revolution had ended in the triumph of the Brissotins, without having abolished the feudal system, and without having given back the land to the Communes—where should we be to-day ?

But perhaps Brissot has formulated somewhere a programme in which he explains how the Girondins proposed to put an end to the feudal system and the struggles it provoked ? At the supreme moment, when the people of Paris were demanding the expulsion of the Girondins from the Convention, he may perhaps have said how the Girondins proposed to satisfy, were it only in part, the most pressing of the popular needs ?

He never says anything, absolutely not a word of the sort. The party of the Gironde cut short the whole of this question by repeating that to touch property, whether it be feudal or middle class, is to do the work of the " leveller," of the " aider and abettor of disorder," of the " anarchist." People of that sort should be simply exterminated.

" Before August 10, the disorganisers were real revolutionists," writes Brissot, " because a republican had to be a disorganiser. But the disorganisers of to-day are the real counter-revolutionists ; they are enemies of the people, because the ' people ' are master now. What is left for them to desire ? Interior tranquillity, since this tranquillity alone assures to the owner his property, to the worker his work, to the poor their daily bread, and to all the enjoyment of liberty." *

Brissot did not even understand that at that time of scarcity, when the price of bread had gone up to six or seven *sous* the pound, the people might well demand an edict to fix the price of bread. Only " anarchists " could make such a demand ! †

For him and for the whole of the Gironde, the *Revolution* was terminated since the movement of August 10 had placed

* Pamphlet dated October 24, 1792.
† *Ibid.* p. 19.

their party in power. There was nothing more to be done but to accept the situation and obey whatever political laws the Convention should make. They did not even understand the man of the people, who said that, since the feudal laws remained, since the land had not been given back to the Communes, since in all things concerning the land question there was merely a provisional arrangement, since the poor had still to bear the whole burden of the war—*the Revolution was not ended*, and only revolutionary action could bring it to an end, seeing the immense resistance offered by the old *régime* to every attempt at decisive measures.

The party of the Gironde could not even comprehend this. They admitted only one class of discontented—that of the citizens who feared "either for their riches, their comforts, or their lives." * Any other kind of discontented had no right to exist. And when we know in what a state of uncertainty the Legislative Assembly had left all questions pertaining to the land, we can but ask how such an attitude of mind *could be possible?* In what sort of unreal world of political intrigue did these men live? We should not be able to understand them at all, were it not that we know too many like them among our own contemporaries.

Brissot's conclusion, accepted by all the Girondins, was as follows: "We must make a *coup d'état*, a third revolution, which must 'beat down anarchy.' Dissolve the Commune of Paris, and destroy its sections! Dissolve the clubs which preach disorder and equality! Close the Jacobin Club, and seal up its papers! The 'Tarpeian Rock,' that is, the guillotine, for 'the triumvirate' of Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, as well as for all the 'levellers'—all the 'anarchists.' Then, a new Convention will be elected, but not one of the present members shall sit again" (which meant, of course, a certainty of triumph for the counter-revolution). A strong Government, and Order—restored! Such was the Girondins' programme ever since the fall of the King had carried them into power and made "the disorganisers useless."

What was left, then, for the revolutionists to do if not to take

* Pamphlet dated October 24, 1792, p. 127.

up the fight, and fight for life or death? Either the Revolution must have stopped short—unfinished as it was—and then the counter-revolution of Thermidor would have begun fifteen months sooner, in the spring of 1793, before the abolition of the feudal rights had been accomplished; or else the Girondins had to be expelled from the Convention, notwithstanding all the services they had rendered to the Revolution, so long as royalty had to be fought. It was impossible to ignore these services. "No doubt," exclaimed Robespierre, in the famous sitting of April 10—"they have struck at the Court, at the *émigrés*, at the priests, and that with a heavy hand; but at what time? When they had still to gain power. Once they had gained it, their ardour soon abated. *How quickly they changed the objects of their hatred!*"

The Revolution could not be left unfinished. It had to go on—over their bodies, if necessary. And, therefore, Paris and the revolutionary departments, ever since February 1793, were in the throes of an agitation which culminated in the movement of May 31.

CHAPTER XLII

CAUSES OF THE RISING ON MAY 31

Struggle between "Mountain" and "Gironde"—Momentous questions—Inactivity of Convention—Montagnards—Robespierre—Counter-revolution gains ground—Directories of departments and districts—New Commune—Growth of Popular Societies, Fraternal Societies and Revolutionary Committees—*Federalism*—Centralisation—Gironde and "Mountain"

DURING the early part of 1793, the struggle between the "Mountain" and the "Gironde" grew daily more envenomed according as these three great questions presented themselves to France.

First: Were all the feudal dues to be abolished without redemption, or were these survivals of feudalism to continue to starve the farmer and paralyse agriculture? This was the burning question which meant so much to an agricultural population of nearly twenty millions, including those who had bought the greater part of the national lands taken from the clergy and the emigrant nobles.

Secondly: Were the villages to retain possession of the communal lands which they had retaken from the lords? Would the right of resuming possession be recognised for those Communes that had not already done so? Would the right of every citizen to the land be admitted?

And thirdly: Was the *maximum* going to be introduced, which meant the fixing of the price of bread and other commodities of prime necessity?

These three great questions were exciting the whole of France and had divided it into two hostile camps. On one side were those who possessed property; on the other, those who possessed nothing—the rich and the poor; those who were

enriching themselves in spite of misery, scarcity and war, and those who were supporting the whole burden of the war and yet had to stand for hours, and sometimes for entire nights at the baker's door, without being able in the end to carry home a morsel of food.

And yet months—five to eight months—passed without the Convention having done anything to change the situation or to solve the great social problems evolved by the development of the Revolution itself. Time was spent in endless discussions in the Convention and hatred was increasing between the two parties, of which one stood for the rich, and the other defended the poor, while no agreement, no compromise was possible between those who defended property and those who wished to attack it.

It is true that the "Montagnards" themselves had no very clear ideas about economic questions, and were divided into two groups—the one known as the "Enragés" being the much more advanced of the two. The other group, to which Robespierre belonged, was inclined to take views almost as much in defence of property as were those of the Girondins concerning the three great questions just mentioned. But little as we may sympathise with Robespierre, it must be admitted that he developed with the Revolution and he always felt deeply for the sufferings of the people. In the National Assembly, ever since 1791, he had spoken in favour of restoring the communal lands to the Communes. The more he saw of the property-owning and commercial selfishness of the middle classes the more openly he sided with the people and the revolutionary Commune of Paris—with those who were then called the "anarchists."

"The food necessary for the people," he declared in the Convention, "is as sacred as life itself. All that is necessary to preserve life is property common to the whole of society. It is only what is in excess of this that may become private property, and may be given up to the industrial activities of the traders."

What a pity that this frankly communistic idea did not prevail among the nineteenth-century socialists instead of the

"collectivism" of Pecqueur and Vidal, which was preached in 1848 and is now being dished up again under the name of "scientific socialism." What might not the trend of the Communist movement in 1871 have been, had it recognised as its principle that "all things necessary for life are as sacred as life itself and represent the common property of the whole nation"—if it had taken as its watchword: "The Commune organising consumption and guaranteeing well-being for all."

Everywhere and always a revolution is made by minorities. Even among those deeply interested in the Revolution it is only a minority that devotes itself entirely to it. This was also the case in France in 1793.

As soon as royalty was overthrown a gigantic movement was set on foot throughout the provinces against the revolutionists who had dared to fling down the head of a King as a defiance to all the reactionaries of Europe. In the manor-house, the drawing-room, the confessional, the cry was: "What scoundrels to have dared to do that! Now they will stop at nothing: they are going to rob us of our wealth, or else guillotine us!" And so the plots of the counter-revolutionists redoubled in vigour.

The Church, every Court of Europe, the English middle classes, all took part in the work of intrigue, propaganda and corruption for organising the counter-revolution.

The maritime towns, especially such as Nantes, Bordeaux and Marseilles, where there were many rich merchants, Lyons, the manufacturer of luxury, Rouen, the centre of trade and industry, became powerful centres of reaction. Whole regions were influenced by priests and *emigres* who had returned under false names, and also by English and Orléanist gold, as well as by emissaries from Italy, Spain, and Russia.

The party of the "Gironde" served as the rallying-point for this mass of reaction, for the royalists knew perfectly well that the Girondins, in spite of their apparent republicansim, were really their allies, and that they were compelled to be so *by the logic of their party*, which is always much more powerful than the party label. And the people, on its side, understood the situation perfectly. It knew that so long as the Girondins

remained in the Convention no real revolutionary measure would be possible, and that the war carried on so feebly by these sybarites of the Revolution would be prolonged indefinitely to the utter exhaustion of France. Accordingly, therefore, as the necessity for "purifying the Convention" by the elimination of the Girondins became more and more evident, the people on its side tried to organise itself for the local struggles which were imminent in every large city and every small town and village.

We have already remarked that the Directories of the departments were mostly counter-revolutionary. The Directories of the districts were equally so. But the municipalities, established by the law of 1789, were much more democratic. It is true that when they were first constituted in the summer of 1789, they mercilessly repressed the peasant revolts. But, as the Revolution developed, the municipalities, elected by the people often in the midst of insurrectionary disturbances and under the supervision of the Popular Societies, gradually became more revolutionary.

In Paris, previous to August 10, the council of the Commune had been composed of middle-class democrats. But during the night of August 10, a new revolutionary Commune was elected by the forty-eight sections, and although the Convention, at the instance of the Girondins, had dissolved this Commune, the new Commune elected on December 2, 1792, with its procurator, Chaumette, its deputy-procurator, Hébert, and its mayor, Pache (who was appointed somewhat later), was a frankly revolutionary body.

An elected body of officials invested with powers so extensive and so diverse as those entrusted to the council of the Paris Commune would have certainly inclined by degrees towards a moderate policy. But the people of Paris had, in the sections, centres for revolutionary action. These sections, however, according as they arrogated to themselves various political powers, such as the right of distributing cards of citizenship to show that the recipient was not a royalist conspirator, the appointing of volunteers to fight in La Vendée, and so on—these very sections, whose Committee of Public Welfare and

the Committee of General Safety were working to make them political organs, in their turn soon inclined to officialism and conservatism. In 1795, they became, in fact, the rallying-points for the middle-class reaction.

This is why a network of Popular Societies and Fraternal Societies, as well as Revolutionary Committees, was constituted side by side with the Commune and the sections to become, after the expulsion of the Girondins in the Year II. of the Republic, a real power for action. All these groups federated with each other, either for momentary purposes or for continuous action, and they endeavoured to put themselves in touch with the thirty-six thousand communes of France. For this purpose they organised a special correspondence-bureau.

A new, freely constituted organisation thus came into existence. And when we study these groupings—these "free understandings," we should say now—we see before us the realisation of what the modern anarchist groups in France are advocating without even knowing that their grandfathers had already put it into practice during so tragic a moment of the Revolution as was the early part of 1793.*

The majority of historians in sympathy with the Revolution, when they come to the tragic struggle which was fought out between the "Mountain" and the "Gironde" in 1793, dwell too much, it seems to me, on the secondary aspects of this struggle. They attach too much importance to the so-called *federalism* of the Girondins.

It is true that after May 31, when the Girondist and royalist insurrections broke out in several departments, the word "federalism" embodied in contemporary documents the chief article of accusation used by the "Mountain" party against the Girondins. But this word had become a mere catch-word, a party badge, and was in reality only a battle-cry good enough

* Mortimer-Ternaux, a rabid reactionary, has pointed out this double organisation in his *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. vii. Jaurès (*La Convention*, vol. ii. p. 1254) has also a very well written page on this subject; and Aulard refers to it at some length in his *Histoire politique de la Révolution*, part ii. ch. v.

to use against one's adversaries, and as such it served its purpose well. In reality, as Louis Blanc has remarked, the "federalism of the Girondins consisted chiefly in their hatred of Paris and their desire to oppose the reactionary provinces to the revolutionary capital. They were afraid of Paris, and this was all their federalism meant." *

They detested and feared the ascendency gained in the Revolution by the Commune of Paris, the Paris revolutionary committees and the people of Paris. When they talked of transferring the seat of the Legislative Assembly, and later of the Convention itself, to some provincial town, it was not for love of provincial autonomy. It was merely to place the legislative body and the executive authority in the midst of a less revolutionary population than that of Paris—among people less active in the public cause. This was how royalty acted in the Middle Ages when it preferred a growing town, a "royal town," to the older cities accustomed to the *forum*. Thiers wanted to do the same in 1871.†

Instead of federalising, everything done by the Girondins showed them to be as centralising and authoritarian as the Montagnards, perhaps more so; for the latter relied at least upon the Popular Societies when they went on commission into the provinces and not upon organs of bureaucracy—the councils of the departments and the districts. When the Girondins appealed to the provinces against Paris, it was to incite the counter-revolutionary forces of the middle classes in the manufacturing towns and the fanaticism of the peasants in Normandy and Brittany against the revolutionists of Paris. When the reactionaries were victorious and the Girondins returned to power after the 9th Thermidor, they proved, as befits a party of order, that they were centralisers much more than the Montagnards.

M. Aulard, who wrote at some length about the federalism of the Girondins, aptly remarks that before the establishment

* Louis Blanc, 4to, vol. ii. p. 42.

† When the Girondins talked of assembling the commissioners of the departments at Bourges "they would not have stopped at this transference," says Thibaudeau in his *Mémoires*: "It was their intention to form a second Convention."

of the Republic none of the Girondins expressed federalist tendencies. Barbaroux, for example, was an unmistakable centraliser, and declared before the Bouches-du-Rhône Assembly that a Federative Government is not suitable for a great people, because of the slowness of its working and the multiplicity and complexity of its machinery.* We do not, in fact, find any serious attempt at federative organisation in the scheme for a Constitution that the Girondins brought forward in 1793. They show themselves by it to have been thorough centralists.

On the other hand, it seems to me that Louis Blanc lays too much stress on the "fiery impetuosity" of the Girondins, Brissot's ambition clashing with Robespierre's, and the wounding of Robespierre's self-esteem by the reckless Girondins—for which Robespierre never pardoned them. Jaurès expresses similar ideas, at least in the first part of his volume on the Convention,† which, however, does not prevent him, later on, from indicating other causes—when he begins to explain the struggle between the people of Paris and the *bourgeoisie*—causes much more serious than wounded self-esteem, and "the egoism of power."

Of course the "fiery impetuosity" of the Girondins, so well described by Louis Blanc, and the conflict of ambition were present, and they certainly helped to envenom the strife, but in the struggle between the "Gironde" and the "Mountain," there was, as we have already said, one general cause of strife infinitely more serious than all the personal conflicts put together. This cause Louis Blanc had already clearly indicated by quoting from Garat the language used by the "Gironde" to the "Mountain" and the reply of the "Mountain" to the 'Gironde":

"It is not for you," said the Gironde, "to govern France,

* Aulard, *Histoire politique*, p. 264. "I do not know that any one should have claimed the honour of it," Thibaudeau wrote, when speaking of the federalism of the Girondins, in his *Mémoires sur la Convention et la Directoire*, vol. i. p. 38 (Paris, 1824). As to Marat, he was very explicit on this point in his paper, under the date of May 24, 1793. 'They have for a long time been accusing the leaders of this infernal action with federalism; I confess that I have never held this opinion of them, although I also have sometimes reiterated the charge."

† *La Convention*, pp. 388, 394, 396, and 1458.

you, who are covered with the blood of September. The legislators of a rich and industrial empire *must regard property as one of the most sacred bases of social order*, and the mission of legislating for France cannot be fulfilled by you who preach anarchy, protect plunder and terrify the owners of property. . . . You summon against us all the hired assassins of Paris ; we summon against you all the honest folk of Paris."

It is the language of the propertied party—*le parti des honnêtes gens*—those who massacred the people of Paris in June 1848 and in 1871, supported the *coup d'état* of Napoleon III., and who are now ready to do it all over again.

To it the "Mountain" replied : "We accuse you of wanting to use your talents for your own advancement only, and not in the interests of Equality. So long as the King permitted you to govern through the ministers you gave him, so long did he seem honest enough for you. . . . Your secret desire has never been to raise France to the glorious destiny of a Republic, but to keep her under a King whose Mayors of the Palace you would yourselves have been."

We shall see how just this accusation was when we find Barbaroux in the South and Louvet in Brittany both of them hand in glove with the royalists, and when so many of the Girondins entered into an agreement with *les blancs*, after they came back to power through the reaction of Thermidor. But let as continue the quotation.

"You want liberty without equality," said the "Mountain," "and we desire equality because we cannot conceive liberty without it. You who call yourselves statesmen, you want to organise the Republic for the rich ; but we, not pretending to be statesmen, are striving for laws which will lift the poor out of their misery and turn all men, under a state of universal well-being, into happy citizens and ardent defenders of a universally adored republic."

Here we see two absolutely different conceptions of society ; and it was so that the struggle was understood by its contemporaries.*

* Numerous quotations could be given to prove this. The two following may serve as examples : "The Girondins wanted the Revolu-

The Revolution had hitherto confined itself to overthrowing the King, without even trying to secure its work by a complete change of the ideas of the nation in a republican direction; it had to stop after its first victory, and leave France to struggle, as best she could, against German, English, Spanish, Italian, and Savoyard invaders, supported from within by the partisans of royalty. Or else, the Revolution, after getting rid of the King, had to make at once, without delay, an effort towards "Equality," as they then called it—towards "Communism," as we should say now. It must complete the work of abolishing the feudal rights, the work of restoring the land to the communes, the work of nationalising the soil, while it would recognise the right of all to the land. It must consolidate the work already so far carried out by the revolted peasantry during those four years, and it would try, with the people's help, "to raise the poor out of their wretchedness." It must try to create, if possible, not absolute equality of riches, but a condition of well-being for all,—"universal welfare." And it would do this by forcibly taking the power of Government from the rich, and transferring it to the Communes and the Popular Societies.

These alternatives suffice to explain the sanguinary struggle which rent asunder the Convention, and with it the whole of France after the downfall of royalty. Everything else is of secondary importance.

tion to stop short of the middle classes," says Baudot. They wanted "quietly to establish a middle-class aristocracy, which should take the place of the nobility and clergy," said Bourdon de l'Oise at the Jacobin Club, on May 31. (*La Société des Jacobins*, Aulard edition, vol. v. p. 220.)

CHAPTER XLIII

SOCIAL DEMANDS—STATE OF FEELING IN PARIS—LYONS

Effect of execution of King—Changed aspect of Revolution—Rise of counter-revolution—Paris Commune tries to keep down price of bread—Varlet—Jacques Roux—Movement against owners of large fortunes—Petition to Convention—Marat tries to stop agitation—Effect of riot—Necessity of crushing "Gironde" becomes evident

NOTWITHSTANDING the violence that the Parliamentary struggle between the "Mountain" and the "Gironde" displayed at times, it would have dragged on had it been strictly confined to the Convention. But since the execution of Louis XVI. events were moving faster, and the gulf between the revolutionists and the counter-revolutionists was becoming so wide that there was no longer any possibility of a vague, indetermined party, half-way between the two others. Opposed as they were to the natural course of development which the Revolution was following, the Girondins soon found themselves, together with the Feuillants and Royalists, in the ranks of the counter-revolutionists, and as such they had to succumb. The Revolution was still in its ascendant phase.

The execution of the King had produced a profound impression in France. If the middle classes were stricken with terror at the daring of the Montagnards, and trembled for their property and their lives, the intelligent portion of the population saw on the contrary the dawn of a new era—the nearing of that "well-being for all" which the revolutionists had promised to the poor.

The greater was their deception! The King had perished,

royalty had disappeared; but the insolence of the rich was growing. Their insolence sunned itself in the wealthy quarters, it even announced itself impudently in the public galleries of the Convention, while in the poor districts misery grew blacker and blacker, as the sad winter of 1793 crept on, bringing a lack of bread, unemployment, a rise in prices, and the depreciation of paper-money. And, in the meantime, bad news came in from everywhere: from the frontier, where the troops had melted like snow; from Brittany, where a general rising with the help of the English was being prepared; from La Vendée, where a hundred thousand revolted peasants were murdering the patriots with the benediction of the clergy; from Lyons, which had become the stronghold of the counter-revolutionists; from the Treasury, that now existed only by fresh issues of paper-money (*les assignats*); and, finally, from the Convention, which had come to a standstill, and was exhausting its forces in stormy internal struggles.

All this was helping to paralyse the revolutionary spirit. In Paris, the poor workers, the *sans-culottes*, no longer came to the sections in sufficient numbers, and the middle-class counter-revolutionists took advantage of it. In February 1793, the *culottes dorées* invaded the sections. They came in great numbers to the evening meetings, passed reactionary votes—by using their sticks in case of need—displaced the *sans-culotte* functionaries, and had themselves nominated in their stead. The revolutionists were even forced to reorganise their forces, so as to be able to come to the rescue from the neighbouring sections, when one section was invaded by the counter-revolutionists.

In Paris and in the provinces some sections were even compelled to ask the municipal council to guarantee to the poor men of the people who assisted at the sittings, and accepted duties on the committees, a payment of two livres per day. Whereupon the Girondins did not fail, of course, to ask the Convention to dissolve all these organisations of Sections, Popular Societies and Federations of Departments. They did not understand what power of resistance was yet in the old *régime*, and they did not see that such a step, taken at this

moment, would have secured the immediate triumph of the counter-revolution and the "Tarpeian Rock" for themselves.

However, the mass of the people was not yet discouraged. The fact is, that new ideas were ripening in many minds, new currents were coming to the surface, and seeking the form which would best express them.

The Paris Commune, having obtained large grants from the Convention for the purchase of flour, succeeded more or less in keeping the price of bread to three-halfpence a pound. But to obtain bread at this price, the people had to spend the night at the bakers' doors, waiting in a queue on the pavement. And then the people understood that the Commune in buying wheat at the price the monopolists extorted only enriched the speculators at the expense of the State. It meant moving for ever in a circle, for the profit of the stock-jobbers. Stock-jobbing had already grown alarmingly. The newly formed *bourgeoisie* rapidly became rich by this means. Not only did the caterers for the armies—the "rice-bread-and-salt" (*les riz-pain-sel*)—make ill-gotten fortunes, but, as everything—wheat, flour, copper, oil, soap, candles, zinc, &c.—induced speculation, to say nothing of the enormous speculations on the sale of national estates, fortunes grew from nothing with an extraordinary rapidity in the sight and hearing of all.

The question: "What is to be done?" was then asked with all the tragic meaning which it acquires in times of crisis.

Those to whom the supreme remedy for all social evils is always "the punishment of the guilty," could only propose the death penalty for the stock-jobbers, the reorganisation of the police system of "public safety," and a revolutionary tribunal—which was in reality merely a return to Maillard's tribunal, without its openness, but certainly not a solution of the problem.

In the faubourgs, however, a deeper current of opinion was also forming, one which sought *constructive solutions*, and this current found expression in the predictions of a workman of the faubourgs, Varlet, and of a former priest, Jacques Roux, supported by all the "nameless ones," who in history go by the name of *Les Enragés* (the extremists). These men under-

stood that the theories on freedom of commerce, defended in the Convention by men like Condorcet and Sieyès, were not true: that those commodities which are scarce in the market are easily to be seized upon by speculators, especially during a period such as the Revolution was now traversing. And they set themselves to spread ideas on the necessity of *communalising and nationalising commerce, and organising the exchange of goods at cost price*—those ideas which later on inspired Fourier, Godwin, Robert Owen, Proudhon, and their subsequent socialist followers.

The *Enragés* had understood—and we will see later how a beginning of practical application was given to their ideas—that it was not enough to guarantee to each man the right to work, or even a right to the land; they saw that so long as commercial exploitation existed, nothing could be done; they maintained that to prevent this, *commerce would have to be communalised.*

At the same time, a pronounced movement was growing among the masses against the owners of great fortunes—a movement similar to that of to-day in the United States against the rapidly amassed fortune of the "trusts." The best minds of the time were struck by the impossibility of establishing a democratic Republic, so long as there was no protection against the monstrous inequality of incomes, which was already asserting itself, and threatened to grow even worse.*

This movement against the monopolists and the stock-jobbers was bound to produce also a movement against *speculation in paper-money*, and on February 3, 1792, delegates from the Commune, from the forty-eight sections and from the "United Defenders of the eighty-four departments" came before the Convention, demanding that a limit should be put to the depreciation of paper-money, due to stock-jobbery. They demanded the repeal of the decree of the Constituent

* Michelet's genius has led him to see very clearly the importance of this communist movement of the masses, and he had already drawn attention to its essential points. Jaurès (*Histoire socialiste*, vol. iv. pp. 1003 *et seq.*) has now given more ample and very interesting information on this movement in Paris and Lyons, where L'Ange was a precursor of Fourier.

Assembly which had recognised that money is merchandise, and the death penalty for stock-jobbers.*

This was, as we may see, a revolt of the poor against the wealthy classes, who having got all possible advantages out of the Revolution, were now opposed to its benefiting the poor. And this is why, when the petitioners learned that the Jacobins, Saint-Just included, were opposed to their petition, for fear of alarming the middle classes, they spoke of them as of "those who do not understand the poor, because they themselves dine well every night."†

Marat, too, tried to calm the agitation. He disapproved of the petition and defended the Montagnards and the Paris deputies whom the petitioners attacked; but he knew misery well, and when he heard the pleadings of the working women who came to the Convention on February 24, begging the protection of the legislators against the speculators, he at once took up the cause of the poor. In a very violent article, in the issue of his paper of the 25th, "despairing of seeing the legislators take any effectual measures," he preached "the complete destruction of this accursed brood"—"capitalists, stock-jobbers, monopolists, whom these wretched representatives of the nation encouraged, by not attacking them."

The fury of an enraged mob is felt in this article, in which

* Could stock-jobbing influence the fluctuations in the value of paper-money? Several historians have put to themselves this question, only to reply in the negative. The depreciation, they said, was due to the too great quantity of tokens of exchange which were put into circulation. This is true; but those who have followed closely the fluctuations in the price, let us say, of wheat on the international markets, of cotton on the Liverpool Exchange, or of Russian notes on the Berlin Exchange, some thirty years ago, will not hesitate to recognise that our grandfathers were right in holding stock-jobbers largely responsible for the depreciation of the paper-money. Even to-day, when financial operations cover an infinitely wider area than they did in 1793, stock-jobbing has always the effect of *exaggerating out of all proportion the effects of supply and demand at a given moment*. If, with the present facilities of transport and exchanges, stock-jobbing cannot create a *permanent* rise in the price of a commodity, or in the value of given shares, it always exaggerates nevertheless the natural rise, and swells quite out of proportion the temporary fluctuations in price which are due either to the varying productivity of labour (for instance, in the harvests), or to fluctuations in supply and demand.

† Jaurès, iv. p. 1023.

Marat demands, first, that the principal monopolists be handed over to a State tribunal, and then advocates revolutionary acts, saying that "the looting of a few shops, at the doors of which the monopolists should be hanged, would soon put an end to these malpractices, which reduce twenty-five million people to despair, and cause thousands to perish of want."

On the same day, in the morning, the people did indeed pillage some shops, taking sugar, soap, &c., and there was talk in the faubourgs of recommencing the September massacres among the monopolists and jobbers of the Stock Exchange, and the rich altogether.

One can imagine what was made of this movement, which after all was nothing but a small riot, by the Girondins who wished to convince the provinces that Paris was a raging furnace of terror, in which no one was safe any longer. Happy at having found in Marat's article the sentence about pillage which we have just quoted, they made enough out of it to accuse the "Mountain" and the people of Paris *en masse* of intending to murder the rich. The Commune did not dare to approve the riot, and even Marat had to contradict himself by saying that it was fomented by royalists. As to Robespierre, he did not lose the opportunity of attributing the whole movement to the influence of foreign money.

The riot produced nevertheless the desired effect. The Convention raised, from four to seven millions, the advance it was making to the Commune to enable it to keep bread at three-halfpence the pound, and Chaumette, the *procureur* of the Commune, developed before the Convention the idea which was later introduced into the "law of maximum"—that the question was not solely to obtain bread at a reasonable price. It was also necessary, said he, "that commodities of secondary necessity" should be accessible to the people. There no longer exists "any just ratio between the pay of a day's manual labour and these commodities of secondary necessity." "The poor have done as much as the rich, even more, for the Revolution. The whole life of the rich has changed, he alone (the poor man) has remained in the same position, and all he

has gained through the Revolution is the right of complaining of his poverty."*

This movement in Paris at the end of February contributed to a great extent to the fall of the Girondins. While Robespierre was still hoping by legal means to paralyse the party of the "Gironde" in the Convention, the *Enragés* understood that so long as this party ruled in the Assembly, no progress of any sort would be made in matters of economics. They had the courage to say aloud that the aristocracy of money, of the great merchants and financiers, was rising from the ruins of the old aristocracy, and that this new aristocracy was so strong in the Convention that if the coalition of the Kings had not counted on its support, they would never have dared to attack France. It is even very probable that from that time on Robespierre and his faithful Jacobins told themselves that they ought to make sure of the *Enragés* to crush the Girondins, leaving till later, according to the turn events might take, the question whether to follow the *Enragés* or to fight them.

It is certain that ideas such as those advocated by Chaumette were bound to simmer in the people's minds in all large towns. The poor man had indeed done all for the Revolution, and while the *bourgeoisie* got rich, the poor man alone got nothing. Even in those cities where no popular movements similar to those of Paris and Lyons had taken place, the poor must have made similar reflections among themselves. And everywhere

* A much keener economist than many professional economists, this most sympathetic man pointed to the root of the question, showing how monopolists exaggerated the results of conditions created by the war and the repeated issues of paper-money. "War at sea," said he, "the disasters in our colonies, the losses on the market value of the paper currency, and above all, the fact that the quantities of notes issued no longer correspond with the needs of the commercial transactions—these are a few of the causes of this considerable rise which we lament. But how great is their influence, how terrible and disastrous is their result, when among us there exist evilly disposed men, monopolists, when the national distress is used as a base for the selfish speculations of a crowd of capitalists who do not know what to do with the immense sums of money they have gained in the recent transactions."

they must have noticed that the Girondins were a centre, round which could rally those who wished to prevent at all costs the Revolution from benefiting the poor.

At Lyons, the struggle took just the same course. It is clear that in this great manufacturing town, where the workmen lived by an industry of luxury, which unavoidably had suffered from the Revolution, the destitution was terrible. There was no work, and bread was at a famine price, threepence a pound.

There were in Lyons, as everywhere, two parties: the popular party, represented by Laussel, and still more by Chalier, and the party of the merchant middle class, which rallied round the Girondins, as an intermediate step before going over to the Feuillants. The mayor, Nivière-Chol, a Girondist merchant, was the man of the middle-class party.

Many priests who had refused to take the oath of obedience to the Constitution were in hiding in this town, where the population had always had a leaning towards mysticism, and agents of the *émigrés* also were there in great numbers. Altogether Lyons was a centre for conspirators coming from Jalès,* Avignon, Chambéry and Turin.

Against all these, the people had but the Commune, in which the two most popular men were Chalier—an ex-priest and mystic communist, and Laussel, another ex-priest. The poor worshipped Chalier, who never ceased to preach against the rich.

It is difficult to disentangle the events which took place in Lyons during the first days of March. We only know that the unemployment and want were terrible, and that there was great unrest among the workmen. They demanded the maximum for grain, and also for those commodities which Chaumette called "commodities of secondary necessity" (wine, wood, oil, soap, coffee, sugar, &c.). They also called for the prohibition of the traffic in tokens of exchange, whether notes, gold or silver, and wished for the establishment of a tariff of wages. The poor discussed the expediency of massacring or guillotining the monopolists, and the Commune of

* Ch. xxxi.

Lyons, going no doubt by the decree of the Legislative Assembly of August 29, 1792, ordered searches to be made all over Lyons, similar to those which took place on August 29, 1792, in Paris, in order to lay hands on the numerous royalist conspirators sojourning in the city. But the royalists and the Girondins, rallying round the mayor, Nivière-Chol, succeeded in seizing the municipality, and proposed to deal severely with the people. The Convention, however, interfered to prevent the slaughter of the "patriots," and for this purpose sent three commissioners to Lyons. Supported by these commissioners, the revolutionists again took possession of the sections which had been invaded by reactionaries. The Girondin mayor was forced to resign, and on March 9, a friend of Chalier was elected in the place of Nivière-Chol.

But the struggle did not end with that, and we shall see later on how, the Girondins again gaining the upper hand at the end of May, the people, the "patriots," were massacred. For the present let us only note that in Lyons, as in Paris, the Girondins served as a rallying-point, not only for those who were opposed to the people's Revolution, but also for all those absolute Royalists and constitutional Feuillants who did not want a Republic.*

The necessity of crushing the political power of the "Gironde" became, however, still more evident when the betrayal of Dumouriez revealed whither their policy was leading.

* On April 15, the *bourgeoisie* of Lyons sent to the Convention a delegation of those sections where they held the upper hand, to report that their city groaned beneath the tyranny of a Jacobin municipal council, which was laying hands on the property of rich merchants. They also asked the *bourgeoisie* of Paris to get hold of the sections. At the end of February the Mayor of Paris, Pétion, published his "Letter to the Parisians," in which he called the *bourgeoisie* to arms against the people, saying: "Your property is threatened, and you close your eyes to the danger. . . . You are subjected to all manner of requisitions and yet you suffer patiently." This was a direct appeal to the middle classes against the people.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE WAR—THE RISING IN LA VENDEE—TREACHERY OF DUMOURIEZ

Need of volunteers—Forces ordered—Money required—Lack of trustworthy generals—Dumouriez—His connection with Girondins and Montagnards—France and England—War declared—Treachery of Dumouriez—Counter-revolutionary movement in Brittany—Rising in La Vendée—Danton recalled from Belgium—Volunteers enlist—Terrible situation—"Mountain" tries to allay panic—Revolutionary tribune—Peasants urge clergy to rise—Savage hunt for republicans—Dumouriez in Belgium—Danton tries to check Dumouriez—Dumouriez outlawed—Committee of Public Welfare created—Danton becomes leading spirit—Fall of Girondins inevitable

In the early part of 1793, the war began under very unfavourable circumstances, and the advantages obtained during the previous autumn were not maintained. Great reinforcements were necessary in order to enable the army to take the offensive and the free enlistments were far from giving the necessary numbers.*

It was estimated in February 1793, that it would take at least 300,000 men to fill up the gaps in the army and to bring up its effective force to half a million, but volunteers were no longer to be counted on. Certain departments (the Var and the Gironde) willingly sent their battalions—nearly whole armies—but other departments did nothing of the sort.

Then, on February 24, the Convention was compelled to

* The people knew, of course, how the volunteers of 1792 had been received in the army by the staff of officers and the generals—all royalists. "None of them wanted to have them," says Avenel, who has consulted the archives of the War Office. The volunteers were treated as "disorganisers" and cowards; they were shot on the slightest provocation, and the troops were incited against them (*Lundis révolutionnaires*, p. 8).

order a forced levy of 300,000 men, to be raised among all the departments, and in each department by the districts and communes between them. These latter had first to call upon volunteers; but if this appeal was not answered by the required number of men, the communes had to recruit the remainder, in whichever way they considered best—that is to say, either by lot or by personal nomination, with the right, however, of finding a substitute in both cases. To induce men to enlist, the Convention not only promised them pensions, but it also undertook to enable the pensioners to buy portions of the national estates, by paying for them in instalments with their pensions, a tenth part of the total cost of the land or estate purchased to be paid every year. Government lands to the value of 400 million francs were assigned for this purpose.*

Meanwhile money was badly wanted, and Cambon, an absolutely honest man, who held an almost absolute power over the finances, was forced to make a new issue of 800 millions in paper-money. But the best estates of the clergy (which were the guarantee for these notes) had already been sold, and the estates of the *émigrés* did not sell so easily. People hesitated to buy them, fearing that the purchased estates might be confiscated when the *émigrés* would return to France. Therefore the Treasury, under Cambon, found it increasingly difficult to meet the ever-growing needs of the armies.†

However, the greatest difficulty of the war was not this. It lay in the fact that nearly all the generals belonged to the counter-revolution, and the system of the election of officers by the soldiers themselves, which the Convention had just introduced, could furnish superior officers only after the lapse of a certain time. For the present, the generals did not inspire confidence, and in fact the treachery of Lafayette was soon followed by that of Dumouriez.

Michelet was perfectly justified in saying that when Du-

* Everything remained, however, so far as it can be ascertained, as promises (Avenel, *Biens nationaux*, in *Lundis révolutionnaires*).

† A few revolutionary sections of Paris offered thereupon to mortgage all their properties to serve as a guarantee for the notes. This offer was refused, but there was a profound idea in it. When a nation makes war, property owners must bear the weight of it, as much and even more than those whose only incomes are their wages.

mouriez left Paris to rejoin his army a few days after the execution of Louis XVI., he was already meditating his treachery. He had seen the triumph of the "Mountain," and he probably understood that the execution of the King was the beginning of a new phase in the Revolution. For the revolutionists he felt nothing but hatred, and he no doubt foresaw that his dream of re-establishing the Constitution of 1791 in France, with a Duke of Orléans on the throne, could only be realised w th the help of Austria. From that day he must have decided on his treachery.

At this moment Dumouriez was closely connected with the Girondins, and even on intimate terms with Gensonné, with whom he remained in communication till April. However, he did not break with the "Montagnards" either, who already mistrusted him—Marat treated him frankly as a traitor, but did not feel strong enough to attack him. The victories of Valmy and Jemmapes had been so much glorified, and the real facts concerning the retreat of the Prussians were so little known, that the soldiers, especially the rank and file, adored their general. To attack him in these circumstances would have been to risk rousing the army, which Dumouriez could have led against Paris and the Revolution. Consequently there remained nothing for the "Mountain" to do but to wait and watch.

In the meantime France was entering into a war with England. As soon as the news of the execution of Louis XVI. had reached London, the English Government returned his passport and papers to the French Ambassador, ordering him to quit the United Kingdom. But it goes without saying that the execution of the King was only a pretext to break off relations with France. It is in fact now known, through the Count de Mercy, that the English Government felt no affection for the French royalists, and that it was not in the least anxious to strengthen them by its support. England simply considered this the right time to get rid of a maritime rival that had helped the Americans to obtain their independence, to take from France her colonies, and perhaps even some great mil tary port—at any rate, to weaken her sea power.

The English Government simply made the most of the impression produced by the execution of the King to press the war.

Unfortunately, the French politicians did not see how inevitable from the English point of view was this war. Not only the Girondins—especially Brissot, who plumed himself on knowing England—but Danton also, still hoped that the Whigs, of whom a party were enthusiastic supporters of the ideas of liberty, would overthrow Pitt and prevent the war. In reality, the greater part of the British nation was soon united on the question of war when its mercantile advantages were understood. It must also be said that the English diplomatists managed to make very clever use of the ambitions of the French statesmen. They made Dumouriez believe that he was the man for them—the only one with whom they could treat; and they promised to support him, to re-establish a constitutional monarchy. Danton they persuaded that the Whigs might, very possibly, return to power, and they would then make peace with Republican France.*

On the whole they managed to put the onus on France when the Convention declared war with Great Britain on February 1.

This declaration changed the whole of the military situation. To take possession of Holland, to prevent the English from landing there, became an absolute necessity. But this was precisely what Dumouriez, either because he did not consider himself strong enough, or because he had no mind to, had not done during the autumn, although he had been urged by Danton to do it. He had taken up, in December, his winter quarters in Belgium, and this of course did not dispose the Belgians in favour of the French invaders. Liége was his chief military depôt.

Up to the present we do not yet know all about Dumouriez' treachery. Very probably, as Michelet said, he had already made up his mind to betray, when he returned to his army on January 26, 1793. His march at the end of February,

* Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française* (Paris, 1891), Book I., ch. ii., pp. 373 *et seq.* Avenel, *loc. cit.*

against Holland, when he took Breda and Gertruydenberge, seems to have been already a manœuvre agreed upon with the Austrians. At any rate, this march served the Austrians admirably. They took advantage of it to enter Belgium, on March 1, and took Liége, where the inhabitants had in vain begged Dumouriez for arms. The patriots of Liége were forced to fly, the French army was completely routed and disbanded; the generals refused to help each other, and Dumouriez was far off in Holland. It was impossible to do the Austrians a better turn.

This news produced a tremendous effect in Paris, especially as it was followed by other news, equally grave. On March 3 it became known that a counter-revolutionary movement was about to begin immediately in Brittany. At the same time, at Lyons, the reactionary battalions of the *fils de famille* (wealthy young men) made a move against the revolutionary Commune—just at the time when the *émigrés*, who had gathered in numbers at Turin, were crossing the frontier and entering France in battle array, backed up by the King of Sardinia. To crown all, the department of La Vendée rose on March 10. It was quite evident that these various movements were, as in 1792, parts of one great counter-revolutionary scheme. And every one in Paris suspected that Dumouriez was won over by the counter-revolutionists, and was working for their advantage.

Danton, who was at that time in Belgium, was recalled in all haste. He arrived in Paris on March 8 and pronounced one of his powerful calls to unity and patriotism—an appeal which made hearts thrill all over France. The Commune hoisted once more the black flag. Again the fatherland was declared in danger.

Volunteers enlisted hurriedly, and on the evening of the 9th a civic feast, at which masses of people assisted, was organised in the streets, on the eve of their departure. But it was no longer the youthful enthusiasm of 1792. A sinister energy goaded them on. A lowering anger gnawed at the hearts of the poor of the faubourgs at the sight of the political struggles tearing France asunder. "A rising in Paris is what is needed,"

Danton is reported to have said, and indeed one was needed to rouse the people and the sections from the torpor into which they were sinking.

To ward off the difficulties, truly terrible, which beset the Revolution, to provide for the immense expenditure imposed on France by the counter-revolutionary leagues without and within, the Revolution had to find resources by levying taxes upon the fortunes which were then being amassed by the middle classes, owing to the Revolution itself. But this was exactly what the governing class refused to admit, partly on principle, the accumulation of large *private* fortunes being considered the way to enrich *the nation*, and partly from the fear with which a more or less general rising in the big towns, of poor against rich, inspired them.

The horror of the September days—especially the 4th and 5th at the Châtelet and the Salpêtrière—was yet fresh in their memories. What would happen then if a whole class rose against another—the poor against the rich, against all the wealthy? It meant civil war in every town. And this, with La Vendée and Brittany rising in the West, supported by England, by the *émigrés* in Jersey, by the Pope, and all the clergy—with the Austrians in the North, and the army of Dumouriez ready to follow its general and march against the people of Paris!

Therefore the leaders of opinion of the "Mountain" and the Commune did their utmost first of all to allay the panic, pretending that they considered Dumouriez a trustworthy republican. Robespierre, Danton and Marat, constituting a sort of triumvirate of opinion, backed up by the Commune, made speeches to this effect, and they all worked at the same time to rouse courage in the people's hearts, so as to be in a position to repel the invasion, which wore a far more serious aspect than it had in 1792. All worked to this end, save the Girondins, who saw but one thing—"the anarchists," who were to be crushed and exterminated!

On March 10, a renewal of the September days was feared in Paris. But the public anger was turned upon the journalist friends of Dumouriez, and a band betook themselves to the

chief Girondin printing offices of Gorzas and Fiévé, and smashed their presses.

What the people, inspired by Varlet, Jacques Roux, the American, Fournier, and other *Enragés* really desired was a purification of the Convention. But the more common demand for a revolutionary tribunal had been substituted for this in all the sections. Pache and Chaumette came to the Convention on the 9th, to demand such a tribunal. Whereupon Cambacérès, the future "arch-counsellor" of the Napoleonic Empire, proposed that the Convention should renounce the current ideas on the division of legislative and judicial power and seize the latter as well, so as to be able to establish a special tribunal for the trial of traitors.

Robert Lindet, a lawyer of the old monarchist school, proposed later on to institute a tribunal consisting of judges nominated by the Convention, and bound to judge those whom the Convention would send before them. He insisted upon having no jury in this new tribunal, and it was only after long debates that it was decided to reinforce the five judges, nominated by the Convention, by twelve jurymen and six assistants, taken from Paris and the adjoining departments, and nominated every month by the Convention.

And so, instead of measures calculated to reduce stock-jobbing and place the necessaries of life within reach of the people, instead of a purification of the Convention, which would have eliminated the members always opposed to revolutionary measures, instead of taking military steps rendered imperative by the already almost confirmed treachery of Dumouriez, the insurrection of March 10 obtained nothing beyond a revolutionary tribunal. The creative, constructive spirit of a popular revolution, which was feeling its way, was now confronted by the spirit of police management, which was soon to crush it.

After appointing this tribunal the Convention was going to adjourn, when Danton rushed to the tribune, and stopped the members as they were leaving the hall, to remind them that the enemy was on the frontiers of France, and that nothing had yet been done.

The same day the peasants in La Vendée, urged on by the clergy, rose in insurrection and began to massacre the Republicans. The rising had long been prepared, chiefly by the priests, at the instigation of Rome, and there had already been an attempt at starting it, in August 1792, when the Prussians had entered France. Since then, Angers had become the political centre of the malcontent priests, the Sisters of the Sagesse Order and others serving as emissaries to distribute the appeals to revolt, and to awaken fanaticism by spreading stories about supposed miracles.* The levy of men for the war, promulgated on March 10, became the signal for a general rising. The head council of the insurrection, dominated by the priests, and having at its head the priest Bernier, was established at the demand of Cathelinau, a mason and sacristan of his parish, who had become one of the most audacious chiefs of the bands.

On the 10th the tocsin rang in several hundred parishes, and about 100,000 men left their work to begin the hunting down of the republicans and those priests who had sworn allegiance to the Constitution. It was an actual hunt, with a ringer who sounded the "view halloo," says Michelet, a hunt of extermination, during which the captives were subjected to the most terrible tortures: they were killed slowly, or else were left to be tortured by the women's scissors and the weak hands of the children who prolonged their martyrdom. All this, under the leadership of the priests, with tales of miracles to incite the peasants to kill the wives also of the republicans. The nobles, with their royalist amazons, only came after. And when these "honest folk" decided at last to appoint a tribunal to try the republican prisoners, this tribunal, in six weeks, sent 542 patriots to be executed.†

* Michelet, Book X. ch. v.

† "Each day," wrote a royalist priest, François Chevalier (quoted by Chassin), "each day was marked by bloody expeditions which cannot but horrify every decent soul, and seem justifiable only in the light of philosophy." (They were commanded by priests in the name of religion.) "Matters had come to a pass, when it was said openly that it was unavoidable and essential for peace, not to leave a single republican alive in France. Such was the popular fury that it was sufficient to have attended at a mass said by one of the constitutional clergy,

To resist this savage rising, the Republic had nothing but 2000 men scattered all over the lower part of La Vendée, from Nantes to La Rochelle. It was not till the end of May that the first organised forces of the Republic arrived. Up to then the Convention had only been able to oppose decrees: death penalty and confiscation of property for the nobles and priests who had not left La Vendée at the end of a week! But who was there with the necessary force to carry out these decrees?

Matters were no better in Eastern France, where the army of Custine was retreating; while in Belgium, Dumouriez was in open rebellion against the Convention since March 12. He sent them from Louvain a letter, which he at once made public, and in which he reproached France with the crime of having annexed Belgium, of wishing to ruin that country by introducing paper-money and the sale of national properties. Six days later he attacked the superior forces of the Austrians at Neerwinden, allowed himself to be beaten by them, and on March 22, supported by the Duke de Chartres and some Orléanist generals, he entered into direct negotiations with the Austrian, Colonel Mack. These two traitors promised to evacuate Belgium without resistance, and to march against Paris to re-establish there the constitutional monarchy. In case of need, they would call on the Austrians to support them, and in the meantime the Austrians occupied Condé, one of the French fortresses near the frontier, as a guarantee.

Danton, staking his head on it, rushed to Dumouriez' camp, to prevent this treason and to attempt to bring back Dumouriez to the Republic. Having failed in persuading two Girondins, Gensonné, a friend of Dumouriez, and Gaudet, to go with him, he left alone, on the 16th, for Belgium, running the risk of being accused himself of treason. He found Dumouriez in full retreat after the Battle of Neerwinden, and understood that the traitor had already made up his mind. He had indeed

to be imprisoned and then murdered, or shot, under the pretext that the prisons were too full, as they were on September 2." At Machecoul, 524 republican citizens had been shot, and there was talk of massacring the women. Charette was urging on his fanatical peasants to do this.

already given his word to Colonel Mack to evacuate Holland without fighting.

Paris was seized with fury when, Danton having returned on the 29th, Dumouriez' treason was established as a certainty. The republican army, which alone might have repulsed the invasion, was perhaps already marching against Paris to re-establish royalty! Under such conditions, the Committee of Insurrection, which had then been meeting for some days at the Bishop's palace, under the leadership of the *Enragés*, won over the Commune. The sections began to arm and seized the artillery; they probably would have marched against the Convention, had not other counsels prevailed to prevent a panic. On April 3, confirmatory news of Dumouriez' treachery was received. He had arrested the commissioners sent to him by the Convention. Happily, his army did not follow him. The decree of the Convention, outlawing Dumouriez and ordering the arrest of the Duke de Chartres, had reached the regiments, and neither Dumouriez nor the Duke de Chartres succeeded in winning over the soldiers. Dumouriez was forced to cross the frontier, as Lafayette had done, and to seek refuge among the Austrians.

On the following day he and the Imperial generals issued a proclamation, in which the Duke of Coburg made known to the French that he was coming to restore to France her constitutional King.

At the height of this crisis, when the uncertainty about the attitude of Dumouriez' army jeopardised the security of the Republic itself, the three most influential men of the "Mountain"—Danton, Robespierre and Marat—in agreement with the Commune led by Pache, Hébert and Chaumette, acted with complete unanimity, to prevent the panic and the sad consequences it might have entailed.

At the same time the Convention, in order to avoid the lack of unity which had hitherto hampered the general management of the war, resolved to take the executive power into their hands, as well as the legislative and judicial powers. They created a Committee of Public Welfare (*Comité de Salut public*), with very extensive powers, almost dictatorial—a measure

vhich was evidently of an immense importance for the subsequent development of the Revolution.

We have seen that after August 10 the Legislative Assembly had founded, under the name of "Provisory Executive Council," a body of ministers invested with all the functions of the executive power. Besides, in January 1793, the Convention had created a "Committee of General Defence," and, war being at that moment the most important matter, this committee obtained control over the Provisory Executive Council, and thus became the chief machinery of the administration. Now, to give the Government more unity, the Convention created a "Committee of Public Welfare" (*Comité de Salut public*), elected by it and renewable every twelve months. This committee was to supplant both the Defence Committee and the Executive Council.

In reality it was the Convention itself supplanting the Ministry, but little by little, as was to be expected, the Committee of Public Welfare overruled the Convention and acquired in all the branches of administration a power which it shared only with the Committee of Public Safety (*Comité de Sûreté générale*), entrusted with the control of the State police.

In the middle of the crisis which was developing in April 1793, Danton, who had until then taken a most active part in the war, became the leading spirit of the Committee of Public Welfare, and he retained this influence until July 10, 1793, when he retired.

Finally, the Convention, which had sent, since September 1792, several of its members to the provinces and to the armies, with the title of Commissioned Deputies (*Représentants en mission*), armed with very extensive powers, decided to send eighty more deputies to rouse enthusiasm in the provinces and to supervise the war. And, as the Girondins generally refused to accept this function, they willingly agreed to appoint members of the "Mountain" on these difficult missions, perhaps with the idea of having a freer hand in the Convention after their departure.

It was certainly not these measures of reorganisation of the

Government which prevented the treachery of Dumouriez having the disastrous effect it might have had, if the army had followed its general. There was a higher force in action. For the French nation the Revolution possessed a charm, and gave it a vigour, which it was not possible for a general to destroy at his will and pleasure. On the contrary, this betrayal had the effect of giving a new character to the war—that of a popular, democratic war. But every one understood that Dumouriez alone would never have dared what he did. He obviously had strong support in Paris. It was there that the root of the treachery lay. "The Convention betrays," said the address of the Jacobin Club, signed by Marat, who presided that night.

Henceforth the fall of the Girondins and the removal of their leaders from the Convention became inevitable. The treachery of Dumouriez gave the final impetus to the insurrection which broke out on May 31.

CHAPTER XLV

A NEW RISING RENDERED INEVITABLE

Rising of May 31—Significance of rising—Summary of situation—Convention and Dumouriez—Girondins vote arrest of Marat—People take his part—Character of Marat—He is acquitted—Famine in large towns—Extraordinary tax levied—Indignation of Girondins—Commission of Twelve appointed—Hébert and Varlet arrested—Isnard's threat—Sections demand expulsion of Girondins from Convention

May 31 is one of the great dates of the Revolution, and quite s full of significance as July 14 and October 5, 1789, June 21, 791, and August 10, 1792—but, perhaps, the most tragic of hem all. On this day the people of Paris rose for the third me, making its last effort to impress upon the Revolution really popular character; and, to bring this about, it had to and up—not against the King and the Court, but against he child of the Revolution itself—the National Convention—order to eliminate from it the leaders of the Girondin party. June 21, 1791, the day of the King's arrest at Varennes, had ought one epoch to a close; the fall of the Girondins on lay 31, 1793, was the close of another epoch. At the same me it became a symbol for all revolutions to come. Hence-rth, for a long time to come, no revolution will be possible less it culminates in its May 31. Either there will be in e revolution a day when the proletarians will separate them-lves from the middle-class revolutionists, and will advance en to a point where the others will not be able to follow em without ceasing to be middle class; or this separation ll not take place, and then there will be no revolution.

Even to this day we feel the tragedy of the situation which esented itself to the Republicans of that time. On the

eve of May 31, it was no longer a question of a perjured, treacherous king to be set aside: it was against their comrades in the fight that the revolutionists had to proceed, because it had become evident that unless this was done, the reaction would have got the upper hand already in June 1793, while the chief work of the Revolution—the destruction of the feudal system and of "the right divine of royalty"—had not yet been accomplished. The dilemma was this: either to proscribe the Girondin republicans, who had up till then fought so bravely against despotism, but were now saying to the people: "Thus far, but no farther!"; or else to rouse the people for the purpose of eliminating them, and passing over their dead bodies to try and accomplish the great work which the Revolution had begun.

This tragic situation is very clearly revealed in Brissot's pamphlet "To his Constituents," dated May 26, which we have already mentioned. We cannot, in fact, read these pages without feeling that it is a question of life or death that is debated. Brissot was evidently hazarding his head in publishing this pamphlet, in which he implacably demanded that those whom he called the "anarchists" should be sent to the scaffold. After its appearance there remained but two issues: either the "anarchists" should let themselves be guillotined by the Girondins, which would open the door to the royalists; or else the Girondins should be expelled from the Convention, and in that case it was they who must perish.

It is evident that the members of the "Mountain" did not decide with a light heart to appeal to an insurrection in order to compel the Convention to thrust out from its midst the chief leaders of the Right. For more than six months they had been trying to come to some agreement. Danton especially laboured to negotiate a compromise. Robespierre, for his part, worked to render the Girondins powerless "parliamentarily," without resorting to force. Marat himself stifled his anger in order to avoid civil war. In this way they managed to delay the separation for several months. But at what a price! The Revolution was entirely stopped; nothing was

being done to secure what had been already gained. It was living from hand to mouth.

In the provinces, the old *régime* had maintained much of its strength. The privileged classes were lying in wait for the moment to recapture their wealth and position, to restore royalty and the feudal rights that the law had not yet abolished. The first serious check of the armies would have brought about the victorious return of the old *régime*. In the South, the South-West and the West of France, the mass of the people were with the priests, with the Pope, and through them with royalty. It is true that a great deal of the land taken from the clergy and the dispossessed nobles had already passed into the hands of the upper and lower middle classes, as well as to some extent to the peasants. The feudal dues were neither redeemed nor paid. But all that was merely provisional. And what if to-morrow the people, exhausted by poverty and famine, weary of the war, should retreat to their hovels and leave a free hand to the old *régime*? Would it not be triumphant everywhere in a few months?

After Dumouriez' treachery the situation in the Convention became quite untenable. Feeling how deeply they were implicated by this treason of their favourite general, the Girondins redoubled the bitterness of their attacks against the "Mountain." Accused of conniving with the traitor, they could only reply by flinging down a demand for the prosecution of Marat for the address the Jacobins had published on April 3, on hearing the news of Dumouriez' treachery, which Marat had signed as the president of the club for that week.

Taking advantage of the absence of a great many members of the Convention—mostly members of the "Mountain"—who were acting as commissioners to the armies and in the departments at that time, the Girondins demanded of the Convention, on April 12, an order of prosecution against Marat, and then a warrant for his arrest, in order to send him for trial before the criminal tribunal, for having advocated murder and pillage. The decree for his arrest was voted on April 13, by 220 voices against 92, out of 367 voters—seven

being for an adjournment, and forty-eight abstaining from voting.

The blow however failed. The people of the faubourgs loved Marat too much to allow him to be condemned. The poor felt that Marat was one of the people and never would betray them. And the more one studies the Revolution the more one knows what Marat did and what he said, the more one discovers how unmerited was his reputation as a sinister exterminator which the historians, admirers of the middle-class Girondins, have created for him. Nearly always, since the very first weeks of the Convocation of the States-General, and especially in critical moments, Marat saw more clearly and more justly than the others, clearer and better even than the two other great leaders of revolutionary opinion—Danton and Robespierre.

From the day that Marat threw himself into the Revolution, he gave himself entirely to it, and lived in absolute poverty, driven continually into hiding while the others entered into power. Up to his death, in spite of the fever which racked him, Marat never changed his way of living. His door was always open to the men of the people. He thought that a dictatorship would help the Revolution through its difficulties, but he never thought of dictatorial powers for himself.

Bloodthirsty as his language was with regard to the creatures of the Court—especially at the outset of the Revolution, when he said that if they did not strike off thousands of heads there would be nothing done and the Court would crush the Revolution—he always respected those who were devoted to the Revolution, even when they in their turn began to be an obstacle to the development of the movement. He saw from the outset that the Convention, having a strong Girondin party in its midst, would never be capable of accomplishing its mission, but he tried at first to avoid the elimination of the Girondin leaders by violence, and he only became its advocate and organiser when he saw that it was necessary to choose between the " Gironde " and the Revolution. If he had lived, it is probable that the Terror would not have assumed the ferocity imprinted on it by the members of the Committee

of Public Safety. They would not have been allowed to use it to strike, on the one side, the advanced party—the Hébertists—and, on the other, the conciliators, such as Danton.*

The more the people loved Marat, the more the middle-class members of the Convention detested him. This is why the Girondins, who wished to break down the "Mountain," decided to begin with him: he would be defended less than any other Montagnard.

But as soon as Paris learned that a writ was out for Marat's arrest, the excitement was immense. The insurrection would have broken out on April 14 if the "Mountain," including Robespierre and Marat himself, had not preached calmness. Marat, who did not let himself be arrested at once, appeared before the tribunal on April 24, and was acquitted off-hand by the jury. He was then carried in triumph to the Convention, and from thence into the streets on the shoulders of the *sans-culottes*, under a cascade of flowers.

The attempt of the Girondins had thus failed, and they understood at once that they never would recover from that blow. It was "a day of mourning" for them, as one of their newspapers said, and Brissot began to write his last pamphlet, 'To his Constituents," in which he did his best to arouse the passions of the well-to-do middle classes against the 'anarchists."

Under these conditions, the Convention, whose sittings were becoming furious battles between the two parties, lost the people's respect: and the Commune of Paris took naturally the lead in the initiation of revolutionary measures.

As the winter of 1793 advanced, famine in the large towns grew worse and worse. The municipalities found the greatest difficulty in the world in procuring bread, were it only a pound,

* Marat was right in saying that the works he had published at the beginning of the Revolution, *Offrande à la Patrie*, *Plan de Constitution*, *Législation criminelle*, and the first hundred numbers of the *Ami du peuple*, were full of tenderness, prudence, moderation, love of mankind, liberty, justice (Chèvremont, *Marat*, vol. ii. p. 215). Jaurès, who has read *Marat* carefully, has done much towards showing him in a true light, especially in the fourth volume of his *Histoire de la Révolution*.

or a quarter of a pound—four ounces—a day, for each inhabitant. To do that even, the municipalities, and especially that of Paris, had to run into the most frightful debt.

The Commune of Paris then ordered a progressive income tax of twelve million livres to be levied on the rich, for the expenses of the war. An income of fifteen hundred livres for the head of each family, and a thousand livres for every other member, were considered as "necessary" and therefore freed from this taxation. But everything above this amount was treated as "superfluity," and had to pay a progressive tax: thirty livres for a superfluity of two thousand livres; fifty livres on a superfluity of from two to three thousand livres; and so on, up to twenty thousand livres on a superfluity of fifty thousand livres.

For sustaining the war in which France was engaged, in the midst of a Revolution and a famine, such an extraordinary tax, to be levied this special year only, was very modest, after all. It was only the large incomes which were touched by it, whereas a family of six persons who had an income of ten thousand livres would have paid less than one hundred livres. But the rich protested loudly, while Chaumette, the promoter of this tax, whom the Girondins wanted to attack after Marat, said justly: "Nothing will make me change my principles. Even with the knife at my neck I shall still declare, *up to this day, the poor have done everything; it is time for the rich to take their turn.* I shall declare that the selfish people, the young idlers, must be made useful, whether they like it or not, and some respite be procured for the useful and respectable worker."

The Gironde redoubled its hatred for the Commune that had suggested the idea of such a taxation. But one can imagine the general explosion of hatred that broke forth among the middle classes, when Cambon, supported by the public in the galleries, proposed in the Convention, and put to the vote a forced loan of a thousand millions to be levied throughout France on the rich people, and assessed on nearly the same principles as the tax of the Commune—a loan to be reimbursed later on by the money raised on the *émigrés'* lands, according as they were sold. In the difficult circumstances through

vhich the Republic was passing, it had no other possible way ut except a tax of this kind. But in the Convention the efenders of property were ready to slay the Montagnards vhen the latter supported the project of a forced loan; they lmost came to blows.

If proofs were still necessary to show the impossibility of nything being done to save the Revolution, so long as the Girondins remained in the Convention, and the two parties ontinued to neutralise each other, these debates upon the oan would have given a striking demonstration of it.

But what exasperated the people of Paris most of all was iat to stop the Revolution, of which Paris had up to that me been the chief forcing-bed, the Girondins did all they ould to incite the departments against the capital, not even esitating before the necessity this involved of marching hand hand with the royalists. They preferred royalty rather ian that any step should be made towards the Social Republic. etter to inundate Paris with blood and to rase the accursed own to the ground, than to allow the people of Paris and their ommune to initiate a movement which would threaten the iddle-class property-owners. Thiers and the Bordeaux ssembly of 1871 had, we see, their ancestors in 1793.

On May 19, the Girondins, at the suggestion of Barère, ecreed the formation of a Commission of Twelve to examine to the decisions passed by the Commune, and this commission, ppointed on the 21st, became the driving-wheel of the overnment. Two days later, on the 23rd, it caused Hébert be arrested, the deputy-procurator of the Commune, beloved the people for the frank republicanism of his *Père Duchesne*, d Varlet, the favourite of the Paris poor, for whom the onvention was but a "law-shop," and who preached the cial revolution in the streets. But the arrests were not eant to stop there. The Commission of Twelve proposed o to prosecute the sections; it demanded that the register the sections should be given up, and it procured the arrest the president and secretary of the City section for having used to give up their registers.

The Girondin, Isnard, who presided over the Convention

during these days, an authoritarian in whom Thiers was foreshadowed—on his part added to the ferment by his threats. He threatened the Parisians, if they made any attack on the National representation, that Paris would be destroyed. "People would be searching soon on the banks of the Seine, to see if Paris had ever existed." These stupid threats, which recalled only too well those of the Court in 1791, brought the popular indignation to its full height. On the 26th there was fighting in nearly every section. The insurrection became inevitable, and Robespierre, who until then had discouraged the rising, went to the Jacobins on the 26th to say that if need be he was ready to rise alone against the conspirators and traitors who sat in the Convention.

Thirty-five sections of Paris out of thirty-eight had already asked the Convention to expel from its midst twenty-two Girondin representatives, whose names were given. The sections were now rising to compel the Convention to obey the will of the people of Paris.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE INSURRECTION OF MAY 31 AND JUNE 2

Preparations for rising—Activity of sections—Commission of Twelve—Want of union among revolutionists—*Les Enragés*—New class of middle-class property-owners—May 31—Failure of insurrection—Preparations for fresh revolt—June 2—News of rising at Lyons—Fury against Gironde—Letter to Convention—Speech of Marat to Jacobin Club—Girondins join counter-revolutionists—Convention outlaws Girondins

NCE more the people, in their sections, got ready for insurrection as on August 10. Danton, Robespierre and Marat held equent consultations with each other during those days; ut still they hesitated, and again action came from the "unnown ones," who constituted an insurrectionary club at the shop's Palace, and appointed a Commission of "Six" for at purpose.

The sections took an active part in the preparations. The ction of the Quatre Nations had already, in March, declared elf in a state of insurrection, and had authorised its Watch ommittee to issue mandates of arrest against citizens suspected anti-revolutionary opinions, whilst other sections, those of auconseil and Poissonnière, openly demanded the arrest of the Brissotin" deputies. The following month, that is to say, April 8 and 9, after the treachery of Dumouriez, the ctions of Bonconseil and the Halle-aux-Blés insisted on e general's accomplices being prosecuted, and on the 15th, irty-five sections published a list of the twenty-two members the Gironde, whose expulsion from the Convention they manded.

From the beginning of April, the sections had also been ving to constitute their own federation, for action, outside

the Council of the Commune, and on April 2 the Gravilliers section, always in the vanguard, took the lead in the creation of a "General Committee." This committee acted only in an intermittent way, but it was reconstituted on the approach of danger, on May 5, and on the 29th it undertook the direction of the movement. As to the influence of the Jacobin Club, it was never very great, and its members themselves admitted that the centre of action lay in the sections.*

On May 26, numerous gatherings of the people besieged the Convention, into which they speedily forced their way, and those who entered the hall demanded, with the support of the galleries, that the Commission of Twelve should be suppressed. But the Convention resisted this demand, and it was not until after midnight that, wearied out, it at last yielded, and the Commission was broken up.

This concession was, however, only for the moment. The very next day, on the 27th, profiting by the majority they had in the Convention owing to the absence of a great many of the "Montagnards," who were on commissions in the provinces, the "Gironde," supported by the "Plain," re-established the Commission of Twelve. The insurrection had thus had no effect.

What had rendered the insurrection powerless was that there was no agreement among the revolutionists themselves. One party of the sections, inspired by those known as the "Extremists" (*les Enragés*), wanted a measure that would strike terror into the counter-revolutionists. They wanted, after rousing the people, to kill the principal Girondins: they even spoke of slaying the aristocrats in Paris.

But this scheme met with strong opposition. The National Representation was a trust confided to the people of Paris; how could they betray the trust of all France? Danton, Robespierre and Marat opposed it strenuously. The council of the Commune with Pache, the mayor, also refused to agree to this scheme; and the Popular Societies would not support it either.

There was another thing to be taken into account. It was

* *Vide* Aulard, *Jacobins*, vol. v. p. 209.

ecessary to consider the middle classes who were at that time lready very numerous in Paris, and whose battalions of National Guards would have put down the insurrection if it became question of defending their property. Guarantees had thus o be given that property should not be touched. This is hy Hassenfratz, one of the Jacobins, who declared that there as nothing in theory against the pillage of the scoundrels—or so he called the rich—nevertheless tried to prevent the nsurrection from being accompanied by pillage. "There are hundred and sixty thousand men having their homes in aris, who are armed and ready to repress pillage. It is clear hat it is an *absolute impossibility* to make an attack on property," id Hassenfratz to the Jacobins; and he therefore called on l the members of the club to "pledge themselves to perish, ther than allow attacks to be made on property."

A similar oath was taken on the night of the 31st, in the Commune, and even at the Bishop's Palace, by the "extremts," the sections doing likewise.

The fact is, that a new class of middle-class property-owners ad already sprung up at this time—a class which has increased o enormously during the nineteenth century—and the revolutionists were compelled to take them into consideration, so s not to be opposed by them.

On the eve of an insurrection one can never tell whether ne people will rise or not. This time there was also the fear nat the *Enragés* would try to kill the Girondins in the Convention, and so compromise Paris in the eyes of the departments. Three days, therefore, were spent in conferences, ntil it was agreed that the insurrection should be directed y a union of the different revolutionary elements—the ouncil of the Commune, the Council of the Departments, nd the General Revolutionary Council at the Bishop's Palace; nat no personal violence should be committed, and that roperty should be respected. They were to confine themlves to a *moral insurrection*, to putting pressure on the Convention, so as to force it to hand over the guilty deputies to ne revolutionary tribunal.

Marat, on leaving the Convention on the evening of the 30th,

explained this decision at the Bishop's Palace, and afterwards at the Commune. And apparently it was he who, braving the law which punished with death any one who rang the tocsin, rang the first peal at midnight from the belfry of the Hôtel de Ville. The insurrection thus began.

The delegates who sat at the Bishop's Palace, and who were representing the centre of the movement, first deposed, as had been done on August 10, the mayor and the council of the Commune; but instead of dismissing the mayor and appointing another council, they reinstated both, after first making them take an oath to join the insurrection. They did the same with the council of the department, and that night the revolutionists from the Bishop's Palace, the Department, and the Commune met together, constituting a "General Revolutionary Council" which undertook the direction of the movement.

This council appointed Hanriot, the commander of one of the battalions, that of the *sans-culottes* section, to be General Commander of the National Guard. The tocsin was rung and drums were beating the "alarm" throughout Paris. But still indecision was the most noticeable thing in this rising. Even after the alarm-gun on the Pont-Neuf had begun to fire, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the armed sectionaries, pouring into the streets, did not seem to have any fixed plan. Two battalions, faithful to the Girondins, had been the first to hasten to the Convention, and they took up a position in front of the Tuileries. Hanriot, with forty-eight cannon from the sections, surrounded the Tuileries and the Assembly Hall.

Hours passed by without anything being done. All Paris was on foot, but the majority of the people only wanted to put some pressure on the Convention, so that the Girondin Vergniaud, seeing that they went no further, put a resolution to the effect that the sections had merited well of the country. He no doubt hoped by this to mitigate their hostility towards the "Gironde." It looked almost as if the day were lost, when new crowds of people came up in the evening and invaded the Hall of the Convention. Then, the Montagnards feeling

hemselves reinforced, Robespierre demanded not only the uppression of the Commission of Twelve and the trial of its nembers, but also the trial of the principal members of the 'Gironde," whom they called "the Twenty-Two" and who lid not include the Twelve.

This proposition was not discussed. All that the Convention lecided to do was to break up the Commission of Twelve nce more, and to have all its papers settled and sent to the Committee of Public Welfare, for a report to be made on them vithin three days. For the rest, the Convention approved f a resolution of the Commune which directed that the work- nen who remained under arms, until public tranquillity was estored, should be paid forty sous a day. Upon this the Commune levied a tax on the rich, so as to be able to pay the orkmen for the first three days of the insurrection. It was ecided, also, that the galleries of the Convention should be nrown open to the people, without tickets being required for dmission.

All this meant, however, very little. The "Gironde" as still there, and continued to have a majority in the Con- ention. The insurrection had failed. But then the people f Paris, comprehending that nothing had been done, set to ork to prepare for a fresh rising for the next day but one, une 2.

The revolutionary committee formed within the General ouncil of the Commune gave the order for the arrest of oland and his wife. He had gone away, and she was arrested one. It furthermore demanded very plainly that the Con- ention should have twenty-seven of its Girondist members rested. That evening the tocsin was rung, and the measured ports of the alarm-gun began again to resound.

On June 2 all Paris had risen, this time to finish matters. lore than a hundred thousand armed men assembled round e Convention. They had with them one hundred and ty-three pieces of artillery, and they asked that the Girondist aders should hand in their resignations, or, failing this, that enty-two of them, the number being afterwards raised to enty-seven, should be expelled from the Convention.

The horrible news that arrived that day from Lyons reinforced the popular insurrection. It became known that on May 29 the famished people of Lyons had risen, but that the counter-revolutionists—that is, the Royalists supported by the Girondins—had gained the upper hand and had restored order by murdering eight hundred patriots!

This was unfortunately only too true, and the share taken by the Girondins in the counter-revolution was only too evident. The news roused the people to fury; it was the doom of the "Gironde." The people who were besieging the Convention declared that they would let no one pass out so long as the expulsion of the principal Girondins, in some fashion or other, was not pronounced.

It is known that the Convention, or at least the Right, the "Plain" and part of the "Mountain," declaring that their deliberations were no longer free, tried to get out, hoping to overawe the people, and so make their way through the crowd. Whereupon Hanriot, drawing his sword, gave the famous order: "Gunners, to your guns!"

After a three days' resistance, the Convention was thus obliged to do as it was bidden. It voted the exclusion of thirty-one of the Girondist members; whereupon a deputation of the people brought to it the following letter:

"The whole of the people of the departments of Paris have deputed us to tell you, citizen legislators, that the decree which you have just made is the salvation of the Republic; we come to offer hostages from among us, in numbers equalling those of whom the Assembly has ordered the arrest, so as to answer their departments for their safety."

On the other hand, Marat gave an address to the Jacobins on June 3, in which he summed up as follows the meaning of the movement that had just been carried out, and proclaimed the right of well-being for all.

"We have given a great impetus to the Revolution," he said, speaking of the expulsion of the thirty-one Girondin deputies, "it is for the Convention now to confirm the bases of the public happiness. Nothing is easier; you only must make up your minds definitively. We wish that all the citizens

poken of as *sans-culottes* may enjoy happiness and comfort. We wish that this useful class should be helped by the rich n proportion to their capacities. We do not wish to attack roperty. But what is the most sacred property? It is that existence. We wish this property to be respected. . . .

"We wish that all men who have not a hundred thousand vres' worth of property should have an interest in the maintenance of our work. As to those who have more than a hundred housand, let them cry out as much as they like. . . . We hall tell these men: 'Acknowledge that we are the great umber, and if you do not help us to turn the wheel, we shall rive you out of the Republic, we shall take possession of your roperty, and divide it among the *sans-culottes*.'"

And to this he added another idea which was soon to be put to execution:

"Jacobins," he went on to say, "I have a truth to tell you. ou do not know your most deadly enemies; *they are the nstitutional priests.* It is they who declaim most in the rovinces against anarchists, disorganisers, Dantonism, Robespierrism, Jacobinism. . . . Do not cherish any longer the opular errors; cut at the roots of superstition! Declare penly that the priests are your enemies."*

At that moment Paris did not in the least desire the death the Girondist deputies. All that the people wanted was at the revolutionary members of the Convention should have liberty of action for carrying the Revolution further on. he arrested deputies were not sent to the Abbaye prison; ey were guarded in their own homes. Their pay even, of ghteen francs a day, allotted to each member of the Conntion, was continued, and every one of them could move out Paris, accompanied by a gendarme, whom he had to d.

If these deputies, acting in accordance with the principles antique citizenship, which they so much liked to vaunt, d withdrawn into private life, it is certain that they would ve been let alone. But instead of that, they hurried off to eir departments to stir them up against the Convention,

* Aulard, *Jacobins*, vol. v. p. 227.

and when they saw that in order to excite the counter-revolution and to rouse the departments against Paris, they would have to march hand in hand with the royalists, they allied themselves with the royalist traitors, rather than give up their plans. They marched with these traitors against the Revolution.

Then, and only then—in July 1793—the Convention outlawed them as rebels.

CHAPTER XLVII

THE POPULAR REVOLUTION—ARBITRARY TAXATION

Immediate result of expulsion of Girondins—Importance of period, May 1793 to July 1794—Famine continues—War against coalition—Difficulties of *sans-culottes*—Forced loan necessary—*Superfluous* and *necessary* incomes—Impossibility of levying loan

If any one doubts the necessity under which the Revolution lay, of expelling the chief men of the "Gironde" from the Convention, he should cast a glance at the legislative work which the Convention set itself to accomplish, as soon as the opposition of the Right was broken.

The taxation of the rich to help towards the enormous expenses of the war; the establishment of a maximum price for all commodities; the restoration to the communes of the lands which the nobility had taken from them since 1669; the definite abolition, without redemption, of the feudal rights; the laws concerning inheritance, intended to spread and equalise wealth; the democratic Constitution of 1793—all these measures came in rapid succession after the Right had been weakened by the expulsion of the Girondist leaders.

This period, which lasted from May 31, 1793, to July 27, 1794 (9th Thermidor of the Year II. of the Republic), represents the most important period of the whole Revolution. The great changes in the relations between citizens, the programme which the Assembly had sketched during the night of August 4, 1789, were, after four years of resistance, at last carried out by the purified Convention, under the pressure of the popular revolution. And it was the people—the *sans-*

culottes—who not only forced the Convention to legislate in this way, after they had given it the power of doing so by the insurrection of May 31; but it was also they who put these measures into execution locally, by means of the popular societies to whom the commissioned members of the Convention applied, when they had to create local executive power.

Famine still reigned during this period, and the war, maintained by the Republic against the coalition of the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Sardinia and the King of Spain, urged on and financed by England, assumed terrible proportions. The requirements of this war were enormous, and one can have no idea of them without noting the minute details that are to be found in the documents of the time, so as to conceive the actual penury and ruin to which France was brought by the invasion. Under these truly tragic circumstances, when all things were lacking—bread, shoes, beasts of burden, iron, lead, saltpetre—when nothing could enter by land through the armies of four hundred thousand men hurled against France by the allied Kings, and nothing by sea, through the blockade maintained by English ships—under these circumstances the *sans-culottes* were striving to save the Revolution which was on the point of collapsing.

At the same time, all who held by the old state of things, all who had formerly occupied privileged positions and all who hoped either to regain those positions, or else create new ones for themselves as soon as the monarchic *régime* was re-established—the clergy, the nobility, the middle classes enriched by the Revolution—all conspired against it. Those who remained faithful to it had to struggle between the circle of foreign cannon and bayonets that was closing round them, and the conspirators in their midst who were trying to stab them in the back.

Seeing this, the *sans-culottes* made haste to act so that when the reaction gained the upper hand, it should find a new and regenerate France: the peasants in possession of the land, the town-worker familiarised with equality and democracy, the aristocracy and the clergy despoiled of their riches which had been their true strength, and these riches already passed into

housands of other hands, divided into shares, changed entirely n appearance, unrecognisable—impossible to reconstruct.

The true history of those thirteen months—June 1793 to uly 1794—has not yet been written. The documents which ne day will be used for writing it exist in the provincial rchives, in the reports and letters of the Convention's com- issioners, in the minutes of the municipalities and of the opular societies. But they have not yet been collected with he care that has been bestowed upon the documents concern- ng the legislation of the Revolution, and they ought to be ought for soon as they are rapidly disappearing. This would, o doubt, be the work of a life-time: but without this work he history of the Revolution will remain incomplete.*

What the historians have chiefly studied of this period is the War—and the Terror. And yet these are not the essentials. The essential factor was the immense work of distributing the anded property, the work of democratising and dechristianising rance, which was accomplished during these thirteen months. o relate this immense work with all the struggles to which it ave birth in the different places, in each town and hamlet of rance, will be the work of some future historian. All that we an do to-day is to recall some of the chief features of it.

The first really revolutionary measure taken after May 31 as the *forced loan from the rich* to subvent the expenses of the ar. The condition of the Treasury was, as we have seen, de- lorable. The war was devouring huge sums of money. The aper-money, issued in too great quantities, had already de- reciated. New taxes on the poor could not produce any- ing. What else was left to do, if not to tax the rich? And he idea of a forced loan, of a milliard levied on the rich—an lea which had already been mooted under the Ministry of ecker at the outset of the Revolution—germinated in the ation.

When we read to-day what contemporaries, both reactionaries

* Papers of the highest value have been destroyed recently at Clair- aux. We have found the traces of them and we have recovered some agments of the library of "Pélarin," which had been sold to a grocer d a tobacconist in the village.

and revolutionists, said of the condition of France, it is impossible not to think that every republican, whatever his ideas might be concerning property, must have sided with the idea of a forced loan. There was no other possible way out of the difficulty. When this question was brought forward, on May 20, the tax was proposed by Cambon, a moderate; but the Girondins fell upon the proposers of the loan with unexpected violence, stirring up a shameful scene in the Convention.

This is why all that could be done on May 20 was to accept the idea of a forced loan *in principle*. As to the manner of carrying it into effect that was to be discussed later on—or perhaps never, if the Girondins succeeded in sending the "Montagnards" to the "Tarpeian Rock."

On the very night following the expulsion of the principal Girondins, the Commune of Paris resolved that the decree fixing the maximum for the price of commodities should be carried into effect without further delay, that the arming of the citizens should be proceeded with at once; that the forced loan should be levied; and that the revolutionary army should be organised and should comprise all good citizens, but exclude the *ci-devants*, that is, the ex-nobles, the "aristocrats."

The Convention lost no time in taking similar action, and on June 22, 1793, it discussed the report of Réal, who proposed the following principles for the forced loan. The *necessary* income, three thousand livres for a father of a family and fifteen hundred livres for a bachelor, was to be free from taxation. The *excessive* incomes were to contribute by progression, up to the incomes of ten thousand livres for bachelors, and twenty thousand for fathers of families. If the income were above this figure, it was to be considered as *superfluous*, and requisitioned in its entirety for the loan. This principle was adopted; only the Convention by its decree of the same day fixed the necessary income at six thousand livres for bachelors and ten thousand for the fathers of families.*

* I here follow the work of René Stourm, *Les finances de l'ancien régime et la Révolution*, 1885, vol. ii. pp. 369 *et seq.* The discussions in the Convention were very interesting. Cambon, on introducing the question on May 20, 1793, said: "I should like the Convention to open a civic loan of a milliard livres, which should be made up by the

They perceived, however, in August, that with these sums he loan would produce less than two hundred millions,* and n September 3, the Convention had to fall back on its decree of une 22. It fixed the *necessary* income at a thousand livres or bachelors and fifteen hundred for married men, plus a housand livres for each member of their family. The *excessive* ncomes were taxed on an ascending scale which went from ten o fifty per cent. of the income. And as to the incomes above ine thousand livres, they were taxed so as never to leave more han four thousand five hundred livres of income, plus the *ecessary* which we have just mentioned, no matter what the mount of the rich man's revenue was. This, however, was pplied not as a permanent tax, but as a forced loan, only made or a time and under extraordinary circumstances.

A striking fact, which proves in a remarkable way the impo- ence of parliaments, is that although there was certainly never ny government that inspired more terror than that of the onvention in the Year II. of the Republic, yet this law con- erning the forced loan was never obeyed. The rich people id not pay it. The levying of the loan entailed enormous xpense; but how was it to be levied upon rich people who ould not pay. By seizure, by sale? For this a complicated olitical mechanism was required, and there was already so very uch of the national property for sale? Materially, the loan as not a success; but as the advanced Montagnards meant to prepare men's minds for the idea of equalising all wealth, nd so to make it another step forward, in this respect they tained their end.

Later on—even after the reaction of Thermidor, the Direc- ory also had recourse to two attempts in the same direction— 1795 and in 1799. The idea of *superfluous* and *necessary*

ch and the indifferent. You are rich, *you have an opinion, which uses us expense;* I want to bind you to the Revolution whether you e or not; I want you to lend your wealth to the Republic." Marat, uriot, and Mathieu supported this proposal; but there was a very rong opposition. It should be noted that it was a department, that Hérault, that had taken the initiative, and set the example of a loan this kind. Cambon mentioned it in his speech. Jacques Roux, the Gravilliers, had already advised it on March 9.

* Stourm, p. 372, note.

incomes was making its way—and we know that progressive taxation became part of the democratic programme during the century after the Revolution. It was even applied in several countries, but in much more moderate proportions; so moderate, indeed, that there was nothing left but the name.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AND THE COMMUNAL LANDS

History of communal lands—Rise of middle-class peasants—Opposition to poorer peasants—*Active* and *passive* citizens—Appropriation of communal land by well-to-do peasants—Inaction of Assembly—Proposal of Mailhe rejected—Decree of Assembly—Indignation produced by decree—Difficulty of carrying decree into effect—Assembly frames new law to advantage of "grabbers"

THE restoration of the communal lands to the village communes and the definite abolition of the feudal laws were, as we have seen, the questions that dominated all others in rural France; questions of immense importance in which two-thirds of France was intensely interested, and yet so long as the Girondins, the "defenders of property" ruled the Convention, they remained in suspense.

Since the beginning of the Revolution, or rather since 1788, when a ray of hope had penetrated into the villages, the peasants had expected to regain possession of the communal lands, and had even tried to take back what the nobility, the clergy and the upper middle classes had appropriated under the edict of 1669. Wherever they could, the peasants took back these lands in spite of the terrible repression which very often followed their attempts at expropriation.

Formerly, the whole of the land—meadows, woods, waste lands, and clearings—had belonged to the village communities. The feudal lords held the right of administering justice over the inhabitants, and most of them had also the right of levying various taxes, generally consisting of three days' work and various payments, or *gifts*, in kind, in exchange for which the

lords were pledged to maintain armed bands for the defence of the territory against invasions and incursions, whether of other lords or of foreigners or of local brigands.

Gradually, however, with the help of the military power they possessed, and of the clergy, who sided with them, as well as of the lawyers versed in Roman law, whom they maintained in their courts, the lords appropriated considerable tracts of land as their private property. This appropriation was gradual; it took centuries—the whole of the Middle Ages—to accomplish it, but towards the end of the sixteenth century it was accomplished. The lords were, by that time, in possession of large tracts of arable land and pastures. But still they were not satisfied.

As the population of Western Europe increased, and the land acquired a greater value, the lords, having become the King's peers, being under the protection of both King and Church, began to covet the lands still in the possession of the village communities. To take these lands by a thousand ways and under a thousand pretexts, either by force or by legal fraud, was the customary thing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Then came the ordinance of Louis XIV., *le Roi Soleil*, in 1669, to furnish the lords with a new legal weapon for the appropriation of the communal lands.

This weapon was the *triage*, which permitted the lord to appropriate *a third* of the lands belonging to the village communities that had formerly been under his jurisdiction, and the lords eagerly took advantage of the edict to seize upon the best land, chiefly the meadows.

Under Louis XIV. and Louis XV. the nobility and the Church continued to seize the communal lands under various pretexts. A monastery would be founded in the midst of virgin forests, and the peasants of their own accord would give the monks vast tracts of the forest, and this possession soon became property. Or else the lord, for a mere nothing, would obtain the right of building a farm on land belonging to the commune in the centre of uncultivated lands, with the result that he soon claimed the right of property over all, and, if need were, did not hesitate to fabricate title-deeds. In other places they took advantage of the law of enclosures (*bornage*),

nd in several provinces the lord who had put a fence round art of the communal lands declared himself the owner of it nd received the royal sanction or the sanction of the parliaments o his rights of property over these enclosures. As the resis- ance of the communes to these appropriations was treated as ebellion, while the lords had protectors at Court, the theft f the communal lands, on a large and small scale, continued hroughout the whole kingdom.*

However, as soon as the peasants became conscious of the pproaching Revolution, they began to insist that all the ppropriations made since 1669, whether under the law of *riage* or otherwise, should be declared illegal, and that the ands, which the village communes themselves had been nduced by a thousand fraudulent means to give up to indivi- uals, should be restored. In certain places, during the risings f 1789–1792, the peasants had already taken back these lands, ut reaction might set in any day, and if successful the *ci- levants*—the dispossessed nobles—would again seize upon hem. It was necessary, therefore, to make the restoration of he lands general and to legalise it, a measure which was trenuously opposed, not only by the two Assemblies, the Con- tituent and the Legislative, but also by the Convention, so ong as it was under the domination of the Girondins.

It must be noted that the idea of dividing the communal nds between the inhabitants of each commune, which was ften brought forward by the village *bourgeoisie*, was not at all avoured by the great mass of the peasants, no more than it is avoured in our own day by Russians, Bulgarians, Servians, rabs, Kabyles, Hindus, or any other peasantry among whom he village community still persists. We know, in fact, that henever a voice is raised in a country where communal pro- erty exists, demanding the division of lands belonging to the illage community, it is raised in behalf of the village middle- ass people, who have grown rich by some small business, and

* Several provincial assemblies had, prior to 1789, tried to compel he village communes to divide their lands, either in equal parts per ead, or in proportion to the personal tax (*la taille*) paid by each house- older. Several *cahiers* of 1789 made a similar demand. Others, on he contrary, complained of the enclosures (*bornage*) which the King ad authorised in certain provinces in 1769 and 1777.

hope to appropriate the poor man's acre, as soon as the land is divided. The bulk of the peasantry is nearly always opposed to such a division.

This was also what happened in France during the Revolution. In the midst of the great mass always sinking deeper and deeper in their hideous poverty, a peasant middle class was being evolved, which was growing rich, in one way or another, and whose demands were the more readily heard by a revolutionary administration, middle class in its origin, its tastes and its point of view. These *bourgeois*-peasants were quite in agreement with the mass of the poor peasants in demanding the *restoration of the communal lands* taken by the lords since 1669, but they were against this mass when they demanded the peremptory *division* of these lands. The opposition of the poorer peasants was the stronger, because of the distinction which had been established during the course of the centuries between two classes of inhabitants, in both rural and urban communes. There were families, more or less well-to-do, who were, or said they were, descended from the first founders of each commune. These styled themselves the *bourgeois*, in Alsace *die Bürger*, the "citizens," or even simply "the families"; but there were also those who had entered the commune later on, and who were called "the inhabitants," *les menants; die Ansässigen* in Alsace and Switzerland.

Only the former had rights over the communal arable lands, and they alone in many cases shared the right of pasturage and the right over the woods, the waste lands, the forests, &c.; while the inhabitants, the *manants*, the *Ansässigen*, were often debarred all rights, and were scarcely allowed to pasture a goat on the waste land, or to pick up the fallen wood and chestnuts.

Their situation became still worse after the National Assembly had established the fatal distinction between *active* and *passive* citizens, not only for political rights but also for the election of the communal councils, the officials, and the judges. By the municipal law of December 1789, the Constituent Assembly had indeed abolished the popular village assembly, which was composed, as in the Russian *mir*, of all the heads of families in the commune, which till then had continued to meet under an elm

or in the shadow of the belfry; and instead of the folk-mote, it had introduced an elected *municipality* which could be elected by the *active* citizens alone.

From that time the appropriation of communal lands by well-to-do peasants and all sorts of middle-class people must have proceeded rapidly. It was easy, indeed, for the "active" citizens to come to an understanding among themselves about purchases of the best pieces of ground, and thus to deprive the poor commoners of the use of the common lands which were perhaps the sole guarantee of their existence. This must have been the case in the Vendée, and undoubtedly all through Brittany also, where the peasants, as may be seen from the laws of 1793, enjoyed till then extensive rights over wide stretches of waste lands, heaths and pastures—rights which the village *bourgeoisie* began to dispute when the ancient custom of communal assembly was abolished by the law of December 1789.

Under the influence of the laws made by the Constituent Assembly, the little village *bourgeoisie* began to insist more and more that the lands appropriated under the law of *triage* should be given back to the villages, and that the division of the communal lands should be decreed at the same time. They were, no doubt, quite sure that if the division were decreed by the National Assembly, it would be accomplished to the advantage of the well-to-do peasants. The poor, the "passive" commoners, would be excluded. But neither the Constituent nor the Legislative Assembly did anything until 1792. They were both opposed to any solution of the land question that might be unfavourable to the nobility, and for that reason they took no action.*

* Robespierre had already demanded in the Constituent Assembly the abolition of the ordinance of 1669, and the restitution of the communal lands which "the towns, boroughs and villages of Artois possessed since time immemorial," and to the preservation of which had mainly been due the abundance of cattle and the prosperity of agriculture and the flax industry. These lands had been taken away by the States-General of Artois for the enrichment of the administrative officials and to place them in the hands of the nobility. He demanded, therefore, the abolition of the ordinance of 1669. (*Motion de Robespierre au nom de la province d'Artois et des provinces de Flandre, d'Hainaut*

After August 10, 1792, however, the Legislative Assembly, on the eve of dissolution, felt itself obliged to do something, and what it did was for the benefit of the village *bourgeoisie*. When Mailhe brought forward, on August 25, 1792, a well-thought-out proposal for a decree to annual the effects of the ordinance of 1669, and compel the lords to restore the communal lands which had been taken from the village communes within the last two hundred years, his decree was not accepted. Instead, eleven days previously, on August 14, the Legislative Assembly, on the motion of François (of Neufchâteau), had already decreed as follows: "First, this year, immediately after the harvest, all the communal *lands* and *usages* other than woods [which meant even the grazing lands still held by the communes, over which rights of pasturage generally belonged to all the inhabitants] shall be divided among the citizens of each commune. Secondly, these citizens shall enjoy complete ownership of their respective portions. Thirdly, the communal property known as *nobody's* and *vacant* shall be equally divided between the inhabitants. And fourthly, to fix the method of division the Committee of Agriculture shall in three days propose a plan to be decreed." By this same decree the Legislative Assembly abolished also the joint liability of the commoners for the payment of dues and taxes.

It was indeed a treacherous blow dealt to communal ownership. Hurriedly drawn up, with incredible vagueness and carelessness, this decree seemed to me so extravagant that for some time I could not believe that the text, as given by Dalloz, was anything but an imperfect summary, and I searched for the complete decree. But I found Dalloz had given the exact and full text of this amazing law, which, with the stroke of a pen, abolished communal property in France and deprived those who were called inhabitants, or *Ansässigen*, of all rights over communal lands.

We can quite understand the fury provoked by this decree throughout France among the poorer of the rural population. It was understood to be an order to divide the communal lands

et de Cambrésis pour la restitution des biens nationaux envahis par les seigneurs. Imprimerie Nationale, 1791. British Museum Pamphlets.)

among the *active* citizens, and those "citizens" only, to the exclusion of the "inhabitants" and the poor. It was a spoliation for the benefit of the village *bourgeoisie*,* and this decree, with its third paragraph, would in itself have sufficed to rouse the whole of the Breton peasantry against the Republic.

Already on September 8, 1793, a report was read before the Assembly to state that the carrying out of this decree was so vigorously opposed by the people that it would be impossible to apply it. However, nothing was done. The Legislative Assembly separated without having abrogated it, and it was not rescinded until October by the Convention.

Seeing the difficulty of carrying the decree into effect, the Convention decided first, by the decrees of October 11–13, 1792, that "the communal lands under cultivation shall, until the time of partition, continue to be ploughed and sown as before in accordance with local customs, and the citizens who shall have done the aforesaid ploughing and sowing shall enjoy the crops resulting from their labours." †

So long as the Girondins dominated the Convention nothing better could be done. But it is very probable that the peasants —those of them, at least, to whom the purport of these counter-decrees was explained—realised that the attempt to divide the communal lands had failed for the time being. But who shall measure the harm that this threat of expropriation, still suspended over the communes, did to the Revolution? Who shall tell the amount of hatred stirred up by it in agricultural districts against the revolutionists of the towns?

Nor was this all. Between August 28 and September 14, on the eve of its dissolution, the Legislative Assembly had published another decree concerning the communal lands, which, if it had been upheld, would have been turned completely to the advantage of the lords. It declared, true enough, that "the unoccupied and waste lands shall be considered as belonging to the village communes, and shall be adjudged as theirs by the tribunals"; but if the lord had appropriated these lands or part of them earlier than within the last forty years,

* The decree was so interpreted indeed by the law-courts (*vide* Dalloz, x. p. 265, No. 2261, note).

† *Ibid.* ix. 186.

and had held them since, they remained his property.* This law, as was shown later by Fabre (deputy for the Hérault), in a report by him to the Convention, was of a very great advantage to the lords, for "nearly all the former lords were able to prove the necessary forty years' possession," and so to nullify the clauses "of this decree which were favourable to the communes."† Fabre also pointed out in this decree the injustice of Article 3, according to which the village commune could never regain possession of its lands once the lord had sold his acquired or supposed rights over them to a third person. Dalloz has, furthermore, shown clearly how difficult it was for the village communes to produce the positive and certain proofs which were demanded of them by the law-courts for reinstating them in possession of their lands.

Such as it was, the law of August 1792 was, therefore, always turned to the advantage of the "grabbers" of communal property. It was only in the Convention, and then only after the insurrection of May 31 and June 2, which ended in the expulsion of the Girondist leaders, that the question of the communal lands could again be considered in a light favourable to the mass of the peasants.

* "These lands shall be restored to the communes unless the former lords (*ci-devant seigneurs*) can prove by title-deeds or by exclusive and *undisturbed possession for forty years* that they have proprietary rights."

† *Rapport de Fabre*, p. 36. British Museum Pamphlets on the French Revolution, R. F., vol. 247.

CHAPTER XLIX

THE LANDS RESTORED TO THE COMMUNES

Law of June 11, 1793—Lands to be restored—Difficulty of partition—Details of decree—Diverse opinions of peasants—Majority of communes quickly take possession of lands—Subsequent history of communal lands

So long as the Girondins were the masters, the question of the communal lands remained as it was. The Convention did nothing to minimise the harmful effects of the decrees of August 1792, still less did it accept Mailhe's proposal concerning the lands of which the communes had been robbed.

But immediately after June 2, the Convention took up the question again, and on June 11, 1793, it passed a law which was marked an epoch in the village life of France, and has been full of consequences—more, perhaps, than any other law in French legislation.

By this law all the lands taken from the communes within the last two centuries, by virtue of the *triage* ordinance of 1669, had to be restored, as well as all those unoccupied, and waste lands, grass, marsh, heath, &c., that had been taken from the village communes in one way or another by individuals, including also those that came under the "forty years' possession" Act, decreed by the Legislative Assembly.*

* "All the communal lands in general," said the law of June 10–11, 1793, "known throughout the Republic under the various names of idle and waste lands, &c. (*gastes, garrigues, landes, pacages, pâtis, communs, bruyères, bois communs, hermes, vacants, palus, marais, marécage, montagne*), and under any other denomination whatsoever, are the property of, and by their nature *belong to, the generality of the inhabitants, or members of the communes, or sections of the communes.* The communes shall be authorised to demand their restitution." Clause 4 of Article 25 of the ordinance concerning the "waters and forests of 1669, as well as all the edicts, declarations, decrees of the council and

However, in passing this just and necessary measure, which was to efface the effects of the spoliations committed under the old *régime*, the Convention made a false step concerning the partition of these lands. On this point there were two conflicting currents of ideas in the Convention as in every other place in France. The well-to-do peasants, who had long coveted the communal lands, of which they in many cases held portions in pledge, wanted the partition. They knew that if the lands were divided, it would be easy for them before long to buy up from the poorer peasants the plots of land which would be allotted to them. They wanted also, as we have said, the division to be made between the "citizens" alone, to the exclusion of the "inhabitants," or even of the poorer citizens—the *passive* citizens of 1789. These *bourgeois* peasants found in the Convention energetic advocates, who always pleaded in the name of property, justice and equality when they pointed out the inequality in the properties held by the different communes—which did not prevent them from defending the inequalities within the commune. These were the men who demanded compulsory division,* there being only a few, like Julian Souhait, who demanded that communal property should be maintained.

The Girondist leaders, however, were no longer there to support the advocates of division, and the purified Convention, dominated by the Montagnards, would not agree to divide the communal lands among one part only of the inhabitants; but it believed at the same time that it was doing a good thing, and acting in the interests of agriculture, by authorising the lands to be divided among the inhabitants individually. The idea which led the Convention astray was that no one in France

letters patent, which since that time have authorised the *triage*, division, partial distribution or concession of woods and forests, manorial and seigniorial, to the prejudice of the communal rights and usages . . . and all the judgments given, and acts done as resulting therefrom, are revoked and remain in this respect as null and void." "The forty years' possession, declared by the decree of August 28, 1792, as sufficient to establish the ownership of an individual, shall not in any case be allowed to take the place of the legitimate title, and the legitimate title shall not be that which emanates from feudal authority."

* *Vide* the speech of P. Lozeau concerning the communal properties printed by order of the Convention.

hould be refused a share of the Republic's land, and under he influence of this idea the Convention favoured, rather han permitted, the division of the communal lands.

The division, says the law of June 11, 1793, shall be made etween all, "so much per head of the domiciled inhabitants, egardless of age or sex, absent or present."* "Every citizen, ncluding the labourers and the domestics on the farms, domiciled for a year in the commune, shall have an equal hare in this division, and for ten years the communal portion ssigned to each citizen shall not be seized for debt."†

The partition, however, had to be optional. An assembly of the inhabitants, composed of all individuals having an nterest in the division, of either sex and over the age of twenty-ne, was to be convened on a certain Sunday, and this assembly vas to decide whether the communal property should be livided, either the whole of it, or only in part. If a third of he assembly voted for the division, the division should be lecided upon and could not be revoked.‡

It is easy to conceive the immense change brought about y this decree in the economic life of the villages. All the ands taken from the communes for the past two centuries, y means of *triage*, pretended debts, and frauds, could now e taken back by the peasants. The forty years' possession vas no longer a title to property, the communes could go as ar back as 1669 to claim their former possessions from the owerful and the crafty. And all the communal lands, includ-ng the lands restored to the peasants by the law of June 11, ow belonged to all those who had lived in the commune or a year in proportion to the number of persons in each amily, including the children of both sexes and aged rela-ives. The distinction between citizen and inhabitant was viped out. Every one had a right to the land. It was a com-lete revolution.

Concerning the other part of the law that decreed the ivision, and its being carried into effect by the will of one-hird over two-thirds of the inhabitants, it was applied only

* Section ii., Article 1.
† Section iii., Article 1.
‡ *Ibid.* Article 2.

in certain parts of France, and then not generally. In the North, where there was not much pasture, the peasants willingly divided the communal lands. But in La Vendée and in Brittany they violently opposed the division being made by the will of a third of the inhabitants. They meant to hold, all of them, their right of grazing, &c., over the uncultivated lands intact. In some parts of France there were numerous divisions. Thus, in the Moselle, which is a wine-growing country, 686 communes divided the communal property, 107 of them per head and 579 per family, only 119 communes remaining undivided; but in other departments, in Central and Western France, the majority of the communes kept their lands intact.

As a rule the peasants, who knew very well that if the communal lands were divided, the poorer families would soon become proletarians and poorer than ever, were in no hurry to vote for the partition.

It need hardly be said that the Convention, whose middle-class members loved so much to talk of the inequalities that would result if the communes simply retook possession of their lands, made no attempt to equalise the benefits conferred on the communes by the law of June 11. Making speeches about the poor communes that got nothing served as an excellent pretext for doing nothing and for leaving the dishonestly appropriated lands with those who had got them, but when the opportunity came for proposing something to prevent this "injustice," nothing was proposed.*

* An exception should be made in favour of Pierre Bridet (*Observation sur le décret du 28 août 1792*. Paris, 1793). He proposed something like what is to-day described as "land nationalisation." "The communal lands," said Bridet, "are national property, and consequently it is unfair to allow certain communes to possess a great deal of land while others have only a little." He proposed therefore that the State should take possession of all the communal lands, and lease them in small lots, if leaseholders were to be found; if not—in large lots, *thrown open to the enterprise of inhabitants from other districts in the neighbourhood*. All this was to be done by the Directories of the departments, which were, as we know, highly reactionary bodies representing the interests of the rich. Of course this scheme was not adopted. Since the lands belonging to each commune would have been leased (as they already were) in the first instance, to the local peasants, rich and poor, by the communes themselves, and would only in exceptional

What the communes, up till then, had been doing themelves was going to be handed over now to paid officials, who, most probably, would have favoured the better-off men in he province, by enabling them to enrich themselves at the xpense of the village communes.

The communes that made no delay in retaking possession f their ancient lands secured them then and there, so that hen reaction triumphed and the lords came back into power, ney could do nothing to regain what the law had taken away om them and the peasants were holding in actual possession. ut the communes that hesitated got nothing at all. For, soon as reaction got the better of the revolutionists, as soon the insurrection of the last of the Montagnards had been rushed on the 1st Prairial, Year III. (May 20, 1795), the first are of the reactionary Convention was to annul the revolutionary decrees of the Montagnard Convention. On the 21st rairial, Year IV. (June 19, 1796), a decree was issued prohibiting the restitution of the communal lands to the communes.*

A year later, on May 21, 1797, a new law forbade the village ommunes to transfer or exchange their property by virtue f the laws of June 11 and August 24, 1793. Henceforth pecial legislation was required for each particular act of ransference. This law was clearly meant to check the too

ases be rented by inhabitants from neighbouring districts, the scheme ractically amounted to this: In order to permit a few *exceptional* iddle-class men to lease lands situated in other districts and comunes than their own, the State was going to step in and take the lace of the communes in the administration of their lands. This what the scheme meant. Of course, its preamble contained fty language about justice which might appeal to socialistically clined town-people, ignorant of the land question, and unable to xamine that language more closely. But in reality the scheme nded only to create many new injustices, even worse than the old nes, and to establish numerous sinecures—all in the name of State gulation.

* "Inasmuch as the effect of the law of June 10, 1793, has given se to numberless actions for claims . . ." since the examination of ese matters under dispute would take a long time, "and since it is, oreover, urgent that the unfortunate results of the too literal interetation of the law of June 10, 1793, should be checked, serious inonveniences from them having already been felt . . . all actions and roceedings resulting from this law are, for the time being, to be spended, and all the present holders of the said lands are, for the me being, to be maintained in their possession" (Dalloz, ix. 195).

scandalous plundering of the communal property which went on after the Revolution.

Later still, under the Empire, there were several attempts made to abolish the legislation of the Convention. But, as M. Sagnac remarks, "the successive attempts against the laws of the Convention failed miserably." There were too many interests established on the part of the peasants for these attacks to have any effect.

On the whole, it may be said that the majority of the communes that had retaken possession of the lands filched from them since 1669 retained possession of them, while those that failed to do so before June 1796 got nothing. In revolution it is only the accomplished facts which count.

CHAPTER L

FINAL ABOLITION OF THE FEUDAL RIGHTS

Girondins oppose abolition of feudal rights—Decree of July 17—Feudal laws abolished *en masse*—Reaction unable to prevent effect of decree—Triumph of Revolution

As soon as royalty was abolished, the Convention had to discuss in its first sittings the question of the feudal rights. However, as the Girondins were opposed to the abolition of these rights without indemnity, and yet proposed no scheme of redemption which would be binding on the lords, the whole matter remained in suspense. But this was the main, the all-absorbing question for much more than one-half of the population of France, who asked themselves with anxiety: "Is it possible that the peasant shall have to set his neck again under the feudal yoke, and again endure the horrors of famine—as soon as the revolutionary period is over?"

We have just seen that immediately after the Girondist leaders had been expelled from the Convention, the decree which restored the communal lands to the communes was passed; but the Convention still hesitated to legislate about the feudal rights. It was only on July 17, 1793, that at last it decided to strike the great blow which was to set a seal upon the Revolution by legalising the attainment of one of its two chief objectives—the complete abolition of the feudal rights.

Royalty ceased to exist on January 24, 1793, and now, on July 17, 1793, the law of France ceased to recognise the rights of the feudal lords—the servitude of one man to another.

The decree of July 17 was quite explicit. The distinctions established by the two preceding Assemblies between the different feudal rights, in the hope of maintaining part of them,

were annulled. Every right based upon the feudal law simply ceased to exist.

"All dues formerly seigniorial, feudal rights, both fixed and casual, even those reserved by the decree of August 25 last, are suppressed without indemnity," so ran the decree.* There was no exception; there remained only those rents and labour dues that were paid purely for the land, and were not of feudal origin.†

Thus the assimilation of *feudal* rents to *ground* rents, which had been established in 1789 and 1790, was completely blotted out. If any rent or obligation had a feudal origin, it was abolished irrevocably and without indemnity. The law of 1790 had declared that if any one leased a piece of land, he could purchase it by paying a sum equivalent to twenty or twenty-five times the annual rent; and this condition was accepted by the peasants. But, added the law, if besides the ground rent the owner had imposed any due of a feudal character—a fine, for instance, on all sales and inheritances, any kind of pledge or tax which represented a personal obligation on the farmer to the landlord, such as the obligation to use the mill or wine-press belonging to the lord, or a limitation on the right of sale of produce, or a tribute out of the crops, or even a payment to be made at the time of breaking the lease, or when the land changed owners—all dues, such as these, had to be redeemed at the same time as the ground rent.

But this time the Convention struck a really revolutionary blow. It would have none of these subtleties. Does your farmer hold his land under an obligation of a feudal character? If so, whatever you call this obligation, it is suppressed without indemnity. Or it may be the farmer pays a ground rent which has nothing feudal about it, but beside this rent you have imposed on him a pledge or a tax or some kind of feudal due. In that case, *he becomes the owner of the land without owing you anything whatsoever.*

But the owner might reply, the obligation was merely nominal. So much the worse. You intended to make a vassal of your farmer; he is therefore free and in full possession of the land

* Article 1 of the decree of July 17, 1793. † Article 2.

to which the feudal obligation was attached, without owing you anything. Ordinary individuals, M. Sagnac says, "either through vanity or by force of custom employed this proscribed form, and in the leases they granted stipulated for some trifling fine or small tax on sales and purchases"*—they wanted merely to play the lord.

So much the worse for them. The Convention did not inquire whether they wanted to play the lord or to become one. It knew that all the feudal dues had been trifling and customary at first, only to grow very oppressive in the course of time. Such a contract was as much tinged with feudalism as those that had served in centuries past to enslave the peasants; the Convention saw in it the mark of feudalism, and therefore it gave the land to the peasant who rented it, without asking any indemnity for it.

More than this: it ordered that "all the title-deeds which acknowledged the now abolished dues should be destroyed."† Lords, notaries, land-commissioners, had all, within three months, to bring those title-deeds and charters which gave one class power over another to the record office of their municipality, there to be thrown in a heap and burned. What the peasants had done during their revolt in 1789, at the risk of being hanged, was now to be done by law. "Five years in irons for every depository convicted of having concealed, subtracted or kept back the originals or copies of such deeds." Many deeds of that sort proved the right of feudal State-ownership over certain lands, for the State, too, had formerly its serfs, and later its vassals. But that did not matter. The feudal rights must and shall disappear. What the Constituent Assembly had done with the feudal titles—prince, count, marquis—the Convention was now doing with the *pecuniary rights* of feudalism.

Six months later, on the 8th Pluviose, Year II. (January 27, 1794), in response to numerous protests, chiefly on the part of the notaries who had recorded in the same books, and often on the same page, the dues attaching merely to the land and the feudal dues, the Convention consented to suspend

* Ph. Sagnac, *loc. cit.* p. 147. † Article 4.

the working of Article 6, and the municipalities were permitted to keep the mixed title-deeds in their archives. But the law of July 17 remained intact, and once more, on the 29th Floreal, Year II. (May 18, 1794), the Convention confirmed the decree that all rents "tinged with the slightest trace of feudalism" were to be suppressed without indemnity.

It is most remarkable that the reaction which took the upper hand since 1794 was quite unable to abolish the effect of this revolutionary measure. It is a long way, as we have already said, from the written law to its carrying into actual effect. Consequently, wherever the peasants had not risen against their lords, wherever they had turned against the *sans-culottes*, as in La Vendée, under the leadership of the lords and the priests, wherever their village municipalities remained in the hands of the priests and the rich—there the decrees of June 11 and July 17 were not applied. In these regions the peasants did *not* regain possession of their communal lands. They did not become the owners of the lands they held on feudal lease from their ex-feudal lords. They did not burn the feudal title-deeds; and they did not even buy the nationalised lands for fear of the Church's curse.

But in many places—in a good half of the departments—the peasants did buy the national lands; here and there they even compelled the administration to sell them in small lots. They took possession of the lands they leased from their former lords, and, after planting a May-tree, they danced round it and burned all the feudal documents. They retook, in fact, their communal lands from the monks, the local *bourgeoisie* and the lords—and where this was done, the returning tide of reaction had no power over the economic revolution that was accomplished in deeds.

Reaction set in on the 9th Thermidor, and with it began the "blue" terror of the enriched middle classes. Later on came the Directory, the Consulat, the Empire, the Restoration, which swept away the greater part of the democratic institutions of the Revolution. But this part of the work accomplished by the Revolution remained: it resisted all attacks. The reaction was able to destroy, up to a certain point, the

political work of the Revolution; but its economic work survived. And the new, transfigured nation, which had been formed during the revolutionary turmoil, also remained and set itself hard to work.

Another thing. When we study the economic results of the Great Revolution, as it was accomplished in France, we comprehend the vast difference there is between the abolition of feudalism accomplished bureaucratically by the feudal State itself, as was done in Prussia in 1848, or in Russia in 1861, and the abolition accomplished by a popular revolution. In Prussia and Russia the peasants were freed from feudal dues and compulsory labour only by losing a considerable part of the lands they possessed and by consenting to pay a heavy indemnity which ruined them. To become free property-owners, they impoverished themselves; while the lords, who at first resisted the reform, drew from it, at least in the fertile regions, unhoped-for advantages. Nearly everywhere in Europe the reform that abolished the feudal servitude increased the power of the lords.

In France alone, where the abolition of the feudal system was carried out by a revolution, the change has acted against the lords, as an economic and political caste, to the advantage of the great mass of the peasants.

CHAPTER LI

THE NATIONAL ESTATES

National estates—Previously benefited only middle classes—Discontent among peasants—Convention orders land to be subdivided—Decree concerning heirs—Effect of redistribution of land—Changed aspect of France

The movement of May 31 had the same salutary effect upon the sale of the national estates. Until then these sales had been profitable mainly to the middle classes. Now the Montagnards took measures for rendering the purchase of national estates accessible to the poor who wished to cultivate the land themselves.

When the estates of the clergy, and later on those of the *émigrés*, had been confiscated by the Revolution and put up for sale, a certain part of these estates was divided at the outset into small lots, and the buyers were allowed twelve years to pay the purchase-money by instalments. But in proportion as reaction grew stronger and stronger in 1790 and 1791, and the middle classes consolidated their power, less and less facilities were offered to the poorer classes for buying the confiscated lands. Moreover, the State, being short of funds, was in need of ready money. Consequently, it was found preferable not to break up the large estates and farms, but to sell them as they were to those who bought them for speculation. True, in certain regions the peasants combined into syndicates for buying the larger estates, but the legislators did not favour such combinations, and an immense quantity of land went into the hands of speculators. The small farmers, the farm labourers, the artisans who lived in the villages, and the poor in general

complained, of course, but the Legislative Assembly paid no attention to their complaints.*

Already, in 1789, the wish was expressed in several *cahiers* that the Crown lands and the mortmain estates should be divided into small farms of from four to five acres each. The people of Artois would even have no farms larger than "three hundred measures of land."† But, as Avenel had already pointed out, "neither in the speeches pronounced on this subject, nor in the decrees that were passed, do we find one single word in favour of those poorer peasants who owned no land. . . . Nobody advocated in the Assembly the organisation of popular credit for enabling these famishing peasants to buy on easy terms small lots of land. . . . Nor was any attention paid to the desire expressed by certain papers, such as the *Moniteur*, which asked that one-half of the lands offered for sale should be divided into lots, worth about 5000 francs each, so as to create a number of small peasant proprietors."‡

The result was that the lands that were put up for sale by the nation were chiefly bought by such peasants who had already some property, or else by middle-class town-people—the last circumstance producing a great deal of discontent in the villages of Brittany and La Vendée.

Thereupon came August 10. Under the menaces of the revolted poor, the Legislative Assembly tried to appease discontent by ordering that the lands confiscated from the *émigrés* should be sold in small lots of from two to four acres, to be paid for by a perpetual rent in money. However, those buyers who could pay ready money had still the preference.

On June 3, 1793, immediately after the expulsion of the Girondist leaders from the Convention, the promise was made by the National Representation, now under Montagnard influence, to give one acre of freehold land to each proletarian family in the villages; and some commissioners of the Convention actually did that, distributing small allotments to the poorest peasants. But it was only on the 2nd Frimaire,

* Ph. Sagnac, *La législation civile de la Révolution francaise*, p. 177.

† *Ibid.* p. 80.

‡ G. Avenel, *Lundis révolutionnaires*, pp. 30–40; Prof. Karéiev, 519.

Year II. (November 22, 1793), that the Convention issued orders to subdivide as much as possible the national estates that were put up for sale. Besides, especially favourable conditions of payment were introduced for the buyers of the estates of the *émigrés*, and these conditions were maintained until 1796, when the reactionaries, returning to power, abolished them.

It must, however, be remembered that the finances of the Republic remained all the time in a deplorable state. The taxes were coming in very irregularly, and the war absorbed thousands and thousands of million francs. The paper currency lost in value, and in such conditions the essential thing was to get ready money as quickly as possible, through the sale of the national estates, so as to be able to destroy a corresponding amount of paper-money from the previous issues. This is why the Montagnards as well as the Girondins cared less for the small agriculturist than for the means of realising as rapidly as possible the largest amounts of ready money. Whoever paid in cash continued to have preference.

And yet, notwithstanding all that, and notwithstanding all prevarications and speculations, considerable quantities of land were sold in small lots. While there were many middle-class people who suddenly made scandalous fortunes by the accumulation of national property, considerable quantities of land, in certain portions of France, and especially in the East (as has been shown by Professor Luchitzky of Kieff), passed in small lots into the hands of the poorer peasants. In this region, a real revolution was accomplished in the distribution of landed property.

At the same time, the idea of the Revolution was to strike a blow at the whole class of great landed proprietors, and completely to break up all large fortunes. For this purpose the right of primogeniture in inheritance was abolished by the revolutionary legislature. Already, on March 15, 1790, the Legislative Assembly had abolished the feudal form of inheritance, according to which the landlord transmitted his estates to one single heir—generally his eldest son. Next year (law of April 8 to 15, 1791) all legal inequalities among

the different heirs were done away with. "All the inheritants of equal degree shall inherit, in equal parts, the properties which are assigned to them by law," said this decree. Next, the number of heirs was increased—collateral heirs and illegitimate children being put on the same footing as the direct heirs; and finally, on March 7, 1793, the Convention abolished all rights "of disposing of one's property, whether in case of death, or whilst still alive, by means of agreed donation in a direct line." "All descendants will have an equal part of the properties of their deceased relatives (*ascendants*)."

The parcelling out of the estates was thus rendered obligatory in all inheritances.

What was the effect of these three great measures—the abolition of the feudal rights without compensation, the return of the communal lands to the communes, and the sale of the estates sequestrated from the clergy and the *émigrés*? How did they affect the distribution of landed property? This question continues to be discussed till now, and the opinions still remain contradictory. It may even be said that they vary according to the portions of France which have been the main object of study by this or that investigator.*

With all that, one fact dominates the others. Landed property *was* subdivided. In all those parts of France where the peasants joined the Revolution, considerable amounts of land passed into the hands of the peasants. And everywhere black misery—the gloomy misery of the old *régime*—began to disappear. Chronic famine which formerly used to brood over nearly one-third of France every year, was known no more in the nineteenth century.

Previous to the Revolution some parts of France suffered every year from famine. The agricultural conditions were

* In the Côte-d'Or, the estates of the clergy were bought more by the middle classes than by the peasants. But it was the reverse with the estates of the *émigrés*, which were bought in the same region mainly by the peasants. In the Laonnais, the peasants have bought more estates of the clergy than the middle classes did, while the estates of the emigrants were equally distributed between these two classes. In the North, considerable areas of land were bought by small associations of peasants (Sagnac, *loc. cit.* p. 188).

exactly what they are now in Russia. The peasant might work himself to death, but he could never have enough even of bread from one crop to the next. His ploughing was bad, his seeds were bad, and his meagre cattle could not give him the necessary manure. From one year to another the crops grew worse and worse. "Just as it is now in Russia!" one is bound to exclaim continually, while studying the documents and the works that deal with the conditions of the French peasants under the old *régime*.

But then comes the Revolution. The storm is terrible. The sufferings inflicted by the Revolution and especially by the war are unparalleled; they are truly tragical. At certain moments one sees the abyss opening that will swallow France. After that comes the Directory, followed by the wars of the Napoleonic Empire. And finally comes the reaction of the Bourbons, who are replaced upon the throne of France in 1814, by the coalition of Kings and Emperors; and with them comes the White Terror, even more terrible than the Red Terror of the Revolution. Whereupon superficial people triumphantly say: "You see, revolutions are of no use!"

There are, however, two legacies of the Great Revolution which no reaction could wipe out. France was democratised by the Revolution to such an extent that those who know France cannot stay for a while in any other country of Europe without saying to themselves: "One sees here at every step that the Great Revolution has not passed over this country. The peasant, in France, has become a man. He is no longer "the wild animal" of whom La Bruyère spoke in his *Caractères*. He is a thinking being. And the very aspect of France has been changed by the Revolution. France has become a country of relatively wealthy peasants. Even the White Terror itself was not capable of thrusting back the French peasant under the old yoke of misery. Of course there still remains too much poverty in the villages, in France as elsewhere. But this poverty is wealth in comparison with what France was a hundred and fifty years ago, and with what we still see wherever the Revolution has not yet carried its torch.

CHAPTER LII

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FAMINE—THE MAXIMUM—PAPER-MONEY

Difficulty of feeding large towns—Activity of speculators—Situation at Lyons—Demand for maximum—Convention fixes price of wheat and food-stuffs—Danger of fixing retail prices—Maximum abolished by reactionaries—Fall in value of paper currency—Bankruptcy threatens State—Necker tries to raise money—Manufacture of false *assignats*

NE of the great difficulties in every Revolution is the feeding the large towns. The large towns of modern times are ntres of various industries that are developed chiefly for the xe of the rich or for export trade; these two branches fail henever any crisis occurs, and the question then arises of how ese great urban agglomerations are to be fed.

France had entered upon this phase. Emigration and war, pecially the war with England which prevented exportation d all the foreign trade by which such towns as Marseilles, ons, Nantes and Bordeaux lived, and the tendency felt by h people to avoid making any display of their wealth in time revolution, combined to put a stop to the manufacture of uries and to commerce on a large scale.

The peasants, especially those who had obtained possession their lands, worked hard. Never was labour so energetic as that autumn of 1791, Michelet tells us; and the harvests of 91, 1792, and 1793 had been abundant, so that there should ve been no lack of bread. But since 1788, all Europe, and ance in particular, had been passing through a series of bad rs—very cold winters and sunless summers. In reality re had been only one good harvest, that of 1793, and then y in half the departments. In those there had been even a

surplus of wheat; but when this surplus, as well as the means of transport, had been requisitioned for the war, there was a dearth in more than half France. A sack of wheat which before that had been valued at only 50 livres in Paris, went up to 60 livres in February 1793 and to 100 and 150 livres in the month of May.

Bread, which formerly cost three sous a pound, now rose to six sous, and even to eight sous in the small towns round Paris. In the south it was famine price—ten and twelve sous a pound. At Clermont in the Puy-de-Dôme in June 1793, a pound of bread cost sixteen to eighteen sous. "Our mountain districts are in the utmost misery. The government is distributing the eighth of a *setier* per individual, and every one is obliged to wait two days for his turn," we read in the *Moniteur* of June 15, 1793.

As the Convention did nothing there were disorderly gatherings and riots in eight of the departments, and the Commissioners of the Convention were forced to fix the price of breadstuffs as the people wished. The trade of *bladier* (speculation in wheat) became at this time one of the most dangerous.

In Paris the question of feeding 600,000 persons had come to be one of life or death; for if the price of bread remained at six sous a pound, as it then was, an insurrection was inevitable and in that case grape-shot alone could prevent the pillaging of the rich men's houses. The Commune, therefore, plunged deeper into debt to the State, and expended from 12,000 to 75,000 livres a day to furnish the bakers with flour, and to keep the price of bread at twelve sous for the four-pound loaf. The Government, for its part, fixed the quantity of grain that each department and each canton should send to Paris. But the roads were in bad repair and all the beasts of burden had been requisitioned for the war. The prices of everything had gone up in proportion. A pound of meat which had formerly cost five or six sous now sold at twenty sous; sugar was ninety sous a pound, and a candle cost seven sous.

Speculators had been treated with much severity; but that did not help matters. After the expulsion of the Girondins the Commune had succeeded in getting the Convention to close the Stock Exchange in Paris on June 27, 1793, but specu-

ation still went on, and speculators were seen assembling at the Palais Royal wearing a special badge and marching in processions with girls to mock the misery of the people.

On September 8, 1793, the Paris Commune in desperation et seals on the houses of the bankers and "money-merchants." Saint-Just and Lebas, sent by the Convention on commission to the Lower Rhine, made an order in the Criminal Court for the house of any one convicted of jobbery to be razed to the ground. But speculation was only driven into other channels.

In Lyons the situation was worse than in Paris, for the municipality being partly Girondist, took no measures to relieve the wants of the people. "The population of Lyons at present s 130,000 souls at least; *there are not provisions enough for three days*," wrote Collot d'Herbois to the Convention on November , 1793. "Our situation as regards food is desperate. We are n the brink of famine. . . ." And it was the same in all he large towns.

During this period of scarcity there were touching instances f devotion. We read, for instance, how that the sections of Montmartre and L'Homme Armé decreed a civic fast of six eeks;* and Meillé has found in the Bibliothèque Nationale the ecree of the Observatoire section dated February 1, 1792, by hich all well-to-do citizens in this section were pledged not to se sugar and coffee until their more moderate price would allow he enjoyment of them to their less fortunate brethren.† ater on in the Year II. (February and March 1794), when read went up to a very high price, all the patriots of Paris ecided not to eat any more of it.

But such things could only have a moral effect in the midst dearth. A general measure became necessary. On April , 1793, the administration of the Paris department had ldressed a petition to the Convention demanding that the aximum price at which corn could be sold should be fixed; d after a serious discussion, in spite of strong opposition, the onvention on May 3, 1793, decided to fix a maximum price r all grains.

* Buchez and Roux, xxxvii. 12. † Meillé, p. 302, note.

The general intention of this decree was to place, as far as possible, the consumer in direct touch with the farmer in the markets, so that they could dispense with the middle-men. For this purpose every merchant or owner of corn and flour was bound to send from his place of residence to the municipality a declaration as to the quantity and nature of the grain in his possession. Corn and flour were no longer to be sold except in public markets established for the purpose, but the consumer might lay in provisions by the month directly from the merchants or landowners of his canton if furnished with a certificate from the municipality. The lowest prices at which the different kinds of grain had stood between January 1 and May 1, 1793, became the maximum price, above which the grain could not be sold. These prices were to be slightly decreased by degrees until September 1. Those who sold or bought at prices above the maximum were to be fined. Those who were convicted of maliciously or designedly spoiling or concealing the grain or flour, which was done even during the scarcity, were to be put to death.

Four months later it was found advisable to equalise the price of wheat all over France, and on September 4, 1793, the Convention fixed for the month of September the price of the best quality wheat at 14 livres the quintal (50 kilos. in weight, 100 by measure). This was the maximum so much cried down,* a necessity of the moment of which the royalists and Girondins made a crime to lay upon the Montagnards. The crime was all the more unpardonable because those who sympathised with the people demanded that not only should the price of wheat be fixed, but also that of the baked bread, as well as various objects of prime and secondary necessity. If society had undertaken to protect the life of the citizen, should it not also, they said with justice, protect it against those who made attempts on that life by forming coalitions to deprive it of what was absolutely necessary

* It is often thought that it would be easy for a revolution to economise in the administration by reducing the number of officials. This was certainly not the case during the Revolution of 1789–1793, which with each year extended the functions of the State, over instruction, judges paid by the State, the administration paid out of the taxes, an immense army, and so forth.

The contest over this subject was, however, very keen—many of the Montagnards as well as the Girondins being absolutely opposed to the idea of fixing the price of food-stuffs, which they said was "impolitic, unpractical and dangerous." * But public opinion prevailed, and on September 29, 1793, the Convention decided to fix a maximum price for things of first and second necessity—meat, cattle for the market, lard, butter, sweet oil, fish, vinegar, brandy, and beer.

This solution was so natural that the question of forbidding the exportation of grain, and of building granaries with this view and of fixing a maximum price for cereals and meat had already been discussed by both politicians and revolutionists since 1789. Certain towns, such as Grenoble, had decided since September 1789, to purchase grain for itself and to deal severely with monopolists. Many pamphlets to this effect were published.† When the Convention assembled, the demands for the fixing of a maximum price became pressing, and the council of the department of Paris met the magistrates of the department to discuss this question. The result was a petition which, in the name of all the people in the department of Paris, demanded that the Convention should fix a maximum price for grain. The prices of articles of secondary necessity were fixed for a year. Combustibles, candles, lamp oil, salt, soap, sugar, honey, white paper, metals, hemp, flax, woollen and cotton stuffs, sabots, shoes, tobacco, and the raw materials used in factories were comprised in this category. The maximum price at which it was permitted to sell these wares was the price each had fetched in 1790, which had been fixed by the assemblies plus one-third, deduction being made of the fiscal and other duties to which they were then subject. This was the decree of September 29, 1793.

But at the same time the Convention legislated against the salaried classes and the poor in general. It decreed that "the

* *Vide* the collection in the British Museum, *Bibliothèque historique de la Révolution*, which contains the pamphlets on the Food Question, Nos. 473, 474, 475.

† Momoro has published a very interesting pamphlet on this subject, in which he explains the communist principles (*Opinion de Momoro . . sur la fixation de maximum du prix des grains dans l'universalité de la République française*).

maximum or highest figure respectively of salaries, wages, piece work or by the day, shall be fixed up to the September following, by the General Councils of the commune at the same rate as in 1790, with half that sum in addition. . . ."

It is clear that this system could not be limited. Once France had shown that she did not wish to remain under a system of freedom in commerce—and consequently in stock-jobbing and speculation which naturally followed—she could not stop at these timid experiments. She had to go further along the road to the communalism of commerce, despite the resistance which such ideas must necessarily encounter. The result of this was that, on the 11th Brumaire (November 1, 1593), the Convention discovered through the report of Barère that to fix the price at which goods should be sold by retailers was "to injure the small trades to the profit of the greater ones, and the factory-hand to the profit of the factory-owner." Then the idea was conceived that to establish the price of merchandise included in the preceding decree, it was necessary to know "the value of each on production." Adding to this five per cent. profit for the wholesale merchant, and five per cent. for the retailer, so much more for expenses of transport, the fair price was fixed at which each kind of goods should be sold.

A gigantic inquiry was begun, therefore, to establish one of the factors of value, the cost of production. Unfortunately, it was never completed, owing to the triumph of reaction, on the 9th Thermidor, when everything of that kind was abandoned. On the 3rd Nivose, Year III. (December 23, 1794), after a stormy discussion, opened by the Thermidorians, on the 18th Brumaire (November 8), the decrees concerning the maximum were repealed. This resulted in an alarming fall in the value of the paper currency: only nineteen francs were given in exchange for a hundred francs in paper, six months later the exchange was two francs for a hundred, and in November 1725 the value had sunk to fifteen sous. Meanwhile a pair of shoes cost a hundred livres and a drive in a carriage six thousand livres.*

* *Vide* Avenel, *Lundis révolutionnaires*, ch. iii., concerning the true causes of this unavoidable dearness.

It has been already mentioned how Necker, to procure the means of existence for the State, had had recourse at first to two loans, one for thirty, the other for eighty millions. These loans, however, not being successful, he had obtained from the Constituent Assembly an extraordinary grant of a quarter of every person's income payable once. Bankruptcy was threatening the State, and the Assembly, led by Mirabeau, voted the grant demanded by Necker. But this also produced very little.* Then, as we have seen, the idea was evolved of putting up the Church lands for sale and issuing *assignats* (paper-money), which were to be cancelled according as the sales brought in the money, thus forming a source of national revenue. The quantity of paper-money issued was to be limited to the value of the lands each time put up for sale. These *assignats* bore interest and had an inflated value.

Jobbery and money-lending no doubt tended continually to depreciate the value of the *assignats:* it could, however, be maintained more or less, so long as the maximum prices of the principal commodities and objects of prime necessity were fixed by the municipalities. But as soon as the maximum was abolished by the Thermidorian reaction the depreciation of the *assignats* was rapid. The misery caused by this among those who lived from hand to mouth can be imagined.

Reactionary historians are always ready to involve this subject, like so many others, in vagueness and confusion. But the truth is that the great depreciation of the *assignats* was only felt after the decree of the 3rd Nivose, Year III., which abolished the maximum.

At the same time, the Convention under the Thermidorians began to issue vast quantities of *assignats*, so that from six thousand four hundred and twenty millions, which were in circulation on the 3rd Brumaire, Year III. (November 3, 1794), the sum had mounted nine months later, that is, by the 25th Messidor, Year III. (July 13, 1795), to *twelve milliards.*

* As a rule, during the whole Revolution no taxes were paid in. In February 1793, the Treasury had not received anything from the tax on landed and personal property levied in 1792, and of that levied in 1791 only half had been received—about 150 millions. The remainder was still to come.

Furthermore, the princes, and above all, the Count d'Artois, had set up in England, by an ordinance of September 20, 1794, countersigned by Count Joseph de Puisaye and the Chevalier de Tinténiac, "a manufactory of *assignats*, resembling in all respects those which had been issued, or were to be issued, by the so-called National Convention." There were soon seventy workmen employed in this manufacture, and the Count de Puisaye wrote to the committee of the Breton insurrection: "Before long you will have a million a day, and afterwards two, and more later."

Finally, on March 21, 1794, there was a discussion in the English House of Commons, in which the famous Sheridan denounced the manufacture of the false *assignats*, which Pitt had allowed to be established in England, and Taylor declared that he had seen with his own eyes the false paper-money being made. Considerable quantities of these *assignats* were offered in all the large towns of Europe in payment of bills of exchange.*

If only reaction had confined itself to these infamous secret doings, but it was even still more active in the systematic monopolisation of food-stuffs by means of purchasing the crops in advance, and in speculating in *assignats*.†

In addition, the abolition of the maximum was the signal for an increase in the price of everything, and this in the midst of terrible scarcity. One can but ask how France managed to pass through such a frightful crisis without completely going under. Even the most revolutionary authors ask themselves this.

* *Vide* Louis Blanc, Book XIII., ch. iv., which gives an excellent *Histoire du maximum*; also Avenel, *Lundis révolutionnaires*.

† Some letters from England, addressed by royalists to their agents in France, reveal the methods by which the stock-jobbers worked. Thus we read in one of these letters: "Run up the exchange to 200 livres for one pound sterling. We must discredit the *assignats* as much as possible, and refuse all those without the royal effigy. *Run up the prices of all kinds of commodities. Give orders to your merchants to buy in all objects of prime necessity.* If you can, persuade Cott . . . to to buy up the tallow and candles at any price, make the public pay as much as five francs a pound. My lord is well satisfied with the way in which B.t.z. (Batz) has acted. We hope that the *assassinats* (*sic*) will be pushed carefully. Disguised priests and women are the best for this work." (S. Thiers, *Histoire de la Révolution française*, vol. iii. pp. 144–145, 1834.)

CHAPTER LIII

COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN BRITTANY—ASSASSINATION OF MARAT

Girondins stir up civil war—Royalist plot discovered—English prepare insurrection in Normandy and Brittany—Insurrection falls through—Weakness of republican forces—Commissioners of Convention succeed in rousing towns—Charlotte Corday—Implication of Girondins in plot—Assassination of Marat—Execution of Chalier—Character and work of Marat

Assailed from all sides by the coalition of European monarchies, in the midst of the tremendous work of reconstruction which she had undertaken, France found herself in the throes of a terrible crisis. And it is in studying this crisis in its details, in realising the sufferings which the people had to endure from day to day, that we realise the enormity of the crime committed by the leisured classes, when, in order to retain their privileges, they did not hesitate to plunge France into the horrors of a civil war and a foreign invasion.

Nevertheless, the Girondist leaders did not shrink after their exclusion from the Convention on June 2, 1793, from going to the provinces, to fan there, with the support of royalists and even of foreigners, the flame of civil war.

It may be remembered that after excluding thirty-one Girondist members from its midst, the Convention placed them under home-arrest, leaving them the right of going about in Paris, under the condition of being accompanied by a gendarme. Vergniaud, Gensonné, Fonfrède, remained in Paris, and from time to time Vergniaud addressed letters, full of venom, to the Convention. As to the others, they escaped and went to rouse the provinces. The royalists could not desire anything better.

Anti-revolutionary risings broke out in sixty departments—the most extreme Girondins and the royalists working hand in hand.

Since 1791 a royalist plot was already hatching in Brittany—its aim being to re-establish the old States-General of this province, and the old administration by the three orders. Tufin, Marquis de la Rouërie-Rezière, had been placed by the emigrant princes at the head of this conspiracy. The plot, however, was denounced to Danton, who had it watched by one of his secret agents. The Marquis de la Rouërie-Rezière was forced to go into hiding, and in January 1793, he died in La Guyaumarais, the châteaux of one of his friends, where he was buried secretly. The insurrection broke out, however, with the support of the English.

With the aid of smugglers and the *émigrés* who lived in Jersey and in London, the English Government prepared a tremendous insurrection which was to place in its hands the fortified towns of Saint-Malo, Brest, Cherbourg, and perhaps also Nantes and Bordeaux. After the Convention had decreed the arrest of the most important Girondist members, Pétion, Gaudet, Brissot, Barbaroux, Louvet, Buzot, and Lanjuinais went to Normandy and Brittany, to take the leadership of the insurrection there. On reaching Caen, they at once organised a League of the United Counties, with the intention of marching against Paris. They had the delegates of the Convention arrested, and they excited popular feeling against the Montagnards. General Wimpffen, who was in command of the Republican troops in Normandy, and who took up the cause of the insurgents, did not hide from them his royalist opinions and his intention to seek support in England; but, notwithstanding this, the Girondist leaders did not break with him.

Happily the people in Normandy and Brittany did not follow the lead of the royalists and the clergy. The towns ranged themselves on the side of the Revolution, and the insurrection, having been crushed at Vernon, fell through.*

The march of the Girondist leaders through Brittany, along the dark, walled country lanes, not daring to show themselves

* "The civic hymn of the Bretons marching against Anarchy,"

even in the smallest towns, where the republicans would have arrested them, shows how little sympathy they found, even in this Breton country, where the Convention had not won the favour of the peasants, and where the levying of recruits for the war on the Rhine was, of course, fiercely resented. When Wimpffen intended to march against Paris, Caen only furnished him with a few dozen volunteers.* In the whole of Normandy and Brittany only five to six hundred men were enlisted, and they did not even fight when they found themselves face to face with a small army arrived from Paris.

In some towns, however, especially in the seaports of Saint-Malo and Brest, the royalists found staunch supporters amongst the merchant class, and a tremendous effort was necessary for the republicans to prevent Saint-Malo from giving itself up, as Toulon had done, to the English.

One must, indeed, read the letters of the young Jullien, commissioner of the Committee of Public Welfare, and of Jeanbon Saint-André, commissioner of the National Convention, to understand how weak were the material forces of the Republic, and how willing the well-to-do classes were to uphold the foreign invaders.

Everything had been prepared to give up the fortress of Saint-Malo to the English fleet, armed as it was with 123 cannon, 25 mortars, and well stocked with cannon-ball, bombs and powder.

such was the title of the song of the Girondins, which Gaudet gives in the *Mémoires of Buzot*, pp. 68–69. Here is one of the stanzas :

> From a throne propped by his crimes,
> Robespierre, all drunk with blood,
> Points out his victims with his finger
> To the roaring Anarchist.

This Marseillaise of the Girondins demanded the death of Danton, of Pache, and of Marat. Its refrain was :

> War and death to the tyrants,
> Death to the apostles of carnage !

Of course, at the same time they themselves were demanding and preparing the slaughter of the revolutionists.

* The review of which Charlotte Corday spoke before her judges and which was to have gathered thousands of men, was a fiction, with which she expected no doubt to frighten the *sans-culottes* of Paris.

It was only the arrival of the commissioners of the Convention which rekindled the zeal of the republicans and prevented this treachery.

These commissioners did not rely upon the local administrative bodies ; they knew them to be worm-eaten with royalism and "commercialism." They went straight to the Popular Society of each town, whether small or large. They proposed to this society to "purify" itself. Each member had to state openly before the whole society what he had been before 1789 ; what he had done since then ; whether he had signed the royalist petitions of the 8000 or 20,000 ; what had been his fortune before 1789, and what it was at the present moment. Those who could not give satisfactory answers to these questions were excluded from the Republican Society.

After this the society became the recognised organ of the Convention. With its aid the commissioner proceeded to a similar purification in the municipality and had the royalist members and profit-mongers (*profiteurs*) excluded. Then, supported by the society, they roused the enthusiasm of the population, especially of the *sans-culottes*. They directed the enlisting of volunteers and induced the patriots to make efforts, often heroic, for the defence of the coasts. They organised republican *fêtes* and introduced the republican calendar. And when they left, to accomplish the same work elsewhere, they handed over to the new municipality the work of taking all necessary measures for the transport of ammunition, provisions, troops, when asked to do so by the commissioners of the Convention—always under the supervision of the local Popular Society with which they maintained a regular correspondence.

Very often the war demanded extraordinary sacrifices. But in each town, in Quimper, in Saint-Malo itself, the commissioners of the Convention found men devoted to the Revolution ; with their aid they organised the defence. The *émigrés* and the British ships did not even dare to approach Saint-Malo or Brest.

Thus the royalist insurrection failed both in Normandy and in

Brittany. Yet it was from Caen that Charlotte Corday came to assassinate Marat. Influenced, no doubt, by all that she heard said against the Republic of the *sans-culotte* Montagnards, dazzled perhaps by the refined republican airs which the Girondins who had come to Caen gave themselves, and where she met Barbaroux, Charlotte Corday arrived on July 11 in Paris, determined to murder some one of the eminent revolutionists.

The Girondist chroniclers, who all hated Marat, the chief organiser of May 31, have made out that Charlotte Corday was a republican. This is absolutely untrue. Mademoiselle Marie Charlotte Corday d'Armont belonged to an arch-royalist family, and her two brothers had emigrated. She herself, brought up in the convent of l'Abbaye-aux-Dames at Caen, now lived with a relation, Madame de Breteville, who was only prevented by fear from openly calling herself a royalist. All the so-called "republicanism" of Mademoiselle Corday d'Armont lay in the fact that she refused once to drink the king's health, and explained her refusal by saying that she would be a republican "if the French were worthy of a Republic." That is to say, she was a constitutionalist, probably a "Feuillante." General Wimpffen even described her simply as a royalist.

Everything leads us to believe that Charlotte Corday d'Armont did not stand alone. Caen, as we have just seen, was the centre of the Federation of the United Departments, organised against the Montagnard Convention, and it is very probable that a plot had been prepared for July 14 or 15, to kill on that day "Danton, Robespierre, Marat and Company," and that Charlotte Corday knew of this. Her visit to the Girondin Duperret, to whom she handed over some leaflets and a letter from Barbaroux—then at Caen—and whom she advised to retire to Caen without delay, tend rather to represent Charlotte Corday as the tool of a plot hatched at Caen by the Girondins and the royalists.*

The original plan of Charlotte Corday had been, she said,

* That a plot existed, and that the Girondins were cognisant of it, seems clear enough. Thus, on July 10, a letter was read at the General Council of the Commune of Paris, received at Strasbourg, and forwarded to Paris by the mayor of that city, in which were the following lines:

to kill Marat on the Champ-de-Mars, on July 14, during the anniversary *fête* of the Revolution, or should he not be there, at the sitting of the Convention. But the *fête* had been put off, and Marat, who was ill, did not attend the Convention.

Then she wrote to him, begging to be received, and on obtaining no answer, she wrote again, playing this time jesuitically on his kindness, of which she knew, or of which her friends had spoken to her. In this letter she said she was unhappy, persecuted, knowing for certain that with such a recommendation she would be received.

With this note, and a dagger hidden in her scarf, she went, on July 13, at seven o'clock in the evening, to Marat. His wife, Catherine Evrard, after hesitating a little, finally allowed the young lady to enter the modest room of the people's friend.

Marat, wasted by fever for the past two or three months, after the life of a tracked wild beast which he had led since 1789, was seated in a closed bath, correcting the proofs of his paper on a board placed across the bath. It was here that Charlotte Corday d'Armont struck the Friend of the People in the breast. His death was instantaneous.

Three days later, on the 16th, another friend of the people, Chalier, was executed by the Girondins at Lyons.

In Marat, the people lost their most devoted friend. The partisans of the Girondins have represented him as a bloodthirsty madman, who did not even know what he wanted. But we know to-day how such reputations are made. The fact is, that in the dark years of 1790 and 1791, when he saw that all the heroism of the people had not been able to break the royal power, Marat began to despair, and he wrote that a few thousand aristocratic heads ought to be sacrificed to make the Revolution succeed. However, in the depth of his heart, he was not at all bloodthirsty. He only loved the people, both

"The 'Mountain,' the Commune, the Jacobin Club and the whole rascally crew are a hair's-breadth from the grave. . . . Between now and July 15 we will dance! I hope that no other blood than that of Danton, Robespierre, Marat and Company will be shed" (I quote from Louis Blanc). On July 11 and 12, in the Girondist paper, the *Chronique de Paris*, there were already allusions to the death of Marat.

he and his heroic mate, Catherine Evrard,* with a love far deeper than that of any other prominent revolutionist, and to this love he remained true.

From the day the Revolution began, Marat took to bread and water, not figuratively speaking, but in reality. And when he was murdered, the entire fortune of the Friend of the People was a note for 25 livres (francs).

With this love of the people to guide him, Marat, who also was older than most of his revolutionist comrades, and had more experience, understood the various phases of the Revolution, and foresaw what was to come, far better than did any of his contemporaries. He was the only one, we may say, of the revolutionary leaders who had a real understanding of events and power of grasping them as a whole, in their intricate bearings on one another.†

That he had a certain amount of vanity is to be explained to some extent by the fact that he was always pursued, always tracked, even in the greatest days of the Revolution, while each new phase of the Revolution only confirmed the accuracy of his predictions. But these are mere details. The distinctive feature of his mind was that at each given moment he understood what had to be done for the triumph of the people's cause—the triumph of the people's revolution, not of an abstract theoretical revolution.

However, it must be owned that when the Revolution, after the abolition of feudal rights, had to make one more step to solidify its work—when it had to take such measures as would benefit the lowest classes by giving to every one the certainty of work and life—Marat did not fully grasp the truth in the ideas held by Jacques Roux, Varlet, Chalier, L'Ange, and many others. Having been himself unable to formulate the leading ideas of the deep communist change, of which these precursors sought the practical forms, and fearing, on the other hand, that

* "A divine woman, who, touched by his position when he fled from cellar to cellar, took in and hid the Friend of the People. To him she devoted her fortune and sacrificed her peace." Thus Michelet quotes the words of Albertine, Marat's sister, about Catherine Evrard.

† It is a pleasure to note that a study of Marat's work, neglected till this day, led Jaurès to speak with respect of this quality of the popular tribune.

France might lose the liberties she had already won, he did not give these communists the necessary support of his energy and his immense influence. He did not make himself the mouthpiece of the new movement.

"Had my brother lived," said the sister of Marat, "neither Danton, nor Camille Desmoulins"—nor the Hébertists either, we may add—"would have been guillotined."

On the whole, although Marat understood the sudden accesses of fury in the people, and even considered them necessary, at times, yet he certainly was not an upholder of terrorism as it was practised after September 1793.

CHAPTER LIV

THE VENDÉE—LYONS—THE RISINGS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

Royalist conspiracies in South—Risings against Convention—Toulon surrenders to English and Spanish fleet—Causes of rising in La Vendée—Disaffection of peasants—Ill-feeling of villages against towns—Girondins help insurrection—Plan of Vendeans—They take Saumur and Angers, but are forced to retire at Nantes—Vendeans exterminated—Risings in Provence and at Lyons—Chalier—Marseilles and other southern towns join movement—Royalists defeated—Siege and capture of Lyons—Action of republicans in Lyons—Bordeaux surrenders to Convention

the royalist rising failed in Normandy and Brittany, the actionaries met with more success in the province of Poitou, the departments of Deux-Sèvres, Vienne, and Vendée, Bordeaux, Limoges, and partly in Eastern France, where ings against the Convention began at Besançon, Dijon and âcon. In these parts of France the middle classes, as we ve seen, had acted with ferocity against the revolted peasants 1789.

In the South, where royalist conspiracies had been going on a long time, revolts broke out in several places. Marseilles l into the hands of the counter-revolutionists—Girondins d royalists—who elected a provisory government, and ended to march against Paris. Toulouse, Nîmes and enoble rose also against the Convention.

Toulon surrendered to an English and Spanish fleet, which ok possession of this fortress in the name of Louis XVII. rdeaux, a trading town of great importance, seemed also be ready to rise at the call of the Girondins; and Lyons, ere the industrial and merchant *bourgeoisie* was supreme

since May 29, revolted openly against the Convention, and withstood a long siege; whilst the Piedmontese, profiting by the disorder in the army, which had Lyons as its base of operations, crossed the frontier of France.

Up to the present day, the true causes of the rising in La Vendée have not been made quite clear. Of course the devotion of the peasants to their clergy, cleverly made use of by Rome, did much to foster their hatred against the Revolution. Certainly there was also in the villages of La Vendée a vague attachment to the King, and it was easy for the royalists to rouse the pity of the peasants for "the poor King who had desired only the good of the people, and had been executed by the people of Paris"; many tears also were then shed by the women over the fate of the poor child, the Dauphin, shut up in a prison. The emissaries who came from Rome, Coblentz and England, bringing with them papal bulls, royal decrees and gold, had a clear field under such conditions, above all when they were protected by the middle classes, the ex-slave-traders of Nantes, and the merchants on whom England showered promises of aid against the *sans-culottes*.

And finally, there was this reason, in itself sufficient to bring whole provinces to arms—the levy of three hundred thousand men ordered by the Convention. This levy was regarded in La Vendée as a violation of the most sacred right of every human being—that of remaining in his native land.

It is nevertheless permissible to believe that there were yet other causes to rouse the peasants of La Vendée against the Revolution. Continually, whilst studying various documents of the period, one comes across such causes as must certainly have produced a feeling of resentment among the peasants against the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies. The fact alone that the former had abolished with a stroke of the pen the folk-motes of the villages, which had existed for centuries until December 1789, as also the fact that the peasants were divided into two classes—active and passive—and that the administration of communal affairs was given to those elected by the rich only—these facts alone were sufficient to

awake discontent in the villages against the Revolution, and against the towns in general and their middle classes.

It is true that on August 4 the Revolution had proclaimed in principle the abolition of feudal rights and mortmain, but the latter, it appears, no longer existed in the West, and feudal rights were only abolished on paper; and as the risings of the villages were not widespread in the western provinces, the peasants of these provinces saw that they would have to continue paying feudal dues as before.

On the other hand—and this was of great importance to the villages—the sale of the State lands, of which the greater part, all the Church lands, should have reverted to the poor, were now being bought by wealthy people in the towns, and this tended to strengthen the general ill-feeling of the villages against the towns. To this must also be added the pilfering of the communal lands for the benefit of the middle class, which was increased by the decrees of the Legislative Assembly.*

It thus happened that the Revolution, while imposing new burdens on the peasants—fresh taxes, recruiting, and requisitions—had given nothing to the villages up to August 1793, except when the peasants themselves had taken the lands of the nobles or the estates of the clergy. In consequence, a deeply seated hatred was growing in the villages against the towns, and we see indeed that the rising in La Vendée was a war declared by the villages against the towns, especially against the middle classes of the towns.†

With the help of Rome, the insurrection broke out, wild and bloody, under the guidance of the clergy. And the Convention could only send out against it some insignificant troops, commanded by generals either incapable or else interested in making the war drag on; while the Girondist deputies did their best to help the insurrection by the letters they addressed

* *See* ch. xxvi.

† Certain indications of a social character in the Vendean rising are to be found, says Avenel, in the work of Antonin Proust (*La Justice révolutionnaire à Niort*). It was a war of the peasants against the *bourgeois*—the peasants sending their delegates to the *bourgeois* creditors "to get the title-deeds and burn them" (*Lundis révolutionnaires*, p. 284).

to Nantes and the other towns. All these forces, acting in the same direction, made it possible for the rising to spread and finally to become so menacing that the "Mountain," in order to crush it, had recourse to the most abominable measures.

The plan of the Vendeans was to take all the towns, to exterminate the republican "patriots," to carry the insurrection into the neighbouring provinces, and then to march against Paris.

At the beginning of June 1793, the Vendean leaders, Cathelineau, Lescure, Stoflet, and La Roche-Jacquelein, at the head of 40,000 men, took the town of Saumur, which gave them command over the Loire. Then, crossing the Loire, they took Angers (June 17), and dexterously disguising their movements, they immediately marched on Nantes, the seaport of the Loire, the possession of which would have put them into direct communication with the English fleet. On June 29 and 30, their armies, rapidly massed, attacked Nantes. But in this enterprise they were routed by the republicans. They lost Cathelineau, the real and democratic leader of the rising, and they were forced to abandon Saumur and retire to the left bank of the Loire.

A supreme effort was made now by the Republic to attack the Vendeans in their own country. The war became a war of extermination, and finally twenty to thirty thousand Vendeans, followed by their families, decided to emigrate to England after crossing Brittany. They consequently crossed the Loire from south to north, and went northwards. But England had no desire to receive such immigrants, and the Bretons, for their part, received them coldly, the more so as the Breton patriots were gaining the upper hand in the towns and villages; therefore all these starving and ragged people, with their women and children, were driven back towards the Loire.

We have mentioned already the savage ardour with which the Vendeans, encouraged by their clergy, were animated at the outset of their revolt. Now, the war was becoming one of mutual extermination. In October 1793—it is Madame de la Roche-Jacquelein who writes thus—their watchword was "No quarter." On September 20, 1793, the Vendeans

filled the wells at Montaigne with the bodies of republican soldiers, many of them still alive and only stunned or disabled by blows. Charette, on taking Noirmoutiers, on October 15, had all those who surrendered shot. Living men were buried up to the neck, and their captors amused themselves by inflicting all kinds of tortures on the unburied heads.*

On the other hand, when all this mass of men, women and children, driven back to the Loire, poured into Nantes, the prisons of this town began to be dangerously overcrowded. In these dens, swarming with human beings, typhoid fever and various other infectious diseases raged, and soon spread into the town which was already exhausted by the siege. Besides, just as in Paris, after August 10, the imprisoned royalists threatened to set fire to the city and to murder all the Jacobins, so the Vendeans imprisoned at Nantes likewise threatened to exterminate all the republicans as soon as the "Royal Army" of Vendeans should approach Nantes. It must be noted that the patriots numbered but a few hundreds in this town, which had gained its wealth in the slave trade and slave labour in Saint Domingo, and was losing it now that slavery had been abolished. Consequently, the patriots had to display an extraordinary vigilance and energy to prevent Nantes from being taken by a sudden attack of the "Royal Army," and the republicans from being massacred. Their efforts had been so great that the men of the republican patrols were quite worn out.

Then the cry of "Drown them all," which had already been heard in 1792, became more and more menacing. A panic,

* *See* Michelet, who studied the Vendean war from local documents on the spot. "The sad question," he says, "has often been discussed as to who had taken the initiative in these barbarous acts, and which of the two sides went furthest in such crimes. The wholesale drowning of the Vendeans in the Loire by Carrier is spoken of endlessly, but why should the massacres of Charette be passed over in silence? Old Vendean veterans have told their doctor, who retold it to me, that never had they taken a soldier (especially one of the army that came from Mayence) without killing him under torture, provided they had time for that; and when the men from Nantes arrived, in April 1793, at Challans, they saw nailed to a door something which resembled a great cat; this was a republican soldier who for several hours had been nailed there, suffering terrible agonies and unable to die" (Michelet's *History of the Revolution*, Book XI. ch. v.).

which Michelet compares to the panic which takes hold of men in a plague-stricken town, seized on the poorest among the population of Nantes, and the commissioner of the Convention, Carrier, whose temperament made him only too susceptible to such a panic, let them have their own way.

The people began by drowning the arrested priests, and ended by exterminating over 2000 men, women and children, incarcerated in the prisons of Nantes.

As to La Vendée, the Committee of Public Welfare (*Comité de Salut public*), without going deeper into the scrutiny of the causes which might have brought a whole province to revolt, and contenting themselves wth a hackneyed explanation of the "fanaticism of these peasant brutes," without endeavouring to understand the peasants or to rouse their interest in the Republic, conceived the abominable idea of exterminating the Vendeans and depopulating the department.

Sixteen entrenched camps were made, and twelve "infernal columns" were sent into the country to ravage it, to burn the peasants' huts, and to exterminate the inhabitants. It is easy to conceive what a harvest such a system gave! La Vendée became a bleeding wound of the Republic, and one which bled for two years. An immense region was lost entirely to the Republic, and La Vendée was the cause of the most painful divisions between the Montagnards themselves.

The risings in Provence and at Lyons had an equally fatal influence on the progress of the Revolution. Lyons was at that time a city of industries for the wealthy. Great numbers of artist-workmen worked in their homes at weaving fine silks and also at making gold and silver embroideries.

Now, the whole of this industry came to a standstill during the Revolution, and the population of Lyons became divided into two hostile camps. The master-workers, the small employers, and the leisured classes, higher and middle, were against the Revolution; whereas the ordinary workmen, those who worked for the small employers, or who found work in the industries connected with weaving, were wholeheartedly for the Revolution, and were already kindling the

beacons of socialism, which were to flare up during the nineteenth century. They willingly followed Chalier, a mystical communist and a friend of Marat, a man of much influence in the municipal council, the democratic aspirations of which resembled those of the Paris Commune. An active communist propaganda was also being carried on by L'Ange—a precursor of Fourier and his friends.

The middle classes, for their part, listened willingly to the nobles, and above all to the priests. The local clergy had always had a strong influence at Lyons, and they were reinforced now by a number of priests who had returned from their emigration to Savoy.

Taking advantage of all this, the middle-class Girondins behind whom were the royalists, had invaded the greater, part of the sections of Lyons, and were preparing a rising against the Jacobins.

The conflict broke out on May 29, 1793. There was fighting in the streets, and the middle classes got the upper hand. Chalier was arrested, and after being tamely defended at Paris by Robespierre and Marat, he was executed on July 16, after which the repression on the part of the middle classes and the royalists became terrible. The wealthy people of Lyons who had been Girondins up till then, encouraged by the revolts in the West, now openly made common cause with the royalist *émigrés*. They armed 20,000 men and fortified the town against the Convention.

At Marseilles the Girondins had intended to support Lyons. Here they had risen after May 31. Inspired by the Girondin Rebecqui, who had come here from Paris, the sections of Marseilles, the greater part of which were also in the hands of the Girondins, had raised an army of 10,000 men, which was going to march towards Lyons, and thence to Paris, to combat the Montagnards there. Other southern towns, Toulon, Nîmes, Montauban, joined the movement, which soon acquired, as might have been expected, an openly royalist character. However, the Marseilles army was soon routed by the troops of the Republic, commanded by Carteaux, who entered Marseilles on August 25.

Rebecqui drowned himself; but a party of the defeated royalists took refuge at Toulon, and this big military port was given up to the English. The English admiral took possession of the town, proclaimed Louis XVII. King of France, and had an army of 8000 Spaniards brought over by sea, to hold Toulon and its forts.

Meanwhile an army of 20,000 Piedmontese had entered France to rescue the royalists at Lyons, and they were now coming down towards Lyons, by way of the valleys of the Sallenche, the Tarentaise, and the Maurienne.

The attempts of Dubois-Crancé, a member of the Convention, to treat with Lyons, failed, because the movement had fallen by now into the hands of the royalists, and they would not listen to any offers. The commandant Précy, who had fought among the Swiss on August 10, was one of the faithful adherents of Louis XVI. Many of the *émigrés* had also come to Lyons to fight against the Republic, and the leaders of the royalist party were contriving with an agent of the royal house, Imbert-Colomiès, as to the means of connecting the Lyons insurrection with the operations of the Piedmontese army. Finally, the Council of Public Welfare for Lyons had for secretary General Reubiès, one of the "Pères de l'Oratoire," while the commandant Précy was in touch with the agents of the royal house, and was asking them for reinforcements of Piedmontese and Austrian soldiers.

In these circumstances nothing remained to do but to besiege Lyons in due form; and the siege was begun on August 8 by seasoned troops, detached for this purpose from the army of the Alps, and with cannon brought from Besancon and Grenoble. The workmen of Lyons had no desire for this counter-revolutionary war, but they did not feel themselves strong enough to revolt. They escaped from the besieged town, and came to join the army of the *sans-culottes*, who, although they lacked bread themselves, still shared it with 20,000 of these fugitives.

In the meantime, Kellerman had succeeded, in September, in driving back the Piedmontese, and Couthon and Maignet, two commissioners of the Convention, who had raised an army

of peasants in the Auvergne, armed with scythes, pickaxes and pitchforks, arrived on October 2 to reinforce Kellerman. Seven days later the armies of the Convention at last took possession of Lyons.

It is sad to record that the repression by the Republicans was terrible. Couthon apparently favoured a policy of pacification, but the terrorists got the upper hand in the Convention. It was proposed to apply to Lyons the method which the Girondin Isnard had proposed to apply to Paris—that is to say, to destroy Lyons, so that nothing but ruins should remain, which would bear the following inscription: "*Lyons made war against liberty—Lyons exists no more.*" But this absurd plan was not accepted, and the Convention decided that the houses of the wealthy were to be destroyed, and that those of the poor should be left intact. The execution of this plan was placed in the hands of Collot d'Herbois, and if he did not carry it out, this was because its realisation was practically impossible; a city is not so easily destroyed as that. But by the tremendous number of executions and the prisoners being shot "in a heap," Collot managed to surpass even the Marseilles counter-revolutionists, and did, of course, immense harm to the Revolution.

The Girondins had counted greatly on the rising in Bordeaux, and this merchant town rose indeed, but the insurrection did not last. The people were not to be carried away; they did not believe in the accusations of "royalism and Orléanism" hurled against the "Mountain," and when the Girondist members who had escaped from Paris arrived at Bordeaux, they were forced to go into hiding in this city, which in their dreams was to have been the centre of their rising. Bordeaux soon gave itself up to the commissioners of the Convention.

As to Toulon, which had been long since worked upon by English agents, and where the naval officers were all royalists, it surrendered completely to an English squadron. The few republicans of this city were imprisoned, and as the English, without losing time, had armed the forts and built new ones, a regular siege was necessary to retake the town. This was only done in the December following.

CHAPTER LV

THE WAR—THE INVASION BEATEN BACK

Reorganisation of republican army—Horrors of war—Girondist generals replaced—The war—Difficulties of republicans—Condition of France—Hopes of allies—Their successes and delays—Republicans gain courage—Victory over Austrians — Surrender of Lyons — Toulon recaptured — Vengeance of republicans

After the betrayal of Dumouriez and the arrest of the Girondist leaders, the Republic had to accomplish anew the entire work of reorganising its army on a democratic basis, and it was necessary to re-elect all the superior officers, in order to replace the Girondist and royalist generals by Jacobin republicans.

The conditions under which this great change was accomplished, were so hard that only the grim energy of a nation in revolution was capable of bringing it to the desired end in face of the invasion, the internal disorders, and the underground work of conspiracies which was being carried on all over France by the rich, for the purpose of starving the *sans-culotte* armies, and handing them over to the enemy. For nearly everywhere the administration of the departments and the districts had remained in the hands of the Feuillants and the Girondins, and they did their best to prevent ammunition and provisions from reaching the armies.

It needed all the genius of the Revolution and all the youthful audacity of a people awakened from its long sleep, all the faith of the revolutionists in a future of equality, to persist in the Titanic struggle which the *sans-culottes* had to carry on against the invaders and the traitors. But how many times the exhausted nation was on the point of giving in!

If to-day war can ruin and devastate whole provinces, we

an guess what were the ravages of war a hundred and twenty ears ago, amongst a population much poorer then. In the epartments adjoining the seat of the war, the harvests were ut, mostly unripe, as forage. Most of the horses and other easts of burden were pressed into service, either on the spot r for one of the fourteen armies of the Republic. The oldiers, in common with the peasants and the poor of the owns, lacked bread. But they lacked everything else as well. n Brittany and in Alsace, the commissioners of the Convention ere driven to ask the citizens of certain towns, such as Brest r Strasbourg, to take off their boots and shoes and to send hem to the soldiers. All the leather that could be obtained as requisitioned, as also were all the cobblers, to make foot- ear, but this was still insufficient, and wooden shoes had to e distributed to the soldiers. Worse than this, it became nperative to form committees to requisition from private ouses "kitchen utensils, cauldrons, frying-pans, saucepans, uckets, and other articles of brass and pewter, and also any ieces of broken brass or lead." This was done in the districts f Strasbourg.

At Strasbourg, the commissioners of the Convention and he municipal council were obliged to ask the inhabitants or clothes, stockings, boots, shirts, bed-clothes, and old linen, ith which to clothe the ragged volunteers. They had also o beg for beds in private houses, where the wounded might e nursed.

But all this was insufficient, and from time to time the ommissioners of the Convention found it necessary to raise eavy revolutionary impositions, which they levied chiefly om the rich. This was especially the case in Alsace, where e great landowners would not give up their feudal rights, defence of which Austria had taken up arms. In the South, Narbonne, one of the members of the Convention was driven demand the services of all the men and women of the town unload the barges and load the carts which were to transport ovisions for the army.*

* It is important to note that in spite of all that reactionary histo- ns may say about the Terror, we see by the archives in this case

Little by little, however, the army was reorganised. The Girondist generals were eliminated; younger men replaced them. Everywhere appeared new men, for whom war had never been a trade, and who came into the army with all the ardour of the citizens of a nation deeply stirred by revolution. They soon created, too, new tactics, which were later attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, the tactics of rapid marches, and of great masses crushing the enemy in its separate armies, before they had time to effect a junction.

Miserably clothed, often in rags and barefoot, very often hungry, but inspired with the holy flame of the Revolution of Equality, the volunteers of 1793 were victorious where defeat had seemed certain.

At the same time the commissioners of the Convention displayed fierce energy in finding the means to feed, clothe and move the armies. For the greater part, equality was their principle. No doubt there were amongst these commissioners some black sheep, like Cambacerès, a future dignitary under Napoleon. There were a few fools who surrounded themselves with display, such as became later the undoing of Bonaparte, and there were also a few not above bribes. But all these were very rare exceptions. Nearly all the two hundred commissioners honestly shared the hardships and the dangers with the soldiers.

These efforts brought success, and after a very dark period of reverses in August and September, the republican armies gained the upper hand. The tide of the invasion was stemmed in the beginning of the autumn.

In June, after the treachery of Dumouriez, the army of the North was completely disorganised—its generals being ready to fight each other—and it had against it four armies representing a total of 118,000 men, English, Austrians, Hanoverians and Dutch. Forced also to abandon its entrenched camp, and to take refuge behind the Sarpe, leaving the fortresses of

that the *sans-culottes* and a few young citizens were the only ones who answered this call on their patriotism, and that "not one silk-stocking, whether man or woman," turned up on the quay of the canal. After which the commissioner limited himself to imposing on the rich "a patriotic gift" for the benefit of the poor.

Valenciennes and Condé in the hands of the enemy, this army had left open the road to Paris.

The two armies which defended the Moselle and the Rhine barely numbered 60,000 fighting men, and they had against them 83,000 Prussians and Austrians, together with a cavalry corps of about 6000 *émigrés*. Custine, whose devotion to the Republic was very doubtful, abandoned the positions taken in 1792, and allowed the Germans to occupy the fortress of Mayence, on the Rhine.

In Savoy and near Nice, where 40,000 Piedmontese, supported by 8000 Austrians, had to be headed off, there was only the Alpine Army and the Army of the Maritime Alps, both completely deprived of all means of transport, in consequence of the royalist risings in the Forèz, at Lyons, and in Provence.

In the Pyrenees, 23,000 Spaniards entered France, and were opposed by only 10,000 men, who had no cannon and no provisions. With the help of the *émigrés*, this Spanish army took several forts, and threatened the whole of the Roussillon region.

As to England, she inaugurated in 1793 the policy which was followed later on during the Napoleonic wars. Without coming forward too much herself, she preferred to subsidise the allied Powers and to profit by the weakness of France in taking her colonies and ruining her maritime commerce. In June 1793, the English Government declared the blockade of all the French ports, and English vessels, contrary to the custom of international law of those days, began to seize all neutral vessels bringing provisions to France. At the same time England helped the *émigrés*, smuggled in arms and bundles of proclamations to stir up Brittany and La Vendée, and prepared to seize the ports of Saint-Malo, Brest, Nantes, Bordeaux and Toulon.

The interior affairs of France were no better. Brittany was in a ferment through the intrigues of the *émigrés* and the agents of England. In La Vendée, a hundred thousand peasants, influenced to fanaticism, were in open revolt. In the great commercial cities, such as Nantes, Bordeaux and Marseilles, the middle classes were infuriated because their

business affairs had been brought to a standstill. Lyons and Provence were in the full swing of an insurrection. In the Forèz the clergy and the *émigrés* were busy sowing discord; and in Paris itself all who had grown rich since 1789, impatient to see the end of the Revolution, were preparing a fierce attack upon it.

Under these conditions, the allies felt so certain of being able soon to re-establish royalty, and of placing Louis XVII. on the throne, that they considered it a question of but a few weeks. Fersen, the confidant of Marie-Antoinette, was already discussing with his friends of whom should the Council of Regency be composed, whilst the scheme for placing the Count d'Artois at the head of the malcontents in Brittany was agreed upon between England, Spain and Russia.*

If the allies had only marched straight against Paris, they would certainly have reduced the Revolution to serious straits. But either from the fear of a new September 2, or because they preferred the possession of the fortresses won from France to a siege of Paris, they chose to stop in their advance to take Valenciennes and Mayence.

However, Mayence fought, and surrendered only on July 22. The fortress of Condé had surrendered a few days earlier, after holding out for four months; and on July 26 Valenciennes, after an assault of the allies, capitulated in its turn amidst the applause of the *bourgeoisie* who, during the siege, had been in close communication with the Duke of York. Austria took possession of these two fortified towns.

In the North, the road to Paris was open since August 10, 1793, and the allies had more than 300,000 men in all between Ostend and Bâle. What was it then that once again held back the allies and prevented them from marching against Paris, to deliver Marie-Antoinette and the Dauphin? Was it really the desire only to take first those fortresses which would remain theirs, whatever might happen in France? Was it the fear of the fierce resistance which Republican France might offer? Or was it—and this seems to us the most

* Letter to Baron de Stedinck, written on April 26, from St. Petersburg.

obable—considerations of a diplomatic nature? As the cuments which might throw light on the French diplomacy this period are not yet published, we are reduced to con-ctures. We know, however, that during the summer and tumn of 1793, the Committee for Public Welfare was treat-g with Austria about the liberation of Marie-Antoinette, e Dauphin and his sister, and their aunt, Madame Elisabeth. id we know also that Danton carried on secret negotiations th the English Whigs till 1794, to stop the war with England. om day to day people were expecting in England to see x, the leader of the Whigs, overthrow Pitt, the Tory leader, d step into power; and twice—at the end of January 1794, ring the discussion of the answer to the speech from the rone, and on March 16, 1794—it was hoped that the English rliament would declare itself against a war with France.* At any rate, the fact remains, that after their first successes, e allies did not march against Paris, but began to besiege e fortresses. The Duke of York began the siege of Dunkirk d the Duke of Coburg besieged Le Quesnoy.

This gave a moment of respite to the Republic, and allowed uchotte, the Minister of War who had succeeded Pache, ie to reorganise the army which had been reinforced by a y of 600,000 men, and to find republican officers for it. rnot, at the same time, in the Committee of Public Welfare, ed to make the generals act together with more accord, ile the commissioners of the Convention carried the flame the Revolution to the armies.

Thus passed the month of August, during which the reverses the frontier and in La Vendée revived the hopes of the alists and filled with despair a good many of the republicans. wever, from the first days of September 1793, the armies he Republic, spurred by public opinion, took the offensive he North, on the Rhine, and in the Pyrenees. This new ve was crowned with success in the North, where the Duke York, furiously attacked by the French at Hondschoote,

G. Avenel, *Lundis révolutionnaires*, p. 245. Avenel even attri-s the fall of Danton to the failure of this diplomacy, which had ys been opposed by Robespierre and Barère.

was forced to abandon the siege of Dunkirk; but elsewhere the results were for the time indecisive.

The Committee of Public Welfare at once took advantage of the first military successes to demand and obtain from the Convention almost dictatorial powers—to be retained "as long as peace is not concluded." But what helped most in arresting the advance of the invasion was that, seeing everywhere new leaders, openly republican, rise from the ranks and reach the highest positions in a few days, and seeing also the commissioners of the Convention marching themselves sword in hand at the heads of attacking columns, the soldiers were inspired with fresh courage and achieved wonders of valour.

On October 15 and 16, in spite of very heavy losses, they gained at Wattignies the first great victory over the Austrians. This victory was won, we may say literally, by the bayonet, for the village of Wattignies changed hands as often as eight times during the battle. As a result of this defeat, the Austrians raised the siege of Maubeuge, and the victory won at Wattignies had the same influence on the course of events as the victory of Valmy had had in 1792.

Lyons, as we saw, was forced to surrender in October, and in December Toulon was retaken from the English, after an assault which was begun on the 8th Frimaire of the Year II. (November 28, 1793), and lasted till the 26th Frimaire (December 16), when the "English redoubt" and the forts of Eguillette and of Balagnier were taken by assault. The English squadron set fire to the French vessels harboured in the port, as well as to the arsenals, the docks and the powder magazines and, leaving the roadstead, abandoned the royalists, who had delivered Toulon to them, to the vengeance of the republicans.

Unhappily this vengeance was terrible, and left deep traces of hatred in many hearts. One hundred and fifty persons, mostly naval officers, were shot in batches, after which came the detailed vengeance of the revolutionary courts.

In Alsace and on the Rhine, where the armies of the Republic had to fight the Prussians and the Austrians, they were forced

om the beginning of the year's campaign to abandon their
ie of defence round Wissemburg. This opened the road to
rasbourg, where the *bourgeoisie* was calling on the Austrians
d pressing them to come and take possession of the town
the name of Louis XVII. But the Austrians had no desire
strengthen royalty in France, and this gave time to Hoche
d Pichegrue, aided by Saint-Just and Le Bas, who represented
e Convention, to reorganise the army and take the offensive
emselves.

However, winter was already approaching, and the campaign
1793 ended, without there being any new successes to
cord on either side. The Austrian, Prussian, Hessian,
itch, Piedmontese and Spanish armies remained on the
ench frontiers, but the energy of the allies was spent. Prussia
en wished to retire from the alliance; and England had to
id herself at The Hague (April 28, 1794) to pay the Prussian
ng a sum of 7,500,000 francs, and to send in a yearly
ntribution of 1,250,000 francs, before Prussia would agree
maintain an army of 62,400 men to fight France.

The following spring, therefore, the war was to recommence;
the Republic could now struggle under far more favourable
ditions than in 1792 and 1793. Thanks to the enthusiasm
h which it had inspired the poorest classes, the Revolution
freeing itself little by little from those external enemies
o had sought to crush it. But at what a price when we
sider the sacrifices this entailed—the internal convulsions,
alienation of liberty, which in the end killed this very
ie Revolution and delivered France up to the despotism
military "saviour."

CHAPTER LVI

THE CONSTITUTION—THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Committee formed to frame new Constitution—Plans of Girondins—Struggle between Girondins and Montagnards—Girondins try to strengthen power of *Directoires*—Girondist scheme rejected—Constitution of Montagnards—It is accepted by Convention—Dictatorship of Committees of Public Welfare and Public Safety

It has been necessary to narrate at some length the counter-revolutionary risings in France and the varied events of the frontier wars before returning to the legislative activity of the Convention and the events which subsequently unfolded themselves in Paris. Without some knowledge of the former, the latter would be incomprehensible. The truth is, the war dominated everything; it was absorbing the best forces of the nation, and was paralysing every effort to render the Revolution more advantageous to the masses of the people.

The chief aim with which the Convention had been convoked was the elaboration of a new republican Constitution. The monarchist Constitution of 1791, that had divided the country into two classes, one of which was deprived of all political rights, could not be maintained any longer: in fact, it had ceased to exist. Consequently, as soon as the Convention assembled (September 21, 1792), it set to work on a new Constitution, and on October 11 a special committee was elected for this purpose. It was composed, as might have been expected, chiefly of Girondins (Sieyès, the Englishman, Thomas Paine, Brissot, Pétion, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Condorcet, Barère, and Danton). The Girondin Condorect, a celebrated mathematician and philosopher, who as far back as 1774 had

een working with Turgot at political and social reforms, and ho was one of the first, after the flight of Varennes, to declare mself a republican, was the chief author of the constitutional heme placed by the committee before the Convention, and of Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen which accom-anied this scheme.

It is obvious that in a legislative body of deputies, the first uestion to arise, as soon as there was any mention of a new onstitution, was the question as to which of the two parties ruggling for power would profit by this new law. The irondins wished to turn it into a tool which would enable em to put a brake on the Revolution, so that it should not go rther than it went on August 10; to shatter the power of the evolutionary Commune of Paris, and of the revolutionary ommunes in the country, and to crush the Montagnards. nd the Montagnards, who did not consider the work of the evolution accomplished, naturally had to prevent the Girondins rom turning the Constitution into an instrument for opposing he further development of the Revolution.

Even before the condemnation of Louis XVI. the Girondins ad pressed the Convention to accept their Constitution, in the ope of saving the King. And later on, in March and in April 793, when they saw communistic efforts budding amongst the eople and directed against the rich, they pressed the Conven-ion all the more to accept Condorcet's scheme; whilst the Montagnards did all they could to postpone the final discussion, ntil they had succeeded in paralysing the Girondins and the oyalists. It must also be said that the Constitution, which ad roused so much enthusiasm in 1789, had already lost much f its interest for the revolutionists, especially since the decrees f August 10 and 11 had abolished the distinction between passive and active citizens. If the Girondins did attach any mportance to it, it was "to restore order," to diminish the influence that the revolutionists exercised in the provinces through the medium of the municipal councils, and, in Paris, through the Commune.

The municipal law of December 1789 had given the munici-palities considerable power—the greater because the provincial

representatives of the central power had been abolished. And we have seen how the sections of Paris, which acted as independent municipalities, succeeded in conquering extensive administrative rights, when it became necessary to repel invasion, to enlist volunteers, to provision the armies, and to keep a watch on the royalist plots.

In the municipalities and the sections, the Revolution of 1793 had found its best support, and it is easy to understand that the Montagnards did their utmost to retain this powerful instrument of their influence.*

But this is also why the Girondins, in their scheme for a Constitution, which the rising of May 31 alone prevented them from imposing on France, had taken care to destroy the communes, to abolish their independence, and to strengthen the power of the *Directoires* of the departments and the districts, which were the organs of the landlord and the middle classes. To achieve this, the Girondins demanded the abolition of the large communes and the communal municipalities, and the creation of a third and new series of bureaucratic bodies—the *directoires du canton*, which they described as "cantonal municipalities."

If this scheme had been adopted, the communes, which represented not mere wheels of the administration, but bodies possessing lands, buildings, schools, &c., in common, would have disappeared. Their place would have been taken by purely administrative bodies. As the village municipalities very often took the side of the peasants, and the municipalities of the large towns, as also their sections, often stood for the interests of the poor citizen, the Girondins intended to hand over the local government to the middle classes, and they hoped to achieve their end by creating the cantonal municipalities, which would depend much more upon the eminently bureaucratic and

* When, on March 7, 1793, the Defence Committee, alarmed at the desperate situation of France in face of the invasion, called the ministers and the Commune of Paris to consult together, Marat, in summing up what was already being done, told them "that in such a crisis, the *sovereignty of the people was not indivisible*: that each commune was sovereign in its own territory, and that the people had the right to take such steps as were necessary for their welfare" (*Mémoires de Thibaudeau*; Michelet, Book X. ch. i.).

actionary Directories of the departments than upon the
oorer classes of the people.

On this extremely important point the Girondist and the
Iontagnard schemes of Constitution were thus entirely opposed
each other.

Another alteration, and a very important one, which the
irondins endeavoured to introduce and the Constitutional
ommittee rejected, was the introduction of two houses of
rliament, or, in default of this, the division of the legislative
ody into two sections, as was done later in the Constitution of
ie Year III. (1795), after the reaction of Thermidor had set
and the Girondins had returned to power.

It is true that the Girondist scheme for a Constitution seemed
some ways very democratic, in the sense that it left to the
rimary assemblies of electors, not only the choice of their
epresentatives, but also the choice of functionaries of the
reasury, of the Courts of Justice, including the High Court,
nd also the ministers,* and that it introduced the *referendum*,
r direct legislation. But the nomination of ministers by the
lectoral bodies (admitting that it would be possible in practice)
ould only have succeeded in creating two rival authorities,
he Chamber and the Ministry, both nominees of the universal
uffrage, whilst the *referendum* was hemmed in by most com-
licated rules that made it illusory.†

And finally this scheme of a constitution, and the Declaration
f Rights which had to precede it, established, in a more concrete
ay than the Constitution of 1791, the rights of the citizens—
.e., his liberty of religious belief and worship, freedom of the

* Each Primary Assembly had to nominate seven ministers, and the
dministration of the department would form with these names a list
f thirteen candidates for each Ministry. Then, the Primary Assemblies,
onvoked for a second time, would elect the ministers from these lists.

† An excellent summary of the two Constitutions, the Girondin
nd the Montagnard, and of all concerning them, will be found in
ulard's *Histoire Politique*, 2nd part, ch. iv. I follow this summary
or the facts, but the responsibility for the appreciation is mine. Thus
disagree, as may be seen, with M. Aulard in his appreciation of the
irondin project regarding the "cantonal municipalities." Far from
ending to "seriously organise the commune," this project tended, in
ny opinion, to destroy it, so as to replace it by a body bureaucratic
ather than popular.

press, and all other ways of spreading his thoughts. As to the communist tendencies which were coming to the front among the masses, the Declaration of Rights limited itself to acknowledging that "aid to the poor is a sacred debt owed to them by society, and that society owes education to all its members equally."

One can well understand the apprehension that this project raised when it was laid before the Convention on February 15, 1793. The Convention, influenced by the Montagnards, sought to withhold its decision as long as possible, and asked that other projects should be sent in. It also nominated a new commission—the Commission of the Six—to analyse the various projects which might be submitted, and on April 17, the report having been made by the new commission, the discussion began in the Convention. Robespierre pronounced a long discourse which was, as has been remarked by M. Aulard,* certainly slightly tinged with what we call "socialism." "We should," said Robespierre, "declare that the right of property is limited, as all others, by the obligation of respecting the rights of the others; that the right of property must not be injurious either to the security or to the liberty, or to the existence, or to the property of other men; and that every trade which violates this principle is essentially illicit and immoral." He demanded also that the right to work be proclaimed, though in a very modest form. "Society," he said, "is bound to provide for the subsistence of all its members, either in procuring work for them, or in guaranteeing the means of existence to those who are unable to work."

But where the ideas of the Montagnards differed entirely from those of the Girondins was when it came to discussing, on May 22, the abolition of communal municipalities, and the creation of cantonal councils of administration. The Montagnards were decidedly against this abolition, the more so as the Girondins wished to destroy also the unity of Paris and of its Commune, and demanded that each town of more than 50,000 inhabitants should be divided into several municipalities. On this point the Convention took up the opinions of the Monta-

* *Histoire Politique*, p. 291.

nards and rejected the Girondist project of cantonal municialities.

The Constitution of the Montagnards—and herein lies its istinctive feature—maintained the municipalities intact. Could we," said Hérault de Séchelles, "give up the municialities, however great their number? To abolish them would ave been an ingratitude towards the Revolution and a crime gainst liberty. Nay, it would be to *annihilate completely opular government.*" "No," he added, after having uttered ome sentimental phrases, "no, the idea of suppressing nunicipalities can only have been born in the heads of the ristocrats, whence it transferred itself into those of the Moderates." *

For the nomination of representatives the Montagnard Constitution introduced direct manhood suffrage by ballot in ach district (50,000 inhabitants). For the nomination of the dministrators of the departments and those of the districts, he suffrage was to be in two degrees, and in three degrees for the nomination of the twenty-four members of the Executive Council (the Ministry) which was to be renewed each year. The Legislative Assembly was to be elected for one year only, and its acts were to be divided into two categories: the decrees, to be carried into effect at once; and the laws, for which the people could demand the *referendum.*

However, in the Montagnard Constitution, as well as in the Girondin scheme, the right of *referendum* was illusory. To begin with, nearly everything could be done by decrees, and this excluded the *referendum.* Then, to obtain the *referendum* it was necessary that "in half of the departments, plus one-tenth of the Primary Assemblies of each department, regularly constituted," an objection should be formulated against a new law, during the forty days after the promulgation of the proposed law.

Finally, the Constitution guaranteed to all Frenchmen "equality, liberty, safety, inviolability of property, the security

* It is interesting to notice that in Russia also, the enemies of the commune are at the present day partisans of the canton (*Vsessoslovnaya volost*), and that they oppose it to the village communes, whose lands they covet.

of the national debt, free worship, common education, public relief, unrestricted liberty of the press, the right of petitioning, the right of forming popular societies, and enjoyment of all the rights of man."

As to the social laws which the people awaited from the Constitution, Hérault de Séchelles promised these later. Order first: they would see later on what they could do for the people; upon this the majority of the Girondins and Montagnards were in perfect agreement.

On June 24, 1793, this Constitution was accepted by the Convention, and was immediately submitted to the Primary Assemblies, which pronounced themselves with great unanimity and even enthusiasm in favour of it. The Republic was then composed of 4944 cantons, and when the votes of 4420 cantons were known, it appeared that the Constitution had been accepted by 1,801,918 voices against 11,610.

On August 10, the Constitution was proclaimed in Paris with much pomp, and in the departments it became an effective means of paralysing Girondist risings. These no longer had a pretext, since the calumnies which the Girondins spread everywhere about the Montagnards wishing to re-establish royalty, with a Duke of Orléans on the throne, had fallen through. On the other hand, the Constitution of June 24, 1793, was so well received by the majority of the democrats that it subsequently became the creed of democracy for nearly a century.

The Convention which had been convoked for the special purpose of giving a republican Constitution to France had now only to lay down its powers. But it was obvious that under the circumstances, invaders holding part of the country, and the war having to be carried on with an energy far surpassing the means at the disposal of the Republic, and in the face of risings in La Vendée, at Lyons, in Provence, and elsewhere, the Constitution could not be applied. It was impossible for the Convention to disperse, and to leave the Republic to run the risks of new elections.

Robespierre developed this idea before the Jacobin Club on the very morrow of the promulgation of the Constitution, and the numerous delegates who had come to Paris to assist at this

promulgation held the same opinion. On August 28, the Committee of Public Welfare expressed the same opinion before the Convention, which, after hesitating for six weeks, finally decreed, when the Republican Government had obtained its first successes at Lyons—that is to say, on October 10, 1793—that *the government of France should remain "revolutionary" till the conclusion of peace.*

This meant to maintain, in fact, if not by right, the dictatorship of the Committees of Public Welfare and General Safety, which had just been strengthened in September by the law of suspects and the law dealing with revolutionary committees.

CHAPTER LVII

THE EXHAUSTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT

Revolutionary leaders afraid to move—Commune of Paris—Montagnards—Inactivity of Convention—Commissioners of Convention work only to strengthen Montagnard *régime*

The movement of May 31, 1793, had made it possible for the Revolution to complete the work which proved to be its principal achievement: the final abolition, without redemption, of feudal rights, and the abolition of royal despotism. But, this done, the Revolution was coming to a standstill. The mass of the people were willing to go further; but those whom the tide of Revolution had carried to the head of the movement dared not advance. They did not wish the Revolution to lay hands on the wealth of the middle classes, as it had on that of the nobility and clergy, and they strained all their power to moderate, to arrest, and eventually to crush the movement that was beginning in this direction. Even the more advanced and the more sincere among them, as they gradually neared power, developed the greatest consideration for the middle classes, although they hated them. They stifled their own aspirations towards equality, they even considered what the English middle classes might say of them. In their turn they became "statesmen," and laboured to build up a strong centralised government, whose component parts should obey them blindly. They succeeded in erecting this power over the corpses of those whom they had found too advanced, but they realised, when they themselves mounted the scaffold, that in destroying the advanced party, they had killed the Revolution.

After having sanctioned by law what the peasants had de-

anded during the last four years, and had already achieved here nd there, the Convention was incapable of undertaking anything ore of importance. Except in matters of national defence nd education, its work henceforth was sterile. The legislators nctioned, it is true, the formation of revolutionary committees nd decided to pay those of the poor *sans-culottes* who gave their me to serve on the sections and the committees; but these easures, apparently so democratic, were not measures of evolutionary demolition or creation. They were but means for rganising the power of the State.

It was outside the Convention and the Jacobin Club—in the Commune of Paris, in certain sections of the capital and of the rovinces, and in the Cordeliers' Club, that a few men were to e found who understood that to secure the victories already ained, it was necessary to march further still, and they en-eavoured therefore to formulate the aspirations of a social haracter which were beginning to appear among the masses.

They made a bold attempt at organising France as an aggre-ate of forty thousand communes, regularly corresponding mongst themselves, and representing so many centres of xtreme democracy,* which should work to establish the real quality—*l'égalité de fait*, as used then to be said, the "equalisa-ion of incomes." They sought to develop the germs of nunicipal communism which the law of maximum had recog-nised; they advocated the nationalisation of the trade in prime commodities as the best means for combating the monopolists and the speculators. And they attempted, finally, to prevent the formation of large fortunes, and to distribute those already amassed. But, once they had reached power, the revolutionists from the middle classes took advantage of the force that had

* The municipal function was "the last term of the Revolution," as Mignet has so well said (*Histoire de la Révolution française*, 19th edition, vol. ii. p. 31). "Opposed in its aims to the Committee of Public Welfare, it desired, *in lieu of the ordinary dictatorship, the most extreme local democracy*, and in the place of creeds the consecration of the grossest disbelief. Anarchy in politics and atheism in religious affairs, such were the distinctive features of this party and the means by which they counted on establishing its power." It must, however, be remarked that only a part of the "anarchists" followed Hébert in his anti-religious campaign, while many left him on realising the force of religious spirit in the villages.

been constituted in the hands of the two Committees of Public Welfare and General Safety, whose authority grew with the dangers of the war, and they crushed those whom they named the *Enragés*—only to succumb in their turn, in the month of Thermidor, to the attacks of the counter-revolutionary middle classes.

So long as the Montagnards had to struggle against the Girondins, they sought the support of the popular revolutionists. In March and in April 1793, they appeared ready to go far in company with the proletarians. But having entered into power, most of them thought only of establishing a "midway" party, taking a stand between the *Enragés* and the counter-revolutionists, and they treated as enemies those who stood for the aspirations of the people towards equality. They crushed them by frustrating all their attempts at organising themselves in the sections and the communes.

The fact is that the Montagnards, with one or two exceptions, had not even the comprehension of popular needs indispensable in constituting a party of democratic revolution. They did not understand the proletarian, with his troubles, his often starving family, and his still vague and formulated aspirations after equality. It was rather the individual in the abstract, the unity of a democratic society that interested them.

With the exception of a few advanced Montagnards, when a commissioner of the Convention arrived in a provincial town, the questions of employment and prosperity within the Republic and the equal enjoyment of available commodities by all interested him but little. Having been sent to organise resistance to the invasion and to rouse the patriotic feeling, he acted as a democratic official for whom the people were but the tools which were to help him to carry out the plans of the Government.

If he presented himself at the local Popular Society, it was because, the municipality being "worm-eaten with aristocracy," the Popular Society would help him to "purify the municipality," with a view to organising the national defence and arresting the traitors

If he imposed taxes on the rich, often very heavy ones, it was

ecause the rich, "worm-eaten with commercialism," were in mpathy with the Feuillants or the Federalists and were helping the enemy. It was also because by taxing them, means were rovided to feed and clothe the armies.

If he proclaimed equality in some town, if he forbade the aking of white bread and recommended the inhabitants to use ack or bean-bread only, he did so in order that the soldiers ight be fed. And when some agent of the Committee of ublic Welfare organised a popular *fête*, and wrote afterwards Robespierre that he had united a certain number of young omen and young patriots in wedlock, it was yet another stroke military patriotism. It is remarkable, therefore, when we ow read the letters of the deputy commissioners of the Conention, addressed to the Convention or the Committee of ublic Welfare, that we find nothing in them about the great uestions which were then so interesting to the peasants and ie working men.* That military matters and those of provisioning the armies should predominate in this correspondence is quite natural. But the time was one of revolution, nd the commissioners must have continually come across ubjects of vital importance to the Revolution—the more so as ney spoke in their letters of public feeling, of the reception iven to the Montagnard Convention and its Constitution, of ie difficulties of finding provisions for the armies, and of the carcity of available means of subsistence. And yet the great conomic questions, which were of such immense importance or the poor, seem to have interested only three or four of the ommissioners.

The Convention had at last abolished the feudal rights, and ad ordered the burning of the title-deeds—an operation which as carried out with much ill-will; and it had authorised the illage communities to recover possession of those lands which ad been taken from them, under various pretexts, during the ast two hundred years. It is evident that to carry out these ieasures, and to carry them out at once, would have been the

* These letters may be found in the *Recueil des Actes du Comité de alut Public*, published by T. Aulard. Paris, 1889 and following years; lso in Legros, *La Révolution telle qu'elle est: Correspondance du Comité Salut Public avec ses généraux*, 2 vols., Paris, 1837.

way to rouse the enthusiasm of the masses for the Revolution. But in the letters of the commissioners scarcely anything can be found on this subject.* The younger Jullien, in his most interesting letters, addressed to the Committee of Public Welfare and to his friend and patron, Robespierre, only once mentions that he has had the feudal title-deeds burnt.† In the same way only a passing mention of this subject is made once by Collot d'Herbois.‡

Even when the commissioners speak of the supplies of food—and they have often to do so—they do not go to the root of the question. There is but one letter of Jeanbon Saint-André, dated March 26, 1793, which is an exception; but even that letter is anterior to the movement of May 31: later on, he too turned against the advanced revolutionists.§

Writing from the Lot-et-Garonne, one of the departments most in sympathy with the Revolution, Jeanbon begged his colleagues in the committee not to blind themselves to the dangers of the situation: "It is such," said he, "that if our courage does not bring forth one of those extraordinary events which rouse public opinion in France and give it new strength, there is no more hope. The disturbances in La Vendée and in the neighbouring departments are no doubt such as to cause anxiety, but they are really dangerous only because the sacred enthusiasm for liberty is being stifled in every heart. Everywhere men are weary of the Revolution. The rich hate it, the poor lack bread . . ." and "all those who were until now termed 'moderates,' who made some sort of common cause

* The letters published in the collection of Aulard, or in that of Legros, are palpitating with interest in every way; but I have sought in vain for traces of activity of the commissioners in this direction. Only Jeanbon Saint-André, Collot d'Herbois, Fouché, and Dubois Crancé sometimes touch on the great questions which so interested the peasants and the proletarians in the towns. It may be that there are other letters of commissioners which I do not know; but what seems to me certain is that the greater part of the Commissioners took but little interest in these matters.

† *Une Mission en Vendée.*

‡ Aulard, *Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut Public*, vol. v. p. 505.

§ This letter is signed by the two commissioners, Jeanbon and Lacoste, who had been sent to this department; but it is in the writing of the former.

th the republicans, and who at least desired some kind of volution, no longer wish for it now. . . . Let us say it enly, they desire a counter-revolution. Should a new nvention be summoned, the French people would either fuse to elect it, or they would elect one entirely opposed to e principles of liberty. Even the municipal councils are eak or corrupted." Such, at least, they were found to be in the districts that these two representatives had visited.

Jeanbon thus demanded broad and rigorous measures. And the end of his letter he again referred to this subject in a stscript. "The poor man," said he, "has no bread. Although grain is not lacking, it has been hoarded. It is imperave to help the poor to live, if you want them to help you to hold the Revolution. . . . We think that a decree ordering *general levy of all kinds of grain* would be very good, especially a clause be added establishing public granaries, formed with e superfluous stock of private persons." Jeanbon Saint-ndré implored Barère to take the lead in these matters.* ut how was it possible to arouse interest in the Convention r such things?

The strengthening of the Montagnard *régime* was what ost of all interested the commissioners. However, like all atesmen who preceded, like all who will succeed them, it was ot in the general well-being and happiness for the great mass the people that they sought a foundation. It was in the eakening and, at need, in the extermination of the enemies of is *régime*. They soon welcomed the Terror, as a means of ushing the enemies of the democratic Republic; but never o we see them welcoming broad measures of great economic hange, not even those for which they had themselves voted nder the pressure of circumstances.

* *Actes du Comité de Salut Public*, published by Aulard, vol. iii. pp. 3–534.

CHAPTER LVIII

THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Egalité de fait—Socialistic problems—Proposition of Billaud-Varenne—Communalist movement—*Means of subsistence* and *land question*—Leading apostles of communism—Jacques Roux—Leclerc—Varlet—Boissel—Babeuf

In the *cahiers* of 1789, ideas were already to be found which, as Chassin has pointed out, would to-day be classed as socialistic. Rousseau, Helvetius, Mably, Diderot and others had already dealt with the inequalities of fortunes and the accumulation of superfluous wealth in the hands of the few, as the great obstacle to the establishment of democratic liberty. These ideas came once more to the front during the first hours of the Revolution.

Turgot, Sieyès and Condorcet asserted that the equality of political rights meant nothing *without real equality in fact* (*égalité de fait*)! This, said Condorcet, was the "final aim of social art, since inequality in riches, inequality of state, and inequality of education are the main cause of all evils."* And the same ideas found an echo in several *cahiers* of the electors in 1789, who demanded the right of all to the possession of the land, or "the equalisation of wealth."

It may even be said that the Parisian proletariat had already formed a conception of its class interests and had found men to express them well. The idea of separate classes, having opposing interests, is clearly stated in the *cahiers des pauvres* of the district of Saint-Etienne-du-Mont, by a certain Lambert,

* Already Cabet, in his Appendix to *Voyage en Icarie*, edition of 1842, had pointed out, with quotations in support, this characteristic of the eighteenth-century thinkers; of recent works *see* André Lichtenberger, *Le Socialisme et la Révolution française*, Paris, 1899.

a friend of those who have nothing." Productive work, equate salaries (the *living wage* of the modern English cialists), the struggle against the *laisser faire* of the middle-ass economists, and a plain distinction traced between the cial question and the political one—all these are to be found this *cahier des pauvres.**

But it was chiefly after the taking of the Tuileries, and still ore after the execution of the King—in February and in larch 1793—that these ideas began to be openly propagated. would even seem—so at least it is said by Baudot—that if e Girondins appeared as such passionate defenders of property, was because they feared the influence which the propaganda equality and communism was acquiring in Paris.†

A few Girondins, especially Rabaut de Saint-Etienne and ondorcet, fell under the influence of this movement. Con-orcet, on his death-bed, was working out the scheme of a mutuality" (*mutualité*), *i.e.*, of a mutual insurance league nongst all citizens, against eventualities which might throw ie relatively well-off worker into conditions under which he ould be forced to sell his work at no matter what price. s to Rabaut, he demanded that the great fortunes be taken om the rich, either by means of a progressive tax or by a w which would cause the natural flow of the rich man's uperfluous wealth "into establishments of public utility."

* "There has never been and there will never be any but two really istinct classes of citizens, the property-owners and those who have o property—of whom the former have everything and the latter othing," so it was said in the *cahier des pauvres*. "Of what use will wise constitution be to a nation reduced by hunger to the state of keletons?" queried the author of the *Quatre cris d'un patriote*. (Chassin, e *Génie de la Révolution*, Paris, 1863, vol. i. pp. 287, 289.)

† We find in the *Notes historiques sur la Convention nationale, le Directoire, l'Empire et l'exil des votants*, by M. A. Baudot, edited by Ime. Edgar Quinet (Paris, 1893), a very interesting note where it is aid that Ingrand's opinion that the system "of common property" communism), developed by Buonarroti, "was brought forward some me before the events of June 20; and that these events owed their rigin to this spirit of association" (pp. 10–11). Pétion is said to have arned a great number of deputies about it. "It seems," continues Baudot, "that the Girondins put so much acrimony and bitterness nto their policy from fear of seeing the doctrine of the communists redominate." Later on certain members of the Convention took p these ideas, as is known, and joined the conspiracy of Babeuf.

"Great riches are a drawback to liberty," he wrote, repeating a saying very much in vogue at that time. Even Brissot at one time tried to come to some sort of agreement with this popular theory—which soon after he attacked with ferocity.*

A few Montagnards went further. Thus Billaud-Varenne, in a tract published in 1793, spoke openly against great wealth. He protested against Voltaire's idea that the worker should be spurred to work by hunger, and he demanded that it be declared that no citizen should henceforth be permitted to possess more than a fixed amount of land, and that no one be allowed to inherit more than from 20,000 to 25,000 livres.† He understood that the primal cause of social ills lay in the fact that there were men who existed "in a direct but not mutual dependency upon some other human being. For this is the first link in the chain of slavery." He derided small peasant proprietorship which some wished to introduce for the poor, "whose existence in such conditions would never be anything but precarious and miserable." A cry was making itself heard, he said later on (p. 129): "*War to the châteaux, peace to the huts!* Let us add to this the consecration of this fundamental rule: Let there be no citizen who can dispense with employment, and let there be no citizen unable to learn a trade and practise it."

Billaud-Varenne's proposition concerning inheritances was taken up, as is known, by the International Working Men's

* The better to fight "the division of lands proposed by anarchists or the *Coblentzians*" (Robespierre afterwards took up this insinuation of Brissot's against the communists and made it his own), Brissot declared, in December 1792, that *the equality of the rights* of citizens would be a fiction if the laws did not abolish and prevent the too great real inequalities among the citizens. But such institutions, favourable to "equality," added Brissot, "must be introduced without commotion, without violence, without showing disrespect to the first of all social rights, the right of property."

† Speaking of property, he represented it in this interesting guise. "Property," said he, "is the pivot of civil associations. It is well known that, especially in a great empire, the balance of fortunes cannot be quite exact and immovable, and that the impulse of an immense commerce, aided by a vast industry and by riches produced by agriculture necessarily keep it continually oscillating; but the balance should never fall on either side too decidedly." (*Les éléments de républicanisme*, Paris, 1793, p. 57. Pamphlets of the British Museum, vol. F. 1097.)

sociation at its Congress at Bâle in 1869. But it must be
d that Billaud-Varenne was one of the most advanced among
e Montagnards. Some, as for instance, Lepelletier, limited
emselves to asking what the International asked under the
me of "integral education"—that is to say, the teaching
a handicraft to each young man; whilst others limited
emselves to asking for "the revolutionary restitution of pro-
rties," or the limitation of the right of property.

It is, however, chiefly outside the Convention—amongst
e people, in some sections, such as that of Gravilliers, and
the Cordeliers' Club—certainly not among the Jacobins—
at one must look for the champions of the communalist and
mmunist movements of 1793 and 1794. There was even
attempt at free organisation among those who were known
that time as the *Enragés*—that is to say, the extremists—
ose who aimed at a revolution that would tend towards
uality. After August 10, 1792, there was founded—appa-
ntly at the suggestion of the federates who had come to
ris—a sort of league between the delegates of the forty-
ght sections of Paris, the General Council of the Commune
d the "United Defenders of the eighty-four departments."
nd when in February 1793 the movements against stock-
bbers began, of which we have already spoken,* the delegates
this league demanded from the Convention, on February
energetic measures against stock-jobbing. In their address
n already be seen a germ of the idea which later on was the
se of Proudhon's Mutualism and his Bank of the People:
e idea that all profit resulting from exchange in the banks,
there be any profit, should return to the whole nation—
t to separate individuals—since they are produced by *public*
nfidence of all in all.

Our knowledge about the different movements which were
ing on among the people of Paris and of the large towns
1793 and 1794 still remains imperfect. It is only now that
ey are being studied. But what is indisputable is, that the
mmunist movement represented in Jacques Roux, Varlet,
olivier, Chalier, Leclerc, L'Ange (or Lange), Rose Lacombe,

* Chap. xliii.

Boissel, and some others, was of a depth which passed unperceived at first, but which Michelet had already surmised.*

It is obvious that communism in 1793 did not appear with that completeness of doctrine which is found with the French followers of Fourier and Saint-Simon, and especially with Considérant, or even Vidal. In 1793, communist ideas were not worked out in the quiet of a private study; they were born from the needs of the moment. This is why the social problem showed itself during the Great Revolution especially in the form of a question about the *means of subsistence*, and of a *land question*. But in this also lies what makes the *communism* of the Great Revolution superior to the *socialism* of 1848 and of its later forms. It went straight to the root in attacking the *distribution of produce*.

This communism certainly appears fragmentary to us, especially as stress was laid by its exponents upon its different separate aspects; and there always remained in it what we might call *partial* communism. It admitted *individual possession* side by side with *common property*, and while proclaiming the right of all to the entire sum of the fruits of production, it yet recognised an individual right to the "superfluous," by the side of the right of all to the products of "first and second necessity." Nevertheless the *three principal aspects* of communism are already to be found in the teachings of 1793: *Land* communism, *industrial* communism, and communism in *commerce* and in *credit*. And in this, the conception of 1793 was broader than the one of 1848. For, if each one of the agitators of 1793 usually laid more stress on one of these aspects than on the others, these three aspects do not exclude one another. On the contrary, being born from the same conception of equality, they complete each other. At the same time the agitators of the Great Revolution endeavoured to attain the practical carrying out of their idea by the action

* It is probable that besides the advocating of communism in the sections and Popular Societies, there were also, from August 10, 1792, attempts to constitute secret communist societies, which were extended afterwards, in 1795, by Buonarroti and Babeuf, and which, after the revolution of July 1830, gave birth to the secret societies of the Blanquists.

local forces, by immediate practical realisation, while at same time they tried to start some sort of a direct union the 40,000 communes. In Sylvain Maréchal one finds n a vague aspiration towards what we describe now as archist communism—expressed, of course, with much caution, one risked paying with one's head for the use of too frank guage.

The idea of reaching communism by means of a conspiracy rough a secret society which should grasp the reins of govern-nt—the idea of which Babeuf became the apostle—was mulated later on, in 1794 and 1795, when the Thermidor ction had crushed the ascending movement of the Great volution. This was the result of a loss of force—not an ect of the growing power of the years from 1789 to 1793.

Of course there was plenty of declamatory effect in the eachings of the popular communists. It was a fashion of e times—one to which our modern orators also pay a tribute. t everything that is known about the communists of the eat Revolution tends to show them as men profoundly voted to their ideas.

Jacques Roux had been a priest. He was extremely poor d lived with his sole companion, a dog, almost entirely on his come of two hundred livres (francs) in a gloomy house in e centre of Paris,* and preached communism in the working-en's quarters. He was very popular in the Gravilliers ction to which he belonged, and had great influence on the ordeliers' Club—until the end of June 1793, when his in-uence was destroyed by the intervention of Robespierre. to Chalier, we have already seen the power which he had Lyons, and we know through Michelet that this mystic-mmunist was a remarkable man—even more a "friend of e people" than Marat. He was simply adored by his pupils. fter his death, his friend Leclerc came to Paris and continued e propaganda of communism with Roux, Varlet, a young arisian working man, and Rose Lacombe, a leader of the omen revolutionists. About Varlet practically nothing is nown, except that he was popular among the poor of Paris.

* Jaurès, *La Convention*, p. 1069 (notes of Bernard Lazare).

His pamphlet, *Déclaration solennelle des droits de l'homme dans l'état social*, published in 1793, was very moderate in tone.* But it must be remembered that with the decree of March 10, 1793, hanging over their heads, the revolutionists did not dare to say in print everything they thought.

The communists also had their theorists, such as Boissel, who published his *Catéchisme du genre humain* in the early days of the Revolution, and a second edition of the same work in 1791; the anonymous author of a work published also in 1791 and entitled *De la propriété, ou la cause du pauvre plaidée au tribunal de la Raison, de la Justice et de la Vérité;* and Pierre Dolivier, curé of Mauchamp, whose remarkable work, *Essai sur la justice primitive pour servir de principe générateur au seul ordre social qui peut assurer à l'homme tous ses droits et tous ses moyens de bonheur*, was published at the end of July 1793 by the citizens of the Commune of Anvers, a district of Etampes.†

There was also L'Ange (or Lange), who was, as Michelet had already pointed out, a real precursor of Fourier. Babeuf was also in Paris in 1793. He was employed under the protection of Sylvain Maréchal in the administration of the means of subsistence, and made a secret communist propaganda. Forced to stay in hiding, since he had been prosecuted for a supposed

* He limited himself to asking in this declaration that the right of possession of land be limited; that the enormous inequality of fortunes be abolished " by fair means," so that the poor could protect themselves from oppression by the rich, and that " the possessions amassed at the cost of the public, by theft, stock-jobbing, monopoly, &c., should become national property, the instant society obtained conclusive and reliable proofs of peculation." (Pamphlets in the British Museum, F. 499.) In another pamphlet, *Vœux formés par des français libres*, &c., he also asked for severe laws against monopolists (same collection, F. 65.)

† In his *Discours sur les moyens de sauver la France et la liberté*, delivered at the time of the elections for the Convention (this pamphlet may be found at the Bibliothèque Nationale), Jacques Roux maintained that a prolonged dictatorship means the death of liberty, and he wished (pp. 42 and 43) that it should be made obligatory for the great landowners to be allowed to sell their harvest only in those markets indicated to them in their respective districts; " establish," he said, " in all the cities and large market towns public stores where the price of goods will be established by public auction (*au concours*)." Michelet, who had already mentioned this *Discours* (Book XV. ch. vi.), added that this doctrine of Roux was very popular in the Gravilliers, Arcis, and other sections of the Centre de Paris.

forgery—wrongly prosecuted by the middle classes, as has been proved by Deville, who has found the original minutes of the trial*—he was compelled to be very discreet.†

Later on communism was connected with Babeuf's conspiracy. But Babeuf, so far as one may judge from his writings and letters, was only an opportunist of the communism of 1793. His conceptions, as well as the means of action which he advocated, belittled the idea. While it was well understood by many that a movement having a communist tendency would be the only means to assure the victories of the democracy, Babeuf, as one of his recent apologists—quite correctly—put it, sought to shuffle communism into democracy (*glisser le communisme dans le démocratie*). While it had become evident that democracy would lose its victories if the people did not enter the arena with its demands and ideals, Babeuf wanted *democracy first*, and then to introduce communism into it, little by little.‡

Altogether Babeuf's conception of communism was so narrow, so unreal, that he thought it possible to reach communism by the action of a few individuals who were to get the Govern-

* *Thermidor et Directoire*, 1794–1799 (*Histoire socialiste*, vol. v. pp. 14 and following).

† In his *Catéchisme*, Boissel already expounded the ideas which became current among socialists towards 1848. Thus, to the question "Which are the principal institutions of this mercenary, homicidal, anti-social State?" he answers, "Property, marriage, and religions are what men have invented, established, and consecrated to legitimate their impostures." In specifying the things over which men have extended their property rights, he said: "It is those things of which they have thought it necessary to become possessed, or to make others believe that they were possessed, such as lands, women, even men, the sea, the rivers, and mountains, the sky, the nether regions, the gods themselves, out of whom they have always made and still make capital." He was not tender either to the laws, of which he said: "They are the obligations which the strong, the more shrewd, the more cunning have imposed on the weaker, in order to maintain their disastrous institutions, or even to prevent the bad effects of these institutions, so far as it was possible." His definitions of authority and justice might be accepted by modern anarchists. See *Le Catéchisme du genre humain pour l'établissement essentiel et indispensable du véritable ordre moral et de l'éducation sociale des hommes*. (Paris 1789), p. 132. Pamphlets of the British Museum, F. 513 (3).)

‡ Thus, for instance, the people, armed with a democratic Constitution, would veto all the laws, until the maintenance of all citizens should be assured by law!

ment into their hands by means of the conspiracy of a secret society. He went so far as to be ready to put his faith in one single person, provided this person had a will strong enough *to introduce communism, and thus save the world!* A sad illusion, which paved the way for Bonaparte and, continuing to be cherished by a great number of socialists during the whole of the nineteenth century, gave us Cæsarism—the faith in a Napoleon or a Disraeli—the faith in a saviour which still persists even to this day.

CHAPTER LIX

SCHEMES FOR THE SOCIALISATION OF LAND, INDUSTRIES, MEANS OF SUBSISTENCE AND EXCHANGE

Communist movement and land—Economic importance of land—Agrarian proposals—View of Dolivier—Industrial demands—Proposals of L'Ange—Problem of means of subsistence—Question of exchange of produce—Summary of situation—Evils of repression

THE dominating idea of the communist movement of 1793 was, that the land should be considered as the common inheritance of the whole nation, that every citizen should have a right to the land, and that the means of existence should be guaranteed to each, so that no one could be forced to sell his or her work under the threat of starvation. "Actual equality" (*l'égalité de fait*), which had been much spoken of during the eighteenth century, was now interpreted as the affirmation of an equal right of all to the land; and the great transfer of lands which was going on through the sale of the national estates awakened a hope of a practical realisation of this idea.

It must be borne in mind that at this time, when the great industries were only just beginning to grow, the land was the chief instrument of exploitation. By the land the landowner held the peasants in his hands, and the impossibility of owning a scrap of land compelled the peasants to emigrate to the towns, where they became the defenceless prey of the factory-owners and the stock-jobbers.

Under such circumstances the minds of the communists necessarily turned to what was described then as the "agrarian law"—that is to say, to the limitation of property in land

to a certain maximum of area, and towards the recognition of the right of every inhabitant to the land. The land-grabbing that was then practised by speculators during the sales of the national estates could but strengthen this idea; and while some demanded that each citizen desiring to cultivate land should have the right to receive his share of the national property, or at least to buy a part of it under easy conditions of payment—others, who saw further ahead, demanded that all the land should again be made communal property and that every holder of land should get only the right of temporary possession of that land which he himself cultivated, and only for so long as he cultivated it.

Thus Babeuf, fearing perhaps to compromise himself too much, demanded the equal division of communal lands. But he also wanted the "inalienability" of the land, which meant the retention of the rights of the commune, or of the nation, over the land, *i.e.*, *possession* by the individuals, not *ownership*.

On the other hand, at the Convention, during the debate on the law on the partition of communal lands, Julien Souhait opposed the final partition proposed by the Agricultural Committee, and he certainly had on his side the millions of poor peasants. He demanded that the division of communal lands, in equal portions, among all, should be only temporary, and that they might be *redivided after certain periods of time*. The *use* only would be conceded in this case to separate individuals, as it is in the Russian *Mir*.

Dolivier, a curé of Mauchamp, following a similar line of thought, expressed, in his *Essai sur la justice primitive*, "two immutable principles: the first, that the land belongs to all in general and to no one in particular; and the second, that each has the exclusive right to the produce of his labour." But as the land question dominated all others at this time, he preferred to dwell especially on the first of these two propositions.

"The land," he said, "taken as a whole, must be considered as the great common-land of nature"—the common property of all; "each individual must have the right of sharing in the great *common-land* (*au grand communal*). One generation

has no right to make laws for the next, or to dispose of its sovereign rights; how much stronger, then, the reason for not disposing of its patrimony!" And further: "Nations alone, and by sub-division the communes, are the real owners of their land."*

In fact, Dolivier recognised a right of property, transmissible by inheritance, in the case of movable property only. As to the land, no one should be allowed to possess any part of the common property, except what he with his family could cultivate—and then only as a temporary possession. This, of course, would not prevent common cultivation being done by the commune, side by side with farms cultivated individually. But Dolivier, who knew village life well, disliked the farmers as much as the big landowners. He demanded "the complete subdivision of the big farms"; "the utmost division of land among all those citizens who have none, or who have not enough of it. This is the only adequate measure which can put life into our villages, and bring comfort to all the families now groaning in misery, through a lack of means for rendering their work remunerative. . . . The land," he added, "will be better cultivated, domestic resources will be more numerous, and the markets consequently more abundantly supplied; we shall get rid of the most abominable aristocracy, that of the farmers." He foresaw that greater agricultural well-being would be attained in this way, and that there would never again be any need of regulating the prices of the means of subsistence by laws, which "is necessary under the present circumstances, but nevertheless is always inconvenient."

The socialisation of industries also found champions, especially in the Lyons region. The Lyons workers demanded that wages should be regulated by the commune, and that the wages should be such as to guarantee subsistence. It was the "living wage" of modern English socialists. Besides, they demanded the nationalisation of certain industries, such as mining. The

* As this work of Dolivier is not in the British Museum I quote from Jaurès. His other work, *Le vœu national, ou système politique propre à organiser la nation dans toutes ses parties* (Paris, 1790), is only interesting because of the idea of organising the nation from the bottom upwards.—Pamphlets of the British Museum, F. 514 (4).

proposition was also put forward that the communes should seize upon the industrial enterprises abandoned by the counter-revolutionists, and work them on their own account. On the whole the idea of the commune becoming a producer of all sorts of commodities was very popular in 1793. The utilisation of the large tracts of uncultivated land in the parks of the rich, for communal market gardening, was a widespread idea in Paris, and Chaumette advocated it.

It is evident that much less interest was taken then in industry than in agriculture. Nevertheless, Cusset, a merchant whom Lyons had elected member of the Convention, already spoke of the nationalisation of industries, and L'Ange elaborated a project of a sort of "phalanstery," where industry would be combined with agriculture. Since 1790 L'Ange had carried on an earnest communist propaganda at Lyons. Thus, in a pamphlet, dated 1790, he put forward the following ideas: "The Revolution," he wrote, "was going to be a salutary change; but then it was spoiled by a change of ideas, by means of the most abominable abuse of riches. The sovereign (that is, the people) has been transformed." "Gold," he wrote further, "is useful and beneficial in laborious hands, but it becomes dangerous when it accumulates in the coffers of capitalists. Everywhere, sire, wherever your Majesty may look, you will see the land cultivated, but by us; it is we who till it, we who have been the first owners of the land, the first and the last effective possessors of it. The idle who call themselves landowners can but collect the *surplus of our subsistence*. This proves, at least, our rights to co-proprietorship. But if, then, we are co-proprietors, and *the sole cause of any income, the right of limiting our consumption, and of depriving us of the surplus, is the right of a plunderer*," which is, to my mind, a very concrete conception of the "surplus value."*

* *Plaintes et représentations d'un citoyen décrété passif, aux citoyens décrétés actifs*, by M. L'Ange (Lyons), 1790, p. 15 (Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris). For the more or less socialistic ideas of the *Cercle Social* founded by the Abbé Fauchet, and whose organ was *La Bouche de fer sec, vide* A. Lichtenberger, *Le Socialisme et la Révolution française*, ch. iii. p. 69.

Reasoning always from facts—*i.e.*, from the crisis in the means of livelihood through which France was passing—he proposed a system of subscription of all the would-be consumers, entitling them to buy at fixed prices the whole of the crop—all this to be reached by means of free association, gradually becoming universal. He also wanted to see common stores, whereto all the cultivators could carry their produce for sale. This was, as we see, a system which avoided in the commerce of commodities both the individualist monopoly and the obligatory State system of the Revolution. It was the precursor of the present system of co-operative creameries united to sell the produce of a whole province, as may be seen in Canada, or of a whole nation, as is the case in Denmark.

On the whole, it was the problem of the means of subsistence that was the preoccupation of the communists of 1793, and led them to compel the Convention to pass the law of *maximum*, and also to formulate the great principle of the *socialisation of the exchange of produce—the municipalisation of trade.*

In fact, the question of the trade in cereals was foremost all over France. "Full freedom in the grain trade is incompatible with the existence of our Republic," said the electors of Seine-et-Oise before the Convention in November 1792. "This trade is carried on by a minority with a view to its own enrichment, and this minority is always interested in bringing about artificial rises in price, which invariably make the consumer suffer. All partial measures against this speculation are dangerous and impotent," these electors said; "it is half-way measures that will ruin us." All the trade in grain, *the entire provisioning must be carried on by the Republic*, which will establish "a fair proportion between the price of bread and the price of a day's labour." The sale of the national estates having given rise to abominable speculations on the part of those who bought these lands, the electors of Seine-et-Oise demanded the limitation of the size of the farms and the nationalisation of trade.

"Ordain," they said, "that no one shall be allowed to undertake to farm more than 120 arpents of 22 feet to the perch;*

* About 120 acres.

that no landowner be allowed to cultivate more than one such farm, and that he will be obliged to lease out any others he may possess." And they added: "Place, moreover, the duty of providing the necessary food-stuffs for each part of the Republic in the hands of a central administration chosen by the people, and you will see that the abundance of grain and the fair proportion between its price and the day's wage will restore peace, happiness and life to all citizens."

It is evident that these were not ideas from the brain of a Turgot or a Necker; they were born of life itself.

It is interesting to note that these ideas were accepted both by the Committee of Agriculture and that of Commerce, and were developed in their report on the means of subsistence laid before the Convention.* In fact, they were applied, at the instance of the people, in several departments of the Berry and the Orléanais. In the department of Eure-et-Loir, on December 3, 1792, the commissioners of the Convention were nearly killed by the people, who said: "The middle classes have had enough, it is now the turn of the poor workers."

Later on, similar laws were violently advocated by Beffroy (Aisne), and the Convention, as we saw already when referring to the law of "maximum,"† attempted to socialise on an immense scale all trade in objects of prime and secondary necessity, for the whole of France, by means of national stores, and by establishing in every department what would be found to be "fair" prices for all commodities.

We thus see, budding during the Revolution, the idea that *commerce is a social function;* that it must be socialised, as well as the land and the industries—an idea which was to be elaborated later on by Fourier, Robert Owen, Proudhon, and the communists of the 'forties.

We perceive even more. It is clear to us that Jacques Roux, Varlet, Dolivier, L'Ange, and thousands of town and country folk, agriculturists and artisans, understood, from a practical

* "Report and project of a decree on subsistences," presented by M. Fabre, deputy of the department of the Hérault.

† Chap. lii.

oint of view, the problem of the means of subsistence infinitely etter than the Convention. They understood that taxation lone, without the socialisation of the land, the industries and he commerce of the nation would remain a dead letter, even f it were backed up by a legion of repressive laws and by the evolutionary tribunal.

It was the system of selling the national estates adopted by he Constituent Assembly, the Legislative Assembly and the Convention, that had created those rich farmers whom Dolivier considered, and quite rightly, as the worst form of aristocracy. The Convention did not begin to notice this until 1794. But hen, the only thing they were able to do was to arrest the armers in hundreds and to send them to the guillotine as nonopolists (*accapareurs*). However, all these Draconian laws gainst monopoly (such as the law of July 26, 1793, which prescribed the searching of all lofts, cellars, and barns belonging o farmers) resulted only in spreading in the villages hatred gainst the towns, and against Paris in particular.

The revolutionary tribunal and the guillotine could not nake up for the lack of a constructive communist theory.

CHAPTER LX

THE END OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Montagnards and communists—Attitude of Hébert—Of Billaud-Varenne—Obstacles to communism—Assemblies and land—Communal land given to well-to-do peasants—Jacques Roux and Robespierre—Roux prosecuted—Reply to communism of Committee of Public Welfare—Resolutions passed by communists—Convention defends middle class and suppresses communism

Previous to May 31, when the Montagnards saw the Revolution brought to a standstill by the opposition of the Girondins, they sought the support of the communists, and of the *Enragés* in general. In those days, Robespierre, in the proposed Declaration of Rights which he read before the Convention on April 21, 1793, expressed himself in favour of a limitation of the rights of property, and Jeanbon Saint-André, Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varenne, and several others tried to make terms with the communists. If Brissot, in his savage attacks on the Montagnards, described all of them as "anarchists" and "destroyers of property," it was only because at that time the Montagnards had not yet tried to separate themselves definitely from the *Enragés* and the communists.

However, immediately after the disturbances in February 1793, the Convention assumed a threatening attitude towards the communists. Acting on a report by Barère, in which he already represented the communist agitation as the work of the clergy and the *émigrés*, the Convention, notwithstanding the opposition of Marat, enthusiastically voted, on March 18, 1793, "the penalty of death for whomsoever should propose *an agrarian law*, or any subversion whatsoever of landed property, whether communal or individual."

Still, they were forced to conciliate the *Enragés*, since they needed the support of the people of Paris against the Girondins, and in the most active sections of Paris the *Enragés* were very popular. But once the Girondins had been overthrown, the Montagnards turned against those who wished for "the Revolution in deeds, after it had been accomplished in thought," and crushed them in their turn.

It is much to be regretted that there was no one among the educated men of the time who could formulate the communist ideas in a complete and comprehensive form, and make himself heard. Marat might have done so, had he been allowed to live; but he had been assassinated on July 13. As to Hébert, he was too easy-going a man to take upon himself a task of this nature: he belonged too much to the society of the gay middle classes of Holbach's school ever to become a champion of the anarchist communism which was springing up among the masses. He could adopt the language of the *sans-culottes*, as the Girondins had adopted the red woollen cap of the poor, and their familiar "thee" and "thou" in speech, but, like them, Hébert was too little in sympathy with the people to understand and to express the popular aspirations. In fact, he allied himself with the "Mountain" to crush Jacques Roux and the *Enragés* together.

Billaud-Varenne seemed to understand, better than the other Montagnards, the need of profound changes in a communistic direction. He understood at one time that a social revolution ought to have been going abreast with the political revolution. But he, too, had not the courage to enter the ranks for this cause. He took a place in the Government and ended by doing as all the other Montagnards did, when they said: "*The Republic first, social measures will come later.*" But there they got stranded, and there the Republic was stranded as well.

The fact is, that the Revolution, by its first measures, had roused too many interests and too much cupidity to make it possible for communism to develop. The communist ideas about landed property were running counter to all the widespread interests of the middle classes, who had bought national estates, or were wildly speculating in them.

The legislators of the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies, as we have already mentioned, had seen in these sales a means of enriching the middle classes at the cost of the clergy and the nobility. As to the masses of the people, they did not think much about them. Ready money being badly needed in the Exchequer, the national estates were sold recklessly, *avec fureur*, as Avenel says, in 1790 and 1791, to the middle class, or to the rich peasants—even to English and Dutch companies, which bought with an eye to speculation. And when the purchasers, who paid only 20 or even only 12 per cent. of the whole price at the moment of the purchase, had to pay the next instalment, they did all they could to avoid paying anything more, and very often they succeeded.

However, as the peasants who had been unable to obtain any of these lands were complaining bitterly, the Legislative Assembly, in August 1790, and later on, by the decree of June 11, 1793,* the communal lands—the only hope for the poorer peasant —were flung by the Convention to the better-off peasants as their prey.† The Convention promised also that the confiscated land of the *émigrés* should be divided into lots of one to four acres, to be sold to the poor for a perpetual rent which was to be paid in money, and could be redeemed at any time. It was even decreed, towards the end of 1792, that national lands to the amount of a thousand million livres worth, should be reserved for the *sans-culotte* volunteers who had enlisted in the armies, and be sold to them under favourable conditions. But nothing of the kind was done. This decree remained a dead letter, just as hundreds of other decrees of those times.

And when Jacques Roux spoke before the Convention, on June 25, 1793—less than four weeks after the rising of May 31 —denouncing stock-jobbing and demanding laws against the speculators, his speech was received with angry howls, and

* *See* chap. xlviii.

† Most historians have described this measure as a favourable one to the peasants. In reality, it meant depriving the poorest of the sole inheritance which was left them. This is why the measure met with so much opposition when it came to its application.

oux himself was hooted out of the Convention.* Besides, s he attacked the "Mountain" in his speeches, and enjoyed a reat influence in his own section, Les Gravilliers, as well as in he Cordeliers' Club, Robespierre, who never went near this lub, visited it on the night of June 30, after the riots of the 25th nd 27th directed against the soap merchants, in company with Hébert, Collot d'Herbois, and several others, as a delegation rom the Jacobin Club, and they got Roux and his friend Varlet truck off the list of the Cordeliers.

From that day Robespierre never ceased slandering Jacques Roux. As this Cordelier-communist severely criticised the Revolution for having done nothing so far for the people, and would say occasionally in his criticisms—just as the socialists of our own day often do—that the people suffered more under he Republic than under monarchy, Robespierre, whenever he spoke of Roux, never failed to describe him as a "base priest" who had sold himself to the foreigners, a "scoundrel" who endeavoured to excite baneful disturbances to injure the Republic."

From June 1793, Jacques Roux might have considered himself doomed. He was first accused of being the instigator of

* "It is the rich," said Jacques Roux, "who have reaped for the last four years the advantages of the Revolutions; it is the merchant aristocracy, more terrible than the noble aristocracy, which oppresses us, and we do not see any limit to their extortions, for the price of goods is growing to an alarming extent. It is time that the death-struggle between the selfish and the hard-working classes should come to an end. . . . Are the possessions of knaves to be held more sacred than human life? *The necessities of life must be at the disposition of administrative bodies, just as the armed forces are at their disposition.*" Roux reproached the Convention with not having confiscated the fortunes acquired since the Revolution by the bankers and monopolists, and he said that the Convention having decreed "a forced loan of a thousand million livres to be levied upon the rich, *the capitalist and the merchant will the next day raise this sum from the* sans-culottes, *thanks to the monopolies and the powers of extortion they will retain if the monopolies of commerce and forestalling are not destroyed.*" He very clearly saw the danger of such conditions for the Revolution, when he said: "The stock-jobbers get possession of the factories, of the seaports, of every branch of commerce, of all produce of the land, and they cause the friends of justice to die of hunger, thirst and exposure, or else force them into the arms of despotism." (I quote from the text of Roux' speech, found by Bernard Lazare, and communicated to Jaurès.)

the riots against the soap merchants. Later on, in August, when he was publishing with Leclerc a paper, *L'Ombre de Marat*, Marat's widow was persuaded to prosecute him for using this title; and finally he was accused of having embezzled a small cheque which he had received for the Cordeliers' Club, while it is quite certain, as Michelet has said, that "disinterestedness was the special characteristic of these fanatics," and that among all the well-known revolutionists, "Roux, Varlet, and Leclerc were distinguished as models of probity." Roux' section of the Gravilliers vainly demanded from the Commune the abandonment of these prosecutions, offering that its members should give securities for him. The women revolutionists did likewise—and their club was suppressed by the Commune. Finally, he was released, but the prosecution was not stopped.

Full of indignation at the persistent persecutions, Roux and his friends went on the evening of August 19 to the Gravilliers section to which they belonged, and deprived the president and the secretaries of their offices. Roux was nominated president. Upon this, Hébert denounced Roux before the Jacobin Club, on the 21st, and when the matter was brought before the Council of the Commune, Chaumette accused him of "an attempt against the sovereignty of the people," and spoke of capital punishment. Roux was prosecuted, but his section obtained from the Commune his release on August 25. The inquiry, however, was continued, and the charge of theft was brought forward; so that on January 14, 1794 (23rd Nivôse), Roux was sent before a common police court.

This court declared itself incompetent to pronounce upon such serious indictments as those brought against Roux—meaning the affair of the Gravilliers section—and ordered him to be sent before the revolutionary tribunal. Knowing what that meant, Roux stabbed himself in court thrice with a knife. The president of the court hastened to his assistance and displayed much friendliness towards him, even giving him the kiss of civic brotherhood, before he was removed to the Bicêtre prison. In the prison infirmary Roux "tried to exhaust his strength," as it was reported to the procurator of the Revolutionary Tribunal, Fouquier-Tinville, by opening his

ounds; and finally he succeeded in stabbing himself once ore, this time mortally, through the lung. The record of ie post-mortem is dated "1st Ventôse," *i.e.*, February 19, 794.*

The people of Paris, especially in the sections of the centre f the city, understood now that their hopes of "practical quality" were over. Gaillard, a friend of Chalier, who had een kept by the Girondins in prison, at Lyons, during the ege, and who had come to Paris after Lyons had been taken y the Montagnards, also killed himself three weeks later, when e learned that Leclerc had been arrested together with Chauette and the Hébertists.

In reply to all these demands of communism, and seeing that he masses were abandoning the Revolution, as they found that ttle attention was paid to their demands, the Committee of ublic Welfare issued on the 21st Ventôse (March 11, 1794), a ircular, written in a pompous style and addressed to the comissioners of the Convention in the provinces. But the conlusions of both this high-flown circular and the famous speech ronounced two days later (23rd Ventôse) by Saint-Just, were ery poor. The Convention offered nothing but charity—canty charity—to be provided for the destitute by the tate.

"A great blow was necessary to overthrow the aristocracy," o the circular ran. "The Convention has struck it. Virtuous overty must recover the property which criminals had taken way from it. . . . It is necessary that terror and justice hould strike in all directions at the same time. The Revolution s the work of the people. It is time the people should enjoy ts fruits" . . . and so on. But in reality the Convention did othing in this direction. The decree of the 13th Ventôse ear II. (February 3, 1794), of which Saint-Just spoke in high-lown terms, amounted to this: Each commune was to make list of its destitute "patriots"—and later on the Committee f Public Welfare would make a report to the Convention about he means of giving them certain compensation out of the states of the enemies of the Revolution. They would be given

* Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste, La Convention*, pp. 1698 and 1699.

full ownership of about one acre each.* As to the old people and the infirm, the Convention decided on the 22nd Floréal (May 11), to open for them a Book of National Charity, in which both the old and the infirm peasants were to be registered for a yearly allowance of 160 livres (francs), the old or infirm artisans for 120 livres, and the old mothers and widows for 80 and 60 livres respectively.

It is hardly needful to say that this promised acre of land looked like mockery to the peasants. Moreover, apart from a few localities, the decree was never applied. Those who had seized nothing for themselves got nothing.

It must be added, however, that some of the Commissioners of the Convention, namely, Albitte, Collot d'Herbois, and Fouché at Lyons, Jeanbon Saint-André at Brest and Toulon, Romme in the Charente, had shown in 1793 a certain tendency towards socialising various commodities. And when the Convention decreed, on the 16th Nivôse, Year II. (January 5, 1794), that in towns besieged, blockaded or surrounded by the enemy, all materials, goods, and means of subsistence of all sorts, must be shared in common"—"there was a tendency," as M. Aulard says, "to apply this law to towns which were neither besieged nor blockaded, nor surrounded."†

The Convention, or, to be more correct, its Committees of Public Welfare and Public Safety, certainly succeeded in suppressing in 1794 the communist manifestations. But the spirit of the revolution impelled the French nation towards such measures, and under the pressure of events a great work of levelling and an unmistakable display of the communist spirit took place, more or less, all over France, during the Year II. of the Republic.‡

Thus, on the 24th Brumaire, Year II. (November 14, 1793),

* One *arpent*—a measure the size of which varied in different parts of France from one acre to one acre and a quarter.

† *Histoire politique*, chap. viii. ii.

‡ "This is why," Aulard wrote, "one looks vainly for the appearance of socialist theories at this moment of severe repression. But the sum total of partial and empiric measures which are taken, of laws which are passed under the pressure of the moment, and of provisory institutions introduced by the revolutionary government, is bringing about a state of things which prepares men's minds, even though the voice

ne representatives of the Convention at Lyons, Albitte, Collot 'Herbois and Fouché, passed a resolution, which even began to ake effect, whereby all the infirm, the old, the orphans, and the estitute citizens had to be "lodged, clothed, and fed at the ost of the rich in their respective cantons." Moreover, labour, as well as the implements needful in their trades, had o be provided for the citizens capable of work." The commo- ities placed at the disposal of the various citizens—wrote hese commissioners in their circulars—must be in proportion o their labour, their diligence and the ardour they display in he service of the mother country. Many commissioners of he Convention passed similar resolutions. Thus Fouché evied heavy taxes on the rich to feed the poor. It is also ertain—as M. Aulard says—that many commissioners had egun to practise collectivism, or, we should say, municipal ommunism.*

The idea that the State ought to take over the factories bandoned by their owners, and work them, was expressed nore than once. Chaumette developed it in October 1793, when he demonstrated the bad effects of the law of the "maxi- num" upon certain industries; and Jeanbon Saint-André had taken into the hands of the Government a certain mine of Carhaix, in Brittany, in order to secure a living for the workers.

However, if certain of the representatives of the Convention n the provinces really took, in 1793 and 1794, equalitarian measures, and were inspired with the idea of "limitation of ncomes," the Convention itself remained a defender of the nterests of the middle classes, and there must be some truth n the remark of Buonarotti, who wrote in 1842, that the fear of the Convention, lest Robespierre and his group should begin taking measures that would favour the equalitarian instincts of the people, contributed to the downfall of this group on the 9th Thermidor.*

of the socialists is not heard, for a social revolution, and begins a partial accomplishment of it."

* *Observations sur Maximilien Robespierre*, in *La Fraternité, journal mensuel exposant la doctrine de la communauté*, No. 17, September 1842.

CHAPTER LXI

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT—REPRISALS

Committees of Public Welfare and Public Safety—Condition of Paris—Power of old *régime*—Middle classes in opposition to Revolution—Paper-money forbidden by Convention—Weakening of Commune—Convention and sections—"Law of suspects"—Jacobins obtain power—Robespierre and expelled Girondins—Report of Saint-Just—Central Government established—Military situation—Republican reverses—Massacres of Republicans—Attempts to rescue Marie-Antoinette—Her trial ordered, but postponed—Her execution—Condemnation of arrested Girondins—Others follow—Beginning of Terror

Since May 31 and the arrest of the principal Girondin members, the "Mountain" had patiently worked during the summer of 1793 at the constitution of a strong Government, concentrated in Paris and capable of grappling with the foreign invasion, the revolts in the provinces, and any popular risings that might occur in Paris itself under the guidance of the *Enragés* and the communists.

We have seen that in April the Convention had entrusted the central power to a Committee of Public Welfare, and after May 31 it continued to strengthen this committee with new Montagnard elements.* And when the application of the

* The Committee of Public Welfare which at first had been Dantonist, became after May 31 more and more Robespierrist. Saint-Just and Couthon had already become members on May 30; and Jeanbon Saint-André joined on June 12; Robespierre entered it on July 27. Carnot and Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or) were admitted on August 14, and Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne on September 6, after the rising of the 4th and 5th of that month. Three parties could be distinguished in this committee: the *terrorists*, Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne; the workers, Carnot for the war, Prieur for military engineering and armament, and Lindet for the provisioning of the army; and "the

new Constitution was put off till the termination of the war, the two committees—of Public Welfare and of General Safety—continued to concentrate power in their hands, while pursuing a moderate policy—that of standing midway between the advanced parties, represented by the *Enragés* and the Commune of Paris, and the followers of Danton, behind whom stood the Girondins.

In this work of concentration of power the two committees were strongly seconded by the Jacobins, who were extending their sphere of action into the provinces and were closing up their ranks. From eight hundred in 1791, the number of societies affiliated to the Jacobin Club of Paris rose to eight thousand in 1793, and each one of these societies became a support of the republican middle classes; they were also nurseries whence the numerous officials of the new bureaucracy were drawn, and police centres which the Government used for discovering its enemies and for getting rid of them.

Besides, forty thousand revolutionary committees were formed in the towns and the village communes, as well as in the sections, and all these communities, which mostly stood, as Michelet had already noticed, under the leadership of educated middle-class men—very often officials of the old *régime*—were soon subordinated by the Convention to the Committee of General Safety, while the sections themselves, as also the Popular Societies, were as rapidly transformed into organs of the central government, so as to become mere branches of the republican hierarchy.

Meanwhile the state of Paris was far from reassuring. The energetic men, the best revolutionists, had enlisted in 1792 and 1793 in the army, and had gone to the frontiers or to La Vendée, while the royalists were beginning to lift their heads. Taking advantage of the slackened supervision of the sections, they returned in great numbers to Paris. In August, the

men of action," Robespierre, Saint-Just and Couthon. The Committee of Public Safety, which represented the State police, consisted chiefly of functionaries of the old *régime*. One is even tempted to ask oneself whether many of these men had not retained their former sympathies. The Public Prosecutor of the revolutionary tribunal, Fouquier-Tinville, was entirely subservient to the Committee of Public Safety, whose orders he came to receive every evening.

extravagant luxury of the old *régime* suddenly made its reappearance. The public gardens and the theatres were crowded with "muscadins".* In the theatres royalist plays were cheered vociferously, while republican plays were hissed. In one of the former, the Temple prison and the rescue of the Queen were represented, and it needed but little for the escape of Marie-Antoinette to become an accomplished fact.

The sections were overrun by Girondist and royalist counter-revolutionists. And when the young workmen and artisans, weary after their long day's work, assembled in the general meetings of the sections, the young men of the middle classes, armed with cudgels, came to these meetings, and carried the voting at their will.

Of course the sections would have withstood these incursions, as they had already done once before, by each helping the neighbouring sections, but the Jacobins regarded the power of the sections with jealousy, and made use of the first opportunity to paralyse them. That opportunity was not long in coming.

Bread still continued scarce and dear in Paris, and on September 4 crowds began to assemble round the Hôtel de Ville, with cries of "We want bread!"† These cries were becoming threatening, and it needed all the popularity and good-humour of Chaumette, the orator most loved by the poor of Paris, to soothe the crowd. Chaumette promised to provide bread, and to have the administrators charged with provisioning Paris arrested. By these promises he staved off a rising, and the next day the people only sent deputations to the Convention.

The Convention, however, neither knew nor wished to deal with the true causes of this movement. All it did was to threaten the counter-revolutionists with drastic measures, and to strengthen the central government. In fact, neither the Convention, nor the Committee of Public Welfare, nor

* A nickname given to extravagantly dressed dandies of the wealthier classes.

† It is possible, even probable, that royalists, too (like Lepître), worked in the sections to foment this movement. It was an old ruse of the reactionists. But to say that this movement was the work of reactionaries was as absurd and as jesuitical as to say, for instance, that the movements of 1789 were the work of the Duke of Orléans.

even the Commune—the existence of which, it must be said, was already threatened by the committee—showed any capacity for facing the situation. There was no one to express the communist ideas which were growing among the people, with the same vigour, the same daring and precision that Danton, Robespierre, Barère, and so many others had used in expressing the aspirations of the early days of the Revolution. The advocates of "strong government"—middle-class mediocrities, more or less democratic in their views—were steadily gaining the upper hand.

The truth is, that the old *régime* still retained an immense power, and this power had been augmented lately by the support it had found among precisely those on whom the Revolution had poured its gifts. To shatter this power, a new, popular and equalitarian revolution was necessary; but the greater number of the revolutionists of 1789–1792 wanted no such thing. The majority of the middle classes, who had held revolutionary views in 1789–1792, now considered that the Revolution was going too far. Would this Revolution be able to prevent the "anarchists" from "levelling wealth"? Would it not make the peasants too comfortable? so comfortable that they would refuse to work for the purchasers of the national lands? Where, then, should they find the labourers to get profits from their estates? For if the buyers had put millions into the Treasury to buy national lands, it was certainly with the intent of getting profits out of them, and what was to be done if there were no more unemployed proletarians in the villages?

The Court party and the aristocracy, threfore, had now as allies a whole class of men who had bought national lands, troops of the so-called "black gangs" (*les bandes noires*) who were speculating in the purchase and sale of the national estates, crowds of contractors speculating in the supplies for the army, and multitudes of stock-jobbers speculating in the paper-currency and in all the necessaries of life. All of them had made their fortunes, and they were in a hurry now to enjoy them unhindered—to put an end to the Revolution, on one condition only, that the properties they had bought and the

fortunes they had amassed should not be taken from them. A newly created crowd of lower middle-class people backed them up in the villages. And all of them cared but little as to the kind of Government they were to have, *provided it was strong*, provided it could keep the *sans-culottes* in order and withstand England, Austria and Prussia, which otherwise, if victorious, might try to restore to their previous owners the properties taken by the Revolution from the clergy and the emigrant royalists.

Consequently, the Convention and the Committee of Public Welfare, seeing that their authority was endangered by the Commune and the sections, had every facility for taking advantage of the lack of cohesion in the movement of the first days of September, and for giving new powers to the central government.

The Convention decided, it is true, to stop the trade in paper-money, by forbidding it on pain of death, and a "revolutionary army" of 6000 men was organised, under the command of the Hébertist Ronsin, for the purpose of checking the counter-revolutionists and requisitioning in the villages victuals wherewith to feed Paris. But as this measure was not followed by any vital act which would have given the land to those who wished to cultivate it themselves, or would have helped them to cultivate it, the requisitions of the revolutionary army became another cause of hatred in the villages against Paris, and resulted only in increasing the difficulties of providing food-stuffs for the capital.

For the rest, the Convention did not go beyond uttering threats of a "Terror," and endowing the Government with fresh powers. Danton spoke of an "armed nation" and menaced the royalists. "Every day," he said, "some aristocrat, some scoundrel ought to pay with his head for his crimes." The Jacobin Club demanded the arraignment of the arrested Girondins. Hébert spoke of an "itinerant guillotine." The revolutionary tribunal was going to be rendered more efficacious, and searches in private houses were allowed to be made, even at night.

At the same time, while threatening the nation with a reign

of terror, measures were taken to weaken the Commune. As the revolutionary committees of the sections, which held powers of judicial police, including that of arrest, had been accused of various abuses of these powers, Chaumette succeeded in placing them under the surveillance of the Commune and in making them eliminate their less reliable members; but twelve days later, on September 17, 1793, the Convention, becoming jealous of the thus increased power of the Commune, took away this right from its rival, and the revolutionary committees were now placed under the direct supervision of the Committee of Public Safety—that sinister force of secret police which grew by the side of the Committee of Public Welfare, threatening soon to absorb it.

As to the sections, under the pretext that they were being invaded by counter-revolutionists, the Convention decided, on September 9, that the number of their general meetings should be reduced to two a week; and to gild the pill, two francs a meeting were allotted to those of the *sans-culottes* who attended these assemblies, and who lived only by the work of their hands—a measure which has often been put forward as very revolutionary, but which the sections seem to have judged differently. A few of these (the Contract social, the Halle-aux-blés, the Droits de l'homme, under the influence of Varlet) refused the indemnity and condemned the principle; whilst others, as Ernest Mellié has shown, only made very moderate use of this allowance.

On September 19, the Convention increased the arsenal of repressive laws by the terrible "law of suspects." This law made possible the arrest as suspects of all *ci-devants*—dispossessed nobles—of all those who might show themselves "partisans of tyranny or federalism," of all who "do not fulfil their civil duties"—whosoever, in fact, had not continually shown devotion to the Revolution. Louis Blanc and all the admirers of the State describe this law as a measure of "tremendous policy" (*formidable politique*), whereas in reality it simply revealed the incapacity of the Convention to continue in the direction that has been opened and traced by the Revolution. It also prepared the way for the terrible overcrowding of the

prisons, which led later on to the drowning (*noyades*) of prisoners by Carrier in Nantes, to the wholesale shooting by Collot in Lyons, to the *fournées* (batches) of June and July 1794 in Paris, and more than anything else prepared the downfall of the Montagnard *régime*.

As a formidable government thus grew up in Paris, terrible struggles inevitably arose between the various political factions, to decide in whose hands this powerful weapon should be. On September 25, a free fight took place at the Convention between all the parties, the victory remaining with those who represented the party of the golden mean among the revolutionists —with the Jacobins and Robespierre their faithful representative. Under their influence, the revolutionary tribunal was constituted from their nominees.

Eight days later, on October 3, the new power asserted itself. On that day, Amar, member of the Committee of Public Safety, was forced to make, after much hesitation, his report about the Girondins who had been expelled on June 2 from the Convention, in which he demanded that they should be sent before the revolutionary tribunal ; and either from fear or from some other consideration, he now went a good deal further the other way, and demanded, besides the thirty-one men whom he accused, the prosecution also of seventy-three Girondist deputies who had protested in June against the violation of the national representation in the Convention, but had continued to sit. To every one's great astonishment Robespierre violently opposed this proposition. It was not the rank and file, said he, who should be punished ; it sufficed to punish their leaders. Supported as he was by both the Right and by the Jacobins, he carried his point with the Convention, and thus gained the aureole of a conciliator, capable of dominating both the Convention and the two committees.

A few days more and his friend Saint-Just read before the Convention a report, in which, after complaining of corruption, and of the tyranny of the new bureaucracy, he made allusions to the Commune of Paris—Chaumette and his party—and concluded with a demand that "the revolutionary government be maintained till peace be concluded."

The Convention accepted his conclusions. The central government was thus definitively constituted.

Whilst these struggles were taking place in Paris, the military situation offered a most gloomy prospect. In August, an order for a levy had been issued, and Danton having again recovered his energy and his penetration of the people's mind, had the splendid inspiration of putting the entire work of enlistment into the hands, not of the revolutionary bureaucracy, but of the eight hundred confederates who had been sent to Paris by the primary electoral assemblies to signify their acceptance of the Constitution. This plan was adopted on August 25.

However, as one-half of France had no desire for war, the levy progressed but slowly; both arms and ammunition were lacking.

There was a series of reverses at first, in August and September. Toulon was in the hands of the English, Marseilles and Provence were in revolt against the Convention; the siege of Lyons was still going on—it continued till October 8—and in La Vendée the situation was not improving. It was only on October 16 that the armies of the Republic gained their first victory, at Wattignies, and on the 18th that the Vendeans, beaten at Chollet, crossed the Loire to march northwards. But still the massacres of the republicans did not cease, and at Noirmoutiers, Charette shot all who surrendered to him.

It is easy to understand that at the sight of all this bloodshed, of the superhuman efforts made by France to liberate its territory from the invaders, and the incredible sufferings of the great mass of the French people, the cry of "Strike the enemies of the Revolution, high or low!" came from the hearts of the revolutionists. A nation cannot be oppressed beyond endurance without awakening revolt.

On October 3 the order was given to the revolutionary tribunal for the trial of Marie-Antoinette. Since February there had been continual talk of attempted rescues of the Queen. Several of these, as we know to-day, very nearly succeeded. The municipal officers whom the Commune put in charge of the Temple were continually being won over by partisans of the

royal family. Foulon, Brunot, Moelle, Vincent, and Michonis were amongst them. Lepître, an ardent royalist, was in the service of the Commune and attracted attention in the sections by his advanced opinions. Another royalist, Bault, had obtained the post of warder in the Conciergerie prison, where the Queen was now kept. An attempted escape had fallen through in February; but another attempt, organised by Michonis and the Baron de Batz, came very near succeeding. After the discovery of this attempt (July 11) Marie-Antoinette was first separated from her son, who was placed in the keeping of the cobbler Simon. The Queen was then transferred (August 8) to the Conciergerie. But the attempts to rescue her continued, and a Knight of Saint-Louis, Rougeville, even succeeded in penetrating to her, whilst Bault, as warder, kept up relations with the outer world. Every plan for her liberation produced great excitement among the royalists, who threatened a *coup d'état* and the immediate massacre of the conventionals and all patriots in general.

It is very likely that the Convention would not have postponed the trial of Marie-Antoinette till October had it not hoped to stop the invasion of the allied monarchs as a condition of the Queen's liberation. It is known, indeed, that the Committee of Public Welfare had given (in July) instructions in this sense to its commissioners, Semonville and Maret, who were arrested in Italy by the governor of Milan; and it is also known that the negotiations for the liberation of the Crown Princess were carried on still later.

The efforts of Marie-Antoinette to call into France a German invasion, and her betrayals to facilitate the victory of the enemy, are too well known—now that her correspondence with Fersen has been published—for it to be worth while to refute the fables of her modern defenders who wish to prove that she was almost a saint. Public opinion was not mistaken in 1793, when it accused the daughter of Marie-Thérèse of being even more guilty than Louis XVI. She died on the scaffold on October 16.

The Girondins soon followed her. It will be remembered that when thirty-one of them were arrested on June 2, they had been allowed the liberty of moving about in Paris, under the

ondition of being escorted by a gendarme. There was so little dea of taking their lives that several well-known Montagnards ad offered to go to the departments of the arrested Girondins, o be kept there as hostages. But most of the arrested Gironins had escaped from Paris and had gone to preach civil war n the provinces. Some roused Normandy and Brittany, others rged Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Provence to revolt, and everyhere they became the allies of royalists.

At this time, of the thirty-one arrested on June 2, only twelve emained in Paris. Ten more Girondins were added to these, nd the case was brought into Court on the 3rd Brumaire October 22). The Girondins defended themselves with ourage, and as their speeches seemed likely to influence even he picked jury of the revolutionary tribunal, the Committee f Public Welfare hurriedly obtained from the Convention a law n the "acceleration of the pleadings" in Court. On the 9th Brumaire (October 29), Fouquier-Tinville had this new law ead before the Court, the case was closed, and the twenty-two Girondins were condemned. Valazé stabbed himself, the others vere executed on the morrow.

Madame Roland, the real inspirer of the Girondist party, was xecuted on the 18th Brumaire (November 8); the ex-mayor f Paris, Bailly, of whose connivance with Lafayette in the nassacre of July 17, 1791, there was no doubt, Girey-Dupré rom Lyons, the Feuillant Barnave, won over by the Queen while ie accompanied her from Varennes to Paris, soon followed them, nd in December the Girondin Kersaint and Rabaut Saint-Etienne mounted the scaffold, as also did Madame Dubarry f royal fame. Roland and Condorcet committed suicide.

Thus began the Terror, and once begun, it had to follow its nevitable course of development.

CHAPTER LXII

EDUCATION—THE METRIC SYSTEM—THE NEW CALENDAR—ANTI-RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT

Education—Three-grade system—Metric system—Its importance—The Republican calendar—Its connection with Church—Severe laws against priests—First attempts at "dechristianisation"—Encouraged by Convention—Bishop Gobel's renunciation—Enthusiasm of Assembly—Movement spreads—*Fête* of Liberty and Reason—Opposition of Robespierre—Conduct of Danton—Robespierre and Danton—Triumph of Catholicism—*Fête* of the Supreme Being—Prelude to 9th Thermidor

Amidst all these struggles, the revolutionists did not lose sight of the great question of national education. They tried to lay its foundations on principles of equality. An enormous amount of work was actually done in this direction, as may be seen by the documents of the Committee of Public Instruction, recently published.* The admirable report of Michel Lepelletier on education, found after his death, was read before the Convention, and a series of measures for a three-grade system of education—primary schools, central schools and special schools—was adopted.

But the greatest intellectual monument of this period of the Revolution was the metric system. This system did much more than simply introduce into the subdivisions of linear, surface, volume, and weight measures, the decimal system which is the basis of our numeration—which of itself would have gone a good way towards the simplification of mathe-

* *Procès-verbaux du Comité d'instruction publique de l'Assemblée législative* and *Procès-verbaux du Comité d'instruction publique de la Convention nationale*, published, with notes and prefaces, by James Guillaume (Paris, 1889–1907), 7 vols.

natical instruction, and helped to develop the mathematical turn of mind. It also gave to the fundamental measure, the *mètre*, a length (one forty-millionth part of the earth's meridian) which could always be re-established with a very fair degree of accuracy, in case our measures should be lost in future ages, as those of the old civilisations have been lost—and this very fact opened up new vistas for thought. Besides, by establishing a simple ratio between the units of length, surface, volume and weight, the metric system prepared the mind of the next generation for the great victory of science in the nineteenth century—its certainty as to the unity of physical forces and the unity of Nature.

The new Republican calendar was a logical outcome of the metric system. It was adopted by the Convention, after two reports by Romme, read on September 20 and October 5, and another report of Fabre d'Eglantine, read on November 24, 1793.* The new calendar inaugurated also a new era in the reckoning of years, which was to begin with the proclamation of the Republic in France, on September 22, 1792, which was also the autumn equinox. The Christian week was abandoned. Sunday disappeared—the day of rest being each tenth day, the *decadi*.†

This decision of the Convention, which struck out the

* The Republican year was divided into twelve months, each of thirty days, the names for which were found by Fabre d'Eglantine: *Vendémiaire*, *Brumaire* and *Frimaire* for the autumn, from September 22 till December 20; *Nivôse*, *Pluviôse* and *Ventôse* for the winter, from December 21 till March 20; *Germinal*, *Floréal* and *Prairial* for the spring, from March 21 till June 18; and *Messidor*, *Thermidor* and *Fructidor* for the summer, from June 19 till September 16. Five extra days, called the *sans-culottides*, September 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, completed the year. Each month was divided into three decades, and the days were called *primidi*, *duodi*, *tridi*, &c., the day of rest being the tenth day, the *decadi*.

† The idea of establishing the new calendar on an astronomical conception was certainly excellent (the idea of placing the five surplus days all at the end of the year was not so good) and the names of the months were very well chosen; but besides all the objections which were bound to be made against this calendar, because it glorified the Revolution, it is very probable also that the idea of replacing the week of *seven* days (the quarter of a lunar month) by one of *ten* days, too long for our customs, was and will be an obstacle to its general acceptance.

Christian calendar from our daily life, necessarily emboldene those who saw in the Christian Church and its servants th chief support of servitude. The experience they had ha with the clergy who had taken the Oath to the Constitutio had proved the impossibility of winning over the Church t the cause of progress. Consequently the question of abolish ing the payment of the clergy by the State, and of leaving th expense of supporting the ministers of their various cults t the members of these cults themselves, necessarily aros Cambon had already brought it before the Convention i November 1792. But on three different occasions the Con vention decided to retain a National Church, subject to th State and paid by it—while it treated the refractory priest (who had not taken the oath) with great severity.

Against these priests very severe laws were passed : deporta tion for those unsworn, and, from March 18, 1793, death fo those who should take part in disturbances in connection wit the recruiting, and those who should be found on the Republic territory after having been condemned to deportation. O October 21, 1793, even more expeditious laws were decreed and deportation became applicable also to the constitutiona sworn priests, if they were accused of " incivism " by six citizen of their canton. This proved the growth of a conviction i France that the *jureurs* (the priests who had taken the oath were often quite as dangerous as the *non-jureurs* or *papistes*.

The first attempts of " dechristianisation " were made a Abbeville and at Nevers.* The commissioner of the Con vention, Fouché, who was at Nevers and who acted no doub in agreement and perhaps under the influence of Chaumett whom he met in this town, declared, on September, 26, 179 war " against all superstitious and hypocritical worship," also the desire to substitute for them " a worship of the Republi and of natural morality."† A few days after the introductio

* In this account I follow closely the excellent monograph of Profess Aulard, *Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de l'Etre suprême*, 2nd editio (Paris, 1904). An abridgment of this work is to be found also in h *Histoire politique*, 2nd edition, p. 469 and following.

† He also issued an order by the force of which " any minister any cult, or priest pensioned by the nation, is bound to marry, or

of the new calendar he issued, on October 10, a new order, according to which the ceremonies of various cults might only be practised inside their respective temples. All "religious emblems on the high roads," &c., were to be destroyed, the priests were no longer to appear in their vestments anywhere except in their churches, and, finally, burials were to be conducted without any religious ceremony, in fields planted with trees, "beneath the shadow of which shall be erected a statue representing Sleep. All other emblems shall be destroyed," and "the gates to this field, consecrated with religious respect to the shades of the dead, shall bear this inscription: 'Death is eternal sleep'." He also explained the meaning of these decrees to the people, by means of materialist lectures.

At the same time, Laignelot, another commissioner of the Convention, transformed the parish church in Rochefort into a Temple of Truth, where eight Catholic priests and one Protestant minister came to "renounce" their orders on October 31, 1793. At Paris, on October 14, at the instigation of Chaumette, external religious practices were forbidden, and on the 16th the order issued by Fouché on burials was adopted in principle by the Commune.

That this movement was in no way a surprise, and that men's minds had been prepared for it by the Revolution itself and its forerunners, is self-evident. Encouraged now by the acts of the Convention, the provinces threw themselves enthusiastically into the movement of dechristianisation. Following the lead of the borough of Ris-Orangis, the whole district of Corbeil renounced Christianity, and this step received the approbation of the Convention, when deputies from Corbeil arrived on October 30 to report what had been done.

Six days later, deputies from the commune of Mennecy presented themselves at the Convention, attired in copes. They, too, were well received, and the Convention recognised the "right that all citizens have to adopt whatsoever worship suits them best, and to suppress those ceremonies which displease them." A deputation from Seine-et-Oise asking

adopt a child, or to keep an incapable old person, on pain of being divested of his offices and pensions" (Aulard, *Culte de la Raison*, p. 27).

that the Bishop of Versailles, who had recently died, should not be replaced, was also received with due honours.

The Convention encouraged the movement against Christianity not only by its attitude towards dechristianisation, but also by the use to which it put the Church treasures, brought to it by the inhabitants—including the shrine of the Church of Sainte-Geneviève, which was transferred, by order, to the Mint.*

Encouraged undoubtedly by this attitude of the government, Anacharsis Cloots and Chaumette then took another step forward. Cloots, a Prussian baron, who had wholeheartedly espoused the cause of the Revolution, and who advocated with courage and sincerity an International Federation of all peoples, and the *procureur* of the Commune, Chaumette, who was a true representative of the Paris working man, persuaded Gobel, the Bishop of Paris, to lay down his ecclesiastical duties. Having received the consent of the Episcopal Council, and having announced his decision to the department and to the Commune, Gobel came in state on the 17th Brumaire (November 7, 1793), accompanied by eleven of his vicars, and followed by the mayor Pache, the *procureur* Chaumette, and by two members of the department, Momoro and Lullier, to the Convention, to divest himself openly of his prerogatives and titles.

His speech on this occasion was full of dignity. Revering as he did "the eternal principles of equality and morality, the necessary foundations of every truly republican government," he now obeyed the voice of the people and renounced the practice of "the functions of a minister of the Catholic faith." Depositing his cross and his ring, he accepted and put on the red cap which one of the members handed him.

The Assembly was seized thereupon with an enthusiasm which could only be compared to that of the night of August 4. Two other bishops, Thomas Lindet and Gay-Vernon, and some other ecclesiastical members of the Convention, rushed to the tribune to follow the example of Bishop Gobel.

* It will be remembered that the Constituent Assembly had already made similar decisions.

Abbé Gregoire, however, refused to join them. As to Sieyès, he declared that for many years already he had abandoned all ecclesiastical forms, that he had no other faith than that of liberty and equality, and that his prayers had long since called for the triumph of reason over superstition and fanaticism.

The result of this scene in the Convention was tremendous. The whole of France and all the neighbouring nations heard of it. And everywhere, among the governing classes, there rose a flood of hatred against the Republic.

In France, the movement spread rapidly to the provinces. Within a few days several bishops and a great number of clergy had divested themselves of their titles, and their abdications were at times the occasion of striking scenes. It is touching, indeed, to read, for instance, the following description of the abdication of the clergy at Bourges, which I found in a local pamphlet of the period.*

Having mentioned a priest, J. Baptiste Patin, and Julien-de-Dieu, a member of the Benedictine Order, who came to lay down their ecclesiastical prerogatives, the author of the pamphlet continues: "Privat, Brisson, Patrou, Rouen and Champion, all metropolitan *ex-curés*, were not the last to step into the arena; Epsic and Calende, Dumantier, Veyreton, ex-Benedictines, Rauchon and Collardot came after them; the ex-canon Desormaux, and Dubois, his companion, bent beneath the burden of years, followed them with slow steps, when Lefranc exclaimed: 'Burn, burn the credentials of our priesthood, and may the very memory of our past state disappear in the flames which consume them. I lay upon the altar of our fatherland this silver medal; it bears the image of the last of those tyrants who, by reason of the scheming ambition of the clergy, was called "most Christian".' All the documents of priesthood were then burnt in a pile; and a thousand cries arose: 'Perish for ever the memory of the priests! Perish for ever Christian superstition! Long live the sublime religion of Nature!'" After which the pamphlet

* *Extraits du registre de la Société populaire de Bourges. Séance du quintidi 25 brumaire de l'an deuxième de la République française, une et indivisible* (November 15, 1793). Pamphlets of the British Museum, F. 16 (7).

enumerates the patriotic gifts. This list is really touching. Presents in linen and silver shoe-buckles are very numerous. The patriots and the "brothers" were poor. They gave what they could.

On the whole the anti-Catholic feeling, in which a "religion of Nature" was blended with patriotic sentiments, seems to have been far deeper than one was led to think before consulting the documents of the period. The Revolution made men think, and gave courage to their thoughts.

In the meantime, the Department and the Commune of Paris decided to celebrate the following *decadi*, the 20th Brumaire (November 10), in Notre Dame itself, and to organise a *Fête of Liberty and Reason*, during which patriotic hymns were to be sung before the statue of Liberty. Cloots, Momoro, Hébert and Chaumette carried on an active propaganda among the popular societies, and the *fête* was entirely successful. This *fête* has been so often described that we need not dwell on the details. It must be mentioned, however, that in representing "Liberty" a living creature was preferred to a statue, because, said Chaumette, "A statue would also have been a step towards idolatry." As Michelet had already remarked, the founders of the new faith recommended "the choice, for the fulfilment of so august a part, of persons whose character makes them chastely beautiful, and whose strictness of habits and views repudiates any base idea." Far from being a gay mockery, the *fête* was rather a "chaste ceremony, cheerless, dull and tedious," says Michelet,* who was, it is known, very favourably inclined towards the dechristianisation movement of 1793. But the Revolution, he said, was already "old and weary, too old to engender anything new." The attempt of 1793 was not born of the fiery enthusiasm of Revolution, "but of the dialectical schools of the Encyclopedic times." Indeed, it closely resembled the modern Ethical Societies' movement, which also remains out of touch with the masses.

What chiefly strikes us to-day is that the Convention, notwithstanding the requests which came from all quarters, refused to broach the great question, the abolition of salaries

* Book XIV., chap. iii.

for priests paid by the State. On the contrary, the Commune of Paris and its sections openly put into practice dechristianisation. In every section one church was dedicated to the cult of Reason. The General Council of the Commune even risked hastening events. In reply to a religious speech by Robespierre, delivered on the 1st Frimaire,* the Council issued on the 3rd Frimaire (November 23), under the influence of Chaumette, an order by which all churches or temples of all religions in Paris were to be immediately closed; the clergy were made individually responsible for religious disturbances; the Revolutionary Committees were invited to keep a watch on the clergy; and a resolution was made to demand that the Convention exclude the clergy from any form of public service. At the same time a course of "morality" lectures was established, to prepare the preachers of the new cult. It was also decided to destroy the bell towers, while in various sections *fêtes* of Reason were organised, during which the Catholic faith was ridiculed. One section burnt some missals, and Hébert burnt some relics at the Commune.

In the provinces, says Aulard, nearly all the towns, especially in the south-west, seemed to rally round the new rationalist faith.

Yet the government, that is to say, the Committee of Public Welfare, from the very beginning showed a decided opposition to this movement. Robespierre combated it openly, and when Cloots came to tell him with enthusiasm of the abdication of Gobel, he showed his displeasure roughly, asking what the Belgians, whose union with France was desired by Cloots, would say to it.

For a few days, however, he kept quiet. But on November 20 Danton returned to Paris, after a prolonged stay at Arcis-sur-Aube, where he had retired with his young wife, whom he had married in church immediately after the death of his first wife. The next day, the 1st Frimaire (November 21), Robespierre pronounced at the Jacobin Club his first speech, and a very violent one, against the worship of Reason. The Convention, he said, would never take the rash step of forbidding

* See further.

the practice of the Catholic faith. The liberty of religion would be maintained, and the persecution of the peaceful priests would not be permitted. He then pointed out that the belief in a "great Being watching over oppressed innocence and punishing crime" was entirely popular, and he treated the dechristianisers as traitors, as agents of the enemies of France, who wished to repel those foreigners whom the cause of humanity and common interests attracted towards the Republic.

Five days later Danton spoke almost to the same effect in the Convention, and attacked the anti-religious processions. He demanded that a limit be fixed to such manifestations.

What had occurred during these few days to draw Robespierre and Danton together? What new combinations, diplomatic or otherwise, presented themselves at this moment, to call Danton to Paris and to induce him to oppose himself to the dechristianising movement, while he was a true disciple of Diderot, and did not cease to affirm his materialistic atheism even on the scaffold? This move of Danton's is the more striking because during the first half of the month of Frimaire the Convention continued to view the dechristianisers favourably.* On the 14th Frimaire (December 4) the "Robespierrist" Couthon had displayed some more relics from the tribune of the Convention and mocked at them.

The question therefore arises, Was not Robespierre making use of some new turn in the negotiations with England to influence Danton and to freely express his views on religion which had always remained dear to this deistic disciple of Rousseau?

Towards the middle of the month, Robespierre, reinforced by the support of Danton, decided to act, and on the 16th Frimaire (December 6) the Committee of Public Welfare came before the Convention to demand a decree concerning religious liberty, the first article of which forbade "all violence and measures against the liberty of religions." Was this measure dictated by the fear of revolt in the villages, where the closing

* Aulard, *Histoire politique*, p. 475.

of the churches was usually very badly received,* or were there other reasons, unknown to us—the fact remains, at any rate, that from that day Catholicism triumphed. The Robespierrist Government took it under its protection, and once again Catholicism became the State religion.†

Later in the spring, Robespierre and his followers went still further: they made an attempt to oppose to the worship of Reason a new worship, that of the Supreme Being, conceived after the fashion of the *Vicaire savoyard* of Rousseau. This worship, however, in spite of governmental support and the prospect of the guillotine for its adversaries, became confused with the cult of Reason, even though it was called the cult of the Supreme Being, and under this name—Aulard says—a half-deistic and half-rationalistic cult continued to spread up to the time when the reaction of Thermidor got the upper hand.

As to the *fête* of the Supreme Being which was celebrated with great pomp in Paris on the 20th Prairial (June 8, 1794), and to which Robespierre, posing as the founder of a new State religion, which was to combat atheism, attached much importance—this *fête* was as beautiful, it appears, as a popular theatrical performance can be, but it called forth no echo in the feelings of the people. Celebrated as it was by the wish of the Committee of Public Welfare—soon after Chaumette and Gobel, who had all the sympathies of the masses with them, had been executed for their irreligious opinions by this committee—the *fête* wore too much the character of a bloody triumph of the Jacobin government over the advanced spirits among the people and the Commune, to be agreeable to the people. And by the openly hostile attitude of several members of the Convention towards Robespierre, during the *fête* itself, it became the prelude of the 9th Thermidor—the prelude of the grand finale.

* Several letters of commissioners mention this. Most of them, as those of Dartygoëyte, Lefiot, Pflieger and Garnier, are, however, posterior to the decree. (*Actes du Comité de Salut Public*, published by Aulard, vol. ix., pp. 385, 759, 780.)

† As several commissioners of the Convention had taken very stringent measures against the Catholic religion, the Convention added, however, a paragraph to this decree to say that it did not intend to censure *what had been done up to that day* by its representatives.

CHAPTER LXIII

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SECTIONS

Position of sections—"Popular societies"—Opposition of Jacobins—Attitude of Robespierre—Sections gradually deprived of their powers—Control of police—Revolutionary committees subordinated to Committee of Public Safety—State absorbs sections—Revolution doomed

TOWARDS the end of 1793, two rival powers stood facing one another: the two committees—of Public Welfare and of Public Safety—which governed the Convention, and the Commune of Paris. Yet the real strength of the Commune lay neither in its extremely popular mayor Pache, nor in its equally popular *procureur* Chaumette, nor yet in his deputy Hébert, nor in its General Council. It was to be found in the sections. And therefore the central government was steadily endeavouring to subject the sections to its authority.

After the Convention had withdrawn the "permanence" of the sections of Paris; that is to say, their right of calling their general meetings as frequently as they chose, the sections began to found "popular societies" or "sectional societies." But these societies were viewed very unfavourably by the Jacobins, who in their turn were becoming "government men." Therefore, at the end of 1793, and in January 1794, there was much talk in the Jacobin Club against these societies—the more so as the royalists were making a united effort to invade and to capture them. "Out of the corpse of monarchy," said Simond, one of the Jacobins, "came an infinite number of poisonous insects, who are not sufficiently stupid to attempt its resurrection, but who try nevertheless

to prolong the convulsions of the political body."* In the provinces especially, these "insects" were successful. An enormous number of *émigrés*, continued Simond, "lawyers, financiers, agents of the *ancien régime*," overran the country, invaded the popular societies and became their presidents and secretaries.

It is evident that the popular societies, which in Paris were merely the same sections under another name,† would have easily "purified" themselves by excluding from their midst the disguised royalists, and then have continued the work of the sections. But their entire activity displeased the Jacobins, who viewed with jealousy the influence of these "new-comers" who "vied with them in patriotism." "If one believed them," said the same Simond, "the patriots of 1789 . . . are nothing but overtaxed or worn-out beasts of burden who ought to be slaughtered because they can no longer keep pace with the novelties in the political life of the Revolution." And he betrayed the fears of the middle-class Jacobins when he spoke of the "fourth legislative body" which these new-comers would have liked to convoke, in order to go further than the Convention. "Our greatest enemies," added Jeanbon Saint-André, "are not without; we see them: they are amongst us; *they wish to carry revolutionary measures further than we do.*"‡ Thereupon Dufourney spoke against all the sectional societies, and Deschamps called them the *petites Vendées*.

As to Robespierre, he hastened to bring forward his favourite argument—foreign intrigues. "My suspicions," said he, "were only too true. You see that the hypocritical counter-revolutionists are dominant in them. Prussian, English and Austrian agents want, by these means, to annihilate *the authority of the Convention and the patriotic ascendency of the Jacobin Society*."§

* *Jacobins*, vol. v., p. 623.

† *See*, for instance, in Ernest Mellié's work, the statutes of the popular society organised by the Poissonnière section.

‡ *Jacobins*, vol. v., pp. 624, 625.

§ *Jacobins*, sitting of December 26, 1793, vol. v., p. 578. Momoro, a member of the Cordeliers' Club, having hazarded the remark that the

The hostility of the Jacobins against the popular societies was evidently nothing but hostility against the sections in Paris and against all similar organisations in the provinces, and this hostility was but an expression of similar feeling in the Central Government. Consequently, as soon as the Revolutionary Government was established by the decree of the 14th Frimaire (December 4, 1793), the right to elect justices of the peace and their secretaries—a privilege which the sections had enjoyed since 1789—was taken from them. The magistrates and their secretaries were henceforth to be nominated by the General Council of the department.* Even the right of the sections to nominate their relief committees, and of themselves to organise relief work, which they had turned, as we saw, to such good account, was taken from them in December 1793, and given to the Committees of Public Welfare and Public Safety. The popular organisation of the Revolution was thus struck at its very root.

But it is especially in the concentration of police functions that the leading idea of the Jacobin government appears in full. We have seen the importance of the sections as parts of the life of Paris, both municipal and revolutionary ;† we know what they were doing for the provisioning of the capital, the enlisting of volunteers, the raising, arming and despatching of volunteer regiments, the manufacture of saltpetre, the organisation of labour, the care of the poor, &c. But besides these functions the sections of Paris and the provincial popular societies also performed police duties. This had dated, in Paris, from July 14, 1879, when the citizens had themselves formed their district committees, in order to take charge of the duties of the police. Later on, the law of September 6, 1789, confirmed them in the discharge of these duties, and in the following October the municipality of Paris, still a provisional body at this period, founded its secret police under

members of the Cordeliers' Club had often questioned their right to prevent the formation of popular societies, since "the right to assemble in popular societies is sacred," Robespierre answered curtly: "Everything demanded by the public welfare is certainly right."

* Decrees of the 8th Nivôse (December 28, 1793), and of the 23rd Floréal (May 12, 1794).

† Chap. xxiv.

e name of "The Search Committee." The municipal vernment, sprung from the Revolution, thus revived one the worst traditions of the *ancien régime.*

After August 10 the Legislative Assembly decreed that all e police duties of "public safety" should pass to the councils the departments, the districts and the municipalities, and Committee of Supervision was established, with its subordinate mmittees in every section; but as, by degrees, the struggle tween the revolutionists and their enemies became keener, ese committees were overwhelmed with work, and on March , 1793, new revolutionary committees, each made up of velve members, were established in every commune and in ery section of the communes of the large towns, which, like ris, were divided into sections.*

In this way, the sections, through the medium of their volutionary committees, became police bureaux. The ties of these revolutionary committees were limited, it true, to the supervision of strangers; but they soon acquired ghts as extensive as those of the secret police in monarchical tates. At the same time one can see how the sections, which, begin with, had been organs of the democratic revolution, ecame gradually absorbed by the police functions of their ommittees, and how these latter, becoming less and less unicipal bodies, changed into mere police officials, subordinate the central police, which was in its turn subject to the ommittee of Public Safety.†

The two committees—of Public Welfare and of Public afety—separated the revolutionary committees more and ore from their rival, the Commune, which in this way they eakened, and by disciplining them to obedience they ansformed them into machinery of the State. Finally, nder the pretext of suppressing abuses, the Convention trans- rmed them into salaried officials; and at the same time it ubordinated the 40,000 revolutionary committees to the

* *See* the rights given by the section of the Panthéon to its committee, quoted by Ernest Mellié, *loc. cit.*, p. 185.

† *See* the work of Ernest Mellié, p. 189 *et seq.* for very interesting details on the "Committee of Public Welfare of the Department of Paris"—an organ of the secret police—and other similar information.

Committee of Public Safety, to which it gave also the right of "purifying them," and even of nominating their members.

The State's seeking to centralise everything in its own hands, as the monarchy had done in the seventeenth century, and its depriving the popular organisations of such rights as the nomination of the judges and the administration of relief work, as well as of all other administrative functions, and its subjecting them to its bureaucracy in police matters, meant the death of the sections and of the revolutionary councils.

After these changes had been made, the sections of Paris and the popular societies in the provinces were really dead. The State had swallowed them. *And their death was the death of the Revolution.* Since January 1794, public life in Paris had been destroyed, says Michelet. "The general assemblies of the sections were dead, and all their power had passed to their revolutionary committees, which, themselves being no longer elected bodies, but simply groups of officials nominated by the authorities, had not much life in them either."

Now, whenever it might please the Government to crush the Commune of Paris, it could do so without fear of being itself overthrown. And this it really did in March 1794 (Ventôse of the Year II.).

CHAPTER LXIV

STRUGGLE AGAINST THE HEBERTISTS

Robespierre foretells end of Revolution—Causes of its termination — Hébert — Chaumette and Hébertists — Increased power of Committees of Public Welfare and Public Safety—The struggle for power—Robespierre and Danton—Camille Desmoulins—Robespierre attacks Cloots—State of insurrection in Southern France—Fabre d'Eglantine and Bourdon—Attempt to rouse Convention against Committee of Public Welfare—Fabre d'Eglantine demands arrest of three Hébertists—Cordeliers side with Hébertists—Toulon recaptured—Series of republican successes—Authority of Committee of Public Welfare restored—Arrest of Fabre d'Eglantine—False accusations against him—He is executed—Struggle between revolutionary factions continues—Influence of masonic lodges on Revolution.

As early as December 1793, Robespierre spoke of the coming end of the revolutionary Republic—"Let us be careful," he said, "for the death of the fatherland is not far off." * Nor was he alone in foreseeing it; the same idea recurred frequently in the speeches and letters of the revolutionists.

The fact is, that a revolution that stops half-way is sure to be soon defeated, and at the end of 1793 the situation in France was, that the Revolution, having been arrested in its development, was now wearing itself out in internal struggles and in an effort, as fruitless as it was impolitic, to exterminate its enemies while it was mounting guard over their property.†

* *Séances du club des Jacobins*, edited by Professor Aulard; sitting December 12, 1793, vol. v., p. 557.

† Michelet understood this very well, when he wrote a few lines, full sadness (Book XIV., chap. i.), in which he recalled the words of Duport, "Plough deeply," and said that the Revolution was bound fail because both the Girondins and the Jacobins were political revolutionists who marked only "two different degrees on the same line." the most advanced of them, Saint-Just, he added, never ventured to

By the very force of events, France was drifting towards a new movement imbued with a communist spirit. But the Revolution had allowed a "strong government" to be constituted, and this government had crushed the *Enragés* and gagged those who dared to hold similar opinions.

As to the Hebertists who predominated in the Cordeliers' Club and in the Commune, and had succeeded in invading, through Bouchotte, the Minister of War, the offices of his department, their ideas on government led them in paths remote from an economic revolution. It is true that Hébert had at times expressed communist sentiments in his paper,* but to terrorise the enemies of the Revolution and to have the government seized by his party seemed to him far more important than to solve the questions of food, the land and organised labour. The Commune of 1871 also produced this type of revolutionist.

So far as Chaumette was concerned, by his popular sympathies and his manner of life he might almost have been ranked with the Communists. At one time he was indeed under their influence. But he was closely connected with the party of Hébertists, and this party was not in the least enthusiastic about Communism. They never tried to arouse a powerful manifestation of the people's *social will*. Their idea was to attain power by means of a new "weeding out" of the Convention: to get rid of the "worn out, the broken limbs of the Revolution," as Momoro used to say, and to compel the Convention to submit to the Commune of Paris, by means of a new May 31, supported this time by the military force of the "revolutionary army." *Later on they would see what was to be done.*

In this, however, the Hébertists had miscalculated. They did not realise that they had to deal now with two serious powers: a Committee of Public Welfare which during the

attack religion or education or to go to the root of social questions; one can hardly make out what were his views on property. "The Revolution," said Michelet, "thus failed to take the character of a religious or a social revolution, which would have consolidated it by giving it support, vigour and depth."

* Tridon has given some such extracts in his sketch *Les Hébertistes* (*Œuvres diverses de G. Tridon*, Paris, 1891, pp. 86–90).

past six months had become a force in the Government and had won general approval for the intelligent way in which it had directed the war ; and a Committee of Public Safety, which had grown very powerful, since it had concentrated in its hands a wide system of police, and thus had the power to send whomsoever it wished to the guillotine. Besides, the Hébertists began to fight on ground where they were bound to be defeated —the ground of Terrorism. Here they had to meet the rivalry of a whole world of Government officials, even those who, like Cambon, considered Terrorism necessary for conducting the war. Terrorism is always a weapon of government and the government of the day turned it against them.

It would be tiresome to recount here all the intrigues of the different parties that struggled for power during the month of December 1793, and the first months of 1794. Suffice it to say that four groups or parties were then in the field : the Robespierrist group, consisting of Robespierre, Saint-Just, Couthon, and their friends, the party of the "worn out" ; politicians who grouped themselves round Danton (Fabre d'Eglantine, Phélippeaux, Bourdon, Camille Desmoulins, and others) ; the Commune, which was in agreement with the Hébertists ; and finally, those members of the Committee of Public Welfare (Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois) who were known as *terrorists*, around whom were grouped men who did not wish to see the Revolution lay down its arms, but did not want either that Robespierre, whom they secretly opposed, or the Commune and the Hébertists should gain the upper hand.

Danton was, in the eyes of the revolutionists, a man completely used up, but they saw in him a real danger, since the Girondins stood behind him, pushing themselves forward under cover of his great popularity. At the end of November, however, we saw Robespierre and Danton marching hand in hand against the anti-religious movement ; and when it was Danton's turn to submit to a public examination of his life before the Jacobin Club, which was then "weeding itself out," Robespierre again held out his hand to him. He did even more : he identified himself with Danton.

On the other hand, when Camille Desmoulins, who as a

journalist excelled in calumny, issued, on the 15th and 20th of Frimaire (December 5 and 10), the two first numbers of his *Vieux Cordelier*, in which he attacked Hébert and Chaumette in the vilest manner, and started a campaign in favour of an abatement in the prosecution of the enemies of the Revolution, Robespierre read both these numbers before publication and approved them. During the examination of Desmoulins' life at the Jacobin Club, he also defended him. This meant that for the moment he was ready to make certain concessions to the Dantonists, provided they helped him to attack the party of the Left—the Hébertists.

This they did quite willingly and with much violence, by the pen of Desmoulins in his *Vieux Cordelier*, and through the organ of Phélippeaux and at the Jacobin Club, where the latter bitterly attacked the conduct of the Hébertist generals in the Vendée. Robespierre worked in the same direction against Anacharsis Cloots, an influential Hébertist, whom the Jacobins had even elected president at that moment, attacking him with quite religious fanaticism. When it was Cloots' turn to undergo the civic examination of his life, Robespierre pronounced a speech against him, full of venom, in which he represented this pure idealist and worshipper of the Revolution, this inspired propagandist of the International union of all the *sans-culottes*, as a traitor, and that because he had had business relations with the bankers Vandenyver, and had taken some interest in them when they were arrested as suspects. Cloots was expelled from the Jacobin Club on the 22nd of Frimaire (December 12) and so became a victim marked for the scaffold. He was, in fact, arrested a fortnight later.

The insurrection in Southern France dragged on in the meantime, and Toulon remained in the hands of the English; so that the Committee of Public Welfare was accused of incapacity and it was even rumoured that it intended to give up Southern France to the counter-revolution. There were days when the Committee was but a hair's-breadth from being overthrown, "sent to the Tarpeian Rock"—which would have been a victory for both the Girondins and the "moderates," that is to say, for the counter-revolutionists.

The soul of the campaign carried on in political circles against the Committee of Public Welfare was Fabre d'Eglantine, one of the "moderates," seconded by Bourdon (of the Oise) a Dantonist, and between the 22nd and the 27th Frimaire (December 12–17) a serious attempt was made to rouse the Convention against its Committee of Public Welfare, and to impeach it.

However, though the Dantonists plotted against the Robespierrists, both parties joined hands to attack the Hébertists. On the 27th Frimaire (December 17) Fabre d'Eglantine made a report at the Convention demanding the arrest of three Hébertists: Ronsin, the general of the "revolutionary army" in Paris; Vincent, secretary general of the War Office, and Maillard, who had led the women to Versailles on October 5, 1789. This was the first attempt of the "party of clemency" to make a *coup d'état* in favour of the Girondins and a more moderate government. All those who had made fortunes by the Revolution were now in a hurry, as we have already said, to return to a state of "order," and to reach this goal they were prepared to sacrifice the Republic, if need be, and to establish a constitutional monarchy. Many, like Danton, were weary of mankind, and said to themselves: "It is time to put an end to all this," while others—and these are the most dangerous to all revolutions—losing faith in the Revolution, prepared to meet half-way the reaction which they already saw coming.

The arrest of the three Hébertists would have been granted without difficulty by the Convention, but for the fear of recalling the arrest of Hébert in 1793.* It would have become obvious that a *coup d'état* was preparing in favour of the Girondins who would serve in their turn as a stepping-stone to reaction. The publication of the third number of the *Vieux Cordelier*, in which Desmoulins, under names borrowed from Roman history, denounced the whole revolutionary government, helped to unmask the intrigue, for all the counter-revolutionists in Paris suddenly lifted their heads after reading this number, and openly predicted the speedy end of the Revolution.

* *Vide* chap. xxxix.

The Cordeliers immediately took up the cause of the Hébertists, but found no other basis for their appeal to the people than the necessity for acting more severely against the enemies of the Revolution. They too identified the Revolution with *Terrorism*. They carried the head of Chalier about Paris and began to prepare the people for a fresh May 31 rising, with the intention of bringing about a new "purification" of the Convention, and the removal of its "worn-out and its broken limbs." But as to what they intended to do on attaining power—what direction they would try to give to the Revolution—nothing was said about that.

Once the fight was begun in such conditions, it was easy for the Committee of Public Welfare to parry the blow. They by no means rejected Terror as an arm of Government. In fact, on the 5th Nivôse (December 25), Robespierre had made his report on the revolutionary government, and if the substance of this report was the necessity of maintaining the balance between the too advanced parties and the too moderate ones, its conclusion was *death to the enemies of the people!* Next day he demanded, moreover, a greater rapidity in the pronouncement of sentences by the revolutionary tribunal.

About the same time it became known in Paris (on the 4th Nivôse—December 24) that Toulon had been retaken from the English; on the 5th and 6th of the same month (December 25 and 26) that La Vendée was crushed at Savenay; on the 10th that the army of the Rhine, having taken the offensive, had retaken the lines of Wissembourg from the enemy; and on the 12th Nivôse (January 1, 1794) that the blockade of Landau was raised and that the German army had recrossed the Rhine.

A whole series of decisive victories had thus been won, and they strengthened the Republic. They also restored the authority of the Committee of Public Welfare. Camille Desmoulins in his fifth number hastened to make amends for his recent articles, but still continued to attack Hébert violently, a proceeding which turned the meetings of the Jacobin Club in the second decade of Nivôse (from December 31 to January 10, 1794) into personal attacks ending in free fights. On January 10, the Jacobins passed a resolution excluding Desmoulins from

their club, and only Robespierre's great popularity enabled him to induce the society not to carry it into effect.

On the 24th Nivôse (January 13) the committees decided to strike a blow and to terrify the camp of their detractors by ordering Fabre d'Eglantine to be arrested. The pretext was an accusation of forgery, and it was announced loudly that the committees had succeeded in discovering a great plot, the aim of which was to discredit the nation's representatives.

It is now known that the accusation which served as a pretext for the arrest of Fabre—that of having falsified a decree of the Convention to the advantage of the powerful Indian Company—was false. The decree dealing with the Indian Company had indeed been falsified, but by Delaunay, another member of the Convention. The document still exists in the archives, and since its discovery by Michelet, it has been proved that the falsification was in Delaunay's handwriting. But at the time of Fabre's arrest, Fouquier-Tinville, the public prosecutor of the revolutionary tribunal, and of the Committee of Public Safety, did not allow the document to be produced either before or during the trial in court, and Fabre perished as a forger, because the Government simply wanted to get rid of a dangerous foe. Robespierre took good care not to interfere.*

* The affair was a complicated one. The royalists had in their service a very clever man, the Baron de Batz, who by his courage and skill in escaping from pursuit had acquired an almost legendary reputation. This Baron de Batz, after having worked a long time for the escape of Marie-Antoinette, undertook to incite certain members of the Convention to make large fortunes by going into stock-jobbing—money having to be provided for these operations by the Abbé Espagnac. For this purpose Baron de Batz assembled in his house on a certain day Julien (of Toulouse), Delaunay and Bazire (a Dantonist). The banker Benoît, the poet Laharpe, the Comtesse de Beaufort (Julien's mistress), and Chabot (the unfrocked priest who at one time had been a favourite of the people, but who had since married an Austrian lady, a sister of the banker Frey) were also of the party. Besides, an attempt was made by the same man to win over Fabre, and Delaunay was actually won over in favour of the Indian Company. This company was attacked in the Convention, which ordered the liquidation of the company to be proceeded with at once by special commissioners. The wording of this decree had to be written by Delaunay, who wrote indeed a draft of the decree, and this draft was signed by Fabre, who made a few alterations in it in pencil. But other alterations *to the advantage of the company* were subsequently made, in ink, by Delaunay, on the same draft, and this draft, which was

Three months later, Fabre d'Eglantine was executed, as were also Chabot, Delaunay, the Abbé d'Espagnac, and the two brothers Frey, the Austrian bankers.

Thus the mortal struggle between the different factions of the revolutionary party went on, and one easily understands how the foreign invasion and all the horrors of civil war in the provinces were bound to render this struggle more and more violent and sanguinary. A question, however, necessarily arises: What prevented the struggle between the parties from taking the same sanguinary character at the very beginning of the Revolution? How was it that men, whose political views were so widely different as those of the Girondins, of Danton, Robespierre and Marat, had been able to act in concert against royal despotism?

It appears very probable that the intimate and fraternal relations which had been established at the approach of the Revolution in the masonic lodges of Paris and the provinces, between the leading men of the time, must have contributed to bring about such an understanding. It is known, indeed, from Louis Blanc, Henri Martin, and the excellent monograph of Professor Ernest Nys,* that nearly all revolutionists of renown were freemasons—Mirabeau, Bailly, Danton, Robespierre, Marat, Condorcet, Brissot, Lalande, and many others were masonic brothers, and the Duke of Orléans (Philippe-Egalité) remained its national Grand Master down to May 13, 1793. On the other side, it is also known that Robespierre, Mirabeau, Lavoisier, and probably many more belonged to the lodges of the Illuminates, founded by Weishaupt, whose aim was "to free the nations from the tyranny of princes and priests, and as a first step, to free the peasants and the working men from serfdom, forced labour and guilds."

It is quite certain, to quote M. Nys, that "by its humanitarian tendencies, its firm belief in the dignity of man, and by its principles of liberty, equality and fraternity," freemasonry

never submitted to the Convention, was made to pass for the decree itself.

* Ernest Nys, *Idées modernes : Droit International et Franc-maçonnerie*. Bruxelles, 1908.

had helped immensely to educate public opinion in the new ideas—the more so that, thanks to it, in every part of France meetings were held, at which progressive ideas were expounded and applauded, and, what was much more important than is usually thought, men learned to discuss and to vote. "The union of the Three Estates in June 1789, and the movement on the night of August 4, were most probably prepared within the masonic lodges." *

This preliminary work must also have established personal relations and habits of mutual respect between the men of action, apart from the always too narrow party interests, and thus enabled the revolutionaries of different opinions to act with a certain unity, for four years, in the abolition of royal despotism. It was only later, towards the end of the Revolution, when their personal relations were subjected to the severest trials—especially after the freemasons themselves were divided upon the question of royalty—that these links were broken. And then the struggles began to be of the ferocious character they assumed before the fall of the Montagnards.

* E. Nys, *loc cit.* pp. 82, 831

CHAPTER LXV

FALL OF THE HEBERTISTS—DANTON EXECUTED

Struggle between revolutionists and counter-revolutionists continues—Robespierre and commissioners of Convention—Triumph of Hébertists—Great speech of Saint-Just—He advocates Terrorism—His attack on Dantonists—Action of Cordeliers—Arrest of Hébertist leaders—Further arrests of Chaumette, Pache, Clootz and Leclerc—Success of the Government—Execution of Hébertists and others—Royalist rejoicing—End of struggle between committees and Commune—Committees arrest Danton, Desmoulins, Phélippeaux and Lacroix—They are executed—Effect of executions on Paris—End of Revolution in sight

THE winter thus passed in veiled struggles between the revolutionists and the counter-revolutionists, who every day lifted their heads higher and more boldly.

In the beginning of February, Robespierre made himself the mouthpiece of a movement against certain commissioners of the Convention who had acted, as Carrier did at Nantes and Fouché at Lyons, with appalling fury against the revolted towns, and who had not discriminated between the instigators of the revolts and the men of the people who had been dragged into them.* He demanded that these commissioners should be recalled, and he threatened them with prosecution, but this movement came to nothing. On the 5th Ventôse (February 23) Carrier was amnestied by the Convention—and Carrier being the greatest sinner, this meant, of course, that the faults of all the other commissioners, whatever they might have been, were pardoned. The Hébertists triumphed. Robespierre and Couthon were both ill, and did not appear for a few weeks.

* It is known that the young Julien had written to him quite frankly about the excesses of certain commissioners, and especially of those of Carrier (vide *Une mission en Vendée*).

In the meantime Saint-Just, returned from visiting the rmies, delivered before the Convention, on the 8th Ventôse February 26), a great speech which produced a strong impres- ion and still more embroiled matters. Far from advocating lemency, Saint-Just adopted the Terrorist programme of the Hébertists. He, too, menaced the foes of the Republic—even nore vigorously than the Hébertists had ever done. He pro- nised to direct the attack on the "worn-out party," and singled ut, as the next victims of the guillotine, the Dantonists—"the olitical party which always speaks of moving with slow steps, leceives all parties, and prepares the return of reaction; the arty which speaks of clemency because its members know that hey are not virtuous enough to be terrible." Once he stood n this ground of republican probity Saint-Just could speak of ourse with authority, while the Hébertists who—in their words t least—scoffed at probity, gave their enemies the possibility f confounding them with the crowd of "profitmongers" (*profiteurs*) who only saw in the Revolution their personal en- richment. As to the economic questions, the tactics adopted by Saint-Just in his report of the 8th Ventôse was to accept, though very vaguely, some of the ideas of the *Enragés*. He confessed that until then he had not thought of these questions. "The force of circumstances," he said, "leads us perhaps to conclusions of which we had not thought." But now that he thinks of them, he still does not wish to injure great fortunes: he objects to them only because they are in the hands of the enemies of the Revolution. "*The estates of the patriots are sacred*," he says, "but the lands of the conspirators are there for the poor." Still he expresses some ideas upon landed property. His intention is that the land should belong to those who culti- vate it: let the land be taken away from those who for twenty or fifty years have not cultivated it. He would like to see a democracy of virtuous small landowners living in modest ease; and he asks that the landed estates of the conspirators be seized and given to the poor. There can be no liberty so long as there are beggars and paupers, and so long as the civil (he means the economic) relations in society produce desires that are contrary to the established form of government, "*I defy you*," he says,

" to establish liberty, so long as the poor can be roused against the new order of things, and I defy you to do away with poverty, so long as we have not made it possible for every one to be able to own land. . . . Mendicity must be abolished by distributing the national estates to the poor." He spoke also of a sort of national insurance : of a " national public domain established for repairing the misfortunes that may happen to the social body." This domain would be used to reward virtue, to repair individual misfortunes, and for education.

And with all this was mingled a great deal of Terrorism. It was Hébertist Terrorism, slightly tinged with socialism. But his socialism had no backbone in it. It consisted rather of maxims than of legislative schemes. It is obvious, moreover, that Saint-Just's aim was chiefly to prove, as he himself said, " that the ' Mountain ' still remains the summit of the Revolution." It will not allow others to surpass it. It will execute the *Enragés* and the Hébertists, but it may borrow something from them.

Through this report, Saint-Just obtained two decrees from the Convention. One was in reply to those who called for clemency : the Committee of Public Safety was invested with the power of liberating " the detained patriots." The other decree was meant apparently to go even further than the Hébertists ever intended to go, and at the same time to tranquillise the purchasers of national estates. The estates of the patriots were to be sacred ; but those of the enemies of the Revolution were to be confiscated for the benefit of the Republic. As to the enemies themselves, they were to be detained until peace was concluded, and then they would be banished. Those who wished the Revolution to advance further in a social direction were thus befooled. Nothing came of this discourse but the words.

Thereupon the Cordeliers decided to act. On the 14th Ventôse (March 4) they covered with a black veil the board inscribed with the Rights of Man which was hung up in their club. Vincent spoke of the guillotine, and Hébert spoke against Amar, one of the Committee of Public Safety, who was hesitating to send sixty-one Girondins before the revolutionary

tribunal. In ambiguous phrases he even alluded to Robespierre —not as an obstacle to serious change, but as a defender of Desmoulins. It thus meant applying to all evils no remedy but Terrorism. Carrier let slip the word "insurrection."

But the people of Paris did not move and the Commune refused to listen to the appeal of the Hébertist Cordeliers. Then during the night of the 23rd Ventôse (March 13) the Hébertist leaders—Hebert, Momoro, Vincent, Ronsin, Ducroquet and Laumur—were arrested, and the Committee of Public Welfare spread by the agency of Billaud-Varenne all kinds of fables and calumnies about them. They had meant, said Billaud, to massacre all the royalists in the prisons; they were going to plunder the Mint; they had buried food-supplies in the ground in order to starve Paris!

On the 28th Ventôse (March 18) Chaumette, the procurator of the Commune, whom the Committee of Public Welfare had dismissed on the previous day and replaced by Cellier, was also arrested. The mayor Pache was deprived of office by the same committee. Anacharsis Cloots had already been arrested on the 8th Nivôse (December 28)—the accusation being that he had sought information as to whether a certain lady was on the list of suspects. Leclerc, a friend of Chalier, who had come from Lyons and had worked with Jacques Roux, was implicated in the same charge.

The Government triumphed.

The true reasons of these arrests among the advanced party we do not yet know. Had they made a plot with the intention of seizing the power by the help of the "revolutionary army" of Ronsin? It was possible, but up to now we know nothing definite of this affair.

The Hébertists were sent before the revolutionary tribunal, and the committees had the baseness to make up what was known then as an "amalgam." In the same batch were included bankers and German agents, together with Momoro, who since 1790 had become known for his Communist ideas, and who had given absolutely everything he possessed to the Revolution; with Leclerc, the friend of Chalier, and Anacharsis Cloots, "the orator of mankind" (*orateur du genre humain*),

who in 1793 had already foreseen the Republic of Mankind and had dared to speak of it.

On the 4th Germinal (March 24) after a purely formal trial which lasted three days, they were all executed.

It is easy to imagine what rejoicings took place on that day among the royalists, with whom Paris was crowded. The streets were overflowing with "muscadins" attired in the most *impayable* fashion; who insulted the condemned victims while they were being dragged in dust-carts to the Place de la Révolution. The rich paid absurd prices to have seats close to the guillotine, so that they might enjoy fully the death of the editor of the *Père Duchesne*. "The square was turned into a theatre," says Michelet, "and round about there was a kind of fair, in the Champs-Elysées, where gaily dressed crowds circulated among the improvised shops and tents." The people did not appear on that day; gloomy and heavy-hearted, the poor remained in their slums. They knew that it was their friends who were being murdered.

Chaumette was guillotined a few days later, on the 24th Germinal (April 13) with Gobel, the bishop of Paris, who had resigned his bishopric. They had both been accused of impiety. The widow of Desmoulins and the widow of Hébert were included in the same batch. Pache was spared, but he was replaced as mayor by Fleuriot-Lescaut, an insignificant man, and the procureur Chaumette, first by Cellier, and then by Claude Payan, a man devoted to Robespierre and more interested in the Supreme Being than in the people of Paris.*

The two committees—of Public Safety and of Public Welfare—had thus got the better of their rival, the Commune of Paris. The long struggle which this centre of revolutionary

* The law of the 14th Frimaire (December 4), which had established the "Revolutionary Government" had replaced the elected *procureurs* of the communes by *agents nationaux*, nominated by the Committee of Public Welfare. Chaumette, having been confirmed in his functions by the committee, became thus a "national agent." Then, on the day when the Hébertists were arrested, *i.e.*, on the 23rd Ventôse (March 13), the Committee of Public Welfare obtained from the Convention a new law which allowed them to replace provisionally those functionaries, elected by the Communes, of whom they wanted to get rid. In virtue of this law the committee, having removed Pache, the mayor of Paris, nominated Fleuriot-Lescaut in his place.

tiative had sustained since August 9, 1792, against the icial representatives of the Revolution, had come to an end. ie Commune, which for nineteen months had been as a acon to revolutionary France, was about to become a mere rticle of the State machinery. After this, the end was eady in sight.*

However, the royalists were so triumphant after these execu- ns that the committee felt themselves outdone by the coun- -revolutionists. Now, it was they who were asked to ascend e "Tarpeian Rock"—so dear to Brissot. Desmoulins, whose haviour on the day of Hébert's execution was abominable e himself has told all about it), issued a seventh number of his *eux Cordelier*, directed entirely against the revolutionary *ime*. The royalists indulged in foolish manifestations of , and urged Danton to attack the committees. The crowd Girondins who had covered themselves with the mantle of nton were going to take advantage of the absence of the ébertists to make a *coup d'état*—and this would have meant the illotine for Robespierre, Couthon, Saint-Just, Billaud- renne, Collot d'Herbois and all the leading Montagnards. ie counter-revolution might have been already victorious the spring of 1794, but the committees decided to deal a ow to the Right, and to sacrifice Danton.

During the night of March 30 (the 9th Germinal) Paris was pefied to learn that Danton, Desmoulins, Phélippeaux and croix were arrested. Acting on a report laid before the nvention by Saint-Just (drawn up after a rough draft given n by Robespierre which has been preserved till now), the sembly immediately gave the order for the prosecution of

* With Pache and Chaumette disappeared the two men who in the nds of the people best symbolised the *popular revolution*. When the egates who had been sent from the departments came to Paris to nify the acceptance of the Constitution, they were surprised to find ris quite democratic, says Avenel (*Anacharsis Cloots*, vol. ii. pp. 3–169). The mayor, "Papa Pache," came from the country with a f of bread in his pocket; Chaumette, the *procureur* of the Commune, ves in one room with his wife, who mends old clothes. 'Come in,' y reply to whoever knocks at their door—just as it was at Marat's." e "Père Duchesne," the "orator of mankind"—all these men were ially accessible. These were the men who were now taken from people. . . .

Danton and his arrest. The "Marsh" obediently voted as it was told to vote.

The Committees again made an "amalgam"—or "batch"—in order to bewilder public opinion, and sent before the revolutionary tribunal, Danton, together with Desmoulins, Bazire (whose name we saw as a visitor of the Baron de Batz), Fabre, accused of forgery, Lacroix, accused of robbery, Chabot, who acknowledged that he had received (without having spent them) a hundred thousand francs from the royalists for some unknown affair, the forger Delaunay, and the go-between of de Batz's conspiracy, Julien (of Toulouse).

The pleadings before the tribunal were suppressed. When the vigorous defence of Danton threatened to provoke a popular rising, the judges would not permit him or the others to speak, and pronounced the death sentences.

On the 16th Germinal (April 5) they were all executed.

One can well understand the effect produced on the population of Paris and the revolutionists in general by the fall of the revolutionary Commune of Paris, and the execution of men such as Leclerc, Momoro, Hébert, and Cloots, followed by that of Danton and Camille Desmoulins, and finally that of Chaumette. These executions were considered in Paris and in the provinces as the end of the Revolution. In political circles it was known that Danton was the rallying-point of the counter-revolutionists. But for France in general he remained the revolutionist who had always been in the vanguard of all popular movements. "If these men are traitors, whom then shall we trust?" the people asked themselves. "But are they traitors?" others questioned. "Is this not a sure sign that the Revolution is nearing its end?"

Certainly it was such a sign. Once the upward movement of the Revolution was arrested; once a force could be found that was able to say: "Further thou shalt not go," and that at a moment when the most essential demands of the people were seeking expression—once this force had succeeded in crushing those who tried to formulate the claims of the masses, the true revolutionists knew well that this was indeed the death-agony of the Revolution. They were not deceived by Saint-Just,

who told them that he, too, was coming to think like those whom he sent to the scaffold. They understood that it was the beginning of the end.

In fact, the triumph of the committees over the Commune of Paris was the triumph of *order*, and during a revolution the triumph of order is the termination of the *revolutionary* period. There might still be a few more convulsions, but the Revolution was at an end.

And the people who had made the Revolution finally lost all interest in it. They stood aside to make way for the "muscadins."

CHAPTER LXVI

ROBESPIERRE AND HIS GROUP

Position and influence of Robespierre—Causes of his power—His incorruptibility—His fanaticism—His accusation against Fabre—His character and policy

Robespierre has been often mentioned as a dictator; his enemies in the Convention called him "the tyrant," and it is true that as the Revolution drew to a close Robespierre acquired so much influence that he came to be regarded both in France and abroad as the most important person in the Republic.

It would, however, be incorrect to represent Robespierre as a *dictator*, though certainly many of his admirers desired a dictatorship for him.* We know, indeed, that Cambon exercised considerable authority within his special domain, the Committee of Finance, and that Carnot wielded extensive powers in matters concerning the war, despite the ill-will borne him by Robespierre and Saint-Just. But the Committee of Public Safety was too jealous of its controlling power not to have opposed a dictatorship, and, besides, some of its members detested Robespierre. Moreover, even if there were in the Convention a certain number who were not actually averse to Robespierre's preponderating influence, these would have been none the less unwilling to submit to the dictatorship of a Montagnard so rigorous as he in his principles. Nevertheless, Robespierre's power was really immense. Nearly every one of his enemies as well as his admirers felt that the disappearance of his party from

* The *Notes historiques sur la Convention nationale*, by Marc Antoine Baudot (Paris, 1893), may be of little value, but Saint-Just's proposal to appoint Robespierre dictator to save the Republic, which Baudot mentions (p. 13), is by no means improbable. Buonarotti speaks of it as of a well-known fact.

he political arena would mean, as indeed it proved, the riumph of reaction.

How then is the power of Robespierre and his group to be xplained ? First of all, Robespierre had been incorruptible n the midst of a host of men who readily yielded to the seduc- ions of riches and power, and this is a very important trait in ime of revolution. While the majority of the middle-class nen about him shared in the spoils of the national estates when hey were put up for sale by the Revolution, and took part in he stock-jobbery ; while thousands of Jacobins secured posts nder Government for themselves, Robespierre remained an pright judge, steadfastly reminding them of the higher rinciples of republicanism and threatening those keenest after poil with the guillotine.

In all he said and did during those five troubled years of evolution, we feel even now, and his contemporaries must nave felt it still more, that he was one of the very few politicians of that time who never wavered in their revolutionary faith, nor in their love for the democratic republic. In this respect Robespierre was a real force, and if the communists had been able to oppose him with another force equal to his own in trength of will and intelligence, they would undoubtedly nave succeeded in leaving a far deeper impress of their ideas on the Great Revolution.

These qualities, however, which even his enemies acknow- edge in Robespierre, would not suffice alone to explain the mmense power he possessed towards the end of the Revolution. The fact is, his fanaticism, which sprang from the purity of his intentions, kept him incorruptible in the midst of a widespread corruption. At the same time, he was striving to establish his authority over men's minds, and to accomplish this he was ready, if necessary, to pass over the dead bodies of his opponents. In the work of establishing his authority he was powerfully seconded by the growing middle classes as soon as they recog- nised in him the " happy mean "—equally removed from the extremists and the moderates—the man who offered them the best guarantee against the " excesses " of the people.

The *bourgeoisie* felt that here was a man who by the respect

he inspired in the people, the moderate scope of his aims and his itch for power, was just the right man to establish a strong government, and thus put an end to the revolutionary period. So long, therefore, as the middle classes had anything to fear from the advanced parties, so long did they refrain from interfering with Robespierre's work of establishing the authority of the Committee of Public Welfare and of his group in the Convention. But when Robespierre had helped them to crush those parties, they crushed him in his turn, in order that middle-class Girondins should be restored to power in the Convention, after which the Thermidorean reaction was developed to its fullest extent.

Robespierre's mind was admirably suited for the *rôle* he was required to play. To be convinced of this, one has only to read the rough draft of the deed of accusation against the Fabre d'Eglantine and Chabot group, which is written in Robespierre's own hand, and was found among his papers after the 9th Thermidor. This document characterises the man better than any amount of arguments.*

"Two rival coalitions have been quarrelling, to the public scandal, for some time past," it begins. "One of them is inclined to moderation and the other to excesses which are practically working against the Revolution. One declares war against all energetic patriots and preaches indulgence for conspirators, the other artfully slanders the defenders of liberty, and would crush, one by one, every patriot who has ever erred, while remaining at the same time wilfully blind to the criminal plottings of our most dangerous enemies. . . . One tries to abuse its credit with or its presence in the National Convention [Danton's party], the other misuses its influence with the popular societies [the Commune and the *Enragés*]. One wants to obtain from the Convention dangerous decrees and measures of oppression against its adversaries; the other makes use of dangerous language in public assemblies. . . . The triumph

* It was Robespierre who prepared the rough draft of the accusation against this group, but he made Saint-Just his mouthpiece. Vide *Papiers inédits trouvés chez Robespierre, Saint-Just, Payan, &c., supprimés ou omis par Courtois, précédé du rapport de ce dernier à la Convention nationale*, vol. i., p. 21 *et seq.* Paris, 1828.

of either party would be equally fatal to liberty and national authority. . . ." And Robespierre goes on to say how the two parties had attacked the Committee of Public Welfare ever since its formation.

After charging Fabre with preaching clemency, in order to conceal his own crimes, he adds: "The moment no doubt was favourable for preaching a base and cowardly doctrine, even to well-disposed men, when all the enemies of liberty were doing their utmost on the other side; when a venal philosophy, prostituted to tyranny, neglected thrones for altars, opposed religion to patriotism,* made morality contradict itself, confounded the cause of religion with that of despotism, the Catholics with the conspirators, and tried to force the people to see in the revolution not the triumph of virtue but the triumph of atheism—not the source of happiness, but the destruction of moral and religious ideas."

We can see plainly from these extracts that if Robespierre had not the breadth of view and boldness of thought necessary for the leader of a party during a revolution, he possessed in perfection the art of inciting an assembly against this or that person. Every phrase in his deed of accusation is a poisoned arrow that hits the mark.

The most striking point in all this is the fact that Robespierre and his friends did not realise the part the "Moderates" were making them play until the time had come for their own overthrow. "There is a scheme to incite the people to level everything," his brother writes to him from Lyons. "If care is not taken, everything will be disorganised." And Maximilien Robespierre could see no further than his brother. In the efforts of the advanced party he saw only attacks on the Government of which he was a member. Like Brissot, he accused them of being the tools of the London and Viennese Cabinets. The attempts of the Communists were for him only "disorganisation." It was necessary to "take care" of them—to crush them by the Terror.

* We see in Aulard's *Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de l'Etre suprême* how, on the contrary, the movement against Christianity was linked with patriotism.

"What are the means of ending the civil war?" he asks in a note. And he replies:

"To punish the traitors and conspirators, especially the guilty deputies and administrators.

"To send patriotic troops under patriot leaders to subdue the aristocrats of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, the Vendée, the Jura, and every other region where the standard of revolt and royalism has been set up.

"And to make terrible examples of all the scoundrels who have outraged liberty and shed the blood of patriots." *

It is not a revolutionist who speaks but a member of a Government using the language of all Governments. This is why Robespierre's whole policy, after the fall of the Commune until the 9th Thermidor, remained absolutely sterile. It did nothing to prevent the impending catastrophe, it did much to accelerate it. It did nothing to turn aside the daggers which were being secretly whetted to strike the Revolution; it did everything to make their blows mortal.

* *Papiers inédits*, vol. ii., p. 14.

CHAPTER LXVII

THE TERROR

Steps taken by committees to increase their power—War with England—Condition of provinces—Burning of Bedouin—Special commission formed to deal with arrested citizens—Robespierre's law of 22nd Prairial—Effect of law—Aim of Robespierre—Attempts on his life—Arrests and executions—Terror—Hatred of Jacobin government

After the downfall of their enemies of the Left and of the Right, the committees continued to concentrate more and more power in their own hands. Up to that time there had been six Government departments, which were indirectly subordinate to the Committee of Public Welfare through the intermediary of the Executive Committee composed of six ministers. On the 12th Germinal (April 1) the State departments were suppressed and their place taken by twelve Executive Commissions, each of them under the supervision of a section of the committee.* Furthermore, the Committee of Public Welfare obtained the right of recalling by its own authority the commissioners of the Convention. And finally, it was decided that the supreme revolutionary tribunal should sit in Paris under the eye of the committees. Those who were accused of conspiracy, in any part of France, were to be brought to Paris for trial. At the same time measures were taken for purging Paris of all dangerous elements. All *ci-devants* (dispossessed nobles) and all the foreigners belonging to the nations at war with France, with a few indispensable exceptions, were to be expelled from Paris.†

* As James Guillaume has shown, the majority of these Commissions had already been formed successively since October 1793. *Procès-verbaux du comité d'instruction publique de la Convention*, vol. iv., Introduction, pp. 11, 12.

† Decrees of the 26th and 27th Germinal.

The other great pre-occupation of the Government was the war. In January 1794, there had still been hope that the opposition party in the English parliament supported by a considerable number of people in London and several influential members of the House of Lords, would prevent the Prime Minister, Pitt, from continuing the war. Danton must have shared this illusion—which was one of the crimes imputed to him. But Pitt carried the parliamentary majority with him against "the impious nation," and since the beginning of spring England, and Prussia whom she subsidised, pushed on the war vigorously. There were soon four armies, 315,000 strong, massed on the frontiers of France, confronting the four armies of the Republic, which numbered only 294,000. But by this time the armies of France were Republican armies, democratised, with tactics of their own elaborated, and they were not long in gaining the upper hand over the allied Powers.

The darkest spot, however, was in the condition of things in the provinces, especially in the South. The indiscriminate extermination of all the counter-revolutionists—both the leaders and their irresponsible followers—to which the local Jacobins and the commissioners of the Convention had resorted when their party triumphed, aroused such bitter hatred that it was war to the knife everywhere. To make matters still more difficult, there was no one either on the spot or in Paris who could have suggested any remedy but extreme measures of repression. Here is an instance in point.

The department of the Vaucluse had always been full of royalists and priests; and it happened that in Bedouin, one of these remote villages at the foot of Mont Ventoux which had never forsaken the old *régime* nor concealed the fact, "the law had been scandalously outraged." On May 1, the "Tree of Liberty" had been cut down and "the decrees of the Convention dragged through the mud." Suchet, the local military chief, who was presently to become an imperialist, wished to make a terrible example of the village and demanded its destruction. Maignet, the commissioner of the Convention, hesitated and applied for instructions to Paris, whence came the order "Punish severely," whereupon Suchet set fire to the

illage and 433 houses were rendered uninhabitable. With uch a system one can easily imagine that there would be no hoice but to "punish severely."

So it was in reality. A few days later, it being found im-ossible to transfer to Paris all the arrested citizens, for, as Maignet said, it would have required an army and a com-nissariat to do it, Couthon proposed a special commission to eal with them. This commission was to be formed of five nembers to sit at Orange and try the enemies of the Revolution n the departments of the Vaucluse and the Bouches-du-Rhône. The two committees agreed to the proposal.* Robespierre vith his own hand drew up the instructions for this com-nission, and these instructions presently served as a model for his law of Terror issued on the 22nd Prairial.†

A few days later, Robespierre enlarged upon these principles before the Convention, saying that hitherto they had shown oo much consideration for the enemies of liberty and that they nust now go beyond the judicial forms and simplify them.‡ And two days after the *Fête* of the Supreme Being he proposed, vith the consent of his colleagues on the Committee of Public Welfare, the famous law of the 22nd Prairial (June 10)—con-cerning the reorganisation of the revolutionary tribunal. By virtue of this law, the tribunal was to be divided into

* I here follow the account given by Louis Blanc (Book XII., chap. xiii.), whom no one can accuse of being hostile to the Robespierre group.

† "The enemies of the Revolution," said this instruction, "are those who by any means whatever and under no matter what pretext have tried to hamper the progress of the Revolution and prevent the establishment of the Republic. The due penalty for this crime is death; the proofs requisite for condemnation are *all information, of no matter what kind*, which may convince a reasonable man and a friend of liberty. The guide for passing sentences lies in the conscience of the judge, enlightened by love of justice and of his country, their aim being the public welfare and the destruction of these enemies of the fatherland."

‡ "They wish to govern revolutions by lawyers' subtleties; con-spiracies against the Republic were being treated as if they were actions between private individuals. Tyranny slays and liberty pleads! And the Code made by the conspirators is the law by which they are judged! . . ." "The only delay in punishing the enemies of the fatherland should be until such time as they are found out: it is not so much a question of punishing as of destroying them."

sections, each composed of three judges and nine jurors. Seven of their combined number were to be sufficient for making decisions. The rules for passing sentence were to be those which have just been described as contained in the instructions to the commission at Orange, except that among the crimes deserving of death they included also the spreading of false news to divide or stir up the people, the undermining of morality and the corrupting of the public conscience.

It is evident that to decree such a law was to sign the bankruptcy of the revolutionary Government. It meant doing under a pretext of legality what the people of Paris had done in an insurrection and in a moment of panic and desperation during the September days. And the effect of the law of the 22nd Prairial was to bring the counter-revolution to a head in six weeks.

Was Robespierre's purpose in drawing up this law only to strike at those members of the Convention whom he believed to be most harmful to the Revolution, as some historians have tried to prove? His withdrawal from the business of government after the discussions in the Convention had proved that the Assembly would not allow itself to be bled by the committee without defending its members, gives an air of probability to this supposition. But the well-established fact that the instructions to the commission at Orange had also emanated from Robespierre upsets this theory. It is more probable that Robespierre simply followed the current of the moment, and that he, Couthon and Saint-Just, in agreement with many others, including Cambon, wanted to use the Terror as a general weapon of warfare as well as a menace to some members of the Convention. In reality, without mentioning Hébert, they had been steadily approaching this law since the decrees of the 19th Floréal (May 8) and 9th Prairial (May 28) which dealt with the concentration of authority. It is also very probable that the attempt of Ladmiral to kill Collot d'Herbois and the strange affair of Cécile Renault helped to secure the acceptation of the law of the 22nd Prairial.

Towards the end of April there had been a series of executions in Paris which must have stimulated to a high degree the hatred

n the royalists'-side. After the "batch" guillotined on the 24th Germinal (April 13), which included Chaumette, Gobel, Lucile Desmoulins, the widow of Hébert, and fifteen others, they had xecuted d'Eprémesnil, le Chapelier, Thouret, old Malesherbes, he defender of Louis XVI. at his trial, Lavoisier, the great hemist and good republican, and the sister of Louis XVI., Madame Elisabeth, whom they might have set at liberty at the ame time as her niece, without in the least endangering the Republic.

The royalists were much infuriated by this, and on the 7th Prairial (May 25) a certain Ladmiral—an office-keeper aged fifty —went to the Convention intending to kill Robespierre. Ladmiral, however, fell asleep during a speech by Barère and missed the "tyrant." He therefore fired instead at Collot d'Herbois as he was mounting the stairs to his lodging. A struggle ensued between the two men in which Collot disarmed Ladmiral.

The same day, Cécile Renault, a girl of twenty, the daughter of a royalist stationer, entered the courtyard of the house where Robespierre lodged with the Duplays, and insisted on seeing him. Her intentions were suspected and she was arrested. Two small knives were found in her pocket and her incoherent answers were interpreted as meaning that she had intended to make an attempt on Robespierre's life. If it was so, the whole affair was very childish; but these two attempts probably served as an argument in favour of the Terrorist Law.

At any rate the committees took advantage of both incidents to make a huge "amalgam." They had the father and brother of the young girl arrested, and several persons whose sole crime was that they had known Ladmiral more or less intimately. In the same "batch" they included Madame Saint-Amaranthe, who kept a gambling-house to which many people were attracted by the beauty of her daughter, Madame de Sartine. As the establishment had been frequented by all sorts of people, among others by Chabot, Desfieux, Hérault de Séchelles, and visited, it seems, by Danton and apparently by a younger brother of Robespierre, the affair was made out to be a royalist conspiracy, in which it was attempted to implicate Robespierre himself. They also dragged in old Sombreuil, whom Maillard

had saved during the September massacres, the actress Grand'-Maison, a mistress of Baron de Batz, Sartino, "a knight of the dagger," and along with these notables a poor innocent little dressmaker, seventeen years old, named Nicolle.

Under the new law of the 22nd Prairial, the trial was soon over. This time the "batch" numbered fifty-four persons, who all went to the scaffold in red smocks of parricides, their execution lasting two hours. This was the first outcome of the new law, which every one called Robespierre's law, and at one stroke it made the rule of the Terrorists detested by all Paris.

One can imagine the state of mind of those who had been arrested as "suspects" and flung into prisons in the capital, when they heard the terms of the new law and its application in the case of the fifty-four red-smocks (*les chemises rouges*). A general massacre to clear out the prisons was expected, as at Nantes and Lyons, and preparations were being made by the prisoners to resist. It is even probable that a rising was planned.* The number of accused persons tried at one time rose to one hundred and fifty, who were executed in three "batches"—convicts and royalists going to the scaffold together.

It is useless to dwell upon these executions. Suffice it to say that from April 17, 1793, the day when the Revolutionary Tribunal was established, until the 22nd Prairial in the Year II. (June 10, 1794), that is, within fourteen months, the tribunal had sent 2607 persons to the guillotine in Paris; but after the passing of the new law, within forty-six days from the 22nd Prairial to the 9th Thermidor (July 27, 1794) the same tribunal caused 1351 to perish.

The people of Paris soon sickened with the horror of seeing the procession of tumbrils carrying the condemned to the foot of the guillotine, where it was as much as five executioners could do to empty them every day. There was no longer room in the cemeteries to bury the victims, and vigorous protests were raised

* A search made in the prisons led to the seizure of sums of money amounting to 864,000 livres, exclusive of jewels, which brought the total value up to something like 1,200,000 livres possessed by the suspects in prison.

ch time a new cemetery was opened in any of the faubourgs. he sympathies of the working people were now turned to the ctims of the guillotine all the more because those struck down elonged chiefly to the poorer classes—the rich having emi- ated or concealed themselves. As a fact, among the 2750 illotined persons of whose social status Louis Blanc found cord only 650 belonged to the well-to-do classes. It was even hispered that on the Committee of Public Safety there was a yalist, an agent of Baron de Batz, who urged on the executions as to render the Republic detested.

One thing is certain ; each new " batch " of this kind hastened e fall of the Jacobin Government. The Terror had ceased to rrorise, a thing which statesmen cannot understand.

CHAPTER LXVIII

THE 9TH THERMIDOR—TRIUMPH OF REACTION

Causes of overthrow of Robespierre—Evils of transfer of land—Republican successes abroad—Terror continues—Dantonists, Girondins and "Marsh" unite to overthrow Robespierre—Unpopularity of Committee of Public Welfare—Robespierre attacks Barère and Fouché—His speech in Convention—Effect of speech—9th Thermidor—Arrest of Robespierre and his associates—Efforts of Commune—Capture of Hôtel de Ville—Execution of Robespierre and Terrorists—End of Revolution—Reactionaries continue executions—Attempted rising of workers—Execution of last of Montagnards—Triumph of middle classes—Royalist manifestations—Massacres of revolutionists—Reaction succeeded by Directory—Final effort of revolutionists—Napoleon proclaims himself Emperor

IF Robespierre had many admirers, who adored him, he had also quite as many enemies, who utterly detested him and lost no opportunity of making him odious by attributing to him all the horrors of the Terror. Nor did they neglect to render him ridiculous by connecting him with the doings of an old mad mystic, Catherine Théot, who called herself "the Mother of God."

But still it is evident that it was not personal enmities which overthrew Robespierre. His fall was inevitable, because he represented a *régime* that was on the point of foundering. After the Revolution had passed through its ascendant phase, which lasted until August or September 1793, it entered upon its descendant phase. It was now passing through the Jacobin *régime* of which Robespierre was the supreme expression, and in its turn this *régime* had to give place to the men of "law and order," who were longing to put an end to the unrest of revolution, and were only waiting for the moment when they could

verthrow the Terrorists of the "Mountain" without provoking
insurrection in Paris.

We cannot overestimate all the evil resulting from the fact
at in economic matters the Revolution was based on personal
in. A revolution should include *the welfare of all*, otherwise
is certain to be crushed by those very persons whom it has
riched at the expense of the nation. Whenever a shifting of
ealth is caused by a revolution, it ought never to be for the
nefit of *individuals*, but always for the benefit of *communities*.
et it was on this point precisely that the Great Revolution
tally erred.

The estates, which were confiscated from the church and the
bility, were given to private persons, whereas they should have
en restored to the villages and the towns, because they had
rmerly belonged to the people—being, as they were, the lands
hich individuals had fastened upon under the protection of
e feudal system. There have never been any cultivated lands
seigniorial or ecclesiastic origin. Apart from a few monastic
mmunities, neither lords nor priests had ever with their own
nds cleared a single acre. The people, those called *vilains*
manants, had cleared every square yard of cultivated
l. It was they who had made it accessible, habitable,
d given value to it, and it was to them it should have been
tored.

But, acting in the interests of a middle-class State, the Con-
tuent and Legislative Assemblies, and even the Convention
, acknowledged the legal claims of lord, convent, cathedral,
d church to lands which in former times had been appro-
ated by those props of the then growing State, and they took
ssession of these lands and sold them chiefly to the middle
sses.

It can be imagined what a scramble for a share in this booty
k place when estates, of which the total value amounted to
m ten to fifteen thousand millions of francs, were on sale for
eral years under conditions extremely favourable to the
rchasers—conditions which could be rendered still more
vantageous by currying favour with the new local authorities.
this way the famous "black bands" were formed in the

provinces, against which all the efforts of the Convention commissioners were powerless.

The pernicious influence of these pilferers, reinforced by th Paris stock-jobbers and the army contractors, spread by degre to the Convention itself, where the honest men among th Montagnards found themselves confronted by "profitmongers and helpless against them. What was there to oppose to them Once the *Enragés* were crushed and the sections of Paris para lysed—what remained in the Convention beside the "Marsh"

The victory of Fleurus, won on June 26 (8th Messidor) ov the combined forces of Austria and England—a victory whic ended the campaign in the North for that year—and the su cesses gained by the Republic's armies in the Pyrenees, the Alp and on the Rhine, as well as the arrival of a transport laden wit wheat from America—at the cost, be it said, of several battl ships—these successes served in themselves as powerful argu ments with the "moderates," who were anxious to resto order. "What," said they, "is the good of a revolutiona government, now that the war is almost over? It is time t go back to legal conditions, and to put an end to governme by revolutionary committees and patriotic societies in the pr vinces. It is time to restore order and to close the period revolution!"

But the Terror, so generally attributed to Robespierre, f from relaxing, was still fully maintained. On the 3rd Messid (June 21), Herman, a government official, "*commissaire d administrations civiles, police et tribunaux*," a man much attache to Robespierre, sent in a statement to the Committee of Publ Welfare, asking permission to inquire into the plottings amon the prisoners and hinting that "it might be necessary presentl to purge the prisons." He was authorised by the committe to hold the inquiry, and forthwith began the sending of tho horrible "batches," those cartloads of men and women to th guillotine, a sight more abominable to the Parisians than th September massacres. These executions were all the mo odious because no one knew where they would end, and becau they went on in the midst of balls, concerts, and other festiviti given by the class that had so recently grown rich, and amid th

erision of the royalist *jeunesse dorée*, who grew daily more ggressive.

Every one must have felt that this state of things could not st, and the Moderates in the Convention took advantage of it. antonists, Girondins, and the members of the "Marsh," ined ranks, and concentrated their forces on Robespierre's verthrow, as the first point to be gained. The condition of aris favoured their designs, as the Committee of Public elfare had succeeded in crippling the sections—the true ntres of the popular movements.

On the 5th Thermidor (July 23) the general council of the ommune, in which Payan, an intimate friend of Robespierre, as now all powerful, did much to injure its popularity by suing a decree that was absolutely unjust to the workers. he council ordered in all the forty-eight sections the procla- ation of the maximum, which was to fix the limit of the orkers' wages. As we have seen, the Committee of Public elfare had already made itself unpopular with the sections y destroying their autonomy, and appointing the members of veral of their committee.

The moment, therefore, was ripe for attempting a *coup état*.

On the 21st Messidor (July 9) Robespierre had at length ecided to begin the attack upon his enemies. Eight days reviously he had been complaining at the Jacobin Club of the ar that was being waged against him personally. He now ent into particulars, and made some allusions to Barère— at very Barère who until then had been the pliant instrument his faction, whenever a bold stroke had been needed in the onvention. Two days later, again at the Jacobin Club, he ade a direct attack on Fouché for his terrible doings in Lyons, d succeeded in having him summoned to answer for them fore the club.

By the 26th Messidor (July 14) war was declared, as Fouché d refused to appear before the Jacobins. As to the attack on arère, it meant also an attack on Collot d'Herbois and Billaud- arenne, as well as on two powerful members of the Committee Public Safety, Vadier and Voulland, who often conferred

with Barère and had collaborated with him in the busines
the prison plots.

All those of the Left, therefore, who felt themselves threate
—Tallien, Barère, Vadier, Voulland, Billaud-Varenne, Co
d'Herbois, Fouché—banded themselves together against
" triumvirs "—Robespierre, Saint-Just and Couthon. Mo
rates, such as Barras, Rovère, Thirion, Courtois, Bourdon,
the rest, who, for their part, would have liked to see
downfall of the whole " Mountain," including Collot d'Herb
Billaud-Varenne, Barère, Vadier and the others, no doubt saic
themselves that it was best to begin by attacking the Rob
pierre group, as, once that was overthrown, the rest could
easily managed.

The storm burst in the Convention on the 8th Thermi
(July 26, 1794). It must have been expected, for the hall
thronged. Robespierre attacked the Committee of Gen
Safety in a carefully prepared speech and charged it with c
spiring against the Convention. He was there, he said,
defend the Convention and himself against slanders. He
defended himself against the charge of dictatorial tendenc
and he did not try to be conciliatory towards his adversarie
even towards Cambon, of whom he spoke, as well as of Mallar
and Ramel, in terms borrowed from the *Enragés*, calling th
" *Feuillants*, aristocrats, rascals."

He was permitted to finish, because people were anxiou
know his conclusions, and when he had expressed them it
perceived that in reality he was asking for an increase in his c
authority and that of his group. There was no new outlc
no new programme in his speech. It was only the demanc
a Government member for more power—still more power
be used for purposes of repression.

" What is the remedy for the evil ? " he said in conclusi
" The punishment of the traitors, a complete reconstruct
of the Committee of General Safety, the purification of t
committee and its subordination to the Committee of Pu
Welfare ; the purification of the Committee of Public Wel
itself ; and unity of Government under the authority of
National Convention which was the centre and the judge."

It was understood then that he confined himself to asking for more authority to be vested in his triumvirate, to be used against Collot and Billot, Tallien and Barère, Cambon and Carnot, Vadier and Voulland. The conspirators of the Right must have rubbed their hands. They had only to let Tallien, Billot-Varenne and the other Montagnards act.

The evening of the same day the Jacobin Club rapturously applauded Robespierre's speech and made a furious demonstration against Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne. It was even proposed to march against the two committees. But nothing went beyond mere talk. The Jacobin Club had never been a centre of action.

During the night Bourdon and Tallien secured the support of the Conventionals of the Right, and apparently the plan agreed upon was to prevent Robespierre and Saint-Just from speaking.

The next day, the 9th Thermidor, as soon as Saint-Just rose to read his statement—which, by the way, was very moderate, for it only asked for a revision of Government procedure—Billaud-Varenne and Tallien would not allow him to read it. They demanded the arrest of the "tyrant," meaning Robespierre, and shouts of "Down with the tyrant!" were re-echoed by the whole of the "Marsh." Robespierre attempted to speak, but he, too, was prevented. An order was given for his prosecution, including his brother, Saint-Just, Couthon and Lebas, and they were immediately arrested and taken off to different prisons.

Meanwhile Hanriot, the chief of the National Guard, followed by two aides-de-camp and some gendarmes, was galloping through the streets in the direction of the Convention, when two of the members of the Convention, seeing him pass in the Rue Saint-Honore, had him arrested by six of the very gendarmes under his command.

The General Council of the Commune did not meet until six o'clock in the evening. It then issued an appeal to the people, calling on them to rise against Barère, Collot, Bourdon and Amar, and Coffinhal was despatched to deliver Robespierre and his friends who, it was thought, were kept under arrest in

the building occupied by the Committee of General Safe
but Coffinhal found there only Hanriot, whom he released.
to Robespierre, he had been taken first to the Luxembou
but the officials there refused to receive him; and, instead
going straight to the Commune, and casting in his lot with t
party of insurrection, he went to the Police Office on t
Quai des Orfèvres, and remained doing nothing. Saint-Ju
and Lebas went as soon as they were free to the Commune, a
Coffinhal, again sent by the Council to seek Robespierre, had
force his hand to compel him to go to the Hôtel de Vil
which he reached about eight o'clock.

The Council of the Commune began to arrange for a risin
but it became clear that the sections had no mind to rise agair
the Convention in favour of those whom they charged wi
having guillotined Chaumette and Hébert, killed Jacqu
Roux, ejected Pache from office, and destroyed the autonon
of the sections. Paris, moreover, must have felt that th
Revolution was dying out, and that the men for whom th
Council of the Commune appealed to the people to rise were
no way representative of the popular cause.

By midnight the sections had made no sign of stirrin
Louis Blanc says that they were in a state of division, the
civil committees being unable to come to agreement with th
revolutionary committees and the General Assemblies. Th
fourteen sections that obeyed the Commune in the first in
stance did nothing, while eighteen were hostile, and of thes
six were in the immediate neighbourhood of the Hôtel de Vill
The men of Jacques Roux' section, the Gravilliers, even forme
the first nucleus of one of the two columns that marched upo
the Hôtel de Ville at the order of the Convention.*

* The sections, M. Ernest Mellié says, took no initiative, but tamel
followed their committees, the members of which were dependent o
the Committees of Public Welfare and General Safety. They wer
left no part in politics. . . . They had even been forbidden to ca
themselves primary assemblies; on the 20th Floréal, Year II. (May
1794), Payan, the national agent of the Commune, who had taken th
place of Chaumette, warned them by letter that, under a revolutionar
government, there were no primary assemblies. . . . This was t
remind them that their abdication was complete (pp. 151, 152). Afte
recounting the successive purifications to which the sections ha
submitted to make themselves acceptable to the Jacobins (p. 153), M

In the meantime, the Convention was declaring the insurgents and the Commune outlaws, and when this declaration was read in the Place de la Grêve, Hanriot's artillerymen, who had been posted there with nothing to do, slipped away one by one. The Place was quite deserted when shortly afterwards the Hôtel de Ville was invaded by the columns from the Gravilliers and the Arcis. A young gendarme, who was the first to enter the room in which were Robespierre and his friends, fired a pistol-shot which broke Robespierre's jaw. The Hôtel de Ville, the very centre of the resistance, was thus taken without a blow being struck in its defence. Thereupon Lebas killed himself, the younger Robespierre tried to kill himself by leaping through a window from the third story; Coffinhal caught hold of Hanriot, whom he accused of having lost their cause, and hurled him out of window; Saint-Just and Couthon allowed themselves to be arrested quietly.

The next morning, after a mere form of identification, they were all executed, to the number of twenty-one. They went to their death in the Place de la Révolution by a long route amid the insults of counter-revolutionary crowds. The fashionable people who hastened to enjoy the spectacle were even more festive than on the day of the execution of the Hébertists. Windows were let at fabulous prices, and the ladies who sat in them wore full dress. Reaction was triumphing. The Revolution had come to an end.

Here we, too, shall pause, without narrating the details of the orgies under the White Terror, which began after Thermidor, or the two attempts at insurrection against the new *régime:* the movement of Prairial in the Year III. and the conspiracy of Babeuf in the Year IV.

Mellié concludes with these words: "Michelet was right, therefore, in saying that by this time the assemblies of the sections were dead and that all power had passed over to the revolutionary committees, which, being themselves nominated by the Government, had no longer any vitality either" (pp. 154, 155). On the 9th Thermidor (and of this M. Mellié has found the proofs in the Archives), in nearly all the sections the revolutionary committees were assembled to await the orders of the Government (p. 169). It is not surprising, therefore, that the sections did not take action against the Thermidoreans.

The opponents of the Terror, who were always talkin clemency, wanted it only for themselves and their frie The first thing they did when they came into power wa execute all the partisans of the Montagnards whom they overthrown. In the three days, the 10th, 11th, and Thermidor (July 28, 29, and 30) there were a hundred and t executions. Denunciations poured in from the middle cla and the guillotine was working hard—this time on the sid reaction. From the 9th Thermidor to the 1st Prairial, in than ten months, seventy-three Montagnard representati were condemned to death or imprisoned, while seventy-t Girondins re-entered the Convention.

It was now the turn of the real "Statesmen." The "m mum" on commodities was speedily abolished, which produ a violent crisis, during which stock-jobbing and speculat attained gigantic proportions. The middle classes held h holiday, as they did again later on after June 1848 and M 1871. The *jeunesse dorée* organised by Fréon ruled Pa while the workers, seeing that the Revolution was vanquish crept back to their hovels to meditate on the chances of the n upheaval.

They attempted to rise on the 12th Germinal, Year I (April 1, 1795), and again on the 1st Prairial (May 20) demandi bread and the Constitution of 1793. On this occasion the f bourgs showed much spirit, but the middle classes had had ti to organise their forces. The revolutionary tribunal had be abolished, so the last of the Montagnards—Romme, Bourbot Duroy, Soubrancy, Goujon and Duquesnoy—were condemn to death by a military commission and executed.

Thenceforth the middle classes remained masters of t Revolution and the descendant phase continued. The reacti soon became frankly royalist. The *troupe dorée* no long remained concealed, but openly wore the grey coat with t green or blue colour of the *Chouans* * and ill-treated all th known as "terrorists"—that is to say, all republicans. The were persecutions both wholesale and retail. Whoever h assisted in any way in the execution of the King—or in

* The Breton royalists.

rrest after the flight to Varennes, whoever had taken any part vhatever in the assault on the Tuileries, was pointed out to he royalists and life made insupportable for him.

In the departments, especially in the South, the "Companies du Jésus," the "Compagnies du Soleil" and other royalist rganisations practised wholesale reprisals. In the prisons at yons, Aix and Marseilles they killed all those who had taken art in the former government. Mignet says: "Nearly very place in the South had its second of September," and that, f course, means its royalist second of September. Besides hese wholesale massacres, the members of the above-named ocieties of Jesus and the Sun held individual man-hunts. n Lyons, whenever they found a revolutionist who had escaped heir massacres, they killed him and threw the body into the Rhône without any pretence at a trial. Similar deeds were nacted in Tarascon.

The reaction increased until at last the Convention broke up n the 4th Brumaire, Year IV. (October 26, 1795). The Direcory succeeded it and prepared the way for the Consulate first nd the Empire afterwards. The Directory was a terrible rgy of the middle classes, in which the fortunes acquired during he Revolution, especially during the Thermidorean reaction, vere squandered in unbridled luxury. For, if the Revolution ad put in circulation eight milliards of paper-money, the Thermidorean reaction went ten times as fast in that direction, or it issued the amazing sum of thirty milliards in paper *vithin fifteen months.* By this we can calculate the amount of he fortunes which had been accumulated by the "profitongers," thanks to these tremendous issues of paperioney.

Once again, in May 1796, the revolutionary Communists under he leadership of Babeuf tried to get up an insurrection through heir secret society, but they were arrested before it was ripe. An attempt to raise the camp at Grenelle on the night of the 3rd Fructidor, Year IV. (September 9, 1796), also failed. Babeuf nd Darthé were condemned to death, and killed themselves vith a dagger on the 7th Prairial, Year V. But the royalists had heir failure too, on the 18th Fructidor, Year V. (September 4,

1797), and the Directory lasted until the 18th Brumair
Year VIII. (November 9, 1799).

On that day Napoleon Bonaparte carried out his *coup d'éta*
and national representation was completely suppressed by th
ex-sans-culotte, who had the army on his side.

The war, which had lasted seven years, had thus come to i
logical conclusion. On the 28th Floréal, Year XII. (May 1
1804), Napoleon proclaimed himself Emperor, and then w
broke out again, to last with brief intervals until 1815.

CONCLUSION

When one sees that terrible and powerful Convention wrecking itself in 1794–1795, that proud and strong Republic disappearing, and France, after the demoralising *régime* of the Directory, falling under the military yoke of a Bonaparte, one is impelled to ask: "What was the good of the Revolution if the nation had to fall back again under despotism?" In the course of the nineteenth century, this question has been constantly put, and the timid and conservative have worn it threadbare as an argument against revolutions in general.

The preceding pages supply the answer. Those who have seen in the Revolution only a change in the Government, those who are ignorant of its economic as well as its educational work, those alone could put such a question.

The France we see during the last days of the eighteenth century, at the moment of the *coup d'état* on the 18th Brumaire, is not the France that existed before 1789. Would it have been possible for the old France, wretchedly poor and with a third of her population suffering yearly from dearth, to have maintained the Napoleonic Wars, coming so soon after the terrible wars of the Republic between 1792 and 1799, when all Europe was attacking her?

The fact is, that a new France had been constituted since 1792–1793. Scarcity still prevailed in many of the departments, and its full horrors were felt especially after the *coup d'état* of Thermidor, when the maximum price for all foodstuffs was abolished. There were still some departments which did not produce enough wheat to feed themselves, and as the war went on, and all means of transport were requisitioned for its supplies, there was scarcity in those departments. But everything tends to prove that France was even then producing

much more of the necessaries of life of every kind than in 1789.

Never was there in France such energetic ploughing, Michelet tells us, as in 1792, when the peasant was ploughing the lands he had taken back from the lords, the convents, the churches, and was goading his oxen to the cry of "*Allons Prusse! Allons Autriche!*" Never had there been so much clearing of lands—even royalist writers admit this—as during those years of revolution. The first good harvest, in 1794, brought relief to two-thirds of France—at least in the villages, for all this time the towns were threatened with scarcity of food. Not that it was scarce in France as a whole, or that the *sans-culotte* municipalities neglected to take measures to feed those who could not find employment, but from the fact that all beasts of burden not actually used in tillage were requisitioned to carry food and ammunition to the fourteen armies of the Republic. In those days there were no railways, and all but the main roads were in the state they are to this day in Russia—well-nigh impassable.

A new France was born during those four years of revolution. For the first time in centuries the peasant ate his fill, straightened his back and dared to speak out. Read the detailed reports concerning the return of Louis XVI. to Paris, when he was brought back a prisoner from Varennes, in June 1791, by the peasants, and say: "Could such a thing, such an interest in the public welfare, such a devotion to it, and such an independence of judgment and action have been possible before 1789?" A new nation had been born in the meantime, just as we see to-day a new nation coming into life in Russia and in Turkey.

It was owing to this new birth that France was able to maintain her wars under the Republic and Napoleon, and to carry the principles of the Great Revolution into Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and even to the borders of Russia. And when, after all those wars, after having mentally followed the French armies as far as Egypt and Moscow, we expect to find France in 1815 reduced to an appalling misery and her lands laid waste, we find, instead, that even in its eastern portions and in the Jura, the country is much more

rosperous than it was at the time when Pétion, pointing out o Louis XVI. the luxuriant banks of the Marne, asked him if here was anywhere in the world a kingdom more beautiful han the one the King had not wished to keep.

The self-contained energy was such in villages regenerated by the Revolution, that in a few years France became a country of well-to-do peasants, and her enemies soon discovered that in spite of all the blood she had shed and the losses she had sustained, France, in respect of her *productivity*, was the richest country in Europe. Her wealth, indeed, is not drawn from the Indies or from her foreign commerce : it comes from her own soil, from her love of the soil, from her own skill and industry. She is the richest country, because of the subdivision of her wealth, and she is still richer because of the possibilities she offers for the future.

Such was the effect of the Revolution. And if the casual observer sees in Napoleonic France only a love of glory, the historian realises that even the wars France waged at that period were undertaken to secure the fruits of the Revolution—to keep the lands that had been retaken from the lords, the priests and the rich, and the liberties that had been won from despotism and the Court. If France was willing in those years to bleed herself to death, merely to prevent the Germans, the English, and the Russians from forcing a Louis XVIII. upon her, it was because she did not want the return of the emigrant nobles to mean that the *ci-devants* would take back the lands which had been watered already with the peasant's sweat, and the liberties which had been sanctified with the patriots' blood. And France fought so well for twenty-three years, that when she was compelled at last to admit the Bourbons, it was she who imposed conditions on them. The Bourbons might reign, but the lands were to be kept by those who had taken them from the feudal lords, so that even during the White Terror of the Bourbons they dared not touch those lands. The old *régime* could not be re-established.

This is what is gained by making a Revolution.

There are other things to be pointed out. In the history of

all nations a time comes when fundamental changes are bound to take place in the whole of the national life. Royal despotism and feudalism were dying in 1789; it was impossible to keep them alive; they had to go.

But then, two ways were opened out before France: reform or revolution.

At such times there is always a moment when reform is still possible; but if advantage has not been taken of that moment, if an obstinate resistance has been opposed to the requirements of the new life, up to the point when blood has flowed in the streets, as it flowed on July 14, 1789, then there must be a Revolution. And once the Revolution has begun, it must necessarily develop to its last conclusions—that is to say, to the highest point it is capable of attaining—were it only temporarily, being given a certain condition of the public mind at this particular moment.

If we represent the slow progress of a period of evolution by a line drawn on paper, we shall see this line gradually though slowly rising. Then there comes a Revolution, and the line makes a sudden leap upwards. In England the line would be represented as rising to the Puritan Republic of Cromwell; in France it rises to the *Sans-culotte* Republic of 1793. However, at this height progress cannot be maintained; all the hostile forces league together against it, and the Republic goes down. Our line, after having reached that height, drops. Reaction follows. For the political life of France the line drops very low indeed, but by degrees it rises again, and when peace is restored in 1815 in France, and in 1688 in England—both countries are found to have attained a level much higher than they were on prior to their Revolutions.

After that, evolution is resumed: our line again begins to rise slowly: but, besides taking place on a very much higher level, the rising of the line will in nearly every case be also much more rapid than before the period of disturbance.

This is a law of human progress, and also a law of individual progress. The more recent history of France confirms this very law by showing how it was necessary to pass through the Commune to arrive at the Third Republic.

The work of the French Revolution is not confined merely to what it obtained and what was retained of it in France. It is to be found also in the principles bequeathed by it to the succeeding century—in the line of direction it marked out for the future.

A reform is always a compromise with the past, but the progress accomplished by revolution is always a promise of future progress. If the Great French Revolution was the summing up of a century's evolution, it also marked out in its turn the programme of evolution to be accomplished in the course of the nineteenth century.

It is a law in the world's history that the period of a hundred or a hundred and thirty years, more or less, which passes between two great revolutions, receives its character from the revolution in which this period began. The nations endeavour to realise in their institutions the inheritance bequeathed to them by the last revolution. All that this last could not yet put into practice, all the great thoughts which were thrown into circulation during the turmoil, and which the revolution either could not or did not know how to apply, all the attempts at sociological reconstruction, which were born during the revolution, will go to make up the substance of evolution during the epoch that follows the revolution, with the addition of those new ideas to which this evolution will give birth, when trying to put into practice the programme marked out by the last upheaval. Then, a new revolution will be brought about in some other nation, and this nation in its turn will set the problems for the following century. Such has hitherto been the trend of history.

Two great conquests, in fact, characterise the century which has passed since 1789–1793. Both owe their origin to the French Revolution, which had carried on the work of the English Revolution while enlarging and invigorating it with all the progress that had been made since the English middle classes beheaded their King and transferred his power to the Parliament. These two great triumphs are: the abolition of serfdom and the abolition of absolutism, by which personal liberties have been conferred upon the individual, undreamt

of by the serf of the lord and the subject of the absolute king, while at the same time they have brought about the development of the middle classes and the capitalist *régime*.

These two achievements represent the principal work of the nineteenth century, begun in France in 1789 and slowly spread over Europe in the course of that century.

The work of enfranchisement, begun by the French peasants in 1789, was continued in Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria by the armies of the *sans-culottes*. Unfortunately, this work hardly penetrated into Poland and did not reach Russia at all.

The abolition of serfdom in Europe would have been already completed in the first half of the nineteenth century if the French *bourgeoisie*, coming into power in 1794 over the dead bodies of Anarchists, Cordeliers, and Jacobins, had not checked the revolutionary impulse, restored monarchy, and handed over France to the imperial juggler, the first Napoleon. This ex-*sans-culotte*, now a general of the *sans-culottes*, speedily began to prop up aristocracy; but the impulsion had been given, the institution of serfdom had already received a mortal blow. It was abolished in Spain and Italy in spite of the temporary triumph of reaction. It was closely pressed in Germany after 1811, and disappeared in that country definitively in 1848. In 1861, Russia was compelled to emancipate her serfs, and the war of 1878 put an end to serfdom in the Balkan peninsula.

The cycle is now complete. The right of the lord over the person of the peasant no longer exists in Europe, even in those countries where the feudal dues have still to be redeemed.

This fact is not sufficiently appreciated by historians. Absorbed as they are in political questions, they do not perceive the importance of the abolition of serfdom, which is, however, the essential feature of the nineteenth century. The rivalries between nations and the wars resulting from them, the policies of the Great Powers which occupy so much of the historian's attention, have all sprung from that one great fact—the abolition of serfdom and the development of the wage-system which has taken its place.

The French peasant, in revolting a hundred and twenty years

ago against the lord who made him beat the ponds lest croaking frogs should disturb his master's sleep, has thus freed the peasants of all Europe. In four years, by burning the documents which registered his subjection, by setting fire to the châteaux, and by executing the owners of them who refused to recognise his rights as a human being, the French peasant so stirred up all Europe that it is to-day altogether free from the degradation of serfdom.

On the other hand, the abolition of absolute power has also taken a little over a hundred years to make the tour of Europe. Attacked in England in 1648, and vanquished in France in 1789, royal authority based on divine right is no longer exercised save in Russia, but there, too, it is at its last gasp. Even the little Balkan States and Turkey have now their representative assemblies, and Russia is entering the same cycle.

In this respect the Revolution of 1789–1793 has also accomplished its work. Equality before the law and representative government have now their place in almost all the codes of Europe. In theory, at least, the law makes no distinctions between men, and every one has the right to participate, more or less, in the government.

The absolute monarch—master of his subjects—and the lord—master of the soil and the peasants, by right of birth—have both disappeared. The middle classes now govern Europe.

But at the same time the Great Revolution has bequeathed to us some other principles of an infinitely higher import; the principles of communism. We have seen how all through the Great Revolution the communist idea kept coming to the front, and how after the fall of the Girondins numerous attempts and sometimes great attempts were made in this direction. Fourierism descends in a direct line from L'Ange on one side and from Chalier on the other. Babeuf is the direct descendant of ideas which stirred the masses to enthusiasm in 1793; he, Buonarotti, and Sylvain Maréchal have only systematised them a little or even merely put them into literary form. But the secret societies organised by Babeuf and Buonarotti were the origin of the *communistes matérialistes*

secret societies through which Blanqui and Barbès conspired under the *bourgeois* monarchy of Louis-Philippe. Later on, in 1866, the International Working Men's Association appeared in the direct line of descent from these societies. As to "socialism" we know now that this term came into vogue to avoid the term "communism," which at one time was dangerous because the secret communist societies became societies for action, and were rigorously suppressed by the *bourgeoisie* then in power.

There is, therefore, a direct filiation from the *Enragés* of 1793 and the Babeuf conspiracy of 1795 to the International Working Men's Association of 1866–1878.

There is also a direct descent of ideas. Up till now, modern socialism has added absolutely nothing to the ideas which were circulating among the French people between 1789 and 1794, and which it was tried to put into practice in the Year II. of the Republic. Modern socialism has only systematised those ideas and found arguments in their favour, either by turning against the middle-class economists certain of their own definitions, or by generalising certain facts noticed in the development of industrial capitalism, in the course of the nineteenth century.

But I permit myself to maintain also that, however vague it may have been, however little support it endeavoured to draw from arguments dressed in a scientific garb, and however little use it made of the pseudo-scientific slang of the middle-class economists, the popular communism of the first two years of the Republic saw clearer, and went much deeper in its analyses, than modern socialism.

First of all, it was communism in the consumption of the necessaries of life—not in production only; it was the communalisation and the nationalisation of what economists know as consumption—to which the stern republicans of 1793 turned, above all, their attention, when they tried to establish their stores of grain and provisions in every commune, when they set on foot a gigantic inquiry to find and fix the true value of the objects of prime and secondary necessity, and when they inspired Robespierre to declare that *only the superfluity of food-*

tuffs should become articles of commerce, and that what was ecessary belonged to all.

Born out of the pressing necessities of those troublous years, he communism of 1793, with its affirmation of the right of all o sustenance and to the land for its production, its denial of he right of any one to hold more land than he and his family ould cultivate—that is, more than a farm of 120 acres—and ts attempt to communalise all trade and industry—this communism went straighter to the heart of things than all the minimum programmes of our own time, or even all the maximum preambles of such programmes.

In any case, what we learn to-day from the study of the Great Revolution is, that it was the source and origin of all the present communist, anarchist, and socialist conceptions. We have but badly understood our common mother, but now we have found her again in the midst of the *sans-culottes*, and we see what we have to learn from her.

Humanity advances by stages and these stages have been marked for several hundred years by great revolutions. After the Netherlands came England with her revolution in 1648–1657, and then it was the turn of France. Each great revolution has in it, besides, something special and original. England and France both abolished royal absolutism. But in doing so England was chiefly interested in the personal rights of the individual, particularly in matters of religion, as well as the local rights of every parish and every community. As to France, she turned her chief attention to the land question, and in striking a mortal blow at the feudal system she struck also at the great fortunes, and sent forth into the world the idea of nationalising the soil, and of socialising commerce and the chief industries.

Which of the nations will take upon herself the terrible but glorious task of the next great revolution? One may have thought for a time that it would be Russia. But if she should push her revolution further than the mere limitation of the imperial power; if she touches the land question in a revolutionary spirit—how far will she go? Will she know how to avoid the mistake made by the French Assemblies, and will she socialise the land and give it only to those who want to

cultivate it with their own hands? We know not: any answer to this question would belong to the domain of prophecy.

The one thing certain is, that whatsoever nation enters on the path of revolution in our own day, it will be heir to all our forefathers have done in France. The blood they shed was shed for humanity—the sufferings they endured were borne for the entire human race; their struggles, the ideas they gave to the world, the shock of those ideas, are all included in the heritage of mankind. All have borne fruit and will bear more still finer, as we advance towards those wide horizons opening out before us, where, like some great beacon to point the way, flame the words—LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY.

INDEX

Abbaye (prison), soldiers released from, 69; attacked by Federals, 297; massacres at, 299
Absolutism, abolition of, 577–79
Acapts, 203
Agrarian Law, fear of, 169; progress of, 242; repudiated by "Gironde," 342; meaning of, 403–4; supporters penalised, 500
Agrier, 203
Aiguillon, Duc d', against feudalism, 121
Albitte, socialism of, 506, 507
Allier, Claude, organises conspiracy, 250, 251
Allies, mistake of, 466
"Amalgams," 545, 548, 549
Amar, reports on Girondins, 514; attacked, 544
America, North, inspires liberty, 21 *et seq.*; young Republic of, 141
"Ami du Peuple," 395
Anarchism, principles of, 184; beliefs of, 354–55; modern, 365
Anarchists, 4, 13; side with people, 346; persecution of, 347; denounced by Brissot, 350, 392; influence of, 353, 357; attacked by Girondins, 359; called Coblentzians, 486; called Levellers, 511
Anarchy defined by Brissot, 351; in politics, 479
"Ancien régime," vices of, 149
Angremont d', conspiracy of, 293
"Annales patriotiques," *quoted*, 305, 307–8
"Ansässigen," 416; deprived of rights, 418
Archbishop of Arles, tried and executed, 302
Archives, National, records of peasant risings in, 39
Archives of France, vi., provincial, importance of, 409
Argenson, d', *cited*, 12
Argonne, Forest of, Prussians halt in, 325
Aristocracy, worst form of, 499
Arles, Archbishop, accused of massacre, 302
Armies, Four, of France, 556
Arms, search for, 294
Army, French, weakness of, 284; unreliability of, 290; corruption in, 223, 329
German, enters France, on frontier, 323, 324–25; retreat of, 325; recrosses Rhine, 538
of Republic (Fr.), condition of, 462–63; disorganisation and tactics of, 464; retreat of, 465; reorganisation of, 410, 515
Artois, Count d', plans *coup d'état*, hated, 70; escape of, 91; protests against Constitution, 238; in exile, 248; manufactures *assignats*, 444; heads Breton rising, 466
land system in, 417, 433
Assemblies, electoral, in Paris, 47; of Notables, 29, 33, 109; of Representatives, 186; of Commissioners, 273; Village, 416; Communal, 417
Assembly, Constituent, character of, 172; maintains mortmain, 201; reaction in, 202; protects property, 203, 204; imposes redemption, 210;

Assembly, Constituent—*continued*
opposes popular revolution, 214; reinstates King, 233; dissolves, 234; decrees on land, 277; recognises money as merchandise, 374; opposes land solution, 417; abolishes titles, 429; mistakes of, 499
Legislative, sells communal lands, 21; opposes people, 214, 217; formation of, 234; servility of, 237; proceeds against Count de Provence, 239; moderation of, 256; King takes refuge in, 275; threatened, 278, 307; bad policy of, 279; dissolution of, 280; declares against monarchy, 306–7; dissensions in, 315; members bought, 332; disappoints peasants about land, 417; laws of, 418–20; sells *émigrés'* lands, 435; mistake of, 499; sells communal lands, 502
National, inevitability of, 33; enthusiasm in, 118 *et seq.*; condemns riots, 120; temporises over feudal rights, 131; work of, 135, 173; resolutions of, 135; effect on peasants, 136; composition of, 148, 162; threatened, 152; fears people, 159; method of electing, 163–64; opposition to, 167; King's intentions towards, 175; concocts municipal constitution, 184–85; lessens power of Districts, 191; destroys feudalism, 198; resolutions of 200 legalises feudalism, 205; ignores King, 232; reaction in, 232–33; suppresses Lafayette's letter, 245; absolves Lafayette, 285; yields to threats, 288; libels on, 289. *Vide* National
Assignats, *vide* Paper - currency, issue of, 44, 171, 371; depreciation of, 434, 442–3; forging of, 444
Atheism, 479
Avenel, *cited*, 327; *quoted*, 433, 455, 502, 547
August 4, renunciations of, 118 *et seq.*
Aulard, research by, v., *quoted*, 39, 101, 217, 220, 245, 298, 316, 319, 365, 366, 367, 473, 506, 507, 521, 525; *cited*, 481, 482, 483, 526, 527
Aumont, Duke d', refuses command of National Guards, 76
Austria, army, on frontier, 224; urged to invade, 239; war declared against, 240
"Austrian Committee," 283
Author, *cited*, 40
Autonomy of towns, 100

Babeau, *quoted*, 98, 99
Babeuf, apostle of communism, 489, 490, 491, 492, 494, 579; conspiracy of, 485, 569, 571; suicide of, 571
Bachmann (Commander of Swiss), escapes punishment, 293
Bailly (Mayor of Paris), President of Assembly, 56; pins tricolour in King's hat, 91; on Municipal Council, 101; *quoted*, 152; importance of, 160; plans organisation, 183; agrees to free assembly, 184–85; demands dismissal of ministers, 192; execution of, 517; a freemason, 540
Balkan States, *cited*, 579
Banalités, 37, 129, 131, 202
Bankruptcy of State, 33, 149, 168
Banquets, October 1 and October 3, 1789, 152, 153
Barbaroux, justifies massacres, 321; favours centralisation, 367; stirs up revolt, 368, 446
Barbès, secret society of, 580
Barbot, Berthelet de (Abbé), narrative of, 302
Barentain (Keeper of Seals), addresses States General, 51–52, 54; hooted by people, 56
Barère, suggests Commission of Twelve, 397; report of, 441, 500; takes lead, 483; daring

Barère—*continued*
of, 511; attachment to Robespierre, 565, 567
Barnave, silence of, 35; member of Breton Club, 61; in middle-class triumvirate, 162; won over by King, 332; executed, 517
Bastille, taking of (July 14, 1789), official account, 57; true version, 58; *78 et seq.*, 87
Batz, Baron de, conspires with Count d'Artois, 444; organises Queen's escape, 516; cleverness of, 539; agent of, on Committee of Public Safety, 561
Baudot, *quoted*, 369; explains Girondins' defence of property, 485; *cited*, 550
Bault, warder of Queen, 516
Bayon, pursues King, 228
Bazire, tries to stop massacres, 299; in royalist plot, 539; tried and executed, 548
Beauvais, Bishop of, stoned, 56
Beck, Baron de, Prussian Minister, objects to clemency, 335
"Bed of Justice," 25–26
Bedoin, burning of, 556
Beffroy, communism of, 498
Beggary, increase of, 30
Benoît (banker) in Royalist plot, 539
Bernardins, the massacre of convicts at, 303
Bernier, heads Council of Insurrection, 386
Berthier, arrested, 92; trampled to death, 93; effect of death, 100; memory of, 149
Besançon, rising at, 27
Besenval, Marquis de, commands troops in Paris, *72*, 78, 80
Betrayals, 282 *et seq.*
Beuvron, Duchess de, boasts of, 65
Bicêtre (prison), loathed by people, 79; massacres at, 303
Billaud-Varennes, in war-council, 305; against wealth, 486; makes terms with Communists, 500; insight of, 501; on Committee of Public Welfare, 535; slanders Hébertists, 545; attacked by Robespierre, 565–67
"Blackgangs" (*Bandes noires*), speculations of, 511
Blanc, Louis, *quoted* and *cited*, 59, 62, 134, 161, 172, 227, 299, 321, 366, 367, 444, 450, 557, 568; as authoritarian, 194; criticises Robespierre, 243–44; on leaders, 272; excellent at description, 274; criticises Brissot, 356; cites law of suspects, 513; on freemasons, 540; guillotine statistics of, 561
"Blancs," origin of, 290
Blanqui, secret society of, 580
"Blue Terror," 430
Boissel, communism of, 488; *Catéchisme* of, 490; *note*, 491
Bonaparte, Napoleon, vanity of, 464; way paved for, 492; *coup d'état* of, 572
Boncerf, *quoted*, 130–31
"Bonnet rouge" (cap of liberty), 308
Bonneville, appeals to arms, 69
Book of National Charity, 506
"Bornage," 414–15
"Bouche de fer sec," 85
Boucheron, *quoted*, 85
Bouchotte, Minister of War, 467, 534
Bouillé, Marquis de, in royalist plot, 153; commands army of east, 223; massacres at Metz, 224–25
Bourbotte, executed, 570
Bourdon (of the Oise), *quoted*, 369; as Dantonist, 535; attacks Commission of Public Welfare, 537
Bourgeoisie, prosperity of, 376; peasant, 416; power of, 578; *vide* middle classes
Bourges, priests abdicate at, 523
"Bread for all" (1793), 355
Bread, scarcity of, 235; prices of, 438 *et seq.*
Breda, taken by Dumouriez, 383
Brest, federals from, 272
Breteuil, Baron de, effigy of, burned 29; plots with Court, 65, 153; changes prison into granary, 79; corresponds with Fersen, 335

Bretons, civic hymn of, 446
Bridet, Pierre, proposes land nationalisation, 424
Brienne, Loménie de (Archbishop of Sens), Minister, 28, 33
" Brigands," legend of the, 114, 116, 207
Brisson, ex-*curé*, resigns, 523
Brissot, municipal constitution of, 184 ; politics of, 197 ; against people, 241 ; against Republic, 284 ; *quoted*, 293 ; house of, searched, 295, 307 ; *cited*, 305 ; negotiates with England, 327 ; accused by Billaud-Varenne, 338 ; leads " Gironde," 341 ; defends property, 341 ; rival of Robespierre, 344, 367 ; pamphlets of, 346, 349 *et seq.* ; attacks Revolutionists, 347 ; on crimes of Anarchists, 354 *et seq.* ; knows England, 382 ; " To his Constituents," 392 ; stirs up revolt, 446 ; on Commission of Constitution, 470 ; attacks communism, 486; attacks Montagnards, 500 ; a freemason, 540
" Brissotins," 399
British Museum, Pamphlets in, vi., 224, 338, 420, 441, 490, 491, 523
Brittany, risings in, 26 *et seq.* ; disturbances in, 39 ; counter-revolution in, 383, 445 ; discontent in, 433
Broglie, Marshal de, plots with Court, 65 ; defied by people, 70 ; threatens Paris, 71, 80 ; fails King, 91 ; plans *coup d'état*, 92
Brunot, won over by Royalists, 516
Brunswick, D. of, intrigues of, 290 ; fear of, 292 ; aspires to throne 307–8 ; marches on Coblentz, 324 ; defeat of, 325 ; negotiations with, 331 ; mildness of, 335
Brussels, *émigrés* at, 17
Bruyère, La, *quoted*, 436
Buchez and Roux, *quoted* and *cited*, 127, 128, 135, 152, 187, 299, 300, 304–5, 314, 439
Buonarotti, explains 9th Thermidor, 507 ; *cited*, 550 ; commission of, 579
" Bureau de Ville," 186
Buzot, protests against martial law, 161 ; *cited*, 344 ; stirs up revolt, 446 ; *Mémoires* of, *quoted*, 447

Café du Caveau, patriots enrol at, 70
Cahier Général, 36 ; d'Aval, Song in, 113
Cahiers de doléances, 35 ; moderation of, 36 ; pamphlet on, 37 ; demand destruction of Bastille 79 ; delayed, 103 ; on elections, 112 ; socialism in, 484–85
" Ça ira " sung by volunteers, 323, 324
Calendar, Republican, 519
Calende, ex-*curé*, resigns, 523
Calonne, effigy burned, 26, 29 ; convokes Assembly of Notables (1787), 33 ; dismissed, 33
Cambacerès, advises Convention, 385 ; disloyalty of, 464
Cambon, ideas on landed property, 327 ; issues new paper-currency, 380 ; proposes forced loan, 396, 410, and disestablishment of church, 520 ; as Terrorist, 535 ; authority in finance, 550 ; abused by Robespierre, 566–67
Campan, Mme., disclosures of, 155
Canton (system), partisans of, enemies of Commune, 475
Carmelite Convent, massacre at, 302
Carnot, authority in war, 550 ; attacked by Robespierre, 550
Carra, *quoted*, 307 ; denounced by Robespierre, 307–8
Carrier, drowns prisoners at Nantes, 457 ; amnestied, 542 ; advocates insurrection, 545
Carteaux commands Rep. troops, 459
Cathelineau, Vendean leader, 386, 456
Catherine II. (Russia) helps counter-revolution, 253

Catholicism, triumph of, 527
Cassagnac, Granier de, *cited*, 296, 302
Casuels, 203
Cazotte, saved by Maillard, 301; daughter of, 302
Cellier arrested, 545; succeeds Chaumette, 546
Centralisation, evils of, 149
Chabot, silenced, 285; tries to stop massacres, 299; motion of, 306; tried and executed, 540, 548
Chalier, represents people at Lyons, 377; leads workers and arrested, 459; head carried through streets, 538; forefather of Fourierism, 579
Chambery, taken, 326
Chambon succeeds Pétion, 322
Champerty (*champart*), 203, 209
Champion (ex-*curé*), resignation of, 523
Champs-de-Mars, *Fête* in, 178; massacre in, 179, 233, 257
Chapelier, Le, guillotined, 559
Charette, urges peasants to kill Republicans, 387; brutality of, 457; massacres prisoners, 515
Charles I. (England), influence of history on Louis XVI., 91, 151
Charrier, chief of counter-revolution, 250
Chartres, Duke de, candidate for throne, 308, 326, 331; intrigues with Dumouriez, 326, 387; fails with soldiers, 388
Chassin, *quoted* and *cited*, 36, 42, 43, 44, 69, 73, 79, 386, 484, 485
Châteaux burned, 42, 95, 113, 115, 135, 207, 252
Châtelet (prison), revolt in, 73
Châtellier, du, *cited*, 40; *quoted*, 126
Chaumette, *quoted*, 245, 246, 273, 396; Procurator of Commune, 322, 364; law of maximum of, 375; demands revolutionary tribunal, 385; promotes income tax, 396; advocates market-gardening, 496; accuses Roux, 504; arrested, 505; promises bread, 510; purifies revolutionary committees, 513; new cult preached, 520, 522; organises *fête*, 524; guillotined, 527, 546; communism of, 534; attacked by Desmoulins, 536; arrested, 545; character, 547
"Chemises Rouges," 560
Chevalier, François, describes massacre in Vendée, 386
Chèvremont, *cited*, 395
Chiennage, 202
Chiffonistes, 251
Chollet, Vendeans defeated at 515
Chouans, costume of, 570
"Chronique de Paris," *cited*, 305, 307; foretells Manat's death, 450
Church, tithes relinquished, 132; property, value of, 169; expropriation of—lands voted, 170, and speculation in, 171; liquidation of property, 185; treasures sent to Mint, 522
Ci-devants, expelled from Paris, 555
"Citizen Kings," 157
Citizens, "active and passive," 163 *et seq.*, 191, 212; respon- of, 209
Civic Fasts, 439
Civil War, avoided, 306; fear of, 384
Clairvaux, papers found at, 409
Claude Payan, Mayor of Paris, 546
Clavière (Girondist Minister of Finance), 240, 318; dismissed, 244
Clermont-Tonnerre dissolves Grenoble *parlement*, 27
Clive, Ed. Le, *cited*, 40; *quoted*, 114
Cloots, Anacharsis, advocates internationalism, 522; organises *Fête* of Liberty, 524; enthusiasm of, 525; attacked by Robespierre, 536; charge against, 545, guillotined, 546
Club, Breton, revolutionary centre, 60, 61, 64 (*vide* Jacobins)
Constitutional, formed, 43
Cordeliers' (*vide* Cordeliers)

" Coalition of Kings," 336
Coblentz, *émigrés* at, 17, 248, 249, 332
Coburg, Duke of, proclamation, 388; besieges Le Quesnoy, 467
Coffinhal, tries to save Robespierre, 567
Collardot resigns, 253
" Collectivism," founders of, 11, 253
Colonies, English, revolt of, 22
Combes, Anacharsis, *cited*, 40; *quoted*, 114
" Commerçantistes," 253
Commerce, a social function, 498
Commission of Twelve, 347; consternation of, 292; prosecution of sections, 397; suppressed, 400, 403
of Six, 399, 474
Commissioners of Convention, supervise war, 389; levy toll from rich, 463; march sword in hand, 468; functions of, 480–81; defects of, 482; attacked by people, 498; treat with foreign Courts, 516; stringent measures of, 527
of Departments, 366
of Sections, 314
Committee, Agricultural, 494, 498;
Civil (of Districts), 182
of Commerce, 498
of Defence, 472
District assumes police duties, 530
Feudal, report of, 200
to frame Constitution, 470
of General Safety, *vide* Public Safety
Insurrectionary, good sense of, 274; wins Commune, 388
of Militia, 82
Permanent, 69; illegality of, 128
of Public Instruction, 518
of Public Safety (April 1793), 319; deterioration of, 365; ferocity of, 394–95, 458; dictatorship of, 471; authority of, 480; suppresses Communism, 506;
Committee of Public Safety—*continued*
power of, 508; policy of, 509; constitution of, 509; incapacity of, 511; jealous of Commune, 512, 550; sinister force of, 513; organises relief works, 530; controls police, 531; new power given to, 544; triumph of, 546; used by Robespierre, 550; unpopularity of, 565
of Public Welfare, deteriorates, 365; formed, 388–89; treats with Austria, 467; dictatorship of, 468, 477, 480; pompous circular of, 505; suppresses communism, 506; constitution of, 508–9; power of, 508, 534–35; policy of, 509; opposes cult of Reason, 525; demands decree on religious liberty, 526; accused of incapacity and treachery, 536–37; authority restored, 538; parries attack, 538; slanders Hébertists, 545; attacked by Robespierre, 566
Revolutionary, orders arrest of Girondins, 403
Search, 531
of " Subsistence," 53; report of, 63
Watch, of Commune, 301
Committees, Civic, functions of, 193–94
Revolutionary, 477
Commune, definition of, 189–90; *Actes de la*, 186
of Paris, 77, 183; popular work of, 180 *et seq.*; divisions of, 182; coerces National Assembly, 187; functions of, 219; attacks property, 245; Revolutionary, 273; Insurrectionary, 275; power of, 281, 357; holds King prisoner, 283; threatens massacre, 288; foresight of, 292; opposes Directory, 292; releases prisoners, 294; attacked by Assembly, 295; rings

Commune of Paris—*continued*
tocsin, 296; protects prisoners, 298 *et seq.*; stops massacres, 303; how constituted, 312; at Hôtel de Ville, 315; authority of, 319; attacked by Gironde, 317; honesty questioned, 320; success of attack on, 322; constitution of (1793), 322; demands trial of King, 332; differs from Convention, 340; dissolution demanded, 347; anarchists rally round, 353; dissolution of, 364; hoists black flag, 383; backs Jacobin Triumvirate, 384; collaborates with "Mountain," 388; decrees progressive income tax, 396; opposes Terror, 400; levies tax on rich, 403; fixes maximum and reorganises army, 410; power of, destroyed, 472, 532; real strength of, 528; separated from Sections, 531; agrees with Hébertists and downfall of, 547
of France, 176
of Strasbourg, 105
Communes, administration and creation of, 165; federation of, 315
Peasant, joint responsibility of, 210, 279
Village, composition of (1789), 211
Communism, signs of, 41; importance of, 101; Godwin's, 327; supporters of, 451; of Republic, 362–63, 580; efforts towards, 369; tendencies towards, 474; warnings against, 485; in Revolution, 488–89, 579; at Lyons, 496
Constructive, need of, 499
Communist Movement (1891), 363; 484 *et seq.*, 500 *et seq.*; representatives of, 487
Communists, threatened by Convention, 500; of the "Forties," 498
"Compagnies de Jesus," massacres by, 571
du Soleil," massacres by, 571
"Compromising auxiliaries," 74–75
Conches, J. Feuillet de, *quoted*, 28, 135
Conciergerie (prison), attacked, 298
Queen in, 516
Condé, Prince de, plans *coup d'état* 54, 65
occupied by Austrians, 387
Condorcet, municipal scheme of, 192; sincerity of, 243; supports Republic, 307; defends free trade, 373; and equality, 484; author of Constitution, 470; communism of, 485; suicide of, 517; a freemason, 540
"Confederation of Clubs," 151
Confederation, National, 188
"Conquest of Power," 196–97
Considérant, communism of, 488
Conspiracies, at Grenoble, 248; in South, 248
"Conspiracy of the Right," 567
Constitution, discussed, 20, 68; of 1791, 102, 343; oath to, 178; *quoted*, 192; function of, 256; framing of, 470 *et seq.*; democratic character of and summary of, 473; Montagnards', 475; proclaimed, 476
Constitutional Government, first conditions of, 160; guarantees of, 475
Constitutionalists, royalist, limitations of, 36
Conti, Prince de, plans *coup d'état*, 54
Convention, National, contests in, 14; abolishes feudal system 210; convoked, 280; how elected, 309; three parties in; abolishes royalty, 310; Conservatives in, 311; cowardice of, 316; conflicts with, 318 *et seq.*; orders prosecution for massacres, 321; defies monarchies, 327; sovereign rights of, 333; decrees King's trial, 337; publishes pamphlets, 338; votes on King's sentence, 339; differs from Commune, 340;

Convention, National—*continued*
inactivity of, 362, 424; purification of, 364, 385; struggle in, 369; raises bread fund, 375; middle-class power in, 376; levies men, 380; tries to grasp judicial power, 385; helplessness of, 386; grasps executive power, 388; treachery in, 390; child of Revolution, 391; battles in, 395–97; besieged by people, 400, 402; galleries opened to public, 403; tries to overawe people, 404; legislative work of, 407; false step of, 422; legislative stability of, 426; abolishes pecuniary rights, 429; breaks up large estates, 434; fixes maximum, 439–441; Commissioners, zeal of, 448; work finished, 476–79, 481; attempts socialisation, 498; mistakes of, 499; threatens Communists, 500; defends middle classes, 507; checks speculation, 512; jealous of Commune, 513; free fight in, 514; accepts Revolutionary Government, 515; receives resignation of bishops, 522–23; refuses to broach question of priests' pay 524–25; storm in, 566; dissolves, 571; wrecking of, 573
Co-proprietorship, 496
Corday, Charlotte d'Armont, 447, 449–50
Cordeliers, demand Republic, 232; reaction among, 238; attack property, 245; aid Fraternal Societies, 257; favour Republic, 284; support rising, 291; reinforce Jacobin Club, 317; champion communism, 487; action of, 538, 544
Club of, 197; anarchists in, 353; Robespierre visits, 503; Hébertists in, 534
Corney, Ethis de, parleys with de Launey, 83, 84, 85
Corporations of Guilds, abolished, 19
Correspondence bureaux, 182
Cost of production, inquiry into 442
Council, General, of Paris Commune, suppressed, 190; elected by people, 287; attacked, 295; change in, 364; hastens events, 525; appeals to people, 567
General of Departments, constitution of, 166; functions of, 530–31
General Revolutionary, 402
Ministerial, 318–19
Municipal, pays members, 371
Provisory Executive, 389
of the Three Hundred, 160
Councils, of Departments, 166; functions of, 530; take police duties, 531
local, election of, 164
take pledge against violence, 401
Counter-revolution, 176, 220, 221, 223, 245, 247, 251, 363–64, 404, 445 537, 556
Coup d'état, of August 10, 275
of Counter-revolution, 256
of Court, 54, 56, 57 *et seq.*, 68, 71; fails, 87; doubted, 91, 154; supported by foreign Courts, 244
of Girondins, 359, 537
of Napoleon III., 336
of Thermidor 311, 317, 341
Coupe, abolished, 114
"Courrier Français," *quoted*, 113
Parisien," *quoted*, 128
de Versailles et de Paris," *quoted*, 63
Court, rejects overtures, 48; middle class supports, 76–77; stupidity of, 89; intrigues with foreigners, 162
Party, 58
Plots, 64, 65 *et seq.*, 150, 274; evidence of, 283
Courtois, *cited*, 552
Couthon, report on land laws, 277; criticises "Gironde," 344; raises army of peasants, 460–61; favours pacification, 461; mocks relics, 526; Robespierrist, 535; arrested, 567
Crown Lands, division of, 433

"Culottes dorées" invade Sections, 371
"Cult of Supreme Being," 527
Currents, Two, of Revolution, 1 *et seq.*
popular, 195
Cusset, advocates nationalisation of industries, 496
Custine, commands Republican army, 326; retreats, 387, 465

Dalloz, *cited*, 199, 205; *quoted*, 198, 418–19
Danton, silence of, 35; rouses people, 154; inspires masses, 183; policy of, 192; demands dismissal of ministers, 192; persecution of, 234; in London, 235; inactivity of, 273; supports Sections, 291; courage of, 292; orders search for arms, 294; saves prisoners, 298 *et seq.*; Minister of Justice, 318; forced to resign, made Minister of Foreign Affairs, 319; libelled, negotiates with D. of Brunswick, 325; frustrates plots in Brittany, 326; treats with England, 327; parleys with Prussians, 331; demands King's condemnation, 338; stays with army, 338; respects property, 343; believes in English Whigs, 382; appeals for unity and patriotism, 383; incites rising, 384; insists on action, 385; tries to win back Dumouriez, 387; activity of, 389; tries compromise, 392; opposes Terror, 400; secret negotiations of, 467; daring of, 511; speaks of "armed nation," 512; renews energy, 515; returns to Paris, 525; attacks atheism, 526; group of, 535; weary of mankind, 537; a freemason, 540; arrested, tried and executed, 548; illusion of, 556
Dauch, Martin, refuses oath in Tennis Court, 56
Daudet, Ernest, *quoted*, 248, 251
Daunon, speaks in favour of King, 338
Dauphiné, insurrections in, 27; executions in, 128, 166
Debt, National, 171
Declaration of Rights, 22, 163, 473, 500
Decrees (1790), re-establish feudalism, 201; spurious, 207
"Defenders of property," 197
Delaunay, forgery of, 539; trial of, 548
Demeunier proposes joint redemption, 134
Democracy, influence of, 147
Departments, Government, 160
Deputies, flight of, 292
Deschamps against Sections, 529
Desèze defends King, 338
Desmoulins, Camille, speech of, 57
appeals to arms, 72; exults, 159; despairs, 235; a Dantonist, 535; calumnies of, 536–37, 538, excluded from Jacobin Club, 539; rejoices at Hébertists fall, 547; arrested, tried, executed, 548
Lucile, journal, *cited*, 273; guillotined, 546
Desormaux, ex-canon, resigns, 523
Dessonville conspires, 293
"Deux Amis de la Liberté," *quoted*, 79, 94, 127; *cited*, 227
Deville, proves injustice to Babeuf, 491
Dictatorship, military, forced on France, 328
Diderot, socialistic ideas of, 484
Dietrich congratulates new *régime* at Strasbourg, 105
Dijon, riots at, 23
"Direct action," 190
"Direct Self-Government," 183
Directories, revolutionary, 216; favours counter-revolution, 364; strengthened, 472
Directory, attempts progressive taxation, 411; succeeds Convention, 571
Disorder, the use of, 345
"Distribution of Produce," 488
Districts of Paris organise resistance, 69, 180 *et seq.*; autonomy of, 182

Dolivier, Pierre, sympathises with people, 242 ; favours agrarian law, 243 ; on land question, 494–95 ; insight of, 498–99
" Don gratuit," 39
Doniol, *quoted*, 111
Dragoons fraternise with people, 70
Drouet pursues and captures King, 227 *et seq.*
Droz, *quoted*, 48, 79
Dubarry, Madame, guillotined, 517
Dubois (Minister), house of, burned, 28
Dubois (*curé*), resigns, 523
Dubois-Crancé treats with Lyons, 460
Ducos accuses " Mountain," 337
Ducroquet arrested, 545
Dufourney against sectional societies, 529
Dulaure, *cited*, 40
Dumantier resigns, 253
Dumas, letter of, 80
Dumouriez at Caen, 65 ; treachery of, 236, 380, 381, 383, 387, 388 ; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 240 ; supports Duke de Chartres, 308, 326, 387 ; plans invasion of Belgium, 324 ; victory of, at Valmy, 325 ; intrigues with Jacobins, 326 ; enters Belgium, 326 ; hastens to Paris, 338 ; defeat of, at Neerwinden, 346 ; beguiled by Pitt, 382 ; suspected, 383 ; makes pact with Austrians, 383 ; retreats, 387 ; treachery of, confirmed, 388 ; frustrated, 390
Duperret receives Ch. Corday, 449
Duport, Adrien, arms middle classes, 117 ; forms " Confederation of Clubs," 151 ; in Moderate Triumvirate, 162 ; *quoted* by Michelet, 533
Duquesnoy executed, 570
Duranthon, Minister for Justice, 240
Duroy executed, 570
Dusaulx, *quoted*, 73 ; tries to stop September massacres, 299

Edicts forged, 23
Education, scheme of, 517
Egalité de fait, 403, 479, 493
Eglantine, Fabre d', points out injustice of land laws, 420 ; names months for Republican Calendar, 519 ; a Dantonist, 535 ; attacks Committee of Public Welfare, 537 ; arrested, 539 ; guillotined, 540
Elections, qualifications for, 164 ; new law for, 277
Elisabeth, Mme., letter on feudal rights, 135 ; negotiations concerning, 331 ; guillotined, 559
Emigration of nobility, 238–39
Emigrés (emigrant nobles) abandon King, 17 ; arrest of, 92 ; speculate, 219 ; decrees against 235 ; intrigues of, 238 ; ordered to return, 239 ; activity of, 245 ; obstinacy of, 249 ; at Chambéry, 250 ; return to Paris, 290 ; falsehoods of, 324 ; flock to Turin, 383 ; in Jersey, 384 ; fight at Lyons, 460
Enclosure Acts, effect of, 97
Encyclopedists, influence of, 170
England, example of, 8 ; war with, 22, 381 ; helps counter-revolution, 251–52 ; attacks west of France, 253 ; *rôle* of, 327 ; policy of, 328, 465 ; as model for Girondins, 343 ; aims at French sea-power, 381 *et seq.* ; effect of war with, 437 ; false *assignats* made in, 444 ; subsidises Prussia, 469
English Ambassador, testimony of, 75
Government helps Royalists, 446
Revolution taken as model, 196
Enragés (Extremists), character of, 362 ; support Varlet and Roux, 372 ; insight of, 373 ; used against " Gironde," 376 ; inspire people, 385 ; lead in Paris, 388 ; demand " Terror," 400 ; defend property, 401 ; desire equality, 487 ; conciliated, 500 ; suppressed, 345, 534
Entraigues, d', *Les Droits des Etats-Généraux*, by, 46
Epsic (Benedictine) resigns, 523

"Equalisation of Wealth," 241, 243, 484
Equality, doctrine of, 143; opposed, 147; aim of poor, 277; era of, 315; danger to property of, 349; effort towards, 369
Erckmann and Chatrian, *cited*, 38
Espagnac, Abbé d', executed, 540
Espréminil, d', opposes old *régime*, 35; injured by crowd, 55; guillotined, 559
Estaing, Count d', letter of, to Queen, 227
Eudistes refuse oath to Constitution, 294
Europe indebted to French peasants, 578–79
Everard, Catherine, eulogy of, 450
Evolution, 102, 576
Exchequer Court, protest by, 26
Existence, sacredness of, 405
"Expropriation," fear of, 170
Extremists, *vide Enragés*

"Families," the, 416
Famine extent of, 46 *et seq.*; "Compact," 149; in 1792, 328; all over France, 362; increase of, 395; disappearance of, 435–36; struggle against, 437 *et seq.*
Farms, limitation of, 497–98
Faubourgs, St. Antoine and St. Marceau, attack Tuileries, 276
Fauchet, Abbé, founds "Cercle Social," 496
Federalism of Girondins, 365, 366
Federals from Brest and Marseilles, 272, 275
Federation of counter-revolution, 250; of districts, 183–84, 187
Fersen, Count, correspondence of, 155, 335, 516; discusses Council of Regency, 466
Festivals, popular, 177
Fête of Federation, 174 *et seq.*, 187, 223; gives firm basis to Revolution, 250
of Liberty and Reason, 524
of Supreme Being, 527
Feudal Law, Sagnac *quoted* on, 205–6; renewed, 202 *et seq.*
Dues, 37 *et seq.*, 99 *et seq.*;
Feudal Dues—*continued*
redemption of, 201; exacted 207; enumerated, 202 *et seq.*; sacredness of, 210; abolished, 278; question of, 361
Legislation (1790), 205 *et seq.*; 209 *et seq.*
Rights, linked with royalty, 60; in towns, 99; effect of, 111; upheld, 129 *et seq.*; abolition pronounced, 134; but delayed, 195 *et seq.*; retention of, 278; final abolition of, 427 *et seq.*
"Feudal Seizure" abolished, 210
Feudal System, hatred of, 14, 414; broken at Strasbourg, 105; decrees against, 210; land under, 413 *et seq.*
Taxes refused, 44
Feudalism, survivals of, 36, 255; re-established, 201
Feuillants, Club of, 221; position of, 238; fight patriots, 252; oppose Republic, 308; treachery of, 462
Fils de famille, battalions of, 383
Finances, condition of, 32; difficulties of, 168 *et seq.*
Flammermont, *quoted*, 71, 74, 80, 84, 85
Flanders, regiment of, 153
Flesselles (Provost of Merchants) corresponds with Court, 65; disarms people, 76–77; shot, 86–87
Fleuriot-Lescaut succeeds Pache, 546
Fleurus, victory of, 564
Fonfrède arrested, 445
Force, La (prison), attacked, 73, 298
"Forced loans," 242, 409–10; in Hérault, 411
"Forty Years' Possession Act," 421, 423
Foubert, M. L., *quoted*, 189, *cited*, 191
Fouché, socialism of, 506–7; on burial, 521; attacked by Robespierre, 565
Foulon, arrested, 92; hanged, 93; effect of death of, 100, 149

Fouquier-Tinville, Public Prosecutor, 509; "accelerates pleadings," 517
Fourier, ideas of, 373; followers of, 488; teaching of, 498
Fourierism, descent of, 579
Fournées ("batches"), 514; horror of, 561, 564
Fournier inspires people, 385
"Fourth Legislative Body," 529
Fox, Charles James, hopes in, 467
France, financial ruin of, 22; unification of, 177–78; transformation of, 346; divided into hostile camps, 361–62; regenerated, 408–9, 574; democratised, 436; interior condition of, 465–66; organised in communes, 476; communist spirit in, 506; dechristianising of, 519–21; productivity of, 575
Franc-fief, 59
François (of Neufchâteau), motion of, 279; tries to stop massacres 299; proposes division of communal lands, 418
Frankfort-on-the-Maine, occupied by *sans-culottes*, 326
Fraternal societies, task of, 257
"Fraternité, La," *quoted*, 509
Freedom of opinion, 143
Freemasons, Brotherhood of, revolutionaries in, 331
Free trade, in grain, 19; opposed, 497
Fréon organises *jeunesse dorée*, 570
Fréron persecuted, 234
Freys (Austrian Bankers), in plot, 539; executed, 540
"Fury of purification," 303

Gabelle (salt tax) abolished, 169
Gaillard, suicide of, 505
Gamain reveals secret safe, 293, 332
Game laws, 59; abolished, 121, 126, 133
Garat succeeds Danton, 319
Gardes françaises, *vide* Guards
Garnier, letters of, 527
Gay-Vernon, Bishop, resigns, 522
Gazette de Paris, editor of, recruits Royalists, 248
Geneva, emancipation of, 44
Gensonné accused, 338; fails Danton, 387; under home-arrest, 445; on Constitution Committee, 470
German armies, expected in Paris, 256; influence of, 257
Germany, comparison with, 214; attacks Alsace and Lorraine, 253
Gertruydenberge taken, 383
Girant, evidence of, 321
Girey-Dupré executed, 517
"Gironde," the, programme of, 62; defends property, 106, 358; composition of, 310, 311; protects King, 312; impotence of, 319; opposes King's trial, 333; *versus* "Mountain," 340 *et seq.*; tries to end Revolution, 359; rallies reaction, 363; necessary to crush, 378; sends volunteers, 379; hostility to, 402
Girondins, party of, 197, 310; position of, 238; agree with Court, 241; ministry of, 240, 244, 292, 318; fight Anarchists, 252, 384; indecision of, 276; attitude towards massacres, 304–5; ready to admit foreign troops, 307; power of, 311; work against Revolution, 319 *et seq.*, 348 *et seq.*; try to form reactionary guard, 321; expelled, 322, 398, 404; favour war, 323; attack Convention, 327; accuse "Mountain," 333; try to save King, 336–37; policy and aims of, 341–42, 389; characteristics of, and hatred for people, 344, 348; methods of, 346; intrigues of, 347; dreams of, 348; object to equality, 352; programme of, 359; Robespierre's opinion of, 360; ambition of, 369; attack sections, 371; accuse "Mountain," 375; printing-presses of, smashed, 385; fall inevitable, 390; persecute Marat, 393; failure of, 395; incite departments against Paris, 397, 406; out-

Girondins—*continued*
lawed, 406; result of expulsion, 407; opposed to "maximum," 441; stir up revolt, 445, 455–56; work with Royalists, 446; discouraged by Bretons, 447; *Marseillaise* of, 447; defeat of, 459; in hiding, 461; treachery of, 462; in framing Constitution, 470 *et seq.*; use Constitution, 471; divide legislative body, 473; ideas of, 474; spread calumnies, 476; prosecution of, demanded, 514; execution of, 22, 517; similarity with Jacobins, 533
Glezen, 60
Gobel (Bishop of Paris) resigns, 522; guillotined, 527, 546
Godwin, W., *cited*, 184, 327, 373
Goethe at Battle of Valmy, 325
Gorsas, *quoted*, 63
Goujon executed, 570
Government centralised, 318; federative, 367
Revolutionary, 384, 508 *et seq.*, 545, 555
Grand Châtelet (prison), thieves massacred at, 303
Grand'-Maison (actress) guillotined, 560
Grave, War Minister, 24
"Great Unknown," 272–73
Grégoire, Abbé, 61; report of, 200; refuses to resign, 523
Grenelle, attempt to raise camp at, 571
Grenoble insurrection, 27
Guadet, silence of, 35; stratagem of, 245; report of, 295; speech of, 296; motions of, 307; accused, 338; fails Danton, 387; stirs up revolt 446
Guards, French, refuse to fire, 64; distribute bread, 71; fire on German regiment, 72
Municipal, "restore order," 108
National (faithful to King), formation of, 160; *passive* citizens excluded from, 160; disperse, 274–75; supports
Guards, National—*continued*
people, 275; refuse to stop massacres, 300; officers of, dismissed, 314; controlled by middle classes, 401
Guillaume, helps capture King, 227
James, thanks to, vii; on Resolutions of National Assembly, 137 *et seq.*; on democratic beliefs, 142; *quoted*, 143; *cited*, 199, 518, 555

Hanriot, General of National Guard, 402; terrorises Convention, 404; arrested, 567; released, 568
Hardy (English bookseller), *quoted*, 68, 70
Harvests, effect of, 110, 328
Hassenfratz excuses pillage, 401
"Haves and Have-Nots," 354
Hébert, 305; commissioner of Convention, 273; Procurator of Paris Committee, 364; arrested, 397; anti-religious campaign of, 479; character of, 501; denounces Roux, 504; recommends itinerant guillotine, 512; organises *fête*, 524; burns relics, 525; communism of, 534; attacked by Desmoulins, 536; attacks Amar, 544; arrested, 347, 544; guillotined, 545
Hébertists, struggle against, 533 *et seq.*; miscalculation of, 534; arrest of, 537; fall of, 542 *et seq.*
Helvetius, socialism of, 484
Henri Quatre, statue saluted, 29
Herbois, Collot d', President of National Convention, 309; *quoted*, 439; ordered to destroy Lyons, 479; alludes to title-deeds, 482; makes terms with communists, 500; socialism of, 506–7; on Committee of Public Welfare, 535; attempt to kill, 558–59; attacked by Robespierre, 565–67
Herman proposes to purge prisons, 564

High Court (Orleans), safeguards conspirators, 293
Historians, omissions, 24, 134; shortcoming of, 94–95; ignore counter-revolution, 249; embroideries of, 304; limitations of, 306, 409
Hobbes, *cited*, 6
Hoche takes the offensive, 469
Holbach, school of, 501
Holland threatened, 328, 382
Hondschoote, Duke of York attacked at, 467
Hôtel des Invalides, attack on, proposed, 70; arms seized at, 77; attacked, 80
de Ville, congratulates Assembly, 61; becomes centre of Revolution, 69–74
Hue, de, Commander of Swiss Guards, letter of, 82; saved, 86
Huez, de (Mayor of Troyes), killed by peasants, 107
Hulin attacks Bastille, 85, 86
Hume, *cited*, 6

"Illuminates," vow of, 540
Imbert-Colomiès, royalist agent, 460
Imperative Mandate," 185
Income tax, details of, 410–11
Indian Company, power of, 539
Industries, socialisation of, 493 *et seq.*; nationalisation of, 495–96
Insurrection, *vide* Risings; cause of, 41; uncertainty of, 401
"Intellectuals," retrogression of, 243; disbelieve in Revolution, 256; compared with Radicals, 256; inclined to monarchy, 331
International Working Men's Association, 580; Congress (Bâle, 1869), 487
Interregnum, 282 *et seq.*
Invasion, foreign, 181, 238; supported by foreign Courts, 324
Isnard, President of Convention, 397; threatens to obliterate Paris, 398, 461

Jacobins, reaction of, 221, 238; repudiate Republic, 232; support war, 240; attacked by Lafayette, 244; poverty of, 252; mistaken idea about, 257; advanced party of, 272; threatened, 275, 283; punishment of, planned, 289; support advanced revolutionists, 317; intrigue with Dumouriez, 326; extermination planned by Fersen, 335; "do not understand poor," 374; pledged to defend property, 401; support Committees of Public Welfare and General Safety, 508; jealous of sections, 510
Club (Paris), silence of, 284; electors meet at, 309; declares itself Republican, 310; weapon of "Mountain," 316–17; reinforced by Cordeliers, 317; revokes decrees against Duke of Orléans, 337; influence of, 400; affiliation with, 508; demands trial of Girondins, 512; against Popular Societies, 528; "purification" of, 535; Robespierre complains to, 565
Government concentrate police functions, 530
Republicans, officer army, 462
Jacqueries, 15; necessity of, 52; character of, 115
"Jacques Bonhomme," 110
Jalès, confederation of, corresponds with King and *emigrés*, 250
Jaurès, *cited*, 24, 365, 374, 505; shows error of Michelet, 338; quoted on communist movement, 373; on Marat, 395
Jeanbon, *vide* Saint-André
Jemmapes, victory at, 326
Jewish question, 185
Julien-de-Dieu (Benedictine) resigns, 523
Jullien (Commissioner), letter of, 447; burns title-deed, 482; in Royalist company, 539; trial of, 548; describes *noyades* at Nantes, 542

Jullien—*continued*
Madame, letters *quoted*, 221, 274, 286–87 ; *cited*, 344
July 14 (1790), consequences of, 88 *et seq.* ; importance of, 177
June 2 (1793), rising of, 403
Jura, wheat convoys plundered in, 42
Jureurs and *non-jureurs*, *vide* Priests, 520
" Justices of Peace," 102

KARÉEFF, Professor, *quoted*, 39
Kellerman repulses Piedmontese, 460 ; reinforced by Commissioners, 461
Kérengall, Le Guen de, denounces feudalism, 123
Kersaint, report of, 290 ; embraces Danton, 343 ; executed, 517
King, power of, limited, 335
Kings, right divine of, destroyed, 336
King's Council, decree of (April 3, 1789), 63
Klinckovström, Baron R. M. de, *cited*, 335
Knights of Malta, help counter-revolution, 253
of the Poignard, 246

LACOMBE, Rose, communist, 487 ; leader of revolutionary women, 489
Lacoste, Minister for Marine, 240 ; letter of, 482
Lacroix, Sigismund, *quoted*, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 192 ; arrested, 547 ; tried, 548
Ladmiral tries to kill d'Herbois, 558–59 ; guillotined, 559
Lafayette (Commander of National Guard), plots with Court, 65 ; on Municipal Council, 101 ; at Versailles, 156 ; importance of, 160 ; intrigues, 227 ; chief of Feuillants, 244 ; supports royalty in letter, 245 ; absolved, 274 ; suspected, 285–86 ; denounces Jacobins, 286 ; sides with Royalty, 286 ; treachery discovered, 289 ; fate of, 289 ; plans invasion of Belgium, 324 ; treachery of, 380–81
Lagny, J. de, helps capture King, 228
Laignelot turns church into Temple of Truth, 521
Lalande, a freemason, 540
Lally-Tollendal, letter to King of Prussia, 286
Lamballe, Princess de, killed, 299 ; only woman massacred, 302
Lambesc, Prince de, carriage burned, 75
Lambert, " friend of those who have nothing," 484–85
Lameth, in Triumvirate of Moderates, 162 ; won over by King, 332
Lamoignon (Minister), house burned, 28
Land, registers, destruction of, 40, 429 ; question, 52, 488 ; in America, 143 ; confiscation of, 196 ; importance of, 493 ; socialisation of, 493 *et seq.* ; speculation in, 493 ; inalienability of, 494 ; theories on, 495, 543 ; sales of, bad results, 502 ; mistakes in, 563 *et seq.*
Communal, robbery of, 195 ; question of, 211, 212, 361 ; seizure of, 414 *et seq.* ; restoration of, opposed, 415 ; division of, 418 ; division of, rescinded, 419 ; " grabbed," 420 ; restoration of, 421 ; partition of, 422–23 *et seq.* ; transferred, 425
of *émigrés*, sale of, 277, 279, 280, 396
" Hunger," 14
Laws, 199, 277–78
Ownership, 345, 346
Pensioners', not reserved, 380
System (in Artois), 417
Taxes, 199
Landau, blockade raised, 538
Landed property, subdivision of, 435
Lange, precursor of Fourierism, 373, 459, 490, 496, 497, 498, 579
Lanjuinais, founds Breton Club, 60 ; stirs up revolt, 446
Laumur arrested, 545
Launey, Marquis de (Governor of Bastille), 79 ; defends Bastille, 81 *et seq.* ; capitulates, 85 ; killed, 86 ; memory of, 149

Laussel, leads people at Lyons, 377
Lauzun, commands Republican army, 326
Lavergne, Commandant, letter to, 290
Lavoisier guillotined, 559
" Law of Suspects," 477, 513
Law, municipal and administrative, 165 ; ignored, 193
Laws, social, 476
" Leaders of Thought," cowardice of, 285
" League of United Counties," 446
Le Bas (Commissioner), sent to Lower Rhine, 439 ; in fighting line, 469
Lebrun, in Girondist Ministry, 318
Lechapelier, founds Breton Club, 60
Leclerc, disciple of J. Roux, 489 ; arrested, 505, 545
Lefiot, letters of, 527
Lefranc, priest, resigns, 523
Legacy duties, 242
Legends, use of, 103 ; historic, 118–19 ; revolutionary, 302
Legislation, difficulties of, 215, 216
Legros, *cited*, 481
Lemp, Mayor of Strasbourg, house burned, 103
Lenfant, Abbé, saved, 301
Lenôtre, M. G., *cited*, 228
Lepelletier demands " integral education," 487 ; report of, on education, 518
Lescure, Vendean leader, 456
Lescuyer, murder of, 321
Levellers, *vide* Anarchists
Leymarie, *cited*, 40
Liberty, drawback to, 486 ; religious 526
Lichtenberger, A., *cited*, 496
Liége, military depôt, 382 ; taken by Austrians, 383
Lille, military riots at, 223
Lindet, Robert, 385
Thomas, 522
" Living Wage," 495
Lods et ventes, 203
Longwy invested, 290 ; surrender of, 292, 296, 298, 324
Louis XIV. ordinance of, 414
Louis XV., misery under, 22
Louis XVI., accession of, 2 ; reforms under, 19–20 ; opposes representative Government and dismisses Turgot, 20, 21 ; real character of, 21 ; good intention of, 23 ; yields, 31 ; convokes States-General, 33 ; opposes reform, 50 *et seq.* ; policy of, 59 ; served by Commons, 62 ; intentions towards, 65 ; duplicity of, 71 ; visits Paris, 90 ; plots escape, 91 ; " best of Kings," 106 ; heads counter-revolution, 137 ; refuses sanction to Declaration of Rights of Man, 146 ; flight of, planned, 150 *et seq.* ; feeling towards, 155 ; made prisoner, sanctions Declaration of Rights of Man, 157 ; in Paris, 173 ; takes oath, 178 ; explains property, 198 ; remonstrates with National Assembly, 200 ; thanks Bouillé for massacre, 225 ; flees to Varrenne, 226 *et seq.* ; brought back, 229 *et seq.* ; intentions of, 230–31 ; treachery of, 234, 239 ; refuses to sanction decrees, 235 ; secret safe of, 236, 293 ; tries to re-establish Three Orders, 237 ; calls Girondist Ministry, 240 ; foreign correspondence of, 245 ; plots of, 248–49 ; authority limited of, 256 ; takes refuge in Assembly, 275 ; imprisoned with family in Temple, 276, 280, 283, 284 ; position of, 280 ; intrigues of, 290 ; protected by Girondins, 312 ; suspended, 318 ; negotiations in favour of, 325 ; fate of, 328–30 *et seq.* ; speculations of, 328 ; trial of, 330 *et seq.* ; pitied by people, 330 ; indifference to, of foreign Courts, 331 ; disbanded guards in pay of, 332 ; treason of, 333 ; letter to Emperor of Austria, 334 ; death of, a necessity, 335 ; crime of, 336 ; interrogation of, 337 ; defence of, 338 ; found guilty and executed, 339 ;

Louis XVI.—*continued*
Girondist plot in favour of, 349; effect of execution, 370; in England, 381, 382; beloved in La Vendée, 454
Loustalot, harangues crowd, 69, 71; heads deputation, 152; rouses people, 154; *quoted*, 220
Louvet, "Robespierride" of, 346; in Brittany, 368; stirs up revolt, 446
Lozeau, P., speech of, 422
Luckner, joins Lafayette, 286
Lyons, revolt at, 25; massacre at, 321, 404; a Royalist centre, 377; struggle at, 378; counter-revolution in, 383; reaction in, 458–59; siege of, 460; taken by Republicans, 461, 468; champions socialistic industry, 495; communism at, 496

MABLY, *cited*, 6, 12; socialism of, 484
Mack (Colonel in Austrian Army), promise of Dumouriez to, 388
Maignet, raises army of peasants, 460–61; "punishes severely," 556–57
Mailhe, revolutionary measure of, 280; demands reprieve of King, 339; proposes restoration of communal lands, 418, 421
Maillard, leads women to Versailles, 154; saves Cazotte, 301; and forty-three others, 302; tribunal of, 372
Mainmortes, 129 *et seq.*
Malesherbes, defends King, 337; guillotined, 559
Mallarmé abused by Robespierre, 566
Malouet, leads reaction, 56; plots against people, 154
Manants, 416
Manifesto of Leagued Kings, 295
Manorial Justice, 37
Courts, abolition of, 121
Manuel, report of, 299; tries to stop massacres, 300
Marat, rouses people, 154; protests against martial law, 161; queries people's joy, 178; inspires revolt, 183; order to arrest, 222; persecuted, 234; despair of, 234–35; insight of, 256, 293; denounces traitors, 295; circular by, 303; advises people, 307; list of, 309; despairs of France's salvation, 310; loved by people, 320; against war, 323; protests against Republic's right to kill King, 334; accused, 347; *quoted*, 367; takes up cause of poor, 374–75; policy of, 392 *et seq.*; Girondins order arrest of, 393; people's defence of, 394; character of, 394; acquittal of, 395; writing, *quoted*, 395; opposes Terror, 400; rings tocsin, 401–2; addresses Jacobins, 404; supports forced loan, 411; murder of, 450; disinterestedness and nobility of, 450–51; no terrorist, 452; on sovereignty of people, 472; opposes death penalty for communists, 500; loss to Revolution, 501; arrested in Italy, 516; a freemason, 540
"Marc of Silver," 164, 185
Maréchal Sylvain, communism of, 489, 579; employs Babeuf, 490
Marie-Antoinette (Queen), letter to Count de Mercy, 28; leads Court, 58; understood by people, 61; feasts foreign troops, 88; character of, 89, 335; insulted, 90; hated, 151; fêtes soldiers, 153; disdains King, 155; corresponds with Fersen, 155, 334; in personal danger, 156; takes oath, 178; letter of, 235; pitied by people, 330; negotiations about, 331; plots with Austria, 334; tried, 515; executed, 516
Marmontel, *quoted*, 75
Marseillaise hymn by Rouget de l'Isle, 324

Marseilles resists Revolution, 251; federals from, 272; votes for dethronement, 274; demands Republic, 310
"Marsh" or "Plain," 310; composition of, 311; obeys Robespierrists, 547
Martial Law, 160, 209, 221, 257
Martin, Henri, on freemasons, 540
Mascarats, revolt of, 24
Masonic lodges, 540
Massacres, at Lyons, 321, 404, 514; in Champ-de-Mars (July 17, 1791), 179, 257; September, 297 *et seq.*; numbers slain in, 303; of 1848 and 1871, 368; at Machecoul, 387
Mathieu, supports forced loan, 411
Maubeuge, Austrians raise siege of, 468
Maury, Abbé, almost slain, 55
"Maximum," 36, 207, 208, 241, 361, 372; Chaumette's law of, 375–76; fixed by Convention, 439; law of, 497–98; abolished, 570
Mayence occupied by *sans-culottes*, 326
"Means of Subsistence," 493 *et seq.*; problem of, 497
Exchange, 493 *et seq.*
Méhée fils (Fehlemési), *quoted*, 297, 300
Mellié, Ernest, *quoted* and *cited*, 183, 314, 315, 439, 513, 529, 568
Mercure de France, *quoted*, 70, 152, 242
Mercy, Count de, plots, 153; reveals English policy, 381; severity of, 335
Metric system, importance of, 518–19
Michelet, v.; excellent description by, 274; *quoted*, 282, 303, 306; criticises Jacobins, 316–17; criticises Gironde, 319; errors of, 338; on King's mendacity, 337; on communist movement, 373; on Dumouriez, 381–82; on hunting Republicans, 386; *quoted*, 437, 451, 452; on Vendean War, 457–58; *cited*, 488; defends Cordeliers, 504;
Michelet—*continued*
on middle-class leadership, 508; on *Fête* of Liberty and Reason, 524; on death of Revolution, 532; on Jacobins and Girondins, 533; on executions, 546; on Sections, 569; on peasants during Revolution, 574
Michonis, plans Queen's escape, 516
Middle classes, Third Estate or *bourgeoisie*, idea of, 5 *et seq.*; practical programme of, 10; schemes of, 30 *et seq.*; moderation of, 44; in revolution, 47; fear of masses, 58, 75, 81, 106, 158; form militia, 76; betray people, 77; work of, 96; arming of, 128; brutality of, 128; Liberalism of, 144; disband people, 158 *et seq.*; organise government, 162, 163; great fortunes of, 169; speculations of, 171; current of, 195; position of, 196; take arms, 208; legislation of, 214, 215, 218; reaction of, 222; intrigues of, 227; against Republic, 243; joy of, 287; work with counter-revolution, 291; intention of, 356; terror of, 370; hatred of people, 397; power of, 401; plots of, 488
Mignet, *quoted*, 91–92, 479, 571
Militia, armed (1789), 27, 40, 76
Mi-lods, 203
"Ministère sans-culotte," 240
"Ministers for Paris," 76
Mir, Russian, comparison with, 416; land under, 494
Mirabeau, speech of, 55, 88; member of Breton Club, 60; deserts people, 62; petitions King, 66; as Constitutionalist, 151; bought, 161, 162, 175; treachery of, 332; a freemason, 540
Moderates wish municipalities suppressed, 475
"Moderation," 310
Moelle, won over by Royalists, 516
Moleville, Bertrand de, 26, 28; opposes constitution, 240; tried and acquitted, 302
Mombelles, Mme., letter to, 135

Momoro, pamphlet on "maximum," 44; organises *fête*, 524; speaks for sections, 529; crime of, 545; arrested, 545
Monarchy, revival of, 222
Monastic Orders suppressed, 170
Montage, 202
Monge, Gironde minister, 318
Moniteur, Royalist plans in, 295; approved September massacres, 305; advocates peasant proprietorship, 433
Monopolists, rise of, 30; buy up wheat, 63; killed, 208
Monopoly, laws against, 499
Mons, defeat at, 298
"Montagnards," division of, 362; prepare to equalise wealth, 411; break up large estates, 432; give acre to proletarians, 434–35; oppose "maximum," 441; carry on Revolution, 471; ideas of, 474; policy of, 480; *régime* of, 483; *volte face* of, 500; mistake of, 501
Montesquieu, *cited*, 6, 191
Montesquiou, commands army in south, 326
Montmorin (Keeper of Civil List), compromising papers of, 288; acquitted, 295; "blood" of, 301
"Moral Insurrection," 401
Mortimer-Ternaux, *cited*, 314, 365
Mortmain abolished, 20
Mounier, agent of *émigrés*, 296
"Mountain," The, influenced by Commune, 273; conspires, 293; composition of, 310–11; power of, 316; success of attack on, 322; tries to introduce land reform in Belgium, 327; resolved on King's condemnation, 336; *versus* Gironde, 340 *et seq.*; programme of, 345; attacked by Gironde, 346; reproaches Gironde, 358; allays panic, 384; collaborates with Commune, 388; appeals to people, 392; policy of, 508
Municipal function, 479
institutions, 98 *et seq.*
law of December 1789, 471
organisation, 158, 189
Municipalisation of trade, 497
Municipalities, centres of Revolution, 166; cantonal, creation of, 472–73
Municipality elected, 417
"Muscadins," 510, 546, 549
Mutual Insurance scheme, 485

NANGIS, people refuse taxes at, 70
Nantes, slave trade of, 457; Carrier's *noyades* at, 514
Napoleon I., *vide* Bonaparte
Napoleon III., *coup d'état* of, 336
Narbonne supports Constitution, 240
Nation, French, unification of (1790), 177
National Assembly, composition of, 13; tardiness of, 43; Third Estate declares itself to be, 56; congratulations and militant addresses to, 61; loyal to King, 62; true character of, 63; fears people, 63; servility of, 64, 66; inactivity of, 65; marked members of, 65; impotence of, 67 *et seq.*; alarms in, 70, 89; struggle of, 101 *et seq.*; members of, threatened, 149; suppresses soldiers' agitation, 223–25; soldiers send delegates to, 224; Chaumette's estimate of, 246
Debt, amount of, 33; consolidation of, 53
Estates, 432 *et seq.*
Guard organised, 76; *vide* Guards
Lands, speculations in, 511; *vide* Lands
Life, changes in, 576
Representation, 20; defect of, 51; sacredness of, 400
Unity, scheme of Anarchists for, 350
Necker, Minister, 20; policy of, 21; dismissed, 21; recalled, 28, 34; as financier, 31 *et seq.*; his "Compte rendu," 32; three hours' speech of, to States-General, 51 *et seq.*;

Necker—*continued*
compromise of, 54; insight of, 55; dismissed again, 57, 65; tries to avert famine, 62–63; insulted by Court, 71; bust carried in procession, 72; proposes to diminish seigniorial prerogative, 197–98; orders Marat's arrest, 222
Neerwinden, defeat at, 346, 387
Newspapers, scarcity of, 102
Nineteenth Century, *cited*, 40; *quoted*, 199
Nivière-Chol leads middle-class revolt in Lyons, 377
Noailles, Viscount de, speaks against feudalism, 119 *et seq.*
Nobility, luxury of, 17; property rights of, 122 *et seq.*
Noirmoutiers, prisoners shot at, 515
"Noirs," gathering of the, 290
Notables, Assembly of, 39; *vide* Assembly
Noyades of Nantes, 457, 458, 514
Nys, Ernest, thanks to, vii., monograph of, on freemasons, *quoted*, 540–41

October 5 and 6 (1789), Paris Insurrection, 146 *et seq.*
Old age pensions, 506
"Ombre de Marat, L'," 504
Orange, Commission at, 557–58
Order, triumph of, 549
Ordinance of 1670, 20
Orléans, Duke of, plot against, 64, 65; popularity of, 69; bust carried in procession, 72; dreams of, 150; disgrace of, 161; intrigues of, 227–28; expects crown, 231; candidate for throne, 331; Grand Master of freemasons, 540
Owen, Robert, teaching of, 498

Pache (Mayor of Paris), succeeds Chambon, 322, 364; demands revolutionary tribunal, 385; opposed to Terror, 400; deprived of office, 545; spared, 546; character of, 547
Paine, Thomas, sincerity of, 243; on Constitution Committee, 470
Palais Royal, revolutionary focus, 49, 61, 70, 72; deputation from, 152
Pamphlets, revolutionary, 24, 46, 53; *vide* British Museum
Pan, Mallet du, *quoted*, 223, 242
Panis, signs appeal of Commune, 301
Pannetier, leads attack on Bastille, 82, 83
Paper-currency (*vide Assignats*); under Directory, 571
Paris, hunger riots in, 23, 28, 46 (*vide* Riots); clerks and populace of, 29; centre of Revolution, 67; thieves hanged in, 77; ammunition kept in, 77; misery in, 92; scarcity in, 149; feared, 151; insurrection breaks out in, 154; districts of, 171; reaction in, 200; sections of, 215; municipality demands Republic, 232, 310; reaction in, 233, 509; full of conspiracies, 245; rises August 9 and 10, 275; laments her dead, 282; to be burned, 290; searched for arms, 294; purified, 303; revolutionary energy of, 324; threatens Convention, 333; panic in, 383, 384; rising needed in, 383; fury of, 388, 403, 404; hated by farmers, 499; executions in, 514; inactive, 545; "purification" of, 555
Parlement of Paris banished to Troyes, 26; recalled, 29
of Rennes, 26
Parlements (Courts of Justice), closing of, 24, 25 *et seq.*; disturbances about, 39; suspension of, 163; support reaction, 166
Parliament, English, friends of French Republic in, 556
Prussian, uselessness of, 45
Passeret (King's secretary) hooted, 56
Patin, J. Baptiste, resigns, 523
"Patriote française," *cited*, 305
347

Patriots, beaten at Arles, 251; mutilated by Uhlans, 251; form league of defence, 252
Patrou, resigns, 523
Payan, exasperates workers, 565
Peasant Risings (*vide Jacqueries*], 2, 28, 29, 40, 44, 46, 52, 112 *et seq.*, 159, 177, 198, 207, 208
Peasants, misery of, 17; oppose export of grain, 26; not represented in Assembly, 51; slaughter of, 127; illegal executions of, 128; disappointment of, 132 *et seq.*; refuse to pay taxes, 149, 150; Draconian laws for, 199, 208, 209; hardships of, 202; difficulties of, 204; repression of, 211; courage of, 228; deprived of political rights, 234; refuse to pay feudal dues, 279; oppose foreign invasion, 324; condition of (in 1793], 393; regain communal lands, 413; oppose division of lands, 415; rights of disputed, 417; admitted, 418; anger of, 418–19; advantages gained by, 431; industry of, 437; discontented in La Vendée, 454; energy of (1792), 574
Pecqueur, collectivism of, 11–12, 363
Pélarin Library, fragment found of, 409
Peltier, lies of, 304
People, first; conflict with rich, 48; feared, 55; in revolt, 56, 61, 63–64; take arms, 68; slaughtered, 85; character of, 89; change in, 179; vigilance of, 196; needs of, 218; intelligence of, 256; despair of, 287; victory of, 287–88; belied, 293; power of, 312, 357; devotion of, 313; offer hostages to Convention, 404; sovereignty of, 472; social will of, 534
"Père Duchesne," edited by Chaumette, 322
"Pères de l'Oratoire," 460
Permanent Committee, 76, 81, 84, 182, 190–91
Personal servitude suppressed, 20
Rights over peasants, 37
Pétion (Mayor of Paris), member of Breton Club, 61; proposes loan, 63; tries to save Princess de Lamballe, 299; during September massacres, 305; imprisoned, 314; resigns, 322; accused, 338; "Letter to Parisians" by, 378; stirs up revolt, 446; on Council of Commune, 470
"Petitions of Eight Thousand and Twenty Thousand," 309
Pflieger, letters of, 527
Phélippeaux, a Dantonist, 535; attacks Hébertist generals, 536; arrested, 547
Philosophers, influence of, 1, 2
Philosophy, scientific, 9
Picard, Abbé, escape of, 297
Pichegrue, attacks invaders, 469
Piedmontese, enter France, 460
Pikemen, save prisoners, 302
Pikes, forging of, 73, 77
Pillaging, rareness of, 75
Pitt, policy of, 48; money of 252; overthrow hoped for 467; against "impious nation," 556
"Plain" or "Marsh," right wing of Convention, 315
"Pleas," 203
"Plenary Court," 25
Polignac, Duchess de, effigy burned 29; people's opinion of, 61 letter of, 65; hatred for, 70 intrigues of, 86, 88; insulted 90; exiled, 91
Politics, study of, 6
Poor, relief of, 185, 193–94; neglected by Convention, 505
Pope, aids counter-revolution, 384
Popular Societies, 252, 257, 365, 400, 448, 480
Pougatchoff, leads Russian peasants (1773), 2
Power, demoralisation of, 478
Précy, commandant at Lyons, 460
Press, attitude of, towards September massacres, 305
Priests, intrigues of, 238; decrees against, 239, 280; join counter-

Priests—*continued*
revolution, 250; protected by "patriots," 252; massacre of, 297; incite Vendéan rising, 336; enemies of Jacobins, 405; refuse oath to Constitution, 520; lay down prerogatives, 522–23
Primogeniture, abolished, 434–35
Princes, intrigues of, 58
Prisons, conspiracies in, 56, 298; *vide* Massacres, September
Privat (*curé*) resigns, 523
Profiteurs, 543
Proletarians, part played by, 391, 484
Property, protection of, 74; sacredness of, 122 *et seq.*, 143, 198, 342, 343, 368; rights of, 136; substituted for Fraternity by Girondins, 343; movement against, 373; guaranteed, 401; superfluous, 405; defended, 500; of "patriots" respected, 544
Proudhon, *quoted*, 189; ideas of, 373; his Bank of People, 487; teaching of, 498
Proust, Antonin, explains Vendéan revolt, 455
Provence, large towns in, abolish flour tax, 41
Count de, "Monsieur," intrigues of, 161, 162; protests against Constitution, 238; in exile, 248
Provinces, importance of, 247
Provincial histories, importance of, 40
Assemblies, discussions in, 32
Prudhomme, plain speaking of, 235; "Révolutions de Paris," paper of, *cited*, 305
Prussia, King of, advises concessions, 249
Public force, basis of, 144
Puisage, Count J. de, countersigns false *assignats*, 444

"Quatre cris d'un patriote," 485
Quinet, Edgar, *quoted*, 35
Quint, 203

Ramel, abused by Robespierre, 566
Rauchon, priest, resigns, 523
Reaction, revival of, 153; rampant, 158 *et seq.*; organised, 213; in Paris, 233, 235; progress of, 255; forces of, 408
Reason, Cult of, 521–25
Rebecqui (Girondin) stirs up Marseilles, 459; drowns himself, 460
Redemption, 39; "*rachat au denier* 30," 119, 122; difficulties of, 199; of feudal dues, 277–78
"Red Terror," 311, 436
Referendum, 473
Reforms, under Turgot, 19
Regnal, *cited*, 40
Relevoisons, 203
Reliefs, 203
Religion democratised, 7
Religious hatred, 249
Renault, Cecile, strange affair of, 558–59
Rennes, *parlement* of, 26; magistrates disqualified at, 167
Renunciation, legend of, 134 *et seq.*
Republic, enemies of, 170; people's service to, 179; France impelled towards, 310; of middle classes, 343; Breton peasants against, 419; strengthened, 538
Republican soldiers, torture of, 457
Republicans, massacre of, 386; persecution of, 571
Requint, 203
Reubiés, General, Secretary of Lyons Committee of Public Welfare, 460
Reuss, Rodolphe, *cited*, 99
"Réveillon Affair," 47 *et seq.*
"Révolte, La," *cited*, 40, 199
Revolution, definition of, 2, 3; need of enthusiasm in, 124; meaning of, 242; made by minorities, 363; alternatives offered to, 369; makes men think, 524; evils of, 563; benefits of, 573 *et seq.*
Great French, history of, incomplete, v.; heroes of, 35 map of, 111; great dates of

Revolution, Great French—*continued*
118, 391; good humour of, 178; true picture of, 210–11; logical sequence of, 311; aims of, 323; not supported in Belgium, 327; chief work of, 392; complete on land question, 423; economic results of, 431; legacies of, 436, 577; expenses of, 440; devotion to, 448; social problem in, 488–89; interests roused by, 501; work of people, 505; middle classes enriched by, 511, 537; source of modern social ideas, 581; various phases of, *vide* Chapter index
American, influence of, 21
English, contrasted, 3; 96 *et seq.*, 581; part played by people in, 4; lesson of, 6
popular power of, 145
Russian, 17
in Savoy, 326
Revolutions of 1848 and 1870, 336
"Revolutions de Paris," 220, 242, 305
Revolutionists, type of (1871), 534
Rigby, Dr., letter of, 74
Right of poor, 376
of property, limitation of, 487
"Right to Work," 194, 343
"Rights of Man," *vide* Declaration; veiled in black, 544
Riots, hunger, 19 *et seq.*; at Dijon, Auxerre, Amiens, Lille, Pontoise, Passy, St.-Germain, 23; at Poitiers, Vizille, Cevennes, Vivarais, Gévaudan, 24; at Lyons, 25; in Paris, 26, 27, 29; spread of, 41 *et seq.*; bloodless character of, 42; influence elections, 42; at Villejuif, 48
Rising, of May 31-June 2 (1793), 361 *et seq.*, 391, 399
Risings, in Besançon, Provence, Languedoc, Béarn, Flanders, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, 27 *et seq.*; in country districts, 35 *et seq.*; in Strasbourg, &c., 103 *et seq.*
Agrarian, 97
Risings—*continued*
character of, 111 *et seq.*; spread of, 116
Peasant, 109 *et seq.*
popular influence of, 94–96
of Royalists, unsuccessful, 253; in La Vendée, 384; in Provence and Lyons, effects of, 458
Urban, 95
Robert, *quoted*, 242; persecuted, 234
Robespierre, silence of, 35; member of Breton Club, 61; protests against martial law, 161; insight of, 240, 307; opposes Agrarian law and Republic, 243; fears people, 244; inactivity of, 273; denounces Carra, 307; Vice-president of Convention, 309; supported by "Marsh" or "Plain," 311; "golden mean of the Mountain," 317; against war, 323; opinion on regicide, 334; rival of Brissot, 344; satirises Girondins, 344; moderation of, 345; speech, on April 10, 360; development of, 362; belief in "foreign money," 375; attacks "Gironde," 376; policy of, 392; declares for insurrection, 398; opposes "Terror," 400; demands suppression of "Twelve" and trial of "Twenty-Two," 403; advocates restoration of communal lands, 417; socialistic speech of, 474; reads Declaration of Rights, 500; attacks Roux and Varlet, 503; "La Fraternité's" observations on, 507; daring of, 511; opposes prosecution of obscure Girondins, 514; represents Jacobins, 514; religious speech of, 525; opposes Cult of Reason, 525–26; accuses sections of foreign intrigues, 529; on public welfare, 529; foresees end of Republic, 533; group of, 535; reports on Revolutionary Government, 538; popularity of, 539; a freemason, 540;

Robespierre—*continued*
attacks commissioners, 542; position and power of, 550 *et seq.*; incorruptibility of, 551; *bourgeoisie's* respect for, 552; letter from his brother, 553; drafts accusation of F. d'Eglantine, 547, 552; suspicions of, 553; notes on "Terrorism" of, 554; enemies of, 562; cabal against, 565 *et seq.*; attacks "Left," 566; arrest of, 567; stupor of, 568; identification and execution of, 569
Rochambeau, Count de, refuses arms to middle classes, 103
Roche-Jacquelein, La, Vendean leader, 456
Mme. de, letter *quoted*, 456
Rochefoucauld, supports Court, 245
Roland, silence of, 35; politics of, 197; Minister for Interior, 240; dismissed, 244; house of, searched, 295, 307; address of, 296; justifies massacres, 304, 321; again Minister, 318; resigns after execution of King, 319; influence of, 319; examines King's secret papers, 332; leader of "Gironde," 341; absurd plan of, 349; arrest of, ordered, 403; suicide of, 517
Mme., influence of, 240; guillotined, 517
Rome helps revolt in La Vendée, 455
Romme, execution of, 570
Ronsin, organises "revolutionary army," 512; arrested, 545
Rosière, Thuriot de la, District delegate, 82, 83, 84
Rouen, insurrection at, 24
(priest) resigns, 523
Rouërie, Marquis de, plots in Brittany, 320, 326; heads conspiracy, 446
Rousseau, J. J., influence of, 6, 12; *cited*, 191; socialism of, 484
Roux, Jacques, ex-priest and popular leader, 372; inspires people, 385; advises forced loan, 411; communism
Roux, Jacques—*continued*
of, 489; insight of, 498–99; denounces stock-jobbing, 502–3; struck off Cordeliers' list, 503; false charge against, 504; trial and suicide of, 504–5
Xavier, *quoted*, 114
"Royal dictature," 209
Royal family, negotiations concerning, 331
Session, 55, 59
Royalists, plot of, 290; letters to agents, 444; where successful, 453; rejoicings of, 547; fury of, 559
Royalty, as shield of property, 66; tools of, 175; downfall of, 229–30, 285; abolished *de facto*, 276
Russia, peasants in, 17, 18; comparison with, 165, 212, 213, 214, 356, 436, 475, 574; joint responsibility in, 279; absolutism dying in, 579; future of, 581

Sagesse, Sœurs de la, Royalist emissaries, 336
Sagnac, M., *quoted*, 134, 199, 204, 205, 206, 207, 426, 435
Saint-Amaranthe, guillotined, 559
Saint-André, Jeanbon, letters of, 447; warning of, 482; demands bread and "Terror," 483; makes terms with communists, 500; socialism of, 506–7; opposes sections, 529–30
"Saint Bartholomew of property," 119, 126, 198
Saint-Etienne, Rabaud de, 46; communism of, 485; executed, 517
Saint-Georges, Commandant, house of, burned, 107
Saint-Huruge, Marquis of, proposes march on Versailles, 152
Saint-Just, theory of, about King, 334; proves King's treachery, 338; opposes petition against stock-jobbing, 374; with army, 439; pleads for "destitute patriots," 505; demands Revolutionary Government,

Saint-Just—*continued*
514; a Robespierrist, 535; adopts Terrorism, 543–44; mouthpiece of Robespierre, 552; shouted down, 567; arrested and executed, 569
Saint-Lazare, monastery attacked, 73, 75
Saint-Malo, attempt to surrender, to English, 447
Saint-Méard, J. de, *cited*, 299; *quoted*, 303
Saint-Simon, followers of, 488
Salle, Marquis de la, commands National Guard, 76
Salmour, Count de, *quoted*, 74, 80
Salpêtrière (prison), massacre at, 303
Samichon, E., *quoted*, 20
Sans-culottes, volunteer for war, 280; outnumbered in sections, 371; "happiness and comfort" for, 405; patriotism of, 463–64; enfranchisement of Europe by, 578
Santerre, ordered to stop massacres, 300; at war, 305
Sardinia, invades France, 253, 383
Sartino (Knight of Poignard), guillotined, 560
Sauce, grocer, King in shop of, 228–29
Schwendt, supports Revolution, 105
"Scientific socialism," 363
Séchelles (of Hérault), municipal integrity of, 475–76
Second Empire, comparison with, 215
Secret police, revival of, 531
Sections (of Paris), 180 *et seq.*; creation of, 188; under new law, 189 *et seq.*; General Assembly of, position of, 190; centres of Revolution, 193; new function of, 312–13; federation of, 312; demand dethronement, 314; attacked by Gironde, 322; prepare rising, 399–400; pledged to defend property, 401; conquer rights, 472; overrun with Royalists, 510; attacked by Convention, 513; suppression of, 528 *et seq.*; perform police duties, 530; divisions among, 568
Seigniorial exactions, 18
justice in cities, 38
Seligman, E., *cited*, 20
Sens, Archbishop of Minister, 28 (*vide* Brienne)
September Days, horror of, 384 (*vide* Massacres)
Serfdom, abolished on King's estates, 36; essence of, 129 *et seq.*; general abolition of, 577–79
Sergent, signs appeal to Commune, 301
Servan, War Minister, 240, 244, 305, 318
Sheridan, R. B., denounces forging of *assignats*, 444
Sieyès, silence of, 35; famous pamphlet of (*Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?*), 43, 46; motion of, 53; member of Breton Club, 61; proposals of, 143, 163; defends free trade, 373; on special committee, 470; defends equality, 484; adopts new cult, 523
Simmoneau (Mayor of Etampes) killed, 242
Simon (cobbler), Dauphin put in charge of, 516
Simond, *quoted*, 528, 529
"Sixteen Commissioners," 192, 193
Smith, Adam, influence of, 8
Social demands, 370 *et seq.*
distinctions, danger of, 143; abolished, 144
"Socialisation of Exchange and Produce," 497
"Socialism," origin of, 11–12, 13, 459; modern, 580
Societies, Fraternal, 222, 365
Popular, 222, 448, 528
Society of the Indigent, 252
Soète, 203
Soldiers, distrusted, 81; as citizens, 223; meeting of, 224; fraternise with peasants, 229
Sombreuil, commands Invalides, 80; saved, 301; legend about daughter, 302; guillotined, 559
Somnier, *cited*, 40; *quoted*, 114
Soubrancy, executed, 570

Souhait, Julian, demands maintenance of communal property, 422; opposes portioning land, 494
Soul, Albert, *cited*, 382
Spaniards, attack South, 253; 8000 in Toulon, 460; 23,000 in France, 465
Speculations, in Church property, 255; in land, 279, 404; in wheat, 329; in necessities, 372; in *assignats*, 373
Speculators, protected, 63
Spires, taken by Republican army, 326
Stamp duty, 25
State, sphere of action of, 196
States, modern, structure of, 5 *et seq.*; centralisation of, 7
States-General, 29, 30, 33–34, 39, 43, 48; Third Estate in, 39; of Brittany, 42; rely on Paris, 49; opening of, 50 *et seq.*
"Statesmen," 311, 338, 570
Statute labour abolished, 19, 37
Stedinck, Baron de, letter to, 466
Stock Exchange closed, 438
Stock-jobbers, pernicious influence of, 584
Stock-jobbing, essence of, 372; effect of, 374; prohibited, 439, 487
Stourm, Réné, *cited*, 410–11
Strasbourg, *cahier* of, 99; rising in, 103 *et seq.*; in danger of invasion, 469
Strobel, *cited*, 40; *quoted*, 113
Students fraternise with people, 27
Suchet, severity of, 566
Suffrage restricted, 234
"Surplus value," Lange's explanation of, 496
Swiss, soldiers, refuse to fire, 27; regiment defends Bastille, 82; Guards faithful to King, 274; treachery of, to people, 276; in Paris, 290; massacre of, 298

Taille (entail), 59; (personal tax), 415
Taine, complacency of, 23; superficiality of, 39; *quoted*, 41; exaggeration of, 74; "shocked," 102; disparagement of, 177
Talleyrand (Bishop of Autun), proposition of, 169; supports Court, 245
Tallien, report to Assembly, 300; report of, 300, 302; attacked by Robespierre, 567
"Tarpeian Rock," 346, 347, 359; for Girondins, 372
Tasque, 203
Tax, on bread and meat, 36
Taxation, progressive, 396, 485
Taxes, limitation of, 37 (*note*), 53
Taxpayers, joint liability of, 20
Taylor, sees false *assignats* made, 444
Tennis Court, oath in, 54 *et seq.*
Terrage, 203
Terriers (land registers), 199
"Territorial subvention," 25
"Terror," use made of, 117; need of, 253–54; counter-revolutionary, 306; welcomed, 483; begun, 517, 555 *et seq.*; Law of (22nd Prairial) 557; maintenance of, 564
Terrorism, used politically, 535
Theatres, political plays in, 510
Théot, Catherine, mad mystic, 562
Thermidor, reaction of 9th, 430; reaction triumphs, 562
Thibaudeau, *quoted*, 367
Thiers, famine at, 40
Thiers, M., *quoted*, 444
Third Estate, opportunity of, 7–8; composition of, 34; issues *cahiers*, 35; and middle classes, 38; and poorer classes, 39; determination of, 44; position of, 52, 115; demand union, 53; Constitution, 54 *et seq.*; resistance of, 54 *et seq.*; King opposed to, 59; sagacity of, 214; reaction of, 243
Third Republic, progress to, 576
Thouret, silence of, 35; guillotined, 559
Three Estates, union of, 43, 62; separation of, 54
Thuriot, supports forced loan, 411
Tinténiac, Chevalier de, countersigns false *assignats*, 444
Tithes "solites and insolites," 37 (*note*); destruction of deeds, 114; abolition of, 119 *et seq.*; iniquity of, 132

Tocqueville, veracity of, 18
Toll-gates, removed, 19; burned, 71
Tolls, suppressed, 203
Torture, abolished, 20
Toulon, surrendered to English, 447; surrender of, 453, 460; retaken from English, 468, 538
Tour de la Glacière, tragedy of, 321
Touzel, Mme., saved by Commune, 299; *cited*, 306
Town Council of Paris, 76
Treizains, 203
Triage, 414, 421
Tribunal, Revolutionary, 301, 372; demanded, 385; rapidity of, 538; abolished, 570
Tridon, *cited*, 534
Triumvirate, of Duport, Lameth and Barnave, 162
of Danton, Marat, and Robespierre, 319, 321, 322; attacked by Gironde, 320; effect of attacks, 320; threatened by Girondins, 359
Tronchet, defends King, 337
Troops, refuse to fire, 56
Tuileries, invasion of, 210; taking of, 278; numbers slain in, 282
Türckheim, resigns, 106
Turgot, creator of political economy, 8; as economist, 19, 23; representative government, 20; foresight of, 21; explains riots, 25; reforms rejected, 31; reforms of, 38; as Minister, 52; on equality, 484
Turkey, representative Government in, 579

"United defenders" appeal to Convention, 373
United States, recognised by France, 22

Vadier, attacked by Right, 565, 567
Valazé, suicide of, 517
Vallet, Gabrielle, recognises King, 228
Valmy, battle of, 325
Varenne, Maton de la, *cited*, 303, 306
Varennes, flight to, 226 *et seq.*; threatened, 335
Varlet, arrest of, 347; leader of people, 372; inspires people, 385; arrested, 397; communism of, 489; pamphlet of, 490; insight of, 498–99; struck off Cordeliers, 503; condemns payment of members, 513
Vaucluse, Royalist centre, 556
Vendean leaders, defeat of, 456; brutalities of, 457
Vendée, against Revolution, 176; insurrection in, 247; rising in, 328, 334, 383; massacre of Republicans in, 386; reaction in, 430; rising in, 453 *et seq.*; result of suppression in, 458; crushed at Savenay, 538
Venterolles, 203
Verdun, siege of, 296; surrender of, 324
Vergniaud, 35; demands suspension of King, 276; leader in "Gironde," 341; tries to pacify people, 402; under home-arrest, 445; on Convention Committee, 470
Vernon, insurrection crushed at, 446
Versailles, King and Ministers insulted at, 23; plots at, 43; intrigues in, 64; *fête* at, 88 *et seq.*; march on, planned, 152; march on, 154 *et seq.*
Veto, opposition to, 147 *et seq.*; suspensive, 148; royal, 188
Veyreton, resigns, 253
Vic and Vaissete, *quoted*, 28; *cited*, 40
Vidal, as authoritarian, 194; collectivism of, 363; communism of, 488
Vieux Cordelier, 536–38; exults, 547
Village Communes, suppressed, 165
Village, economic life of, 423
Vincennes, donjon transformed, 79
Vincent, won over, 516; advocates guillotine, 544; arrested, 545
Vivarais, adheres to royalty, 253
"Vive la Liberté," cry of, 41

Voltaire, 6 ; idea, 486
Volunteers (*sans-culottes*), 280 ; equipment of, 291, 320 ; enthusiasm of, 323 ; two battalions of, sacrificed, 326 ; for La Vendée, 364 ; evil treatment of, 379 ; civic feast for, 383 ; ragged but victorious, 463–64 ; lands not reserved for, 502
Vote, capitative, granted, 54
Voulland attacked, 565

War, reason for, 24 ; fatal to Revolution, 241 ; opposition to and unreadiness for, 323 ; terrible effects of, 328 ; preparations for, 379 ; onus of, laid on Republic, 382 ; requirements of, 408 ; difficulties of the, 462 *et seq.* ; end of, 564
Watch Committee, circular of, 303 ; attacked by Gironde, 320 ; justifies expenditure, 321
Wattignies, victory of, 468 ; first victory of Republic, 515
Weber, the Austrian, acquitted, 302 ; *cited*, 306
Weishaupt, founder of Illuminates, 540
Westermann, escorts Prussians on retreat, 325
Wheat, prices of, 104
"White Terror" (1794), 272, 276 ; under Bourbons (1814), 306 ; partisans of, 311, 336, 436, 569
Wimpffen, General, Commander in Normandy, 446–47
Wissemburg, abandoned, 469 ; retaken, 538
Women, in revolution, 27 ; club of, suppressed, 504
Workers, under arms, payment of, 403

York, Duke of, candidate for throne, 308 ; besieges Dunkirk, 467 ; abandons siege, 468
Young, Arthur, "Travels in France," *quoted*, 11, 43, 53, 56, 68, 70, 116 ; *cited*, 102

61c
Vol
Vol
Vo
Vo
W
W
W

V. P
V. P
V. P

(Continued from Back of Jacket)

Social Philosophies

51—WHAT IS MUTUALISM? Clarence L. Swartz.

52—WHAT IS COOPERATION? James Peter Warbasse.

53—WHAT IS THE SINGLE TAX? Louis F. Post.

54—WHAT IS SOCIALISM? Jerome W. Hughan.

55—WHAT IS COMMUNIST ANARCHISM? Alexander Berkman.

(In preparation: COMMUNISM vs. CAPITALISM.)

Educational Outlines

161—THE A B C OF ART. John Haldane Blackie.

162—THE A B C OF EVOLUTION. Vance Randolph.

163—THE A B C OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vance Randolph.

164—THE A B C OF PHYSIOLOGY. Vance Randolph.

165—THE A B C OF ASTRONOMY. Jay L. B. Taylor.

166—THE A B C OF GEOLOGY. Aileen Hardy.

167—THE A B C OF BIOLOGY. Vance Randolph.

168—THE A B C OF CHEMISTRY. Newell R. Tripp.

169—THE A B C OF PHYSICS. Jay L. B. Taylor.

170—THE A B C OF PLAYING. W. Lockwood Marsh.

171—FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION. Thomas [illegible] and Hamm.

172—CIVILIZATION IN TRANSITION (1789-1870). Thomas and Hamm.

173—OUR OWN TIMES. Thomas and Hamm.

Great Books Made Easy

141—THE DESCENT OF MAN. Charles Darwin. Summarized by Newell R. Tripp.

142—THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE. Ernst Haeckel. Summarized by Vance Randolph.

143—HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND. Henry Thomas Buckle. Summarized by Clement Wood.

144—HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS. W. E. H. Lecky. Summarized by Clement Wood.

145—HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE. John William Draper. Abridged [illegible]

146—SOCIOLOGY. Lester F. Ward. Summarized by Clement Wood. Introduction by Harry Elmer Barnes.

See Back of Jacket for Other Vanguard Titles

VANGUARD BOOKS

Social Science Classics

1—**RUSKIN'S VIEWS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE.** John Ruskin. Edited with Introduction by J. Fuchs.

2—**WAR—PATRIOTISM—PEACE.** Leo Tolstoi. Edited with Introduction by Scott Nearing.

3—**PROUDHON'S SOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.** P. J. Proudhon. Edited with Introduction by Henry Cohen.

4—**THE ESSENTIALS OF MARX.** Karl Marx. Edited with Introduction by Algernon Lee.

5—**IMPERIALISM—THE STATE AND REVOLUTION.** Lenin.

6—**THE CONQUEST OF BREAD.** Peter Kropotkin.

7—**KROPOTKIN'S REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS.** Peter Kropotkin. Edited with Introduction by Roger N. Baldwin.

8—**LONDON'S ESSAYS OF REVOLT.** Jack London. Edited with Introduction by Leonard Abbott.

9—**SOCIAL ANTICIPATIONS.** H. G. Wells. Edited with Introduction by Harry W. Laidler.

10—**LOVE'S COMING OF AGE.** Edward Carpenter.

11—**THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS.** Thorstein Veblen.

12—**THE STATE.** Franz Oppenheimer.

13—**PROGRESS AND POVERTY.** Henry George (Abridged).

14—**INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.** Benjamin R. Tucker. Edited with Introduction by C. L. S.

15—**NOT GUILTY.** Robert Blatchford.

16—**THE GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION.** Peter Kropotkin. Two volumes. ($1.50)

Current Questions

61—**NEGRO LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES.** Charles H. Wesley.

62—**DON'T TREAD ON ME.** Coleman, Hayes, Wood.

63—**BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM.** A. S. Sachs.

64—**NEW TACTICS IN SOCIAL CONFLICT.** Symposium. Edited by Laidler and Thomas.

65—**THE BRITISH GENERAL STRIKE.** Scott Nearing.

66—**THE PROFITS OF RELIGION.** Upton Sinclair.

67—**WHAT'S SO AND WHAT ISN'T.** John M. Work.

68—**EQUITABLE SOCIETY AND HOW TO CREATE IT.** Warren Edwin Brokaw.

69—**THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES.** Leon Whipple.

70—**THE WAR MYTH IN U. S. HISTORY.** C. H. Hamlin.

71—**IS CONSCIENCE A CRIME?** Norman Thomas.

72—**WHERE IS CIVILIZATION GOING?** Scott Nearing.

73—**COMPANY UNIONS.** Robert W. Dunn. Introduction by Budenz.

74—**THE CHILD AND THE HOME.** B. Liber.

75—**THE SOCIALISM OF OUR TIMES.** Edited by Laidler and Thomas.

76—**THE REMEDY FOR OVERPRODUCTION AND UNEMPLOYMENT.** Hugo Bilgram.

Studies of Soviet Russia

Edited by Professor Jerome Davis of Yale University

91—**HOW THE SOVIETS WORK.** H. N. Brailsford.

92—**VILLAGE LIFE UNDER THE SOVIETS.** Karl Borders.

93—**THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET UNION.** Scott Nearing and Jack Hardy.

94—**SOVIET RUSSIA AND HER NEIGHBORS.** R. [illegible]

95—**RELIGION UNDER THE SOVIETS.** Julius F. [illegible]

96—**THE JEWS AND [illegible] MINORITIES UNDER THE SOVIETS.** Avrahm Yarmolinsky.

97—**HEALTH WORK IN RUSSIA.** Anne G. [illegible]

98—**WOMAN IN SOVIET RUSSIA.** Jessica Smith.

99—**SOVIET TRADE UNIONS.** Robert W. Dunn.

100—**THE NEW SCHOOL IN NEW RUSSIA.** [illegible] Wilson.

101—**LIBERTY UNDER THE SOVIETS.** Roger N. [illegible]

(Continued on Inside Flap)

Examine These At Your Bookseller—Buy From Him.

If ordered by mail enclose five cents on each book for carriage charges.

VANGUARD PRESS, 100 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK

S0-CCU-156